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Abstract 
Efforts to improve methods of freight traffic 
forecasting, to regulate lorry movements in sensitive 
environments and to rationalise deliveries to shops have 
been inhibited by limited knowledge of the way products are 
distributed. This thesis examines the shortcomings of 
previous methods of freight flow analysis, then proposes an 
alternative approach which takes much more account of the 
frameworks of marketing and physical distribution within 
which freight transport is organised. This approach is then 
adopted in an investigation of the factors that influence 
the routeing of food products from factories to shops. This 
investigation is based on data collected in surveys of 
manufacturers, multiple retailers, wholesalers and 
distribution contractors, and drawn from various published 
sources. 
Consideration is given first to the allocation of food 
manufacturers' output between different marketing channels. 
This determines the number and nature of agencies handling 
this output. Of these agencies, the manufacturer and 
multiple retailer generally have a choice of logistical 
channel, i. e. they can either transport goods directly or 
channel them through an intermediate stockholding/ 
transhipment point. The research examines the factors 
influencing the choice of logistical channel and the nature 
of the link between channels controlled by food 
manufacturers and retailers. The spatial structure of these 
logistical channels is also explored, particularly in terms 
of the number and locations of intervening nodes between 
factory and shop. Later sections of the thesis investigate 
the routeing of flows through this framework of distributive 
nodes. A distinction is made between the "strategic" 
routeing of bulk movements between factories and depots, and 
the more localised "tactical" routeing of deliveries to 
shops. 
At each stage, attempts are made to explain variations 
in the spatial organization of firms' d istr ibut ion 
operations and to establish general relationships between 
distribution variables. Data on the present state and 
recent development of the food distribution system are used 
to help to explain trends in general freight statistics. 
The thesis concludes with an assessment of the advantages 
and limitations of this approach and consideration of the 
implications of the research findings for the way in which 
freight traffic is forecast and regulated. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Over the past decade there has been an increased demand 
from various public and private agencies for more detailed 
analysis of the spatial pattern of freight movement. Much 
of this demand has come from organizations interested in 
forecasting the growth of freight traffic. Such forecasts 
are required by central government departments principally 
to plan the provision of new transport infrastructure and to 
estimate future energy needs. Following numerous 
criticisms of its traditional method of freight traffic 
forecasting, the Department of Transport (DTp) devised a new 
forecasting model in 1978 which required more data on the 
logistics of freight movement (DTp, 1980). To firms 
engaged in transporting goods and supplying transport 
equipment, national freight traffic forecasts represent an 
important source of market intelligence. At the local 
scale, planning authorities have been required since 1973 by 
the Heavy Commercial Vehicles (Control and Regulation) Act 
to monitor lorry movements in their areas and, if possible, 
reduce their impact on the environment by means of access 
restrictions and the designation of lorry routes. Concern 
about the environmental effects of freight transport has 
given rise to a series of studies by Government committees 
(Pettit, 1973; Armitage, 1980) and pressure groups 
representing industrial and environmental interests (Sharp, 
1973; Civic Trust, 1970 and 1979; Hamer, 1978). These 
studies have been hampered, however, by a dearth of 
available information on the way in which goods are 
distributed. 
Research conducted over the past 30 years has, 
nevertheless, provided valuable insights into many aspects 
of the freight transport system. Major studies have been 
undertaken on three of the four stages into which flow 
analysis is conventionally divided: 
1. Traffic Generation: Mention has already been made of 
official efforts to devise models that accurately forecast 
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the aggregate volume of freight movement for the country as 
a whole. These have been complemented by attempts to 
correlate the amounts of freight traffic generated by 
smaller areas (Chisholm and O'Sullivan, . 1973) or even 
individual premises (Starkie, 1967; Bartlett and Newton, 
1982) with such variables as employment, industrial output 
and retail sales. 
2. Traffic Distribution: Much of the early research in this 
field sought to generalise patterns of commodity flow and 
use them to explore the spatial structure of national and 
regional economies (Hay, 1979). Later work has tried, with 
limited success, to simulate the pattern of freight movement 
between traffic zones by means of gravity modelling and 
linear programming techniques (Chisholm and O'Sullivan, 
1973; Heyman, 1971; Pitfield, 1978a). It is important to 
note that the "pattern" which these studies have analysed is 
the spatial distribution of individual inter- and 
intra-zonal freight journeys. This is not the pattern 
produced by the through-movement of particular freight 
consignments. 
3. Modal Split: The allocation of freight traffic between 
transport modes, particularly between road and rail, has 
been a very contentious issue and given rise to extensive 
research on the cost structure of the various modes and the 
factors influencing industrialists' choice of mode (e. g. 
Bayliss and Edwards, 1970). 
4. Flow Routeing: By comparison with the previous three 
stages of flow analysis, the routeing of freight 
consignments from point of production to point of sale has 
received little attention. Numerous algorithms have been 
developed to optimise the distribution of bulk (or 
"primary") flows among factories and warehouses, and the 
routeing of delivery vehicles to customers, but there have 
been very few studies of the actual patterns of product 
flow. Unlike the traffic distribution models which employ 
the freight journey as the unit of analysis, the study of 
product routeing attempts to trace the through-movement of 
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consignments from "first origins" to "final destinations". 
In the absence of detailed studies of freight routeing, 
it has been very difficult to establish a relationship 
between general freight transport statistics (compiled 
almost entirely on the basis of individual vehicle journeys) 
and the way in which firms organise the movement of their 
products on the ground. Insufficient attention has been 
given to the frameworks of production, storage and 
distribution within which firms plan their freight 
operations. As a result, traffic generation and 
distribution models have been based upon only a superficial 
understanding of the forces that shape the pattern of 
freight flow. By examining the routeing of these flows one 
is able to explore more directly the causal links between 
transport and the economic activities with which it is 
associated. 
Research on the routeing of freight flows has been 
inhibited by the lack of available data. Official 
statistics on freight flows, collected on the basis of 
individual vehicle journeys, are of little use in this 
context. Analysis of freight routeing must, therefore, 
rely upon original surveys of firms' production and 
distribution systems. Major studies of this type were 
commissioned by the DTp in 1975 and carried out by three 
research teams at UWIST and the Universities of Newcastle 
upon Tyne and Leeds. The purpose of these studies was to: 
" i) establish a data-base relating to the 
flows of a limited number of important commodities in terms 
of their origins, destinations, modes, packaging and 
handling characteristics. 
ii) consider changes affecting the provision 
of transport within the commodities (sic) ; and 
iii) consider changes affecting the generation 
and demand for the chosen commodities. " 
(Pike and Gandham, 1981, p4) 
Data collection was facilitated by the fact that most 
of the commodities studied were the products of monopolistic 
or of igopol istis industries. The teams also confined their 
attention to primary flows (i. e. "flows from the point of 
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production to redistribution depots, ports or manufacturing 
plants") and largely ignored the delivery of goods outwards 
from depots to customers. They did not, therefore, examine 
the complete through-movement of commodities from "first 
origins" to "final destinations". 
Nevertheless, even within this limited field of 
enquiry, they found that "there is a wide range of 
explanatory variables which shape freight flow patterns" and 
concluded that "the number and complexity of these variables 
preclude the modelling of freight flows on anything other 
than a highly aggregate basis or on an individual commodity 
basis" (Pike and Gandham, 1981). Where an "individual 
commodity" is produced by a large number of firms, however, 
rather than by a monopoly or oligopoly, these firms can vary 
enormously in the way in which they organise their 
distribution (Thorpe et al., 1973; Hemingway, 1979). Under 
these circumstances, attempts to model the routeing of 
flows, even of a single commodity, would prove formidable, 
especially if one tried to incorporate into the analysis the 
delivery of products to customers. Such an exercise would 
also be seriously constrained by firms' natural reluctance 
to divulge information about the movement of their stocks. 
Much of the data received by the teams studying commodity 
flows, for instance, were given a "commercial-in-confidence" 
rating and the results of the subsequent analysis made 
available only to the DTp (Pike and Gandham, 1981). It 
would be extremely difficult, therefore, to construct 
operational models to simulate and forecast the complete 
through-routeing of freight flows, even on the basis of 
"individual commodities". 
The formulation of operational models need not, 
however, be the sole objective of routeing studies. 
Another important purpose of these studies is to explain the 
routeing of freight flows and to account for changes in the 
pattern of movement. A detailed explanation of product 
routeing can provide an insight into the workings of the 
freight transport system lacking in the more general 
modelling exercises. It may also identify the processes 
that have contributed to the growth in the total volume of 
freight movement and, thereby, place forecasting on a firmer 
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explanatory basis. An investigation of this type may also 
enable planners to assess more fully the scope for 
rationalizing the pattern of freight movement and the likely 
effects of restrictions on lorry traffic. 
This thesis examines the factors influencing the 
routeing of one class of commodities - dry groceries, from 
the factory at which their processing is completed to their 
point of sale. These factors are analysed within the 
framework set out in figure 1.1. At the most general 
level, consideration is given to the trading links between 
the various types of organization involved in the production 
and distribution of groceries. Firms belonging to the same 
marketing channel can organise the delivery of goods to 
their customers in different ways. Most firms have 
available at least two "logistical channels"1 through which 
they can route their products. These logistical channels. 
differ in the number and location of intervening storage and 
transhipment points and in the distribution of bulk flows 
among these nodes. The spatial structure of the logistical 
channel is analysed in depth as this determines the 
strategic routeing of products to the depot from which 
delivery to shops takes place. Attention is finally 
directed to the routeing of local deliveries from depots to 
retail customers. 
The aim of this study is not only to furnish 
forecasters and planners with a description and explanation 
of the spatial structure of the grocery distribution system. 
It is also intended that this work be of interest to firms 
engaged in the production and distribution of grocery 
products. Much of the previous research in this field, 
particularly that undertaken by operations researchers, has 
tended to be either normative and highly theoretical or to 
be in the form of detailed case studies of individual 
companies. As firms have begun to attach greater 
importance to physical distribution, a demand has risen for 
more general surveys of distribution operations that permit 
inter-company comparisons and promote the dissemination of 
new ideas. Many firms, for example, have recently begun to 
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Figure, 1.1: Analytical Framework. 
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participate in an ongoing survey of distribution costs 
(McKibbin, 1982a) . The few general, positive studies of 
distribution systems so far conducted have tended to neglect 
the spatial dimension. The spatial structure of a 
distribution system is, nevertheless, a major determinant of 
its efficiency and effectiveness in meeting marketing 
requirements. For example, a survey of firms that have 
recently raised the efficiency of their distribution 
systems, revealed that 39% of them did so partly by the 
"geographic relocation of depots" (Kearney, 1980). By 
analysing, at a much more general level than previous 
research, the geography of manufacturers', wholesalers' and 
retailers' distribution systems, this study may assist firms 
in the formulation of their future plans for distribution. 
Note: 
1. Definitions of technical terms can be found in the 
glossary. 
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Chapter 2 
Previous Studies of Freight Distribution. 
To date, geographical studies of freight flows have 
failed to satisfy the demands of transport planners and 
policy makers working at the local, regional and national 
scales for accurate and reliable forecasts. This is 
largely because their limited data base, high level of 
generalization and heavy dependence on theoretical models 
that have consistently yielded disappointing results. The 
inadequacy of these studies lies in their failure to produce 
authentic spatial models of freight flow and in their 
neglect of the way in which the distribution of goods is 
organised. In their quest for simplified models, planners 
have lacked much of the detailed information that would be 
necessary for a deeper understanding of freight 
distribution. 
This chapter has two main aims: to consider the demands 
for a greater knowledge and more thorough explanation of the 
pattern of freight flow, and to examine the deficiencies of 
previous studies on this subject. This will set the scene 
for the proposal, put forward in chapter 3, of an 
alternative approach to the study of freight movement. 
The Demand for Information about the Pattern of Freight 
Flow. 
In the 1970s, planners working at various spatial 
scales began to take a greater interest in freight 
transport. Their interests can be examined under three 
general headings: 
(a) Forecasting 
(b) Environmental Concern 
(c) Rationalising the pattern of freight 
movement 
(a) Forecasting: Freight forecasts are needed to indicate 
future demand for infrastructural capacity in, the transport 
system, energy and vehicles. They are also used to 
21 
estimate the future level of environmental costs arising 
from freight transport. In the case of energy and vehicle 
usage, national aggregate forecasts can suffice. The 
planning of transport infrastucture and the operations of 
transport undertakings requires forecasts disaggregated by 
product and route. 
Freight forecasting has been undertaken at two levels: 
1. At the national or "macro" level, the Department of 
Transport provides forecasts of how freight volumes may be 
expected to grow in the country as a whole. These 
forecasts are not disaggregated either spatially or by 
commodity type. Attempts have been made to develop 
macro-level spatial models of freight flow, but the models 
so far produced have not been able to simulate past patterns 
of flow with sufficient accuracy to warrant their use as 
forecasting tools. 
2. At the local level, many planning authorities have 
produced forecasts of future volumes of commercial vehicle 
traffic. These forecasts have invariably been 
disaggregated spatially, either predicting flows on 
individual links on the road network or interzonal flows 
(Barber, 1971). It has been common practice to use the 
official macro-level forecast as the growth factor in local 
freight traffic models, despite the fact that freight 
traffic volumes are unlikely to grow uniformly throughout 
the country. Some areas, such as West Yorkshire, Greater 
London and Berkshire, have derived their own growth factors 
tailored to local forecasts of population, employment etc. 
(Eastman, 1980) . 
Up to the late 1970s, macro-level freight forecasting 
was based on the close correlation between tonne-kilometres 
moved and GDP (fig 2.1). Faith in the stability of this 
relationship was reinforced by evidence drawn from many many 
other countries (Tanner, 1974). As set out in Tanner 
(1974), the method of forecasting involved simply 
extrapolating the linear relationship between GDP and 
tonne-kilometres. On this basis, Treasury estimates of 
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future levels of GDP could be translated into traffic 
forecasts. (To convert the forecast volume of freight 
movement measured in tonne-kms into a traffic volume 
measures in vehicle kilometres, it was necessary also to 
extrapolate past trends in vehicle carrying capacity, load 
factors and average distance travelled per vehicle per 
annum. ) Adams (1974) seriously questioned the 
credibility of this extrapolatory forecasting, particularly 
as "the lorry traffic forecast has no upper limit" (p553). 
Tanner (1974) was fully aware of the weaknesses of this 
method: 
"... the uncertainties in various steps of this forecasting 
process are so great that the final result can be little 
better than guesses (sic). The amount of road traffic and 
the kind of vehicles in which it will travel are extremely 
subject to external factors such as the quality of the road 
system, the various legal and fiscal controls that may be 
applied and the relationship between the growth of freight 
and growth of GDP. The forecasts that are reached are, 
therefore, not regarded as reliable indicators of what will 
actually happen but as just one attempt to quantify this. " 
Doubts about the continuing stabil ity of the 
relationship between GDP and tonne-kms were well founded 
because from 1974 onwards this relationship began to depart 
from the straight linear trend it had followed for over a 
decade (fig 2.1). 
In 1973, two government statisticians, Brown and 
Maultby expressed dissatisfaction with the method of freight 
forecasting later outlined in Tanner (1974). They claimed 
that: 
"it is clear now that a "broad brush" method of 
forecasting transport demand which previously had the 
advantage of simplicity can no longer be used without 
awkward and unreliable assumptions about the way the 
relationship between freight demand and economic activity is 
moving. " (p25) 
This method was unreliable they believed "because it could 
not take into account the different rates of growth of individual 
industries and the changing structure of the economy. Another 
shortcoming of the method was that it failed to provide forecasts 
in any commodity detail" (p25). 
Brown and Maultby went on to devise an alternative method of 
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forecasting that disaggregated freight by commodity type. 
Having identified seven general commodity classes which together 
accounted for 85-90% of inland freight tonnage, they found that 
over the period 1963-1973 the activity level in each of the 
corresponding industrial sectors (measured by "output, 
consumption etc") correlated highly with the tonnage of freight 
they generated. It was argued, therefore, that if forecasts of 
future activity levels in these industries could be obtained, 
they might provide a more reliable basis for freight forecasting 
than a general projection" of the level of GDP. 
To investigate more fully the transport demands of those 
industries that give rise to a large proportion of total freight 
tonnage, the DTp commissioned (in 1975) a series of major flow 
studies on the following products: iron ore, general steels, 
coal, petroleum products, bricks, paper and board, milk, beer and 
sugar (Pike and Gandham, 1981). As explained in chapter 1, most 
of the information supplied, however, was regarded as being 
confidential, and, as a consequence, few of the results have been 
made public. In these more detailed studies it has been possible 
to analyse the spatial patterns of freight movement quite 
explicitly. If the results of these spatial analyses can be 
used for forecasting purposes, then separate forecasts may be 
made for individual trunk routes or "corridors". This would 
constitute a significant advance on the current method of 
forecasting* freight flows on the strategic road and rail 
networks. At present, this involves simply scaling up existing 
traffic volumes on these links by the growth factor calculated 
nationally. As in the case of the local forecasting of 
commercial vehicle traffic, this practice can be faulted on the 
grounds that growth rates are likely to be subject to wide 
spatial variation (Eastman, 1980). It has been suggested that, 
were these national growth rates disaggregated by commodity, 
local forecasters might select factors in accordance with the mix 
of commodities produced in their areas (Eastman, 1980). This, 
however, would be a poor substitute for intrinsically spatial 
forecasts based on an analysis of the pattern of freight flow. 
The problems of developing spatial models capable of providing 
accurate freight forecasts are discussed later. 
The Leitch Committee on Trunk Road Assessment (1977) 
acknowledged that the methods of freight forecasting set out in 
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Tanner (1974) were inadequate and recommended that more attention 
be given to revising these methods. . In its response to the 
Leitch Committee report, the DTp (1980) outlined a new method of 
freight traffic forecasting which extended that put forward by 
Brown and Maultby (1973). The new procedure was as follows: 
1. Forecast (largely on the basis of previous trends) 
output weight of individual industries. 
2. Relate these output weights to the corresponding 
weight of goods transported or ("lifted" onto vehicles ), again 
using previous trends. The ratio of weight produced to weight 
lifted has been termed the "handling factor". By the use of 
"handling factors" for each commodity class 
,, 
one can convert 
output weights into weights lifted. 
3. Allocate weights lifted to transport modes, in 
accordance with modal split projections. 
4. Forecast average length of haul for each commodity 
class (with reference to previous trends. ) 
5. Forecast the amount of freight movement (in 
tonne-kms) by multiplying predicted values for weights lifted and 
average length of haul. 
6. Translate the amount of freight movement into vehicle 
distance by making assumptions about the composition of the 
vehicle fleet, average distance travelled per vehicle and average 
size of load carried. 
The principal advantage of this revised method of forecasting 
is that it is based on a more detailed examination of the freight 
generating properties of particular industries. It still 
suffers, however, from the major shortcoming of being essentially 
extrapolatory. The general extrapolation of the GDP - tonne-kms 
trend has been replaced by a series of lower level extrapolations 
of trends in industrial output, average length of haul, handling 
factors etc. There remains little appreciation of how changing 
circumstances in the future may cause these trends to deviate 
from their past course. Adams (1981, p152) is very sceptical 
about the value of this new forecasting method. He claims that 
"the only thing likely to be gained by this complicating of the 
forecasting method is an increase in jobs for forecasters and 
decrease in the number of people who will understand the result". 
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In concluding a review of current freight modelling 
practices, Eastman (1980) states that: 
"It must .... be recognised that in this very complicated field it is highly unlikely that a fully explanatory model 
will ever be produced; however, it is desirable to extend 
our knowledge as much as possible. " 
Within the context of the freight forecasting procedure 
employed since 1979, there is clearly a need to "extend our 
knowledge" of the following topics: 
i) Relationship between weight of goods produced and 
weight transported i. e. the "handling factor". 
ii) Factors affecting the average length of haul. 
iii) The translation of aggregate flows into vehicle 
movements. 
At present there is scant justification for 
extrapolating recent trends in these variables. Very 
little is known about the processes of change in the 
industrial and distributive systems that have produced these 
trends. This thesis presents an alternative framework for 
the study of freight movements which permits a more detailed 
examination of these processes, most of which have an 
important spatial dimension. 
(b) Environmental Concern: In the 1970s, there has been 
growing public concern over the impact of lorries on the 
environment. Since receiving official recognition in the 
early 1970s, the problem has been widely investigated and 
discussed (Civic Trust, 1970 and 1979; Pettit, 1973; Sharp, 
1973; Transport 2000,1978; Armitage, 1980; Wood Committee, 
1983). Several measures have been proposed to alleviate the 
ill-effects of freight transport on the environment. 
Foremost among these was the provision made in the 1973 
Heavy Commercial Vehicles (Controls and Regulations) Act, 
commonly known as the Dykes Act, for lorry routeing schemes. 
This legislation required local authorities to survey lorry 
traffic in their areas and assess its environmental effects, 
with a view to designating some roads as lorry routes and 
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restricting access to other roads that were considered to be 
more environmentally sensitive. The Act made it incumbent 
upon local authorities, for the first time, to examine 
closely the movements of road freight in their areas. 
It was also recognised that restricting the movements 
of larger goods vehicles would make necessary a greater 
amount of transhipment between different sizes of vehicle, 
particularly, it was thought, on the outskirts of towns and 
cities. It was, therefore, suggested that transhipment 
depots be set up on the urban periphery where large loads 
carried there by heavy lorries would be disaggregated into 
small consignments for delivery to various destinations 
within the urban area in smaller, less environmentally 
offensive vehicles. This concept of "peripheral 
transhipment" was thought by many planners to offer an 
effective means both of alleviating some of the 
environmental problems posed by heavy vehicles and of 
rationalising the pattern of freight distribution. The 
idea was promoted, however, in almost total ignorance of the 
logistics of existing distribution operations and without 
consulting the companies that it would affect (Smith, 1976). 
The numerous studies that were undertaken between 1972 
and 1976 to assess the feasibility of peripheral 
transhipment drew attention to the complexity of existing 
distribution systems and almost unanimously reached the 
conclusion that the implementation of such a scheme would be 
costly and fraught with operational difficulties (PE 
Consulting Group ltd., 1975; Lichfield and Partners, 1975; 
CIDP, 1975; Wytconsult, 1975; Battilana and Hawthorne, 
1976). It was also claimed that the environmental benefits 
of the scheme would not be as great as originally thought 
(Lorries and the Environment Committee, 1976). 
Several of the assumptions made by these feasibility 
studies can be challenged, however. It was assumed, for 
example, that peripheral transhipment depots would be 
essentially urban phenomena, located on the outskirts of 
towns or on the edge of the inner areas of cities. The 
geography of peripheral transhipment has never been fully 
investigated, though, and it is quite possible that, to 
operate viably, it would have to be organized at a larger 
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spatial scale. The Lorries and the Environment Committee 
(1977b) , for example, believed that there is considerable 
scope for the development of regional "freight complexes" 
where transhipment, in addition to a host of other 
functions, might be undertaken. It was also assumed that a 
peripheral transhipment depot would act as an additional 
node in the chain of distribution, whereas, as Plowden 
(1977) has pointed out, it could be substituted for an 
existing node. To measure the scope for nodal substitution 
of this kind, one would need to examine the spatial 
structure of existing distribution systems. Such an 
examination could well reveal that many firms have already 
developed fairly sophisticated systems of transhipment of 
their own accord. 
More recently, the study by the Wood Committee (1983) 
of the social, economic and environmental effects of banning 
heavy lorries in Greater London has been impaired by a lack 
of detailed information on the structure of distribution in 
and around the city. While acknowledging that many firms 
already operate transhipment depots on the outskirts of the 
capital, the Committee did not indicate how widely available 
these facilities are or how firms generally might have to 
restructure their distribution systems to accommodate a 
heavy lorry ban (Times, 19/12/83). Furthermore, the 
Committee's calculation of the cost increases resulting from 
the substitution of small vehicles for heavier ones 
prohibited by the ban is based on questionable assumptions 
about vehicle utilization (Cooper, 1983). Like previous 
studies of the feasibility of restricting lorry movements 
for environmental reasons, that of the Wood Committee fails 
to demonstrate an adequate awareness of the physical 
structure and day-to-day operation of the distributive 
system. 
(c) Rationalising the Pattern of Freight Movement: Rising 
transport costs and increasing road congestion principally 
in urban areas have in recent years prompted considerable 
research on ways of rationalising the movement of freight. 
In North America and Australia the principal goal of this 
work has been to raise the efficiency of the goods delivery 
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system (Highway Research Board, 1971). In the European 
context, greater emphasis has been given to the additional 
objective of reducing environmental costs. All these 
studies have identified consolidation of goods deliveries in 
fewer vehicles as the most promising means both of raising 
vehicle utilization and reducing vehicle kilometres 
generated per tonne delivered. It has been estimated that 
the savings in distribution costs accruing from 
consolidation could be as great as 50% (Lorries and the 
Environment Comm ittee, 1979) . The environmental effects 
would be more difficult to evaluate as the "benefits" of 
reduced vehicle movement would have to be set against the 
"costs" of using bigger vehicles. 
To measure the potential for consolidation, it is 
necessary to obtain much more information about urban goods 
movements. For this purpose, data on goods vehicle trips, 
which in the past has been all that transport planners have 
had at their disposal, do not suffice. Much more must be 
known about the nature of the commodities, the types of 
premises between which they travel and the logistics of 
their delivery. Major studies of freight movements in 
Hull, Swindon and Greenwich/Lewisham commissioned by the 
Transport and Road Research Laboratory have gone some way 
towards meeting these needs. 
Other measures that have been proposed to streamline 
goods deliveries and, to a limited extent implemented, are 
the rescheduling of deliveries (e. g. "Operation Moondrop" in 
London (Pettit, 1973)) and the use of demountable containers 
("Direct Distribution") (Lorries and the Environment 
Committee, 1977a) . It has also been suggested that it 
would be possible for road transport operators to make 
greater use of empty backhauls, thereby raising the 
efficiency of their operations and reducing their impact on 
the environment (Cundill and Hull, 1979). To assess the 
scope for such rationalisations requires much more detailed 
knowledge of freight distribution than is currently 
available. 
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The Limitations of Conventional Methods of Freight Flow 
Analysis 
Geographical work on freight has traditionally been 
undertaken at the national scale and has been directed 
towards modelling the pattern of flow at a general level. 
Most of the work has produced fairly disappointing results. 
The models that have been constructed do not adequately 
simulate the existing pattern of flow and, therefore, cannot 
be used to predict future patterns. Following "initial 
attempts" to model 1962 road freight flows by means of 
gravity and linear programming models, Heyman (1971) 
concluded that: 
"The results indicate that existing freight modelling 
techniques do not produce accurate estimates of either 
generation or distribution, suggesting either that existing 
models require considerable refinement, involving more 
detailed data than is currently available or could 
reasonably be forecast, or that a completely new approach 
needs to be adopted. " 
Chisholm and O'Sullivan (1973) elaborated upon and 
slightly updated Heyman' s work, but still employed gravity 
and linear programming models. They were satisfied with the 
performance of these models when simulating patterns of 
aggregate flow; however, once the flows were disaggregated 
by commodity type, the models proved to be much less 
adequate. 
More recent analysis of the national pattern of freight 
flow by Pitfield (1978a) for British Rail has been similarly 
unsuccessful: 
"It is clear that, with the exception of ore, the model 
fits are absolutely poor irrespective of the mode of 
carriage. " 
Not only have these modelling exercises failed to 
achieve a satisfactory "goodness of fit", but some have also 
produced contradictory results. On the question of the 
spatial pattern of freight generation, Benheddi and Pitfield 
(1980) disagree quite markedly with Chisholm and O'Sullivan 
(1973). 
Each of these analyses employed the same methodology. 
They divided the freight modelling exercise into two parts: 
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the first concerned with the generation and attraction of 
freight traffic by zones; the second with the distribution 
of that traffic between zones of generation and attraction. 
The failure of these studies to provide acceptable 
explanations can be largely attributed to the fact that the 
respective flow systems are enormously complex (Hay, 1979). 
They comprise a vast and chaotic pattern of flow that is 
extremely difficult to model in anything but the most 
general of terms. Students of freight transport have 
always been tightly constrained by a lack of data. In the 
case of road goods movements in the UK, for example, the DTp 
monitors only about 0.1% of the total number of lorry 
journeys each year and obtains only a few pieces of 
information about each. The great complexity of the 
pattern of flow coupled with these data limitations has made 
the freight transport system a natural candidate for a 
"black box" approach, where the internal workings of the 
system are poorly understood, and inferences made on the 
basis of a few of the more easily monitored system 
parameters, such as total weight carried or average length 
of haul. Researchers have traditionally had recourse 
either to stochastic models, of which the most popular has 
been that based on the analogy with gravity, or to a 
normative model derived from linear programming. Neither 
class of model contributes very much to our understanding of 
the freight transport system and both have been subject to 
criticism on both empirical 'and theoretical grounds (Reggie, 
1969; Lowe and Mo ryad as , 1975). 
It is generally agreed that the construction and 
application of these models is severely handicapped by the 
inadequacy of the data. There is a desire for greater 
disaggregation by commodity type and areal unit. 
a) Disaggregation by commodity type: 
The tendency for these models to perform poorly when 
simulating flows disaggregated by commodity type has been 
partly attributed to the crudeness of the commodity 
classification. It is widely acknowledged that there is a 
need for "a more detailed break-down of commodity and 
industry categories", which would make these categories 
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smaller and more "homogeneous" (Heyman, 1971). There has 
been little discussion, however, of the criteria that might 
be used to assess the degree of homogeneity. The 
classification of commodities used by the DTp is based more 
on their physical properties than on their handling or 
transport requirements. Pred (1964) has attempted a 
"geographical differentiation of commodity flows" taking 
into account "locational variation in length and volume" of 
different types of flow. This goes some way towards 
classifying goods with respect to their movement from 
factory to market, but stops short of considering their 
passage through storage and other distributive facilities en 
route. Moreover, Pitfield (1978a) recognises that it may 
be necessary to distinguish between identical commodities 
which are moving "for different purposes", such as assembly, 
storage and sale. Even where movements share the same 
purpose, however, such as the delivery of goods to point of 
final sale, the manner in which similar products are 
marketed and distributed may vary considerably. As Heggie 
(1969) has suggested, the modelling of freight flows ought 
to take more account of "marketing patterns". Further 
disaggregation of commodity types should be accompanied by a 
wider examination of the framework of marketing and 
distribution with which freight movement takes place. 
b) Zonal Disaggregation: 
Another reason that is commonly advanced to explain 
the poor performance of the freight models is that the ratio 
of intra-zonal to inter-zonal flows is too large. This 
could be remedied by further subdivision of the country into 
smaller traffic zones. The number of zones employed by 
Pitfield (134) and by Heyman and Chisholm and O'Sullivan 
(78) could probably be increased significantly without the 
models becoming unmanageable or increasing the demand for 
data too extravagantly. 
More serious objections might be raised, however, to 
the whole practice of zoning. In the first place, because 
it collapses areal data onto a point, the zonal centroid, it 
suppresses detailed information about freight movements at 
the local scale which , as mentioned earlier, planners have 
33 s 
recently been seeking in connection with lorry routeing 
schemes. Furthermore, as Pike and Gandham (1981) have 
observed, "The choice of zonal centriod may be unrelated or 
misplaced with regard to the actual points of freight 
generation. " Secondly, as Openshaw (1976) has 
demonstrated, the performance of spatial interaction models 
can be altered not only by varying the number of zones, but 
also by changing the configuration of zonal boundaries. 
Given the sensitivity of these models to the way in which 
zonal boundaries are drawn, one may challenge their 
generality and objectivity. Thirdly, the analysis of zonal 
flow data has tended to ignore the complex logistics of 
freight distribution. Underlying most freight modelling 
work is the assumption that goods are produced in the zone 
where they originate and are consumed in the receiving zone. 
It is for this reason that commodity flow analysts have 
shown a predilection for correlating traffic generation with 
employment or industrial output and traffic attraction with 
population or retail sales. To some extent the manner in 
which freight statistics are collected predisposes flow 
analysts to this view. These statistics have as their 
sampling unit the lorry journey, plotted either between or 
within traffic zones. No reference is made to the nature 
of the premises from which the vehicle originates or to 
which it travels, nor to the stage that this journey 
represents in the overall movement from point of production 
to point of comsumption. As Chisholm and O'Sullivan (1973) 
explain (p32): 
".... the origin and destination of goods means only the 
origin and destination for the particular movement: the same 
goods may appear again as a separate movement. For 
example, the goods moving into a wholesale warehouse will 
have that building as their destination ; when a delivery is 
made thence, the warehouse will be recorded as the origin. 
Consequently, the freight flow data, while accurately 
representing the work done by the transport sector, do not 
faithfully reproduce the flows from first origin to final 
destination. " 
In the absence of information on the logistics of 
freight movements, it has been quite conveniently supposed 
that the plotting of journeys inter- and intra-zonally gives 
34 
a representative picture of the pattern of flow from 
production to consumption (Heyman, 1971; Chisholm and 
O'Sullivan, 1973). This supposition, however, appears to 
be based on an under-estimation of the number of 
intermediate links in the chain of distribution. This is 
illustrated in a statement made by Bayliss and Edwards 
(1970) with reference to the movement of food (p29-30) : 
"A high proportion of the movements would be from 
processing plants direct to retail outlet. Some 
inter-plant movements obviously occur, because, for example, 
the commodity group includes flour which would move mainly 
from the mill to bread or biscuit factories and there are 
also movements from processing plants to regional 
warehouses, or wholesale distribution centres, but in the 
main the distribution structure of many parts of the food 
and drink industry is such that many consignments probably 
flow direct to shops or public houses. " 
The extent to which Bayliss and Edwards seem to 
under-estimate the complexity of the distribution system can 
be measured by calculating the "handling factor" for food. 
As explained earlier, the handling factor is a measure of 
the number of times a quantity of goods is loaded onto a 
vehicle in its passage from raw material source to point of 
sale. Its calculation reflects the method of road goods 
survey employed by the DTp. To estimate the total tonnage 
of fright carried, the DTp's statisticians record the 
weight of goods loaded onto a vehicle at the beginning of a 
journey. If the movement of a consignment from a factory 
to a shop is broken into several discrete journeys each 
requiring a reloading operation, then its weight might be 
recorded several times. This leads-' eads -' to much 
multiple-counting and results in the tonnes carried 
statistic far exceeding the total weight of goods actually 
in the transport system. The extent of this multiple 
counting is measured by the handling factor, which can be 
expressed as follows: 
weight of goods lifted 
Handling Factor = 
actual weight of goods produced or consumed 
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As some weight is lost in the production process, the 
value of the handling factor will vary with the choice of 
denomiator: a value calculated on the basis of raw material 
inputs would be lower than one based on the weight consumed. 
Handling factors were calculated (by the author) for food 
using figures for 1968 (around the time when Bayliss and 
Edwards were conducting their survey) : (see Appendix 4) 
Based on: i) Raw Material (input) weight: 5.14 
ii) Weight consumed: 5.66 
These handling factors can serve as a rough index of the 
complexity of the food distribution system. They indicate 
that on average there are approximately five links in the 
chain of food supply from raw material source to retail 
outlet. Many of the intermediate (or "relay") nodes in 
this chain are stockholding or transhipment points. Very 
seldom, however, does one find any reference to stockholding 
or transhipment in the literature on freight modelling, 
despite the fact that the locations of these activities act 
as important "hinge points" in the distribution system, 
largely determining the route a product follows. For 
example, the route followed by a popular brand of cake 
("Kipling") has been plotted on fig. 2.2. Conventional 
methods of freight modelling make no allowance for such 
devious routeing, despite the fact that it is commonplace, 
certainly in the distribution of processed foods. The cake 
referred to in the example is neither produced nor consumed, 
but rather stored in the Southampton zone. The storage 
capacity of a zone might be correlated with some of the 
independent variables commonly used in freight flow studies 
such as employment and population. However, this is 
unlikely to yield a significant level of correlation. 
There is no ready source of employment data for warehouses 
and, as warehousing typically accounts for only a small 
proportion of an area's total employment, general employment 
data would be a poor surrogate (GLC, 1980). Any attempt to 
correlate, at a zonal level, the volume of freight generated 
by warehousing with the population it serves would be no 
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less problematical. Warehouses vary greatly in size and in 
the extent of the areas they serve. In many cases, goods 
originating in the warehouse would be distributed well 
beyond the boundaries of the traffic zone. For example, 
fig 2.3 gives some idea of the spatial scale on which food 
distribution is currently organized. It shows the 1 inks 
between a sample of five supermarkets in South Hertfordshire 
and the retail central warehouses that supply them. It can 
be seen that most of these links cross traffic zonal 
boundaries. It would be pointless, therefore, to try to 
correlate the traffic generated by warehousing in a traffic 
zone with the population residing in that zone. The same 
would apply to transhipment. 
While it is clearly difficult to incorporate 
stockholding and transhipment within the traditional 
framework of the freight modelling exercise, its exclusion 
undermines the validity of this analysis and reduces its 
value. As mentioned earlier, the location of these 
activities largely determines the route a product follows. 
Stockholding and transhipment, therefore, have a crucial 
role in the logistics of the transport operation. As 
stockholding and transhipment have received little attention 
from freight traffic modellers, so these logistics have not 
been seriously examined. Heyman (1971), for example, is 
merely "hopeful" that multiple drop deliveries which she 
calls "milk-round" trips, will be confined to traffic zones 
and be entirely intra-zonal. This bases the validity of 
her work on an unfounded assumption. 
Given the great difficulty of accommodating a more 
thorough consideration of the logistics of transport 
operations within the existing methodology of the freight 
flow study, it is necessary, as Heyman has suggested, to 
look for some possible alternative approach to the analysis 
of freight movement. Some possible alternative approaches 
are presented and discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
An Alternative Approach to the Study of Freight 
Distribution. 
Chapter 2 has established the need for more detailed 
spatial studies of freight movement and identified defects 
in the existing methods of analysis. These weaknesses stem 
from over-generalization on too limited a data-base and 
neglect of stockholding, transhipment and the logistics of 
freight distribution. They result partly from the practice 
of building up a generalized pattern of flow on the basis of 
a small sample of vehicle journeys. As each journey is 
considered separately, no attempt is made to trace the 
complete through-movement of products from point of 
production to point of sale. 
An alternative approach would be to examine the passage 
of goods through the systems of production and distribution, 
plotting their movement between the production, storage and 
retail premises through which they pass. The value of such 
an approach has been highlighted by Chisholm and O'Sullivan 
(1973). In discussing the need for future research on the 
geography of freight movement, they conclude that, "Perhaps 
the most important need is to link freight flow data more 
directly with producing and consuming units. This would be 
moving towards the input-output kind of formulation. The 
key point about such an approach is the possibility that 
would then arise for obtaining better estimates of freight 
demands and supplies and providing a better interpretation 
of the observed pattern of freight movement" (p130). The 
use of input-output analysis, however, has so far been 
largely confined to linkages between productive enterprises 
(Dawson, 1979). There has, however, been an attempt at the 
regional level to analyse the links between producers and 
distributors within an input-output framework (South East 
Joint Planning Team, 1971). There are currently 
insufficient data available to permit a similar analysis at 
the national scale. Input-output tables compiled at this 
level have drawn upon Censuses of Production which exclude 
distributive agencies, and therefore, prevent the study of 
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flows along the vertical marketing channel from producer to 
retailer. Input-output data have, nevertheless, been used 
to simulate the past growth of the total volumes of freight 
traffic (Brown and Maultby, 1973). In the absence of 
input-output forecasts for the economy, it was not possible 
to use this as a basis for forecasting future freight 
traffic levels. Existing input-output data are also 
insufficiently disaggregated spatially to permit detailed 
analysis of the pattern of freight flow. An alternative 
approach to the study of freight flow therefore requires 
more information about the distributive sector and about the 
geography of the production and distribution than is 
currently found in national input-output tables. 
It is likely too that data aggregated by industrial 
class or commodity type would not suffice, as flow patterns 
can vary considerably within each of these categories. To 
obtain a realistic picture of the pattern of freight flow it 
may be necessary to descend from the previous heights of 
generality to look in detail at the distribution operations 
of individual firms. By undertaking a "micro-level" survey 
of this kind it should be possible to measure the extent to 
which firms' distribution systems differ and to assess the 
scope for subsequent generalization. At this level of 
analysis one can also enquire about factors, such as 
marketing strategy; that affect the system of distribution 
and about the location of individual premises and vehicle 
routes. 
The basic survey unit for this alternative line of 
investigation would, therefore, be the firm and, at a 
higher order of aggregation, the marketing channel formed by 
the combination of firms linked through trade. This then 
offers an holistic view of the system of freight 
distribution in contrast to the much narrower view afforded 
by the extrapolation of individual journey data. In 
looking at the overall system of distribution this 
alternative approach carries several important advantages. 
Since the early 1960s, firms have increasingly come to 
see transport as a integral part of their distribution 
system and have reorganized their management structures to 
integrate all the functions such as transport, warehousing, 
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stockholding and handling that are involved in the "physical 
distribution" of goods (Brouwer, 1971; Murphy, 1978). it 
has been found that by closely coordinating these 
activities, it is possible to improve the quality of the 
distribution service and reduce its total cost. By 
adopting a "distributional" approach to the study of freight 
flows, one would be taking a view of transport similar to 
that of the transport decision-maker. The value of such an 
approach has been recognised by Meyer (1971) who has argued 
that, "In the case of forecasting inter-city freight 
transport, representation of firms' locational choice and 
the nature of their distribution process - tend to be 
fundamental" (p181). The pattern of freight movement is not 
only determined by the internal structure of firms' 
distribution systems, but also by the way in which the 
systems of firms at different levels of the marketing 
channel knit together. As Thompson (1970) has observed, 
transport flows are "the expression of a deeper functional 
relationship in the linkage between the institutionalised 
channel participants". 
A "distributional" approach also presents the 
opportunity of digging beneath the official, highly 
generalized freight statistics that have formed the basis of 
transport debate and policy-making for many years. It 
should also shed some light into what has long been regarded 
as a "black box". It will also offer an escape from the 
analogue (stochastic) and normative models whose use has 
been forced on researchers by the limited information 
available to them on the nature of the flows and the factors 
producing them. This will also be in keeping with the 
recommendation by the Leitch Committee (1977), made with 
reference to car traffic but equally relevant to freight, 
that forecasts be rooted in a deeper understanding of the 
causes of traffic growth. In the case of freight, this 
necessitates a much closer examination of the relationship 
between transport and the spatial structure of the economy, 
a relationship most clearly manifest in the way goods are 
distributed. 
By studying the flow of goods through the distributive 
system, attention is inevitably given to all the nodes in 
that system. It therefore satisfies the need expressed in 
chapter 2 to take stockholding and transhipment into account 
in an explanation of the flow pattern. By taking this more 
comprehensive view of the distributive system, one can plot 
the routes products follow from points of production to 
points of sale, revealing properties of the flow pattern 
such as the extent of cross-haulage or degree of circuity in 
product movement, that previous studies have ignored. One 
can also avoid using zonal data and thereby escape the 
limitations that this imposes. Instead, it is possible, as 
in the Commodity Flow Studies, to examine the individual 
points of origin and destination and thus relate traffic 
flows more closely to the operating characteristics of 
particular firms (Pike and Gandham, 1981). 
Previous Geographical Work on Distribution. 
The distribution of goods from points of production to 
points of sale is an inherently spatial process, yet one 
that has received little attention from geographers. As 
Dawson (1979) points out, economic geographers, in whose 
general field of interest the subject lies, have 
traditionally been preoccupied with the description and 
explanation of patterns of production. In the past thirty 
years efforts have been made to counter-balance this 
emphasis on production with geographical studies of the 
marketing system. These studies, however, have focussed on 
retailing and the spatial behaviour of consumers. There 
has been no comprehensive geographical investigation of the 
intervening system of distribution that connects factories 
and farms with shops. Becht (1970) used the terms 
"business logistics" and "physical distribution" in the 
context of a general description of the American freight 
transport system, but his work sheds little light on the 
relationship between transport and the distributive system. 
In most theories of industrial and agricultural 
location considerable importance is attached to the 
attraction of the market. The study of firms' market areas 
is, however, only weakly developed (Watts, 1975), and has 
progressed little from the preliminary theoretical work of 
Lösch (1954). Even less empirical work has been done on 
43 
the way in which goods are distributed throughout the market 
area. Among geographers studying industry and agriculture 
there has been a reliance on fairly idealised and 
over-simplified notions about the logistics of distribution. 
In a review of research on distribution, Levy 
(1948) commented that: 
"It is regrettable that public investigations into 
distribution .... have been lately limited to retail distribution. Distribution ... begins when the commodity 
leaves its place of original production and, all the 
following stages should be included, retailing being in fact 
only one, the final stage of this process. " 
In drawing up a prospectus for geographical studies of 
marketing, Applebaum (1954) took this wider view of the 
subject seeing a role for geographers in the "delimitation 
and measurement of market areas and in the study of the 
channels of distribution through which goods move from 
producers to consumers". Writing seven years later Murphy 
(1961) observed that only the first of these topics, the 
study of market areas was receiving attention from 
geographers. This was subsequently confirmed by Berry 
(1967) who claimed that, "The prime concern of marketing 
geographers.... is in how to measure a trade area. " Since 
then some geographical work has been undertaken on other 
parts of the channel of distribution. Vance, for example, 
has produced a general study of American wholesaling, while 
in the United Kingdom the Retail Outlets Research Unit 
(RORU) has examined various aspects of the retail supply 
system. Nevertheless, the field of marketing geography 
remains dominated by spatial studies of market potential, 
store location and consumer behaviour. It is still widely 
acknowledged, however, that marketing geography should, like 
marketing science, examine the backward linkages from shops 
to their suppliers as well as the forward links to their 
customers (Thorpe, 1978; Dawson, 1980). 
Transport geographers likewise have shown little 
interest in the wider distributive framework. The backward 
linkages from shops to their suppliers are more than simply 
transport connections; they are "channels" comprising both 
lines of movement and points of storage and transhipment. 
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By studying freight flows separately, transport geographers 
have tended to overlook the important relationships between 
transport and other elements in the distribution system such 
as storage and handling. 
The Study of Distribution Systems 
To date the study of distribution systems has been 
dominated by operations research, marketing science and 
business management. Much of this work, particularly that 
of the operations researchers, has tended to be either 
normative and highly theoretical (Eilon et al., 1971) or to 
be in the form of detailed case studies of particular 
companies (Mercer et al., 1978; Whitehead Consulting Group 
Ltd., 1970). It has, nevertheless, been noted that 
"detailed studies of the rationale of individual 
distribution systems are few" (Urquhart, 1976). The few 
general and positive (as opposed to normative) surveys of 
distribution strategies that have been undertaken have 
neglected the spatial dimension (Industrial and Commercial 
Techniques Ltd., 1966; Whitehead Consulting Group Ltd., 
1974; Kearney, 1980). There have been no general studies 
of the spatial structure of actual distribution systems upon 
which the freight flow analyst could draw. 
Most of the work done on the subject of physical 
distribution has been directed at particular aspects of 
firms' distribution systems, such as the location of depots 
or routeing of vehicles. According to Schary (1970), this 
fragmentation of the research effort has inhibited a broader 
conceptualization of the distribution process. Several 
attempts have, nevertheless, been made to devise 
comprehensive models of a distribution system (Heskett, 
1966; Schary, 1970; Bowersox, 1972; Geoffrion, 1974). 
Heskett devised a temporal model of a distribution system 
composed of a series of "inventory cells" which he 
classified as "transit" or "static". Schary's model is 
essentially normative, and, by concentrating on the elements 
of time and risk, tends, like Heskett's model, to play down 
the importance of the spatial dimension. Bowersox's 
simulation model and the various optimising models reviewed 
by Geoffrion are intended to offer firms more practical 
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guidance on the design of a distribution system. As these 
models require a considerable amount of data on firms' 
distribution operations, much of which is generally regarded 
as being confidential, their use is confined to internal 
company planning. It was learned too from consultations 
with distribution staff in the course of this research that 
there have been few instances of these comprehensive models 
being applied in practice. 
It would be foolhardy in a research project of this 
sort to attempt to develop a model of a distribution system 
that was both positive and comprehensive, and which could 
simulate the spatial pattern of freight traffic. Such an 
exercise would require the collection and analysis of vast 
amounts of data. This would require considerably more 
resources than those available to this project and demand a 
high level of cooperation from firms in the industry. 
Moreover, a general model of a distribution system 
constructed on too limited a data base would be likely to 
suffer from defects similar to those of the general freight 
flow models discussed in the previous chapter. 
This research has three more modest objectives: 
1. To present an alternative framework for the analysis of 
patterns of freight flow that takes much more account of the 
marketing environment and the logistics of distribution. 
2. Within this framework, to examine in detail the factors 
that affect the movement of one group of products (packaged 
groceries). 
3. To use the results of this study to help explain recent 
trends in freight transport, examine the problems of 
modelling the pattern of freight flow, and assess the scope 
for rationalizing the movement of grocery products. 
This new approach directs attention to the route that 
goods take in moving from points of production to points of 
sale. Broadly speaking, this route may be divided into 
three segments: 
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a) Raw material source (farm, quarry, port etc. ) to first 
processing plant. 
b) Inter-hauls between processing plants while in 
unfinished state. 
c) Distribution of finished product from final processing 
plant to retail outlet. 
This study is mainly concerned with the last of these - 
the distribution of finished goods from factories to shops. 
The schema it employs could, with slight modification, be 
applied to studies of the other route segments. This 
schema has six stages: 
i) Marketing channel 
1allocation. 
ii) Logistical channel allocation. 
iii) Number of nodes at each level of the logistical 
channel. 
iv) Locations of these nodes. 
v) Areas served by these nodes. 
vi) Routeing of flows between these nodes - both at the 
strategic and tactical (local delivery) levels. 
As in the case of the Commodity Flow Studies (Pike and 
Gandham, 1981), the intention is not to "gross-up" the data 
collected in this survey to produce a global picture of the 
pattern of food movement. Indeed, very little actual flow 
data was collected. In this respect, the objectives of the 
present study clearly differ from those of previous 
macro-scale freight modelling exercises. By examining the 
structure of distribution systems at the micro-scale, this 
study should complement this earlier work by providing a 
deeper insight into the planning and management of firms' 
freight transport operations. 
A distinction must also be drawn between this work and 
earlier studies of the distribution system, such as those of 
Jefferys (1950) , Thompson (1970) and NEDO (1971a),, which 
were based on information collected principally at the 
retail level. More recent studies of the potential for 
peripheral transhipment have similarly concentrated their 
attention on the inward flow of goods to shops (Metra, 1976; 
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Urquhart, 1976). While the retail outlet is a natural and 
convenient place at which to enquire about the supply 
system, the view backwards from this point along the 
distributive channel is usually limited to the last link in 
the chain. To get a broader view of the distributive system 
it is necessary to conduct surveys at the upper levels of 
the marketing channel controlled by manufacturers, 
wholesalers and the central offices of multiple retail 
organizations. This has been the approach adopted here. 
The Choice of Food Products. 
Although the proportion of national income spent on 
food has declined as people have become more affluent, it 
still accounts for around 20% of consumer expenditure 
(Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, 1982) and 
gives rise to a roughly similar proportion of the total 
volume of freight movement (measured in tonne-kilometres) 
(DTp, 1982). Food, drink and tobacco products have 
accordingly been identified as one of seven major 
traffic-generating commodity groups (Brown and Maultby, 
1973). National freight forecasts are, therefore, 
particularly sensitive to estimates of the future transport 
demands of this sector of the economy. In recent years the 
volume of food movement, measured in tonne-kms, has been 
increasing broadly in line with total _ 
freight movement, 
despite the fact that the volume of food consumed has 
remained fairly stable. This makes this sector of the 
economy particularly interesting as its freight demands 
appear to be growing almost entirely as a result of changes 
in the way in which its production and distribution is 
organized. 
Food is a relatively expensive commodity to transport 
because of its bulky nature, its need for fast, high quality 
delivery and its distribution to large numbers of wholesale 
and retail outlets. In terms of the ratio of transport 
costs to the value of net output, the food industry may be 
regarded as being very transport-intensive (Edwards, 1970). 
Food is also unusual in being transported almost 
exclusively on the road network. Less than 2% of the total 
number of tonne-kilometres generated by food, drink and 
48 
tobacco products is carried by rail (DTp, 1982). This 
enables one to concentrate on the way in which distribution 
is organized with respect to the road network and, by 
removing the modal split variable, somewhat simplifies the 
analysis. 
The movement of food has a disproportionate impact on 
the urban environment. This is mainly because food 
products have to be distributed widely to a relatively large 
number of shops. This means that a large proportion of the 
total amount of freight movement generated by these products 
takes the form of dispersed deliveries to retail outlets and 
is, therefore, highly intrusive in the community. It has 
been estimated that food accounts for roughly 80% of the 
total weight of goods delivered to shops (GLC, 1976). Much 
of this weight is delivered too in larger that average 
vehicles. This is reflected by the fact that vehicle 
deliveries to food shops account for only 20-25% of total 
shop deliveries (Thorpe et al., 1973; GLC, 1976). Roughly 
60% of the total weight of "food and allied products" 
consumed in Britain is sold by supermarkets, most of which 
receive a large proportion of their supplies in consolidated 
deliveries by vehicles of over 16 tonnes gross weight 
(Financial Times 22/11/77). 
As food traffic is voluminous, intrusive in sensitive 
urban environments and highly conspicuous, it has come to be 
regarded as a prime candidate for the application of various 
rationalization schemes. All the major studies of 
peripheral transhipment, for example, agreed that for such a 
scheme to be effective it would be essential for food 
supplies to be routed through the transhipment depot (CIDP, 
1975; PE Consultants, 1975; Battilana and Hawthorne, 1976). 
Other studies on the potential for direct distribution 
(using demountable containers) (Lorries and the Environment 
Committee, 1977a) and the possible development of freight 
complexes (Lorries and the Environment Committee, 1977b) 
have identified the food industry as the main source of 
traffic, in each case expected to contribute around 37% of 
the prospective throughput. All these studies, however, 
take a very narrow view of the system of food distribution 
which they are proposing to modify. 
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They under-estimate the complexity of this system and 
ignore many of the factors likely to constrain the 
implementation of these new schemes. It should be 
recognised that the food market is fairly static (Institute 
of Grocery Distribution, 1982), and that this affects the 
way in which food is distributed in several ways. As most 
firms can only expand their volume of sales by increasing 
their share of this static market, competition is intense at 
all levels of the distributive channel. Great importance 
is, therefore, attached to the marketing of products, and 
considerable managerial power vested in those responsible 
for marketing and sales. In most firms, distribution is 
organised in accordance with marketing requirements (Schary 
and Becker, 1973; Freight Management, 1975), and this can 
both increase its complexity and reduce its efficiency. A 
marketing policy may dictate, for example, that goods be 
delivered direct to shops rather than channelled through 
wholesale or retail warehouses; it may specify a high 
service level (i. e. fast delivery) and, by promoting goods 
more heavily at particular times of year, may cause costly 
fluctuations in the throughput of the distribution system. 
proposals to rationalize the food distibution system must, 
therefore, take account of firms' commitment to broader 
marketing strategies. 
The food distribution system has, nevertheless, 
undergone enormous change in recent decades and been the 
testing ground for many techniques that have subsequently 
been adopted by other trades. It has been highly 
responsive to such developments as increasing personal 
mobility, road improvements and the introduction of new 
materials handling methods, and been substantially 
reorganized in adherence to the principles of physical 
distribution management. It must be asked, therefore, in 
what ways these changes have affected the volume and pattern 
of food movement, and to what extent they have yielded 
economic and environmental benefits. 
Although discussed so far in fairly general terms, the 
food distribution system is effectively divided into several 
discrete parts which merge mainly at the retail level, and 
to a lesser extent further back along the distributive 
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channel. The main reason for this fragmentation lies in 
the wide variation in perishability between food products. 
As it is beyond the scope of this project to examine in 
depth all the various parts of the food distribution system, 
attention will focus on those products with a longer 
shelf-life referred to in the trade as "dry" or "packaged" 
groceries? These products all experience some form of 
processing or preparation. They are estimated to account 
for around 40% of total food expenditure (Tanburn, 1981) and 
between 60 and 70ö of the sales of the average supermarket. 
The Survey 
Most of the information on grocery distribution 
presented in this thesis was collected from surveys of large 
food manufacturers, wholesalers, multiple retailers and 
distribution contractors in 1978 and early 1979. Forty of 
the largest food manufacturers in the UK were approached, 
all supermarket chains with more than twenty stores, the six 
largest voluntary groups and six distribution contractors 
specialising in the storage and transport of grocery 
products. Firms and organizations co-operating with the 
survey are listed in Appendix 1. Information was also 
collected form the Co-operative Wholesale Society, the 
Co-operative Union and a large Co-operative retail society. 
In the majority of cases where organizations cooperated, 
information was obtained by interview with the distribution 
director or manager. . Some firms supplemented the 
interviews with further information recorded on a postal 
questionnaire. A small number of firms supplied all the 
information they provided on postal questionnaires. Copies 
of the questionnaires and introductory letters can be found 
in Appendix 2. Additional data was obtained from published 
sources both on the firms participating in the survey and 
others which were either not approached or which refused to 
cooperate. These published sources included case studies 
compiled by the Institute of Grocery Distribution 
(Hemingway, 1979), articles in the trade press, annual 
reports and other company literature. 
Although not so highly concentrated as the industries 
surveyed by the Commodity Flow Studies commissioned by the 
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DTp, trade is sufficiently concentrated at the different 
levels of the grocery distribution system to make it 
possible to collect information on a large proportion of 
the total volume of grocery flow from comparatively few 
firms. Table 3.1 shows the market shares in a variety of 
products held by firms in the sample. These figures relate 
only to branded products, and exclude "own label" products 
(i. e. products carrying the name of the distributor rather 
than the manufacturer's brand name), which can account for a 
large proportion of total sales (Table 3.2). Although many 
firms in the sample were heavily engaged in the manufacture 
of "own label" products, most refused to divulge information 
about the scale of this operation or about the retailers and 
wholesalers commissioning this production. The survey of 
multiples covered over 80% of the volume of trade handled by 
this sector, that of voluntary groups covered around 50% of 
their total business. Overall, it is estimated that the 
survey covered the distribution of between 50 and 60% of the 
output of grocery products from factories in the UK and 
between 60 and 65% of the grocery supplies delivered to 
shops (excluding the collection of supplies from cash and 
carry warehouses). 
Most of the interviews had a similar form. The early 
stages were structured around a questionnaire which was 
designed to elicit background information about the history, 
extent and nature of the firm's operations and various items 
of "hard" data on its distribution system. This formal 
questioning usually developed into a more general discussion 
from which it was possible to assess firms' attitudes to a 
range of issues, such as the concentration of stockholding, 
the growth of direct delivery and the coordination of 
marketing and distribution strategies. Only through the 
medium of an personal interview would it have been possible 
to explore the thinking behind various aspects of a firm's 
distribution operation. This survey method also permitted 
a more wide-ranging investigation of firms' distribution 
systems than would have been possible if only postal 
questionnaires had been used. It also yielded a relatively 
high response rate for an industrial survey of this type. 
Against these advantages must be set some of the problems 
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Table 3.1: Market Shares of Food Manufacturers in the Sample. 
(branded products only. ) 
Product Date of Survey 
Biscuits 1977 
Breakfast Cereal: 
Hot 1977 
Cold 1977 
Crisps 1978 
Tea 1976 
Coffee 1976 
Margarine 1977 
Processed Cheese 1977 
Sugar 1977 
Flour 1977 
Marmalade 1976 
Jam 1977 
Canned Products: 
Pasta 1976 
Soup 1976 
Baked Beans 1977 
Processed Peas 1977 
Milk Pudding 1978 
Fruit (imported) 1978 
Market Share 
75% 
68% 
66% 
72% 
71% 
64% 
57% 
56% 
55% 
54% 
53% 
43% 
85% 
65% 
58% 
45% 
75% 
27% 
Source: Mintel and Economist Intelligence Unit Reports. 
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experienced in collecting information in this way. The 
distribution staff interviewed often did not have readily 
available all the quantitative data requested. Under these 
circumstances, many interviewees promised to forward the 
required data by post. It often proved difficult, however, 
to obtain this "missing" data subsequently. Interviews 
also varied in length and content, with some interviewees 
sparing only half an hour of their time and providing only a 
minimum of factual information; others described their 
distribution operation over a period of several hours. 
Some of the distribution staff took advantage of the 
interview to talk at length about particular grievances, 
such as the theft of pallets or labour relations problems in 
their depots, which, though interesting, had little direct 
relevance to the research project. 
Attempts to obtain a comprehensive data set for all the 
firms surveyed were frustrated for several reasons. In the 
first place, firms differed in what data they regarded as 
being confidential. Most manufacturers, for example, 
provided details on the nature of their deliveries to the 
larger supermarket chains, while others refused to do so on 
the grounds that all aspects of their dealings with 
customers were considered secret. In some cases, firms 
claimed that they either did not record the information 
requested or did not collect it in the required form. 
Moreover, much of the data that was provided for some of the 
variables was not strictly comparable. Firms differed 
markedly, for example, in the units with which they measured 
vehicle utilization and drop sizes. The manufacturers also 
adopted different procedures to estimate the proportion of 
output distributed direct from the factory. As a result of 
these inconsistencies, it was necessary to discard much of 
the data collected. The failure of firms to provide 
comparable data on all the aspects of their distribution 
systems being investigated prevented the compilation of a 
comprehensive data set. I Sample sizes therefore vary 
between indices, though, in the case of most of the 
important variables, are of sufficient size to give a 
representative picture and to permit some quantitative 
analysis. 
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Table 3.2: Proportion of "Own Label" Sales in Various 
Grocery Products (1976-77). 
Product 
Garden Peas 
Processed Peas 
Jam 
Canned Fruit 
Baked Beans 
Dry Pasta 
Hot Breakfast Cereal 
Marmalade 
Margarine 
Biscuits 
Flour 
*Cr isps 
Cold Breakfast Cereal 
Canned Soup 
* figure relates to 1978. 
% of Total Sales 
50 
45 
44 
41 
33 
30 
26 
24 
21 
20 
17 
10 
10 
10 
Source: Mintel and Economist Intelligence Unit Reports. 
Table 3.3: "Own Label" Sales as a Proportion of Total 
Turnover: Sample of 8 Large Grocery Multiples 
(1979). 
Multiple 
Sainsbury 
Waitrose 
Keymarket 
Tesco 
International 
Fine Fare 
Allied Suppliers 
ASDA 
$ of Total Turnover 
55% 
42% 
21% 
21% 
17% 
15% 
14% 
6% 
Source: The Grocer 17/4/82. 
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Three types of information were found to be very 
difficult to obtain. The first related to the volume of 
goods a firm produced and/or distributed. Very few firms 
were either willing or able to provide data on the output of 
factories, depot throughput, shop turnover or the volume of 
flow between premises. In the absence of this data, it is 
not possible to undertake a commodity flow analysis similar 
to those commissioned by the DTp in 1975. It is likely 
that most firms would only provide the necessary flow data 
for such an analysis if legally compelled to do so. A 
study of this type cannot, therefore, analyse the pattern of 
flow directly but must instead make inferences about this 
pattern from data collected on the physical and 
organizational framework within which the movement occurs. 
Firms were also very unwilling to divulge information 
about the production and distribution of "own label" 
products. This was unfortunate as these products were 
estimated to account for around 21% of total grocery sales 
at the time of the survey. This average also concealed 
wide variations between products and supermarket chains in 
the relative importance of own label sales (Tables 3.2 and 
3.3) . In most cases, firms aggregated data on their own 
label business with that for branded products. This 
prevented own label distribution from being given the 
separate consideration which, strictly speaking, it deserves 
and made it impossible to establish the complete network of 
manufacturer-retailer linkages. 
It also proved difficult to obtain historical data on 
the development of firms' distribution systems, even in more 
recent times. The dearth of time-series data limits the 
extent to which one can establish quantitatively trends in 
such variables as depot numbers, drop sizes and the amount 
of direct delivery. The lack of detailed records on 
distribution can be largely attributed to the fragmentation, 
until recently, of managerial responsibility for this sphere 
of company operations, and to the fact that its component 
functions, such as storage and transport, have traditionally 
been held in low regard by company management. Several of 
the distribution departments consulted had experienced a 
fairly rapid rate of staff turnover and, as a result, some 
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of those interviewed had been in post for only a short time 
and had a very limited knowledge of past operations. 
Despite these various constraints, it has been possible 
to amass a considerable wealth of information on the way 
food manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers organize the 
distribution of grocery products. This information will be 
analysed in the following chapters to explore in depth 
the factors influencing the routeing of grocery products 
from factories to shops. 
Chapter Outlines: 
The following chapters examine each of the factors 
identified earlier (p18) as affecting the pattern of grocery 
flow factory to shop. 
Chapter 4 examines the network of marketing channels 
within the grocery trade. The institutional structure of 
these channels provides the framework within which physical 
distribution is organized. Various marketing principles 
are invoked to explain the present allocation of grocery 
sales between the various channels. This explanatory 
section is followed by a brief outline of the way in which 
these channels have evolved. 
Chapter 5 looks at the logistical channels of the three 
main agencies in the marketing channel: manufacturers, 
multiple retailers and wholesalers. An investigation is 
made of the factors affecting each agency's choice between 
direct and indirect channels. 
Chapter 6 examines the links between the sections of 
these channels under the control of manufacturers and 
multiples and asks how these firms jointly decide which mode 
of delivery to use. 
Chapters 7 and 8 examine the physical structure of the 
indirect (or echelon) channels, which contain intervening 
stockholding and transhipment nodes. Chapter 7 suggests 
reasons for variations in the number of depots that firms 
operate, while chapter 8 analyses the spatial distribution 
of these depots and considers the theory and practice of 
depot location. 
Chapter 9 investigates the strategic routeing of bulk 
(or primary) flows from factories to depots. 
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The size and shape of the areas served by the various 
types of depot is examined in the first section of chapter 
10 and this leads on to a brief consideration of the 
routeing of delivery vehicles through these areas on their 
41 way to retail outlets. The Co-operative movement's 
involvement in the production and distribution of groceries 
is the subject of Appendix 3. The structure of this 
organization is considered to be sufficiently different from 
those of the other agencies to justify giving it separate 
attention. In Chapter 11 an attempt is made to incorporate 
the main findings of chapters 4- 10 into an explanation of 
recent trends in the movement of food indicated by official 
transport statistics. The concluding chapter assesses the 
value of this approach to the study of freight flows and 
discusses the implications of the main findings of this 
research for freight forecasting and the rationalization of 
goods movements. 
Notes: 
1. The Semantics of Channel Structure: It is important at 
the outset to clarify the definitions of three terms that 
will appear frequently in the forthcoming chapters: they are 
marketing channel, distribution channel and logistical 
channel. In the marketing literature different authors use 
the expressions "marketing channels" (e. g. Guirdham, 1972) 
and "distribution channels" (e. g. Gattorna, 1978) 
synonomously to refer to the different stages in the 
transfer of goods from producer to retailer. In some cases 
this transfer entails the physical movement of goods between 
the premises of the different agencies. In others it 
results merely in the shift of ownership and risk-taking. 
Where actual movement is involved it is common to describe 
the route followed as a "logistical channel". This route 
can either be plotted via organizations of via the premises 
they operate. This is an important distinction because 
some organizations operate nodes at more than one stage in 
the logistical channel. As our interest here lies 
principally in the physical pattern of flow, " logistical 
channels" will hereafter be taken to mean the route linking 
premises through which goods pass on their way from factory 
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to shop, or a section of this route under the control of a 
single organization. 
2. The definition of "groceries" will not be as broad as 
that of Briggs and Smyth (1967). 
3. Although the threshold of 20 shops is larger than the 
conventional definition of a multiple (more than 10 stores),, 
it can be partly justified on the grounds that "economies of 
scale in retailing only become noticeable at the 15-20 
branch level" (Hall et al., 1961). 
I- 
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Chapter 4 
Marketing Channels in the Grocery Trade 
The manner in which a product is distributed is 
determined largely by the way in which it is marketed. The 
investigation of the structure of the food distribution 
system must, therefore, encroach upon the science of 
marketing. Much of the literature on marketing is devoted 
to classifying channels on an institutional basis and 
examining the trading activities of the agencies they 
connect. Differences in the organizational structure of a 
channel need not, however, be manifest in differences in the 
physical distribution of goods. As this thesis is concerned 
principally with the actual patterns of storage and 
transport, the main interest lies in the logistical 
consequences of assigning goods to particular marketing 
channels. First, however, one must examine the network of 
marketing channels. 
This chapter considers the range of channels used in 
the grocery trade, reviews the theoretical arguments that 
have been advanced to explain the relative importance of 
these channels and outlines their historical evolution over 
the past century. 
The Choice of Marketing Channels 
Of the numerous definitions proposed for the term 
"marketing" that of Dawson (1979) is probably the simplest 
and most comprehensive; it states that it is "concerned with 
the transfer of goods from the producer to the consumer". 
This transfer is seldom direct. In most cases, the goods 
pass through one or more distributive agencies. These 
agencies are linked by a series of trading arrangements into 
a marketing channel. In addition to transporting and 
storing goods, these agencies must decide which products to 
stock, promote these products and assume the risks of 
temporary ownership. The distributive system should not 
simply be seen, therefore, as a "mechanistic system" of 
transport and storage (Thorpe, 1978). To understand the 
workings of this system, one must give due attention to 
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other, less tangible marketing considerations. 
Marketing channels have two dimensions (Guirdham, 1972): 
1. INTENSITY: The number of separate transactions made at 
each level of the distributive system - particularly at the 
retail level. 
2. DIRECTNESS: The number of separate agencies linked 
together in the vertical channel from producer to consumer. 
Intensity and directness vary inversely. If there are 
many buying points to contact at a particular stage in a 
channel, the number of transactions can be reduced by 
dealing through a much smaller number of intermediaries. 
As illustrated in figure 4.1, in the absence of an 
intermediary, producers must trade directly with retailers, 
giving rise to a large number of transactions, equivalent to 
the product of the numbers of producers and retailers (Artle 
and Berglund, 1959). The presence of an intermediary can 
streamline the distributive network by reducing the number 
of transactions to the sum of the numbers of producers and 
retailers. The use of intermediaries thereby reduces the 
number of trading links, but at the expense of lengthening 
the vertical channel. Given a certain number of producers, 
the demand for a wholesale intermediary will depend on the 
number of retail outlets that must be supplied. The 
hierarchical structure of the marketing system is, 
therefore, largely shaped by the number of outlets at the 
retail level. 
Broadly speaking, the number of retail outlets through 
which a product is sold depends on two factors: 
i) Size and spatial distribution of the population. 
ii) Shopping behaviour of the population (distance 
travelled to shops, frequency of shopping, amount of 
searching and comparison. ) 
If one takes the size and distribution of population as 
given and focusses attention on shopping behaviour, one 
finds that the manner of purchase varies considerably 
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Figure 4.1: , Structure of a Marketing System. 
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With 10 producers and 100 retailers: 
without wholesaler: 1000 transactions 
with wholesaler: 110 transactions 
Presence of wholesaler reduces the no. of transactions by 89%. 
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between different types of product. Attempts have been 
made to classify products on the basis of their pattern of 
consumption and to relate the resulting product types to the 
structure of the marketing channels through which they are 
distributed. The first of these attempts by Copeland 
(1924) classified goods into three categories: 
Convenience Goods: (e. g. groceries) purchased 
frequently and generally of low value. People are not 
prepared to expend much time or effort in shopping for them 
and willing to accept substitute brands. 
Shopping Goods: (e. g. clothing, footwear) are less 
freguently purchased and of higher value. The decision to 
buy them is based on more searching and comparison. More 
effort goes into "shopping around" for the preferred brand 
or model. 
Speciality Goods: (e. g. jewelry, furniture) are 
generally expensive, infrequently purchased goods for which 
people will expend considerable time and effort in shopping. 
Copeland's simple classification was intended to offer 
manufacturers guidance on how best to market their products. 
A manufacturer of convenience goods would be well advised to 
distribute his products through a large number of retail 
outlets, because, if they were not available in a shop many 
shoppers would make do with an alternative item or brand in 
preference to trying elsewhere. Convenience goods are 
therefore marketed "intensively" at the retail level. In 
contrast, the sale of shopping and speciality goods could be 
confined to a smaller number of retail outlets as consumers 
would "shop around" for them. 
Christaller incorporated Copeland's product 
classification into hA Central Place Theory, ordering goods 
according to the distances people travelled to obtain them 
(Christaller, 1933). Outlets for convenience goods which 
he described as "low order", would, he argued, be widely 
dispersed throughout the settlement hierarchy, higher order 
goods would be available only in the large centres. 
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As the science of marketing evolved, it was realised 
that Copeland's classification was too crude to be of much 
use in the formulation of marketing strategies. An 
important refinement of Copeland's discrete classification 
was made by Aspinwall (1958). 
He arranged goods along a continuous scale based on five 
marketing characteristics: 
a) Replacement Rate 
b) Gross Margin 
c) Service required by customers 
d) Time involved in consumption 
e) Searching time 
Relative measurements based on these five criteria 
could be used to calculate an overall index I as follows: 
I= b+ c+ d+ e- a 
The intensity with which a product is marketed tends 
to vary inversely with this index. Low values correspond to 
Copeland's "convenience" goods, higher values to "shopping" 
and "speciality" goods. Although more recent work has 
suggested further improvements to this product 
classification, Aspinwall's scheme will suffice in the 
present context. 
In Copel and' s scheme, food was classified as a 
convenience good. This is confirmed by an assessment of 
food on the basis of Aspinwall's five marketing 
characteristics: 
a) High replacement rate: food products, especially 
perishable ones, are bought very frequently. Almost all 
households make at least one major shopping trip for food 
per week and several minor ones. The freqency of these 
trips is declining, however. 
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b) Low gross margin: as shown on Table 4.1, the gross 
margin for grocery products is lower than that of most other 
products. 
c) Few services required by customers: most food sales 
require little service as demonstrated by the fact that 
self-service shopping has developed most extensively in the 
food trade. 
d) Little time involved in consumption: Most food products 
have a comparatively rapid consumption rate. Most 
households carry only small stocks of' most foodstuffs, 
though these stocks are increasing as the frequency of 
shopping trips diminishes and greater use is made of home 
freezers. 
e) Little searching time: most shoppers will devote little 
time to searching for particular brands of food product. 
Shoppers will tend to purchase only what is available in one 
or two stores. Table 4.2 indicates how customers react when 
unable to obtain their preferred product in a shop. In the 
case of immediate use food products, fewer than a third 
would look elsewhere for the desired item. Slightly more 
(45%) would search for an "extended use" product elsewhere. 
Food is, therefore, marketed very intensively at the 
retail level. This is indicated by the relatively large 
number of retail outlets selling food (Table 4.3). This 
great dispersal of retail food sales has been conducive to 
the development of an intermediate wholesaling stage in the 
distributive system. 
Great care must be taken, however, in defining this 
wholesaling stage. Many of the traditional functions of 
the wholesaler have been taken over by multiple retailers 
and to a decreasing extent, the larger food manufacturer. 
As these firms consolidate, store and sort goods in their 
own warehouses and provide shop delivery, they may be 
considered part of the "wholesale structure" (Mossman and 
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Table 4.1: Gross Margins of a Variety of Product Groups 
(1971). (expressed as a% of turnover. ) 
Product Group Gross Margin 
Grocery and Provisions 19.9% 
Confectionery, Tobacco and Newspapers 20.4% 
Books and Stationery 30.6% 
Hardware, China, Wallpaper, Paint 31.2% 
Drugs, Cosmetics, Photography 33.8% 
Furniture and Allied Products 34.6% 
Electrical Products 34.7% 
Jewellry, Leather and Sports Goods 35.3% 
Clothing and Footwear 36.4% 
Source: Census of Distribution (1971). 
Table 4.2: Customer Reactions to Desired Product Being 
Out of Stock. 
FOOD NON FOOD 
Extended Use Immediate Use 
Bought Substitute 32% 48% 26% 
Returned to Buy in 23% 21% 33% 
Same Store Later. 
Bought Elsewhere 45% 31% 41% 
Source: Neilsen Researcher (1979) 
Table 4.3: Numbers of Retail Outlets Selling Different Types 
of Product (1971). 
Product Group 
Grocery and Provisions 
Confectionery, Tobacco, Newspapers 
Furniture and Allied Products 
Electrical Products 
Men- and Boyswear 
Chemists 
Footwear 
Jewellry, Watches, Clocks 
Wallpaper, Pa nt 
Books, Stationery 
Toys 
Cycles, Motor Accessories 
Photographic, optical 
China, Glassware 
108,282 
52,751 
22,777 
18,216 
15,722 
14,746 
14,326 
8,013 
6,754 
6,239 
3,521 
2,232 
1,924 
1,737 
Source: Census of Distribution (1971) 
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Morton, 1965). In terms of the organizational structure of 
marketing channels, they have effectively eliminated the 
independent wholesale stage in the distribution of m ost 
processed foods. As McClelland (1966) has pointed out, the 
multiples have converted the link between the shop and the 
warehouse that supplies it from a "market" relationship to 
an "organizational" one. Whilst this has made the 
marketing channels more direct in an institutional sense it 
has not normally had the same effect on the correspond ing 
logistical channels. The extension of the producers' and 
retailers' control into the realm of wholesaling has 
generally resulted in the substitution of a manufacturer's 
distribution depot or retailer's central warehouse for what 
was previously a wholesale warehouse. Where this has 
happened, the number of nodes in the logistical channel has 
remained the same. As will be explained later, however, 
these different types of warehouse vary significantly in 
their operating characteristics. 
Historical Development of Marketing Channels in the Grocery 
Trade. 
Although the origins of several of today's large food 
manufacturers, such as Cadbury, Huntley-Palmer and Birds 
(now part of General Foods) can be traced back to the early 
19th Century, the main growth of the food processing 
industry occurred after 1850. As income levels rose so the 
population could afford to include more, higher-value 
processed foods in their diets (Oddy and Miller, 1976). The 
nascent food processing industries also took advantage of 
the flood of cheap food imports that arrived in Britain in 
the latter half of the 19th Century (Mathias, 1967). 
The new food products placed new demands on the system 
of food distribution. There is some disagreement over the 
state of food distribution around the middle of the 19th 
Century, particularly over the proportions of trade held by 
market stalls and "lock-up" shops (Scola, 1975). There is 
general agreement, however, that the latter increased 
rapidly in importance in the second half of the 19th Century 
and began catering for a much wider public. The Victorian 
revolution in grocery distribution methods, therefore, 
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coincided with, and was undoubtedly promoted by, the 
development of food manufacturing. 
Until the 1850s, the food processing firms "were still 
generally small scale and unrevolutionised, supplying a 
narrow market in much the same way as they had done in 
centuries past" (Burnett, 1968). From then on, however, 
the scale of production increased sharply, concentrating 
food manufacturing in a smaller number of larger factories 
and lengthening the average distance products had to travel 
to the point of sale. This extension of the supply line 
between producer and retailer created conditions conducive 
to the emergence of intermediaries: 
"In most trades up to the turn of the century at least, 
any widening of the gap in time and space between the 
producer and the retailer tended to result in the 
intervention of an intermediary, and the widening of this 
gap was one of the main characteristics of economic 
development in these years. " (Jefferys, 1954) 
This "gap in time" to which Jefferys refers, was not 
simply the time goods spent in transit, but also the time 
spent in storage at various points along the chain of 
distribution. Haberler (quoted in Isard (1956)) has noted 
the close analogy between transport and storage, the former 
effecting movement through space, the latter a movement 
through time. The "intermediaries" which Jefferys 
described assumed responsibility for the movement of goods 
in both dimensions. The principal type of intermediary who 
flourished over this period was the wholesaler. 
The principal raison d'etre for wholesaling, that of 
greatly reducing the number of trading links in the 
marketing system, has been outlined earlier. In addition 
to raising the "transactional efficiency" (Gattorna, 1978) 
of the system, the wholesaler could also enhance the 
efficiency of the supporting transport operation by 
encouraging the movement of goods in bulk loads. Incoming 
goods could be received in bulk consignments from suppliers; 
orders being dispatched to retailers in consolidated mixed 
loads. By storing goods locally, the wholesaler could also 
satisfy retailers' needs at much shorter notice than distant 
suppliers, particularly as long distance transport at this 
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time (late 19th Century) was relatively slow and unreliable 
(Vance, 1970). 
Multiple retailing also developed rapidly in the 
grocery trade from the 1870s onwards. This trade was 
particularly suited to the growth of multiples. As food 
was a "convenience" good for which people preferred not to 
travel very far, it made more sense for the expanding food 
retailer to open new branches, thereby, competing on the 
basis of proximity to customer, rather than simply enlarge 
his existing premises (Jefferys, 1954). Groceries were 
also suited to chain store retailing by virtue of their 
relatively low perishability, high level of standardization 
and easy bulk handling (Braithwaite and Dobbs, 1932). It 
was common practice for multiples at an early stage in their 
growth to receive a high proportion of their supplies at the 
main and often original shop in the chain. There these 
goods were stored and sorted, before being transported, 
usually in the retailer's own cart to the outlying premises. 
As the number of branches and the total volume of trade 
grew, it generally became necessary for the multiple 
retailer to establish a separate warehouse where storage, 
sorting, packaging and even some processing could be 
centralized. The multiple retailer, thereby, effectively 
took upon himself the functions of wholesaler, the large 
scale of his operations enabling him to deal direct with 
manufacturers. This absorption of the wholesaling function 
by the multiple can be considered a major advantage as it 
led "to the reduction or elimination of some wholesaling 
costs, notably a reduction in risk-taking and selling 
costs" (Fulop, 1964). 
The third type of organization to play a major role in 
the distribution of processed foods in late Victorian times 
were the Cooperative Societies. Following the success of 
the Rochdale Society, founded in 1844, many others sprang up 
around the country providing unadulterated food and good 
quality clothing for the working classes. With the 
formation of the Cooperative Wholesale Society in 1864 (in 
England), the retailing societies obtained collectively 
their own wholesaling and production agency. ' CWS factories 
were set up to manufacture some staple foodstuffs, while CWS 
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warehouses were heavily engaged in the distribution of 
processed foods. The institutional structure of the Coop, 
however, prevented the retailing and wholesaling functions 
from being integrated to the same degree as in the multiples 
(see Appendix 3). 
The growing trade in processed foods helped transform 
traditional methods of retailing. Formerly the "fixed 
shop" retailer had catered for the wealthier classes, using 
specialist skills to select, grade, prepare and package 
groceries to suit his customers tastes. Many 
factory-produced foods came standardised, ready packaged, 
branded and advertised, removing the need for the retailer 
to do much more than place the goods on display. Food 
manufacturers, therefore, took an active role in marketing 
their products. Jefferys' comments on the marketing of 
"consumer goods" could have applied equally well to 
processed food: 
"The growing complexity of the production of consumer 
goods, the increased amounts of capital laid out in 
machinery and buildings and the greater volume of output 
meant that the large scale producers could not afford, while 
planning their production, to leave the distribution of 
their goods unplanned and dependent on the whims and fancies 
of wholesalers, retailers and consumers" (Jefferys, 1954, 
p12). 
With the growth in the scale of food manufacturing, the 
intensification of competition among food producers and the 
proliferation of product lines came an increasing 
dissatisfaction, on the part of food manufacturers, with the 
quality of service provided by wholesalers. Many 
wholesalers, it was felt, paid too little regard to brand 
names and often failed to bring new products to the 
attention of their retail customers. They were also 
failing to meet the high standards of stock control and 
delivery service demanded by more perishable products, such 
as margarine. 
Manufacturers of these products were quick to take 
advantage of the concentration of food sales in the hands of 
multiple retailers. Many of these grocery multiples had 
expanded rapidly selling limited ranges of cheap, imported 
food such as bacon, butter and tea to the working classes. 
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As demand grew for processed foodstuffs, however, the 
multiples began to diversify into these products and soon 
became major customers of the food manufacturers. The 
concentration of sales through multiples reached a 
particularly high level in the case of margarine. In 1912, 
one large multiple alone (the Maypole Dairy 'Company) 
accounted for a third of national margarine sales (Mathias, 
1967). 
The desire to exert more control over the marketing and 
supply of their products encouraged the larger food 
manufacturers to establish their own systems of distribution 
capable of delivering goods direct to the retailer. 
Although some manufacturers made early moves in this 
direction before the first world war, the practice of 
dealing direct with the retailer developed mainly in the 
inter-war period. Manufacturers were keen to promote their 
products at store level and ensure that they were available 
through as many outlets as possible. 
Over the inter-war period the number of grocery outlets 
increased substantially. Between 1919 and 1940, the number 
of multiple branch stores rose by 65-70% and Cooperative 
Society branch stores by 55-60% (Jefferys, 1954). Although 
there are no comparable figures for the number of 
independent grocery stores, it appears that, despite having 
suffered a slight decline immediately prior to 1914, this 
sector expanded and prospered in the inter-war period, 
largely as a result of food manufacturers' efforts to 
maximise the number of outlets for their products. In 
addition to offering direct delivery to these stores and 
assistance with merchandising, many manufacturers also 
protected the small independent against competition form 
larger scale retailers by enforcing retail price 
maintenance. This prevented the larger operators from 
translating their lower unit costs into lower prices and 
effectively eliminated price competition (Yamey, 1966; 
Jefferys, 1954). By 1939, over a third of grocery sales 
were subject to retail price maintenance (Kuipers, 1950). 
Nevertheless, the growth in food sales in the inter-war 
period was sufficient to enable the multiples and 
Cooperative Societies to expand without a major displacement 
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of trade from the independents (fig. 4.2). 
As a result of the changes that occurred in food 
distribution between the wars, the wholesalers suffered a 
loss of business. Their share of the trade was squeezed 
from both ends of the marketing channel. On the one hand 
they were bypassed by those manufacturers who began 
offerring their retail customers a direct delivery. " On the 
other, their trade was eroded by multiples and Cooperative 
Societies, which undertook their own wholesaling. By 1938, 
only about 35% of groceries were being channelled through 
wholesalers, the remainder passing direct from producers to 
retailers (Jefferys, 1954). This average figure, however, 
conceals variations in the channel allocations of particular 
food products (Table 4.4). 
The inter-war trends in food distribution were 
interrupted by the imposition of war-time controls on food 
consumption (rationing), manufacturing (concentration of 
production programme) and distribution ("sector" and 
"zoning" schemes) (Hammond, 1954). The rationing of some 
food products continued into the 1950s. In this early 
postwar period there were also restrictions placed on the 
construction of new shops and warehouses. Official policy 
at this time of reconstruction was initially'to regenerate 
the nation's industrial base (Hill, 1966). Only from the 
mid-1950s onwards did distributive facilities receive 
significant investment. 
By then the inter-war trends in distribution had begun 
to reassert themselves. The multiples and Cooperatives 
increased their share of the grocery market, now at the 
expense of the smaller independent stores as well as their 
wholesale suppliers (Stacy and Wilson, 1958). The larger 
retail organizations strengthened their competitive position 
by introducing self-service into their stores. This method 
of selling was first employed in Britain in 1938, but only 
developed on a large scale in the 1950s. In 1947, there 
were ten self-service stores in Britain; by 1962 this number 
had grown to 11,850. The introduction of self-service was 
spurred by the rising cost of labour in the period of near 
full employment in the 1950s. It was also found to be a 
way of increasing turnover per unit of sales area (Duft, 
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Figure 4.3: Reduction in the Number of Grocery Stores, 1951- 
1979. 
Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission (1981). 
Table 4.4: Variations in the Proportions of Selected Grocery 
Products Channelled Through Wholesalers (1938): 
Product % of Total Sales 
Canned Evaporated Milk 57.5 
Canned Soup 45 
Canned Peaches 45 
Jam 37.5 
Tea 22.5 
Chocolate Biscuits 12.5 
Source: Jefferys (1950). 
Table 4.5: Distribution of Groceries to Independent Stores. 
Approximate Proportions of Turnover 
Supplier Voluntary Group Shops Unaffiliated 
Independents 
Voluntary 
Group Wholesaler 66% 
Cash and Carry 18% 68% 
Traditional 
Wholesaler - 10% 
Producer 16% 22% 
100% 100% 
Sources: Bates (1976), Economist Intelligence Unit (1980). 
56 61 66 71 76 1979 
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1967). The rapid and widespread application of the self 
service principle in food retailing was made possible by the 
extensive branding and prepackaging of grocery products 
(National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1971). It was also 
readily accepted by the public which at the time sought a 
faster and more convenient method of shopping (Hill, 1966). 
The success of the early self-service stores prompted their 
enlargement into "supermarkets". These larger retail units 
( >2000 square feet of sales area) offered the operator 
numerous economies of scale and the consumer the attraction 
of a wider range of products. The Cooperative Societies 
pioneered both self-service stores and supermarkets in 
Britain and operated the largest number of these stores 
until the early 1960s when they were overtaken by the 
multiples which went on to exploit the advantages of 
self-service retailing more fully. 
Although the - development of larger and less 
labour- intensive stores enabled the multiples and Coops to 
reduce their unit costs, retail price maintenance initially 
prevented them from lowering many of their prices. It did, 
however, increase their profitability and, particularly in 
the case of the multiples, provided the financial resources 
to set up new stores. There was a major relaxation of 
retail price maintenance in the grocery trade in 1957-8, and 
this helped the multiples to increase their market share 
from 22% to 27% between 1957 and 1961. The passing of 
legislation in 1964 to eliminate r. p. m. from the grocery 
trade heralded a new era of price competition when the 
smaller independent retailer was increasingly undercut by 
the larger operator. 
The independents were, nevertheless, supported in their 
struggle against the multiples by two wholesaling 
innovations introduced in the 1950s. The formation of 
voluntary groups established closer links between 
wholesalers and retailers, enabling them to share some of 
the benefits of bulk buying and collective advertising 
enjoyed by the multiples (Fulop, 1962; NEDO, 1971b). Early 
reluctance on the part of food manufacturers to deal 
centrally with voluntary groups was soon overcome (Duft, 
1967). The development of "cash and carries" extended the 
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practice of self-service into wholesaling, offering retail 
customers lower prices by cutting back on such traditional 
wholesale services as order picking, delivery and the 
provision of credit. 
Despite these initiatives, small scale retailing 
continued to decline, not only because of competition from 
the multiples, but also partly as a consequence of other 
developments such as urban renewal and the introduction of 
Selective Employment Tax (Dawson and Kirby, 1979). Many 
small shops also suffered from the growing tendency in the 
1960s and 1970s for food manufacturers to stop delivering 
small orders direct to the small retail outlet. 
The contraction of manufacturers' delivery networks was 
partly a cost cutting exercise and partly a result of a 
change in marketing policy. Many manufacturers recognised 
that, for several reasons, it was no longer essential to 
trade direct with smaller retailers. The collective share 
of the grocery market held by these retailers had, after 
all, shrunk through their loss of sales to the multiples and 
the Cooperative Societies (figure 4.2). The manufacturers 
were also quite confident that by terminating deliveries to 
these shops they would not be seriously jeopardising their 
sales. This confidence rested partly on the knowledge 
that alternative channels existed in voluntary group 
wholesaling and "cash and carries" through which the small 
retailer could still obtain their products. Many 
manufacturers also believed that the brand loyalty they had 
so desperately sought to build up earlier in the century was 
now sufficiently strong to guarantee sales through these 
outlets even in the absence of a direct promotional link. 
Moreover, alternative methods of marketing were now 
available in the form of television and newspaper 
advertising, which could enable the food manufacturers to 
stimulate consumer demand more directly. By the early 
1970s food manufacturers accounted for almost a quarter of 
total advertising expenditure-(Wardle, 1977). 
The withdrawal of manufacturers' deliveries to small 
independents created in the early 1970s a resurgence of 
demand for the services of wholesalers (National Board for 
Prices and Incomes, 1971; Smith, 1975). This increase in 
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business was short-lived, however, as the independent sector 
continued to contract and as the wholesalers, like the 
manufacturers, found it necessary to cut back on the 
uneconomic delivery of small orders (White, 1973). 
In the 1960s and 70s the multiples also began to win 
sales from the Cooperative Societies. The dispersal of the 
Coop's food retailing activities among hundreds of 
autonomous retail societies and the failure to coordinate 
its wholesaling and retail wings more closely prevented the 
organization from marshalling its huge buying power and 
fully exploiting economies of scale. Much of its profit 
was also distributed in dividends when it could have been 
invested in more modern facilities (Davies, 1976). 
As the multiple sector has expanded, its share of the 
market has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of 
a small number of large supermarket chains. Metcalf (1968) 
concluded that "at the national level the retail grocery 
industry is one of low concentration. ", though he 
acknowledged that the concentration of trade through the 
multiples had reached a high level in some regions. In the 
1970s, the levels of concentration, nationally and 
regionally, have greatly increased conferring on the larger 
multiples enough bargaining power for them to demand larger 
discounts from the producers, considerably extend their 
ranges of "own label" products and dictate to the 
manufacturers conditions for the delivery and promotion of 
their branded goods (Howe, 1983). 
Through the development in the 1970s of superstores and 
limited range discount stores, the multiples have taken 
advantage of the increased mobility and purchasing power of 
shoppers to intensify their competition for grocery sales. 
The concentration of sales through fewer, larger retailers 
and in a smaller number of larger stores has since 1961 led 
to a steady reduction in the number of grocery outlets 
(Hunt, 1983) (fig. 4.3). In addition to the closure of many 
small independent shops, the multiples and Cooperative 
Retail Societies have, in the 1970s, been shutting many of 
their smaller branches and consolidating their sales area in 
larger premises (Institute of Grocery Distribution, 1982). 
This concentration of grocery retailing has, however, helped 
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to create a new role for the small independent store. Many 
people today make "top up" purchases from these local shops 
between relatively infrequent, bulk buying visits to the 
superstore. 
Figure 4.4 shows how the allocation of grocery turnover 
between the main marketing channels has changed over the 
period 1938 to 1978. Although, overall, the proportion of 
grocery sales channelled through wholesalers was very 
similar in the two years (at 35-6%), this general figure 
conceals several important developments over the intervening 
period. In the first place, it conceals significant 
changes in the relative importance of the wholesale channel 
to particular grocery products (NEDO, 1971a) . Second, 
there has been a sharp reduction in the number of direct 
links between producers and unit retailers. This has been 
offset, however, by the large increase in the proportion of 
sales through multiples, which almost invariably deal 
directly with producers. In 1938, the multiples accounted 
for around 38% of the direct flow of groceries from producer 
to retailer; by 1978-9, this proportion had risen to 82%. 
Third, in 1978-9, the majority of supplies channelled 
through wholesalers were collected by the retailer from cash 
and carry warehouses, which did not exist in 1938. There 
has been a very large reduction in the proportion of 
groceries delivered by the wholesaler. Changes in the 
allocation of grocery flows among marketing channels, 
therefore, partly reflect variations in the relative 
importance of the different types of retail organization, 
but are also the result of producers and wholesalers 
curtail ing deliveries to small 'unit retailers. The 
distribution of groceries to small independent shops is 
discussed in greater detail in the next section. 
Supply of Groceries to Independent Stores. 
Independent grocery stores can obtain their supplies 
from four possible sources: cash and carry, voluntary group 
wholesaler, traditional wholesaler or the producer. Few 
up-to-date statistics are available on the proportions of 
independents' supplies obtained from these sources. A 
79 
survey by Thorpe et al. (1973) provided the following 
estimates: 
Cash and Carries 42% 
Voluntary Groups 35% 
Traditional Wholesaler 4% 
Producer 19% 
Some of these figures can be updated with the results of 
more recent surveys. On the basis of a sample of 800 shops 
in 8 areas, Bates (1976) estimated that 48% of independents' 
supplies were obtained from cash and carry warehouses. 
This apparent increase in the importance of the cash and 
carry was confirmed by an Economist Intelligence Unit survey 
(1980), which established that independents acquired roughly 
half their supplies from this source. Some of this 
additional cash and carry trade appears to have been 
displaced from voluntary group wholesalers, some of which 
have raised their minimum drop sizes. The survey of four 
large voluntary groups in 1978-9 suggested that their 
relative importance had declined. On the basis of this 
survey, the voluntary group wholesalers share of the 
independent market should be revised downward to around 27%. 
It is also likely that some of the growth in cash and carry 
sales is the result of manufacturers curtailing an 
increasing number of deliveries to independent stores. 
Although most manufacturers had stopped delivering supplies 
to the smaller independents prior to 1972, minimum drop 
sizes continued to rise after this date forcing larger 
independents to obtain their supplies from alternative 
sources. Also after this date two large food manufacturers 
(one of tea and the other of crisps) abandoned van sales 
operations and replaced them with systems of pre-ordered 
deliveries to much smaller numbers of independents. The 
growing popularity of cash and carry warehouses may also be 
partly attributed to the fact that they tend to hold a wider 
range of stock than delivered trade warehouses, particularly 
of non-food products (Tanburn, 1981). 
These average channel allocation figures conceal wide 
variations between independent shops in their use of the 
various sources. A major distinction can be drawn between 
stores belonging to voluntary groups and "pure independents" 
that are not affiliated to a voluntary group. Independents 
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are fairly evenly divided between these two categories. 
Table 4.5 shows the approximate channel allocations for 
these two types of independent store, again using data 
compiled by Thorpe et al. (1973). The survey of voluntary 
groups in 1978-9 revealed that on average independents 
'affiliated to voluntary groups have been reducing the 
proportion of supplies obtained from group wholesalers. It 
is likely that there has been a corresponding increase in 
the use of cash and carries by voluntary group affiliated 
retailers. Between 80 and 90% of these retailers are 
believed to use cash and carries. 
Few reliable statistics could be found on the supply of 
goods to unaffiliated retailers. According to Thorpe' s 
estimates, it would appear that the proportion of their 
supplies obtained from producers may be slightly higher than 
that which voluntary group retailers acquire from this 
source. This is a surprising finding as the ability of 
stores to qualify for direct delivery is closely related to 
shop size and as the unaffiliated stores have been shown to 
be significantly smaller than their voluntary group 
counterparts in terms of both sales area and turnover 
(Bates, 1976). Deliveries from traditional wholesalers are 
estimated to account for around a third of their supplies 
(Tanburn, 1981). As this represents less than 5% of total 
grocery sales, no separate survey was done of this sector of 
the market. Attention is confined to voluntary group and 
cash and carry operations. 
summary 
As a convenience good, food is marketed intensively 
through a comparatively large number of retail outlets. 
This has created a demand for an intermediate wholesaling 
stage in the distribution of grocery products. In the 
latter half of the 19th century, most of the wholesaling 
work was undertaken by separate agencies. Over the past 50 
years, however, the role of the independent wholesaler has 
considerably diminished. The wholesaler has been bypassed 
on the one hand by manufacturers keen to promote their 
products more heavily at the retail outlet and, on the 
other, by those multiple retailers who, by operating their 
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own warehouses and transport fleets, have assumed 
responsibility for the traditional wholesale functions of 
bulk storage and shop delivery. The growth of the 
multiples' market share from around 20% in 1950 to 56% in 
1982 (Monopolies and Mergers Commission, 1981; Nielsen 
Researcher, 1983) has resulted in a major erosion of trade 
from the wholesaler and increased the importance in the 
grocery trade of direct links between producer and retailer. 
To help stem this loss of business, wholesalers have changed 
their trading practices and the nature of the services they 
offer. This has partly involved transferring 
responsibility for the transport of supplies to small 
independent retailers. 
The displacement of grocery business from indirect to 
direct marketing channels has been promoted by a host of 
factors, the most important of which can be summarised under 
the following headings: 
1. Economic factors: a) as a result of increases in the 
scale and capital intensity of production, food 
manufacturers sought greater control over the final sale of 
their products. 
b) economies of scale in food 
retailing and the benefits of self-service selling have been 
more fully exploited by the multiples, giving them a more 
competitive cost structure. 
c) the multiples accumulated the 
capital necessary to set up storage and delivery systems. 
2. Technological factors: improvements in food 
processing, packaging and materials handling facilitated 
direct bulk delivery from manufacturers to retailers and the 
adoption of self-service in supermarkets. 
3. Social factors: the greater affluence and mobility of 
shoppers, coupled with a desire to shop less frequently and 
for larger amounts, has permitted a spatial concentration of 
grocery sales in fewer, larger outlets, the vast majority of 
which are operated by multiples which deal directly with 
manufacturers. 
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4. Legal factors: the relaxation and ultimate abolition 
of retail price maintenance freed the multiples to compete 
on the basis of price and thereby win sales from smaller, 
less efficient, independent outlets. 
As the importance of the wholesaler as a separate agency 
in the distribution of groceries has diminished, the 
functions of localised storage and store delivery have been 
taken over increasingly by food manufacturers and multiple 
retailers. To assess how this change in the organizational 
structure of the marketing channel has affected the way in 
which groceries are physically distributed, one must examine 
the systems of distribution that the manufacturers and 
multiples have substituted for that of the traditional 
wholesaler. The nature of these alternative systems, which 
today account for around two thirds of the total sales of 
processed foods (Tanburn, 1981), is discussed at length in 
the following chapters. In the next chapter it is shown 
that these systems comprise different logistical channels, 
and that as a result of various factors, the relative usage 
of these channels by manufacturers and multiple retailers 
can vary widely. 
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Chapter 5 
Logistical Channels 
Like marketing channels, logistical channels can be 
considered to have two dimensions: 
i) VERTICAL: the number of nodes and links that comprise 
the route from factory to shop. 
ii) HORIZONTAL: the number of similar nodes at each stage 
in this route (or supply line). 
This chapter will examine the various components in the 
sections of the vertical channel controlled by 
manufacturers, multiple retailers and wholesalers. Chapter 
6 will consider the way in which these are integrated into 
complete logistical channels, extending from factories to 
shops. 
FOOD MANUFACTURERS 
Before analysing the present structure of manufacturers' 
distribution systems, it will be useful to examine the way 
in which these systems have evolved. 
Historical Development of Manufacturers' Distribution 
Systems: 
A simple, four-stage evolutionary modelt has been 
devised to illustrate the development of food manufacturers' 
distibution systems (figure 5.1): 
Stage 1: Extension of the Market Area 
As the larger food manufacturers extended their market 
areas in the latter half of the 19th century, they were 
heavily dependent on the railways for long distance 
transport and on wholesalers for localised stockholding, 
merchandising and delivery. It was common for firms to use 
their own vehicles to distribute products to customers in 
the vicinity of the factory. Cadbury, for example, 
employed its own carts and later motorised vans to serve 
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the Birmingham area from its Bourneville factory (Rogers, 
1931). The size of area served direct from the factory was 
tightly constrained at this time by the poor state of the 
road network and the technical limitations of road vehicles. 
This similarly restricted the hinterland of the railway 
depots through which the remainder of the company's business 
passed. The railway cartage services, for example, 
provided road delivery only within a radius of two or three 
miles of the railway terminal (Reader, 1969). In many 
cases, however, wholesale or large retail customers would 
use their own vehicles to collect supplies from the 
railhead. 
Distribution at this time was characterised by small 
consignment, size, slow carriage and limited stockholding at 
or near the point of sale. Because local delivery by road 
was difficult and costly, goods generally travelled to the 
rail depot nearest to the customer before being transferred 
onto a road vehicle. The flow of these goods through the 
railway network was, therefore, highly dispersed, 
distributing small, individually wrapped consignments 
through a vast number of rail depots. Frequent marshalling 
and sorting of this traffic en route greatly lengthened the 
transit time. More distant customers might have to wait 
several weeks for supplies they ordered direct from the 
producer. Given the long lead times, the wholesaler had an 
important function in holding stocks locally and satisfying 
retailers' needs at comparatively short notice. 
As time passed, however, the food manufacturers became 
increasingly dissatisfied with this system of distribution. 
They realised that the growth in their volume of sales was 
being inhibited by long lead times, poor stocking practices 
and the general failure of intermediaries to promote their 
particular brands (Corley, 1972). As the manufacturers were 
investing heavily in new plant, they were anxious to ensure 
that this investment yielded a good return (Jefferys, 1954). 
As explained earlier, most criticism was levelled at 
the wholesalers who, it was felt, paid too little regard to 
brand names and often failed to bring new products to the 
attention of their retail customers. This became less 
tolerable as competition between manufacturers, whose market 
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areas in many cases now completely overlapped, intensified 
and as they tried to increase sales by developing new types 
of processed food. 
Stage 2: Development of Depot and Delivery System 
In an effort to extend their control over the marketing 
and supply of their products many of the larger food 
manufacturers established their own distribution systems, 
principally in the inter-war period. This involved the 
disperal of stocks to depots around the country, the vast 
majority of which were located at rail terminals. Some 
companies operated their own fleets of delivery vehicles 
from these stockholding points; others employed the services 
of local hauliers. 
The tendency for food manufacturers to operate 
decentralised distribution systems can be largely attributed 
to the fact that food is a convenience good, characterised 
by fast rates of turnover. Products such as food which 
"turnover" rapidly require speedy delivery to the point 
sale. If stocks are not replenished quickly enough and 
"stock-outs" occur then, food being a convenience good, 
customers are much more likely to buy a substitute product 
or shop elsewhere than await the arrival of fresh supplies. 
As the time when food manufacturers were extending their 
distribution operations, the railways were unable to provide 
a fast and reliable delivery service over long distances. 
If the manufacturers were to ensure that retail outlets 
remained adequately supplied, therefore, they had little 
choice but to hold stock within easy reach of these outlets. 
Like stockholding, the sales operation was also 
decentralized, with the distribution depots commonly serving 
as bases for the local sales force. For manufacturers to 
trade directly with a vast number of retail outlets and 
promote their goods at point of sale, it was essential for 
them to expand and decentralize their sales activities. 
Peek Frean, in 1922, was able to distribute biscuits to 
40,000 outlets through a system of 23 depots (Corley, 1972). 
By 1938, Cadbury was supplying around 100,000 outlets from 
17 depots (Cadbury Bros. Ltd., 1945). 
The development of distribution depots by food 
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manufacturers was not motivated solely by their desire to 
market their products more intensively. It also enabled 
them to reduce their transport costs by making more 
efficient use of the railway trunk haul. Instead of 
dispatching goods in small consignments through a large 
number of railway depots, the manufacturers could now send 
loads in considerable bulk-to a much smaller number of their 
own stockholding points (Cadbury Bros. Ltd., 1945). By 
consolidating trunk flows into larger loads, the 
manufacturers were able to obtain more favourable rates from 
the railway companies. One important consequence of this 
rationalization of the pattern of trunk movement, was that 
local delivery distances were lengthened. Goods were no 
longer carried by rail . as close as possible to their 
final 
destination. The concentration of traffic on a smaller 
number of rail -terminals altered the relative distances 
goods moved by road and rail, extending the former and 
shortening the latter. Some of the reduction in railway 
trunking costs was, therefore, offset by an increase in 
local delivery costs. 
In some cases the area served by a depot was delimited 
by the distance that a road delivery vehicle could travel 
within a driver's daily work shift, allowing time for the 
unloading of supplies en route. Some firms extended this 
range, however, by establishing sub-depots (also known as 
"transhipment depots", "transit depots" and "transfer sheds") 
in areas beyond the delivery range of the nearest 
stockholding depot (Attwood, 1971). For example, in 1929, 
Huntley and Palmer, the biscuit manufacturer, supplemented 
its network of 26 stockholding depots with a further 21 
non-stockholding "transfer sheds" (Corley, 1972) Usually 
these satellite depots acted merely as break-of-bulk points 
and bases for small fleets of delivery vehicles. They had 
no stockholding role. Supplies trunked in from the parent 
depot would be disaggregated and delivered within several 
days. By thus divorcing the transhipment function from the 
stockholding function, it was possible for companies to 
relax the logistical constraint imposed by the daily range 
of delivery vehicles. This offered scope for a further 
expansion of the hinterlands of storage depots and 
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lengthening of road delivery distances. It also introduced 
firms to the practice of trunking goods by road, a practice 
which became widespread in the postwar period. 
The lengthening of road delivery distances and the 
efficiency of the delivery operation were also promoted by 
advances in road vehicle technology and improvements to the 
road network. The introduction of the motor vehicle 
permitted an expansion of local delivery areas, as the lorry 
had a range roughly three times greater than the horse and 
cart (Jefferys, 1954). 
The new system of distribution permitted economies in 
the packaging of goods. Previously when goods were 
distributed in small, individual consignments each order had 
to be securely wrapped. Now they could be transported in 
bulk from factory to depot in returnable containers, and 
dispatched from the depot in cheap, and often fairly flimsy, 
wrapping. Cadbury, for example, by developing its own 
distribution system, was able to reduce packaging's share of. 
total distribution costs from 14% to 5% between 1927 and 
1937 (Cadbury Bros. Ltd, 1945). 
Cadbury was the only large food manufacturer to publish 
a detailed record of its distribution operations in the 
interwar period. Although it is not known how 
representative Cadbury's experience in distribution was at 
this time, the information the company has provided offers a 
good indication of the scale of benefits that manufacturers 
could obtain by developing a depot system. Between 1922 
and 1938 Cadbury was able to reduce its distribution costs 
per unit by almost 50% while increasing its total sales by 
around 650%. (figure 5.2) Between about 1925 and 1931, 
savings in transport and packaging costs were largely offset 
by the heavy capital costs of setting up the new depots. 
From 1932 onwards, however, the rapid growth in sales 
volume, fostered by the new system of distribution, 
permitted the spreading of these overhead costs across a 
much larger depot throughput, bringing down the unit cost of 
distribution quite sharply (Cadbury Bros. Ltd., 1945). 
The actual manner in which food manufacturers developed 
their distribution systems, and the character of these 
systems, varied quite considerably. It is possible to 
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indentify four general approaches: 
i) Development of an exclusive "own use" system: 
Companies adopting this strategy, well exemplified by 
Cadbury's, gradually established a system of depots each 
with its own fleet of delivery vehicles and used exclusively 
for the distribution of their own products. 
ii) Development of a "for hire" distribution system: The 
best example of a company following this course was Lever 
Brothers. In 1918 they set up SPD ("Speedy Prompt 
Delivery") as a subsidiary company whose primary duty was to 
handle the local delivery of Lever Bros products but which 
could also provide a distribution service for other firms 
(Reader, 1969). 
iii) Acquisition and expansion of local haulage service: 
Not all firms developed a distribution system of their own 
from scratch. Tate and Lyle, for example, began by 
contracting out their delivery work to local hauliers who 
offered both a storage and a transport service. In 1936, 
they acquired the largest of these hauliers, Pease 
Transport, who operated from a base in London, and used this 
as a nucleus for the subsequent development of a depot 
system of their own (Tate and Lyle Transport Ltd., 1974). 
iv) Continued reliance on local hauliers: Some firms have 
preferred to this day not to invest scarce capital in depots 
and vehicles, nor to encumber management with additional 
responsibility for distribution. Instead, they have 
contracted out their local delivery to haulage companies 
that can both store and deliver their goods. This has been 
a common practice among American firms such as Kellogs and 
Quaker Oats which set up factories in Britain in the 
inter-war period. 
Stage 3: Modal Shift and Associated Depot Closure 
In the 1950s and 60s, the railways lost large volumes 
of freight traffic to road transport, particularly in those 
commodities which were being penalised by the railway's 
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"value of service" pricing scheme (Thompson and Hunter, 
1973) and those which demanded a faster and more reliable 
service. Processed foods fell into both these categories 
and so were natural candidates for a modal shift from rail 
to road. This change in the modal split can be only partly 
attributed to an "actual transfer of custom" between the two 
modes (Ministry of Transport, 1965). The increasing 
dominance of road transport largely reflected its success in 
attracting the large volumes of new traffic being generated 
over this period. Between 1952-and 1962, the output of the 
food manufacturing industry increased by roughly a third 
(Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1963) and a large proportion 
of this increment was transported by road. Indeed, by 
1958, foodstuffs accounted for a fifth of all tonnage 
carried by road (Ministry of Transport, 1959). 
Freight was attracted onto road transport by 
improvements both to the operating performance of lorries 
and to the road network, particularly after 1959 with the 
construction of motorways. These improvements not only 
promoted a transfer of longer distance trunk movements from 
rail to road; they also permitted a further lengthening of 
local delivery distances and consequent expansion of depot 
service areas. This expansion of depot service areas 
enabled companies to distribute throughout the country from 
a smaller number of depots. Large reductions in depot 
numbers occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s and these will 
be discussed in stage 4 of the model. It is important to 
note at this stage, however, that some companies gradually 
began to thin out their depot netorks in the 1950s and early 
1960s and that this process was partly associated with the 
modal shift from rail to road. 
Stage 4: Contraction of the delivery network and 
concentration of stockholding: 
Since the mid 1960s, many manufacturers have quite 
radically altered their distribution systems, putting into 
practice many of the ideas of physical distribution 
management. Many of these ideas can be traced back to the 
second world war, when they were applied in the context of 
military logistics (Smykay, 1964). The later upsurge of 
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interest in the commercial application of these ideas has 
been attributed partly to the fact that other sectors of 
company business had been overhauled leaving distribution as 
the "last cost-saving frontier" (Drucker, 1962) and partly 
to the upward trend in the real cost of distribution 
(Pettit, 1976). Many firms subjected their distribution 
activities to close scrutiny for the first time. A common 
finding was that the upper margin of sales, comprised 
usually of small orders delivered direct to small outlets, 
was being won at high cost in distribution terms (Willis, 
1977). For example, of the Associated Biscuit 
Manufacturers' 76,000 customers (in the late 1960s), 34,000 
bought less than 100 cases "and, therefore, hardly 
recompensed the company for the cost of representatives' 
visits and deliveries" (Corley, 1972). It has been shown 
that delivery costs vary inversely and exponentially with 
order size (Bowen and Mundy, 1972; Williams, 1975) (fig. 
5.3). Once the cost of distributing these small orders 
was taken into account, it often appeared that maximum sales 
did not yield maximum profit (fig. 5.4). Many companies 
reacted to these findings by cutting back on the delivery of 
small amounts (Hussey, 1972). This they did either by 
raising "minimum drop size" (the minimum amount they were 
prepared to deliver) of by imposing prohibitive surcharges 
on small orders (Walters, 1976). Heinz, for example, 
raised its minimum drop size from 5 cases to 15 cases in 
1970 (Self-Service and Supermarketing, 1970). 
Table 5.1 shows how a group of large food 
manufacturers have, in recent years, reduced the number of 
outlets they supply. This contraction of food delivery 
networks effectively reversed the inter-war policy of these 
manufacturers which was to trade directly with as many 
retailers as possible. The severance of many of these 
direct trading links was now considered acceptable for 
reasons that have been outlined earlier (P. 75). The number 
of food delivery points was also diminishing as a result of 
other developments outside the manufacturers' control. 
Many small independent shops were closing down as a result 
of competition from the multiples, redevelopment schemes and 
fiscal policies (Dawson and Kirby, 1979). In the more 
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recent period, the multiples and Cooperative Retail 
Societies have also been closing many of their smaller 
branch stores (Institute of Grocery Distribution, 1982). 
In the 1960s and 70s, the supermarket chains have 
expanded their distribution activities, constructing and 
enlarging central warehouses, acquiring and augmenting 
vehicle fleets. This has enabled them to increase the 
volume of supplies they receive in bulk loads into their 
warehouses and to extend their control over the delivery of 
goods to their branch stores (Walters, 1976). A small but 
increasing proportion of supplies are now transported from 
factory to superstores and hypermarkets which have both 
large enough turnover and sufficient storage space to 
receive direct deliveries. 
The decline in deliveries to smaller outlets and the 
increase in the proportion of output distributed direct from 
the factory has tended to reduce the volume of supplies 
passing throught manufacturers' depot systems. This has 
left many food depots with excess storage, handling and 
transport capacity. - The desire to reduce this surplus 
capacity is one of several motives food manufactures have 
had for reducing depot numbers and concentrating stock in 
fewer locations. Other factors that have promoted the 
concentration of stocks (which will be discussed in chapter 
11) include variations in the relative costs of transport 
and stockholding, and the extension in the range of delivery 
vehicles made possible by road and vehicle improvements. 
In response to these changing circumstances, food 
manufacturers have centralised their distribution systems to 
differing degrees. Some firms have concentrated their 
stocks in one or two locations and make heavy use of large 
numbers of transhipment depots. At the other extreme are 
firms that retain the traditional pattern of dispersed 
stockholding in as many as 25-30 depots. As this high 
level of dispersal permits the subdivision of the country 
into delivery areas that are small enough to be served 
direct from the nearest depot, these firms have little or no 
need for satellite transhipment depots. The majority of 
food manufacturers' distribution systems fall between these 
two extremes of highly dispersed and completely centralized 
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stockholding (Beattie, 1973). The present structure of 
distribution systems can, therefore, vary considerably. 
This is discussed in more detail in chapters 7 and 8. 
The next section will consider why firms vary in the 
proportions of output they channel through their 
distribution systems. Later chapters will investigate 
variations in depot numbers and the use of transhipment 
depots. 
The Classification of Manufacturers' Loqistical Channels. 
The simplest and most widely used classification of 
manufacturers' distribution systems, that of Bowersox et al. 
(1968), rests on the distinction between delivery direct to 
customers from the factory and indirect delivery via 
intervening depots operated or contracted by the 
manufacturer. This three-fold classification is based on 
the relative location of inventories with respect to points 
of production and sale: 
1. ECHELON SYSTEMS: In these systems, as the name 
implies, stocks are held at one or more intermediate 
locations on the supply line from factory to shop. The 
intermediate nodes can serve either as break-bulk points or 
points where flows converging from various origins are 
consol idated. 
2. DIRECT SYSTEMS: In these systems, stocks are 
centralized, often at or 'near the factory and from there 
distributed direct to the customer. 
3. DUAL SYSTEMS, (also known as "Combination" or 
"Flexible" systems) : These are hybrid systems, combining 
some direct delivery from a central store with decentralized 
distribution from dispersed stockholding points. 
Although this distinction between direct and indirect 
logistical channels is of crucial importance in the analysis 
of the routeing of product flows, the classification itself 
is of limited value in the present context as all the food 
manufacturers surveyed operated dual systems. As shown in 
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figure 5.5, however, the dual systems operated by the 23 
manufacturers in the sample varied enormously in their 
relative use of direct and indirect channels. These 
variations may be related to several factors. 
Factors affecting the choice of logistical channel 
a) Product Type: Processed foods, although generally 
assigned to a single category in the compilation of 
transport statistics, differ widely in their physical form 
and marketing characteristics. It is likely, therefore, 
that product type will be a major factor determining the 
mode of distribution. The relationship between these two 
variables is, however, partly obscured by the presence in 
the sample of several large firms which produce a variety of 
dissimilar products. By eliminating these firms and 
grouping those remaining on the basis of the dominant, or in 
some cases only, product they manufacture, it appears that 
product type is a significant factor (Table 5.2). 
It is difficult, however, to relate the choice of 
logistical channel to specific product characteristics, such 
as value, weight, volume, perishability, turnover rate and 
substitutablity, because this choice can be influenced in 
different directions by different characteristics. These 
characteristics can be classified to produce a set of major 
factors that largely determine the way in which a product is 
distributed (Ballou, 1978): 
(i) Weight-Volume Ratio (i. e. density): As shown in 
figure 5.6, transport and storage costs are both inversely 
related to the density of the product. The bulkier the 
product, the less efficiently vehicle capacity and storage 
space can be used. Direct channels generally have lower 
storage and transport costs than echelon channels, by virtue 
of the greater centralization of stock and greater bulk of 
the freight movement. One might, therefore, expect low 
density products, that are prodigal in their use of storage 
and transport capacity, to follow more direct channels than 
high density ones. There is little evidence of this 
happening in the grocery distribution system, however. 
Much of the traffic in low density products, such as 
biscuits, crisps and breakfast cereals, travels along 
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Table 5.2: Logistical Channel Allocation of a Sample of 
Grocery Products. 
Product(s) 
Cr isps 
B iscuits 
Tea/Coffee 
Breakfast 
Cereal 
Margarine/ 
Cheese Spread 
Canned Pasta/ 
Vegetables 
Canned Fruit 
% of Output Distributed 
No. of Firms Direct from Factory 
2 3.51 5 
2 5,7 
2 10,15 
3 9,15,25 
2 25,35 
3 46,56,64 
3 50,60,60 
Source: personal survey 
Mean $ 
4.3 
6.0 
12.5 
16.3 
30.0 
55.3 
56.7 
Table 5.3: Proportion of Grocery Stores Stocking Three Best- 
Selling Brands of Grocery and Related Products. 
No. 1 Brands 
No. 2 Brands 
No. 3 Brands 
% of Grocery Stores 
76% 
53% 
48% 
Source: Nielsen Researcher no. 3 (1975) 
[ based on the following products: baked beans, instant 
cereals, ready to eat cereals, coffee, canned evaporated 
milk, soup, chocolate biscuits, cat food, dog food, 
toothpaste, household cleaner, detergents, men's 
hairdressing, shampoos, soap. ] 
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indirect channels, while high density items like, canned 
foods and sugar, are more directly distributed from 
centralized storage premises. It would seem, therefore, 
that, in the choice of logistical channel, more importance 
is attached to other product attributes. 
(ii) Value-Weight Ratio (or value density): As shown in 
figure 5.7, as value density increases, storage costs rise 
while transport costs fall. From this one might deduce 
that the direct channel would be the most appropriate for 
products with very high and very low value densities because 
this would minimize the sum of transport and storage costs. 
Without empirical data on the value densities and transport 
and storage cost profiles of a range of products, one cannot 
test this hypothesis rigorously. There, nevertheless, 
seems to be some correlation between value density and 
choice of logistical channel as products with low value to 
weight ratios such as canned fruit and vegetables tend to be 
stored centrally and transported as far as possible in bulk 
loads, whereas some with higher ratios, such as coffee and 
tea, are distributed through more dispersed stockholding 
systems to large numbers of outlets. There are, however, 
some major exceptions to this rule, such as biscuits 
(Crawford, 1972a) and sugar, which, though of relatively low 
value density, mainly travel along indirect channels. To 
account for these apparent anomalies, one must also take 
into account the turnover rate of the product. 
(iii) Turnover Rate: This is partly determined by the 
physical characteristics of the product, chiefly its 
perishability, and partly by the nature of consumer demand, 
in particular the frequency and size of purchases. It has 
been observed that there is a correlation between a 
product's turnover rate and its pattern of stockholding 
(Ballou, 1973). Products with a high turnover rate tend to 
be dispersed in local depots close to the customers from 
which orders can be swiftly supplied. Although this 
dispersed pattern of stockholding is expensive both in the 
physical cost of storage and in the financial cost of 
maintaining the large volume of stock it requires, the fast 
rate of turnover ensures that products spend comparatively 
little time in storage, keeping the unit costs of 
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warehousing and stockholding acceptably low. . 
At the 
opposite extreme, those products with a low turnover rate 
are generally stored centrally as they can tolerate a slower 
delivery to the'market and as concentrated stockholding is 
more cost-effective for products which spend a longer time 
in storage. Distinguishing products with a low value 
density, such as biscuits and canned fruit, on the basis of 
turnover rate may help to explain their differing channel 
allocation. Biscuits, with a faster turnover rate, tend to 
be distributed through echelon channels, whereas slower 
moving canned fruit tend to be stored more centrally and 
delivered directly in bulk loads? 
(iv) Substitutability: This may be defined as the degree 
of similarity (in the consumer's mind) between one firm's 
product and that of a competing supplier. It can affect 
the choice of logistical channel in two ways. First, the 
more "substitutable" the product, the greater the importance 
attached to product availability, for if stock should run 
out at the retail level, customers would more readily accept 
an alternative product or brand. By having localised 
storage, echelon channels are generally considered capable 
of replenishing retail stocks more rapidly than direct 
channels, making them more suitable for highly 
"substitutable" products. However, in the case of some 
products of this kind, such as canned vegetables and rice 
pudding, which also have a "low value density, the high cost 
of distribution via an echelon channel would seriously 
reduce their price competitiveness relative to other very 
similar items. Where these products have a slower turnover 
rate, though, as in the case of those mentioned, more direct 
channels may be able to replenish retail supplies quickly 
enough. Second, the more "substitutable" the product, the 
greater is the need to promote it intensively at retail 
level, and usually this is only possible where the 
manufacturer deals direct with the shop-keeper or branch 
store manager and agrees to deliver direct to the shop. 
Widespread shop delivery generally requires the use of an 
echelon channel. The effect of marketing policy on choice 
of logistical channel is discussed more fully below. 
(v) Risk: In the distribution of grocery products, the 
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main risk is of products losing their freshness or 
perishing. As this deterioration can effectively render 
the product worthless, the dominant characteristic of 
perishable products, in distribution terms, is their 
perishability, and this generally over-rides other 
considerations. The more perishable the product, the 
greater the emphasis on the fast, frequent and widespread 
shop delivery that echelon channels can provide. 
It can be seen, therefore, that different product 
attributes affect the choice of logistical channel in 
different ways, making it difficult to establish a clear 
relationship between product type and method of 
distribution. This relationship is further distorted by 
other factors, related more closely to the nature of the 
firm. These are considered below. 
b) Marketing Policy: The way in which a product is 
marketed influences its mode of distribution largely through 
the choice of marketing channel and sales outlets. Reduced 
to its simplest terms, this choice is between indirect 
marketing via the warehouses of wholesalers and multiple 
retailers or direct marketing at the retail outlet. The 
vast majority of supplies received by wholesalers and retail 
warehouses are transported there direct from the factory. 
By far the greater proportion of manufacturers' store 
deliveries are made from local depots. Direct distribution 
can, therefore, be roughly equated with distribution to 
warehouses, indirect distribution with deliveries to shops. 
One might , therefore, expect the allocation of product flow 
between direct and indirect channels to correlate with the 
relative numbers of warehouses and shops supplied. 
Unfortunately, although able in most cases to state the 
total number of outlets served by their distribution 
systems, none of the manufacturers could disaggregate these 
figures by outlet type. A Spearman Rank test of the 
relationship between total number of outlets and the extent 
of direct delivery, nevertheless, yielded a correlation 
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coefficient of -0.484 that was significant at the 99% level. 
This relationship, though weak, was thought to merit further 
examination. 
Number and Type of Outlets Served: The food manufacturers 
surveyed differed widely in the number of outlets to which 
they delivered their products (fig. 5.8). The number of 
outlets served by a manufacturer's distribution system will 
depend on four factors: 
1. The spatial extent of the market area. 
2. The density of wholesale and retail outlets in this 
area. 
3. The degree of market penetration at the wholesale and 
retail levels. 
4. The relative proportions of output distributed to 
warehouses and shops. 
As all the manufacturers in the sample market their 
products nationally, the first and second factors are of 
little concern here. The wide variations in the numbers of 
outlets served are, therefore, a function of factors three 
and four. In respect of the third factor, one may conclude 
that the manufacturers sampled all achieve a high level of 
market penetration as they all produce at least one leading 
brand. As Table 5.3 shows, top brands of grocery products 
are typically sold through roughly three quarters of the 
total number of retail outlets. One may speculate, 
therefore, that differences in the numbers of outlets 
supplied by the manufacturers are attributable more to 
variations in the ratio of warehouse to store deliveries 
than to variations in the degree of market penetration. 
Table 5.4 presents estimates of the numbers of grocery 
stores and warehouses operated by the main distributive 
organizations and estimates of the proportions of grocery 
trade they handle. It can be seen that a producer, such 
as those of canned food, wishing to obtain complete market 
coverage via indirect channels would require to distribute 
his products to roughly 1000 food warehouses. On the other 
hand, to achieve a similar coverage through direct channels, 
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a manufacturer, of say' biscuits, might have to distribute 
his products to around 50,000 outlets. In this respect, 
the ratios of stores: warehouses in table 5.5 give a measure 
of the extent to which a manufacturer can reduce the density 
of his distribution network by delivering to warehouses 
rather than stores. This helps to explain the wide range 
in number of outlets served. 
Companies which distribute to numbers of outlets 
between the extremes of 1000 and 50,000 are likely to make 
significant use of both direct and indirect channels, though 
the relative proportions of warehouse and shop deliveries 
may vary widely. Few producers make deliveries to the 
52,000 unaffiliated independents which are generally very 
small and have a low turnover. Only suppliers of products 
that are perishable and require fast and frequent delivery 
tend to deal direct with these independent stores, often by 
means of a van sales operation. Similarly, many voluntary 
group stores are too small to receive direct deliveries. 
Through a combination of pricing policies and the imposition 
of minimum drop sizes, many of the large food manufacturers 
have reduced the total number of shops eligible for direct 
delivery to around 20,000. These 20,000 stores, however, 
account for over three quarters of total grocery sales. It 
is necessary, therefore, not only to consider the total 
numbers of outlets in each category, but also the 
proportions of grocery turnover they handle. 
There is a marked concentration of grocery turnover in 
a comparatively small number of both warehouses and shops. 
Madigan (1980) has estimated that roughly 70% of grocery 
sales are channelled through around 4000 outlets. The 
multiples, for example, in 1980 operated only 9% of grocery 
stores but held 55% of the grocery market (Institute of 
Grocery Distribution, 1982). The multiples' similar 8% 
share of the total number of grocery warehouses is also 
greatly exceeded by the proportion of indirect flows 
channelled through them (44%). On the other hand, the 60% 
of grocery stores that fall into the "unaffiliated 
independent" category generate only 15-16% of grocery sales 
and the 590 cash and carry warehouses, from which they draw 
most of their supplies, account for less than a quarter of 
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Table 5.5: Approximate Ratios of Shops to Warehouses for 
Different Types of Retail/Wholesale Organization. 
Tie of Organization Ratio 
Multiples 70: 1 
cws 165: 1 
Co-op Retail 
Societies 31: 1 
Voluntary Group 
Wholesalers 87: 1 
Cash and Carry* 99: 1 
* assumes that 80% of independent stores use cash and 
carries (Mintel, 1979). 
Sources: same as table 5.4 
Table 5.6: Concentration of Selected Food Manufacturers' 
Sales: 
Firm Product(s) 
Tate and 
Lyle (1) Sugar 
Cadbury 
Typhon (2) Tea, Jam etc. 
* Biscuits 
* Cakes 
No. of Large 
Retail Customers 
16 
20 
18 
1 
% of Total Sales 
to These Retailers 
84 
80 
80 
15 
Sources: (1) Price Commission, 1978a 
(2) Price Commission, 1978b 
* personal survey (firm's name confidential) 
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all food warehouse turnover (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
1980) . 
This concentration of grocery turnover is reflected in 
the pattern of sales by individual manufacturers. Few 
firms were prepared to divulge information about their sales 
profile. What little data was collected on this subject is 
presented in table 5.6, and reveals a very high 
concentration of sales through a small number of major 
customers (cf. Howe, 1973). A more complete picture of 
market concentration (which includes sales through 
wholesalers) is provided by the Nielsen Researcher (1979), 
which estimated that in 1979 grocery suppliers sold 81% of 
their output through 285 "buying points" (i. e. wholesale and 
retail head offices). Food manufacturers can market their 
products most effectively and economically by confining 
their direct trading links to major retail and wholesale 
customers (Grant, 1968). The total number of outlets to 
which a firm delivers, therefore, depends largely on the 
manner in which the major retail customers are supplied. 
The supply links between manufacturers and their large 
retail customers are examined in detail in Chapter 6. 
c) Size of Firm: One might hypothesize that small firms 
would be more dependent on direct distribution than larger 
ones partly because they lack the financial resources to 
develop their own systems of depots and partly because the 
volumes they distribute are of insufficient size to make the 
use of an echelon system economical. In its study of the 
grocery distribution system, Mintel (1977) found evidence to 
support this hypothesis. Weigand (1963) too has established 
that a relationship exists between a firm's size and its 
dependence on particular marketing channels. Of the smaller 
firms in the sample in terms of turnover, however, only one 
appears to support this hypothesis. Two of the other 
"smaller" firms, manufacturing, significantly, products with 
a shorter shelf life and higher turnover rate, distributed 
these products to relatively large numbers of customers by 
contracting out their local storage and delivery work. The 
motives for this arrangement lay first in the firms' 
inability to put together loads of sufficient bulk to 
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justify direct customer deliveries over long distances and 
secondly in a desire to obtain more favourable rates from 
distribution contractors by increasing the volume and drop 
size of goods channelled through their depots. Clearly 
therefore in considering the effects of firm size, one must 
also take into account the turnover rate of the products 
manufactured. 
To analyse this relationship between firm size and the 
relative usage of direct and indirect distribution more 
fully, one would require a cross-sectional sample of firms 
" varying much more widely in their magnitude. 
d) Economics of the Transport Operation: One of the main 
advantages of trunking large loads direct to customers is 
that it permits savings in unit transport costs. The 
economics of bulk delivery, however, dictate that the 
utilization of the trunk vehicle must be maintained at a 
high level. This was confirmed by the finding that 10 
(71%) of the 14 firms which provided information on this 
subject required customers to take a full lorry load to 
qualify for direct delivery and the associated discounts. 
Three others (21%) -fixed the lower limit at half a lorry 
load, while one fixed it at a third of a full load. . In 
some cases, notably that of canned food, the capacity of the 
vehicle was defined in terms of the maximum weight it could 
carry. In the case of lighter products, such as breakfast 
cereals, tea and crisps, the limit was one of volume. It 
was not possible, therefore, to compare minimum drop sizes 
for direct bulk delivery as some firms provided this 
information in tonnes, others in pallet loads or numbers of 
cases. The tendency for firms to define this minimum drop 
size relative to vehicle capacity nevertheless establishes 
the size of trunk vehicle as another factor influencing the 
proportion of output distributed direct. 
Those firms that were prepared to consider direct 
delivery of less than full vehicle loads also attached 
importance to the length of the delivery and the 
opportunities for combining bulk loads for neighbouring 
destinations. The shorter the distances. involved and the 
greater the scope for the grouping of loads, the greater was 
III 
the likelihood of these firms agreeing to distribute smaller 
loads directly. 
e) Geography of Production: Several firms were 
constrained in the extent to which they distributed direct 
to customers by the dispersal of their production in more 
than one factory. In some instances, customers' orders 
which in aggregate were -large enough to qualify for direct 
delivery comprised goods drawn from several plants in 
amounts that could not be economically distributed direct. 
Some firms mix the stock ranges of their various factories 
in special warehouses or, by means of inter-plant transfers, 
at one or more of these factories. Although the orders 
thus consolidated may be large enough to bypass distribution 
depots and be delivered "direct" to the customer, at least 
some of the goods travel indirectly via an intervening 
mixing point. Firms, nevertheless, consider these mixed 
bulk orders to be distributed direct and this is reflected 
in the figures they provided on channel allocations. 
Several multi-plant firms, however, have found it difficult 
to operate a system of bulk mixing efficiently and as a 
result only distribute mixed orders through local 
distribution depots. Their dependence on the echelon 
channel is likely to be greater, therefore, than it would 
have been had the entire range been produced at a single 
factory. The logistics of bulk distribution from several 
plants is discussed at greater length in Chapter 9 in the 
context of the "strategic" routeing of flows. 
summary 
In examining logistical channels, one must first 
distinguish direct from echelon channels. With the 
expansion- of their market areas and intensification of their 
sales promotion, food manufacturers increased their 
dependence on echelon channels, characterised by highly 
dispersed' systems of stockholding and store delivery. 
Firms, nevertheless, differed widely in the manner in which 
they developed these systems. The growth in the volume of 
their business, the concentration of retail and wholesale 
trade in fewer, larger outlets and improvements in transport 
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and materials handling have encouraged a shift away from 
echelon channels to more direct distribution over longer 
distances. 
Both types of channel were used by all the food 
manufacturers in the sample, though in varying proportions. 
Their relative use of these channels is influenced by a 
series of inter-related factors. As these factors cannot 
be suitably quantified, it is not possible to measure 
precisely their effect on a firm's choice of logistical 
channel or the extent to which they are inter-correlated. 
there are close inter-relationships 
between these factors and the strength of these 
inter-relationships will vary between firms. Some of the 
firms, for example, take more account of the economics of 
the delivery operation in determining their marketing 
strategy than do others. A fuller explanation of channel 
usage would require a more accurate assessment of the 
relative importance of these factors and detailed study of 
the decision-making process. 
MULTIPLE RETAILERS 
Choice of Logistical Channel 
Like food manufacturers, multiple retailers in the food 
trade have a choice of logistical channels. They can 
receive goods direct from the supplier into their shops 
(direct delivery) or channel them through a "central 
warehouse" operated either by themselves or a distribution 
contractor ("centralized" or "consolidated" delivery). As 
far as groceries are concerned, all but one of the firms 
sampled employed both these channels. These firms varied 
enormously in the proportion of supplies channelled through 
a central warehouse. This confirmed the findings of 
earlier writers on the subject (Walters, 1976; Thorpe et 
al., 1973). A comparison of the average proportion of 
turnover channelled through the central warehouse as 
calculated by this survey with those of two earlier surveys 
indicates a decline in the importance of centralized 
deliveries: 
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Supermarket Association (1967) 60% 
Thorpe et al. (1973) 58% 
Present Survey (1978-9) 47% 
These figures should be treated with caution, however, 
as they are calculated on the basis of samples differing in 
their size and composition. Given the high concentration 
of grocery trade in a few large firms and the wide variation 
between them in their use of centralized deliveries, the 
averages will be sensitive to the selection of larger firms 
in the sample. The present survey included all but one of 
the ten largest supermarket chains (in terms of turnover). 
A decline in the relative use of central warehouses may 
be explained in the following ways: 
1. Some firms may have reduced the proportion of supplies 
handled by the central warehouse. This would accord with 
the policy of some chains to develop superstores that can 
receive a higher proportion of direct deliveries, and to 
close down smaller branches that are more dependent on 
centralized delivery. The survey results were also 
significantly influenced by the exceptional circumstances of 
the Tesco chain following its "Checkout" campaign of 1977 
(Tree, 1978). As a result of this campaign, Tesco 
increased its turnover by 40% over a very short period, 
putting great strains upon its distribution system. This 
system lacked the capacity to maintain the proportion of 
centralized delivery at its previous level (Powell, 1978). 
The proportion of supplies channelled through the central 
warehouses therefore fell temporarily while the firm 
expanded its warehouse and transport facilities. 
2. There may 
making less use 
one of the fast 
1978 was ASDA, 
enabled it to 
branches. The 
have been a net shift of trade to firms 
of centralized deliveries. For instance, 
est growing chains over the period 1967 to 
whose exclusive operation of superstores 
receive all grocery supplies into its 
recent growth of Tesco's market share also 
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constitutes a net displacement of trade to a less 
centralized chain. 
3. There may have been a relative growth in the demand for 
products that are generally delivered direct to the store. 
Fresh foods and provisions, for example, have increased 
their share of retail expenditure on food and are typically 
delivered direct. This, however, must be set against the 
decline in the consumption of other direct delivery products 
such as sugar, bread and eggs (Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, 1981). 
While these average figures for channel allocation in 
the multiple sector give a broad indication of general 
trends, they conceal wide variations in the use of the 
different channels by individual retailers. It is 
necessary, therefore, to explore in some depth the factors 
affecting the division of product flow between direct and 
centralized channels. 
Reasons for Centralized Storage and Delivery. 
The firms surveyed were asked why they channelled some 
of their supplies through central warehouses. Their 
replies can be summarised under eight headings: 
1. Buying terms: By receiving goods in bulk loads into 
their warehouses multiple retailers can qualify for bulk 
discount. These discounts will be discussed in more detail 
in chapter 6. It should be noted at this stage, however, 
that these discounts are never large enough to finance 
multiples' warehouse and transport operations. To justify 
incurring the additional distribution costs, the multiple 
retailer must, therefore, derive other benefits from 
centralized delivery. These are listed below. 
2. Product availability: By holding large central stocks 
and operating their own store delivery, they can reduce the 
risk of "stock-outs" (i. e. shops being out of stock in 
particular products). By offerring more frequent 
deliveries, multiple retailers can reduce lead times and 
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accelerate the replenishment of fast-moving lines. Walters 
(1976) notes, however, that although most grocery multiples 
claim to provide a superior delivery service from their 
central warehouses than manufacturers offer, very few have 
made a quantitative comparison of the two types of delivery. 
3. Use of shop space: By relieving shops of the need to 
hold large amounts of cycle and safety stock, much of the 
space otherwise used for storage can be used as selling 
space, thereby raising the productivity of the retail 
floorspace. It is more cost effective to concentrate 
stocks in central warehouses located usually in peripheral 
areas where site costs are lower. 
4. . Stock control: The profitability of retailing is 
critically dependent on the rate of "stock-turn". This is 
defined as the ratio of annual sales to the value of stocks 
held at the-end of the financial year. It is important, 
therefore, not only to maximise sales, but also to minimise 
stock levels. The centralization of inventory reduces the 
total volume of stock that must be held to ensure a given 
level of service (Maister, 1976). In addition to this, 
stockholding can be more easily monitored and controlled 
when it is centralized (Millar, 1983). Where delivery is 
direct from the manufacturer, it is usually the store 
manager who decides how much to order. This dispersal of 
responsibility for ordering is particularly inefficient in a 
trade, such as the grocery trade, where product lines abound 
and differ greatly in their turnover rates. The grocery 
trade, like many others, is subject to the so-called "80: 20" 
rule i. e. roughly 80% of the turnover is generated by only 
about 20% of the product varieties (Walters, 1976; Ballou, 
1978). Under these circumstances, it is necessary to 
operate a tight ordering and stockholding policy, and this 
is best achieved through centralization. Chains with 
highly centralized distribution systems generally have large 
turnovers per square foot of sales area (Allan, 1980). 
5. Labour costs: These costs comprise around 50% of 
average supermarket operating costs (Dawson, 1982, p111). 
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According to one large supermarket' chain these labour costs 
can be disaggregated as follows: 
Management 10% 
Customer service 10% 
Check out 30% 
Goods handling 40% 
(i. e. unloading vehicles, shelf-filling, price 
marking) 
Personnel/miscellaneous 10% 
Of these activities, management and goods handling, 
together representing around half the total labour costs, 
can benefit most from centralized distribution. In the 
case of management, less of the manager's time need be spent 
meeting sales representatives, drawing up orders and 
processing invoices. Madigan (1980) describes the case of 
one supermarket at which 79 separate calls were made by 
salesmen, taking up 26 hours of the manager's time and 
requiring the processing of 79 invoices. Goods handling 
can also be rationalized by the arrival of supplies in 
fewer, larger loads. The scope for rationalization of this 
type was indicated by a survey of deliveries to a 
supermarket in Edgeware reported by one of the distribution 
directors interviewed. Fifty per cent of this 
supermarket's supplies arrived in the form of large 
consolidated loads from a central warehouse and took 45 
minutes to off-load. The remainder came in 132 small drops 
directly from suppliers and took in total around 25 hours to 
unload. There are numerous references in the literature to 
similar patterns of supermarket delivery. The GLC Freight 
Unit, for example, also quote an example of a supermarket 
receiving 60% of its throughput from a central warehouse in 
five consolidated deliveries (average load size = 740 cases) 
(GLC, 1975). The remaining 40% was received in 95 direct 
deliveries from suppliers (average load size *26 cases). 
The extent of possible cost and time savings from 
consolidation have been indicated by Kirby (1975). He notes 
that one order of 500 packs is 31% cheaper and 47% quicker 
to assemble and unload than 5 orders of 100 packs. 
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Furthermore, many manufacturers' direct deliveries are 
less able to adhere to a tight schedule as their vehicles 
make many deliveries per trip and spend much of their time 
on congested urban roads. The unscheduled arrival of these 
delivery vehicles at various times during the day make it 
difficult to deploy staff efficiently to handle these 
deliveries and check invoices. Many manufacturers also use 
less efficient handling systems than the "roll pallets" now 
almost universally employed by multiple retailers for 
centralized deliveries. 
6. Drop quantities: In some cases, distribution via 
central warehouse is made necessary by a manufacturer's 
refusal to, deliver less than a certain amount direct to the 
store. Some alternative channel is needed, therefore, to 
provide small branch stores with supplies in amounts of less 
than this. This was a point made mainly by the smaller 
chains. Larger chains, it would seem, often wield 
sufficient bargaining power to force manufacturers into 
waiving minimum drop size restrictions for their smaller 
branches. This has the effect of discriminating unfairly 
against small shops. operated independently or by smaller 
multiples. 
7. Security: It is widely acknowledged that the loss of 
stock through theft (euphemistically termed "shrinkage") 
correlates closely with the number of separate deliveries to 
the shop and "number of times the back door is opened". By 
greatly " reducing the number of -deliveries and making it 
possible to supervise the delivery operation more closely, 
the centralization of deliveries can significantly reduce 
pilferage. 
8. Product range: Many suppliers are too small to be 
able to offer- direct delivery economically. This is 
particularly true in the recently developed frozen food 
industry. By making it possible for the small supplier to 
deliver in bulk to a central warehouse, the multiple 
retailer is able to include more specialised goods and 
lesser brands in his product range. 
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Variations in 'the proportion of centralized deliveries 
WITHIN chains 
The proportion of a branch store's supplies delivered 
from a central warehouse might be expected to vary within a 
chain in relation to the shop's size, location and method of 
trading. Four hypothesis were drawn up to test these 
relationships. 
1. The larger the shop, the greater will be the 
proportion of supplies received direct from the 
manufacturer. Bigger shops, by virtue of their higher 
turnover and greater amount of storage space available, may 
be more likely to place orders for supplies in excess of 
manufacturers' minimum drop sizes and perhaps of a size 
large enough to qualify for special discounts. 
It proved impossible to test this hypothesis 
independently as firms would not provide the necessary data. 
Instead the retailers were asked directly if such a 
relationship existed. From their replies it appears that 
this relationship applies only to a limited extent, at the 
extremes of the shop size range. At the top end of the 
range, those stores that, can receive direct bulk loads from 
suppliers and thereby qualify for discounts (i. e. 
superstores) tend to take. a smaller proportion of supplies 
from the central warehouse. At the bottom end, very small 
stores may sell a smaller range of goods, excluding some 
products such as fresh food, provisions and frozen foods, 
that are typically delivered direct. This may partly 
reflect a lack of space and partly a failure to generate 
orders of the minimum size necessary to qualify for direct 
delivery. Groceries delivered from the central warehouse 
may then represent a higher proportion of these shops' 
turnover. The disparities in the proportion of centralized 
delivery were greatest in the case of one large national 
chain that operates stores varying in size from small, 
counter-service shops (< 2000 square feet) to superstores. 
The proportions for different size categories were as 
follows: 
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small counter-service shop (<2000 sq. ft. ) 60% 
small self-service shop (<2000 sq. ft. ) 50% 
supermarket (5000 - 20000sq. ft. ) 30-40% 
superstore 20% 
This firm, however, was exceptional. Most firms 
operated stores within the range 2000 - 15000 sq. ft. and 
claimed that across this size range they standardised the 
proportion of centralized delivery. Eight of the 
twenty-three multiples operated superstores, however, which 
drew a higher proportion of supplies direct form 
manufacturers than the rest of the chains. 
2. The further a shop is from a central warehouse, the 
smaller will be the proportion of goods it will receive from 
this source. Such a distance decay relationship could 
reflect the increase in the cost of delivery and 
deterioration in quality of service over greater distances. 
No such relationship was found. With a few minor 
exceptions, the proportion of centralized delivery was 
unaffected by distance form central warehouse. The absence 
of a relationship of this kind may be-explained in the 
following way. The majority of central warehouse 
deliveries are of large, consolidated loads transported 
direct to one or two shops. For bulk deliveries such as 
this the marginal cost of each additional unit of distance 
*is small, so long as the daily range of the delivery vehicle 
is not exceeded. The "friction" of distance is also 
considered to be low because the unit cost of consolidated 
direct delivery represents only a small fraction of the 
gross margin for grocery products. Multiples, furthermore, 
have little difficulty= - in providing the same level of 
delivery service to shops within the daily range of delivery 
vehicles. There are even instances of shops lying well 
outside this range still receiving the same proportion of 
supplies from central warehouse as those within it, despite 
the fact that unit delivery costs to these stores are 
significantly higher. These long distance deliveries can 
take one of three forms: 
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a) two-day delivery within driver staying away 
overnight 
b) outbasing of drivers and exchange of 
vehicles at "staging points" 
c) use of contractor (Freightliner or road 
based distribution contractor) 
There were a few isolated examples of shops on the 
periphery of chains receiving less frequent deliveries of 
larger loads. To compensate for this less frequent service 
these stores devoted a larger proportion of their floorspace 
to storage than other shops in the chain. 
One multiple claimed that it had closed a higher 
proportion of its small shops in areas distant from the 
central warehouse, partly because of the difficulty of 
delivering supplies to them efficiently. Many of these 
shops required comparatively small loads and were most 
efficiently served by multiple drop deliveries. These, 
however, were costly to operate at long distances from the 
central warehouse. In contrast, shops of a similar size in 
the vicinity of the central warehouse could be served more 
cheaply and had tended to survive in greater numbers. This 
indicated that a relationship was developing between shop 
size and, distance from the central warehouse which, 
theoretically, would accord with the policy of standardising 
the proportion of supplies shops received from the central 
warehouse. The greater size of more peripheral stores 
would mean that the unit cost of delivering consolidated 
loads to them would be relatively low and hence unlikely to 
exert a downward pressure on the -level of centralized 
delivery they received. In practice, the relationship 
between shop size and distance was only weakly developed in 
the chain in question and was reported by other multiples 
not to hold for their particular chains. Shop size and 
location are determined much more by local market conditions 
than logistical considerations. 
3. The proportion of central warehouse delivery. will 
depend partly on the siting of the store. The more central 
the location within the urban area, the higher will be the 
site costs and the greater will be the incentive to use shop 
121 
space as productively as possible. This would entail 
maximising the area devoted to selling goods and minimising 
the back storage area. Shops in expensive locations might, 
therefore, be expected to hold less stock and be more 
dependent on central warehouse deliveries: 
While this may be a factor in determining overall the 
average proportion of centralized deliveries for a chain as 
a whole (discussed in the following section), it does not 
appear to cause variation between stores within a chain, 
except insomuch as site correlates with size of store and 
the nature of the retailing operation. Superstores, for 
example, are generally located in peripheral sites where 
land costs are lower and this makes it economically feasible 
to allocate a higher proportion of floorspace to storage. 
The relationship between site and type of retailing is 
discussed below. 
The difficulty of separating the effects of site from 
those of related variables and the inability to obtain data 
on site sites, store turnover and delivery patterns makes it 
impossible to test this hypothesis independently. One must 
rely, therefore, on the assurances of the multiples 
consulted that the proportion of supplies coming from 
central warehouse is not directly affected by site costs. 
4. The proportion of centralized delivery will be affected 
by the nature of the retail operation: 
It has already been seen how, in one chain, small 
counter-service shops received a higher proportion of 
supplies from central warehouses than self-service stores. 
Only about 0.5% of the branch stores operated by multiples 
in the survey were of this type, however. A more important 
distinction can be drawn between two different types of 
self-service operations. These are typified by the 
conventional supermarket and the discount store. 
Discount stores are characterised by a small number of 
lines, minimal service and low prices. Of the e ight 
multiples (out of 23) that operated discount stores, only 
three were firmly committed to this mode of retailing. The 
others still considered "discounting" ventures to be at an 
experimental stage and operated only a few stores of this 
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type. Most discount stores are located in or around town 
centres and were formerly small supermarkets. Their 
conversion to a discount operation has been designed to help 
them compete with the new generation of larger supermarkets 
and superstores that have a more favourable cost structure 
and are more accessible to the motorised shopper. 
In all cases, the discount stores received a higher 
proportion of their supplies from central warehouse than 
other stores in the chain. Only two firms, the two largest 
operators of discount stores could offer separate figures 
for them (table 5.7). 
Two of the firms that had well developed chains of 
discount stores had designated central warehouses for the 
exclusive storage and handling of discount store supplies. 
These separate systems of centralized distribution had been 
created for the discount stores because their product ranges 
differed markedly in size and composition from those of the 
other conventional supermarkets in the chain. 
The high dependence of discount stores on centralized 
distribution reflects the desire to hold store costs to a 
minimum. Labour costs are held down by the very high level 
of consolidated delivery. Unit site costs are also kept 
low by reducing the back store room area and maximising the 
sales per unit area. 
Summary: 
The level of centralized delivery appears to be fairly 
uniform across individual retail chains. Neither distance 
from central warehouse nor siting has a significant effect 
on the proportion of consolidated deliveries a branch store 
receives. This proportion does vary at the extremes of the 
shop size range (> 25,000 sq. ft., <2000 sq. ft. ), but not 
significantly across the broad intervening range. A 
growing number of small to medium stores are being converted 
to the discount style of retailing which demands a much 
higher degree of centralized delivery than conventional 
supermarkets. 
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Table 5.7: Proportion of Supplies from Central Warehouse. 
Discount Stores Average for Whole Chain 
Firm 1 90% 65% 
Firm 2 95% 50% 
Source: personal survey. 
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Figure 5.9: Variations in the Proportion of Turnover Channelled 
through Central Warehouse by Grocery Multiples. 
(source: personal survey) 
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Variations in the proportion of centralized deliveries 
BETWEEN chains 
Despite the numerous advantages of centralized 
delivery, firms differ widely in the proportion of turnover 
they channel through their central warehouse(s) (fig. 5.9). 
This is a variation that many people within the trade find 
baffling. Walters (1976) lightheartedly suggests that 
there are as many views on why this should be so as there 
are retailers. The variation is sometimes ascribed rather 
vaguely to differences in "business philosophy" or "trading 
behaviour", expressions that need clarification. Thorpe et 
al. (1973) identify eight factors thought to influence the 
choice of distribution strategy: 
1. Number of branches 
2. Dispersal of branches 
3. Size of branches 
4. Growth history 
5. Commodity mix 
6. Vertical integration 
7. Sales density 
8. Rent (cost of occupancy) 
They do not adequately explain the role of these factors, 
however, and represent the relationships between them and 
the level of centralized delivery in a series of graphs, 
several of which show trends that are neither self-evident 
nor substantiated by empirical evidence. 
In the light of the present survey, four major factors 
have been identified, three of which combine some of 
Thorpe's variables. 
(i) Number and size of shops: There is no significant 
relationship between the number of shops in a chain and the 
proportion of - centralized deliveries (fig. 5.10). The 
number of shops and their sizes (measured in turnover) will 
together determine the aggregate turnover that will have to 
exceed a certain threshold level to justify the 
establishment of a central warehouse. Even chains that are 
too small to operate a separate warehouse, though, organize 
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some centralized delivery by concentrating the stocks of 
some products at one, usually the original, store in the 
chain and supplying other stores form this base. As all 
the retailers surveyed were large enough to operate at least 
one central warehouse, it is not possible here to comment on 
the minimum viable size of a centralized delivery system. 
Above this lower size limit, there is no significant 
relationship between the degree of centralization and 
turnover (fig. 5.11). 
The relationship between the proportion of centralized 
delivery and the sizes of shop in the chain is complicated 
by the fact that most chains comprise shops varying widely 
in size (measured both in floorspace and turnover). 
Despite this, most chains claim to standardise the 
proportion of supplies each store receives from central 
warehouse. While the shop size profile is likely to 
influence the level at which this proportion is 
standardised, in the absence of shop floorspace and turnover 
data it is not possible to test this relationship. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that some chains, 
notably those that include superstores, vary the proportion 
of warehouse delivery with shop size. This is discussed 
further in the next section. 
(ii) Spatial distribution of shops: Thorpe suggests that 
the level of centralized delivery falls with increasing 
dispersal of branch stores. Although not made explicit, 
this is probably based on the reasoning that more dispersed 
chains would be more costly to supply from a central 
warehouse (for a given level of service). This would be 
particularly so where shops lay beyond the daily range of a 
delivery vehicle (Baker, 1976). This delivery range does 
not impose an absolute limit on the geographical extent of 
a chain, as was explained earlier. 
Deliveries beyond this range, however, are very 
exceptional, and apply to very few of the shops operated by 
the firms surveyed. Most chains, with a centralized grocery 
delivery system had all their branches within the daily 
delivery range. Indeed, for a group of eight chains for 
which store location data were available, 94% _ of 
the 
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branches were within 100 miles of the central warehouse that 
supplied them (fig. 5.12) . These chains were much more 
compact than that of ASDA (firm 9 in fig. 5.12) whose 
superstores are not dependent on a central warehouse for 
grocery deliveries. The spread of ASDA superstores shows 
that its store location policy has not been constrained by 
the need for branches to be within easy reach of a central 
warehouse (Jones, 1981). In 1978, for example, ASDA opened 
stores in such widely dispersed locations as Aberdeen, 
Plymouth, Norwich and Birkenhead (ASDA Annual Report, 1979). 
The spatial distribution of branch stores is, 
therefore, partly related to whether or not the firm 
operates centralized distribution. There was no evidence 
to show, however, that in the case of those multiples that 
engaged in centralized distribution (firms 1-8 in fig. 
5.12), there was a significant relationship between the 
proportion of centralized deliveries and the dispersal of 
branch stores. Figure 5.12 shows, for the multiples 
providing store location data, the cumulative proportion of 
branch stores over increasing distances from the central 
warehouses that supply them. There is little relationship 
between the configuration of these cumulative frequency 
curves and the proportions of supplies received from central 
warehouse. A widely dispersed chain such as 7. with stores 
scattered widely up to a distance of 140 miles from the 
central warehouse can achieve the same level of centralized 
delivery (60%) as a very compact chain, such as 1. with all 
its stores concentrated within a 50 mile radius of the 
central warehouse. It was also found in the case of two of 
the larger multiples which operated more than one central 
warehouse, that dispersal of stores around each warehouse 
could differ markedly despite the fact that the level of 
centralized delivery was uniform across the whole chain. No 
evidence was, therefore, found to support the contention of 
Thorpe et al. (1973) that the importance of centralized 
delivery declines gradually with the increasing dispersal of 
branch stores. 
At a smaller spatial - scale, Thorpe et al. (1973) claim 
that shop occupancy costs will -affect the relative use of 
central warehouses. Chains composed of stores located in 
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town centres where land costs are high might be likely to 
make heavier use of central warehouses, reducing the amount 
of premium space in shops devoted to storage. By 
comparison, chains of neighbourhood stores would not be 
under the same pressure from retail land costs to centralize 
stocks in a peripheral 'depot. Although all the chains with 
highly centralized distribution (affecting in excess of 75% 
of their turnover) are "high street" retailers, it is 
difficult to confirm this hypothesis, for several reasons. 
First, several of the chains operate stores in different 
parts of the urban area. Second, land costs can vary as 
much between urban areas' as within them. To test this 
hypothesis rigorously, one would 'require land cost data 
which most firms are reluctant to provide. Third, the 
siting of a store is usually closely related to its size, 
neighbourhood stores generally being smaller than "high 
street" supermarkets. It is difficult, therefore, to 
separate the effects of size from those of siting. 
3. Growth history: As they have grown, grocery multiples 
have differed in their allocation of investment between 
retail outlets and the supporting system of distribution. 
In the early stages of their growth, those multiples which 
failed to establish their own warehousing and transport 
facilities often ran into difficulties (Jefferys, 1954). 
In later stages of their development, they began to differ 
in the emphasis they placed on these facilities. Reliance 
upon centralized distribution has been partly conditioned by 
the way in which chains have expanded. There have been two 
modes of expansion (Winslet, 1956): 
a) Organic or "unitary" growth: where the chain 
expands gradually by setting up new stores 
from scratch. 
b) Growth by acquisition or merger. 
Organic growth has enabled multiples to expand their 
distribution facilities in phase with the spread of the 
chain. It is not possible, however, to expand the capacity 
of these facilities gradually in line with the addition of 
individual shops, as a central warehouse represents a large 
indivisible investment. A newly opened central warehouse 
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will have excess capacity to accommodate future growth in 
turnover and, possibly, plans to centralize the delivery of 
more products. Bowen and Mundy (1972) have suggested that 
firms take advantage of this situation to centralize the 
delivery of a higher proportion of their supplies. As 
turnover increases, this proportion is gradually reduced 
until it reaches the minimum level acceptable to the firm. 
Warehouse capacity would than be expanded and the same cycle 
would be repeated. This implies that the proportion of a 
chain's supplies passing through central warehouse(s) 
fluctuates throught time. This was not confirmed by the 
survey. Most firms claimed that the trend over the 
previous decade had been towards increasing the proportion 
of supplies coming through central warehouse and that in 
many cases this proportion had now stabilised. It is very 
unusual for a supplier to be asked to revert to direct 
branch store delivery. The, one major instance of this 
happening was in the aftermath of Tesco' s Checkout campaign 
when the firm's distribution system became seriously 
overstretched in a very short time. If the evolutionary 
process that Bowen and Mundy describe were widespread, 
suppliers would be regularly called upon by multiples to 
switch their deliveries from shops to warehouses and vice 
versa, causing much disruption to their distribution 
operations. The survey revealed, however, that this was 
not the case. Bowen and Mundy' s idealised model also 
presupposes that the chain grows gradually and organically. 
In practice, however, very few chains have developed 
entirely in this way: only two, for example, out of the 
total sample of 23. The remainder have grown partly and in 
varying degrees by acquisition. 
The scale of an acquisition can vary enormously from 
the purchase of a single shop to that of a chain of hundreds 
of shops complete with supporting distribution system. 
Usually, small numbers of shops can be quite easily 
integrated into the -existing system of distribution. 
Larger scale takeovers, however, have usually been followed 
by a process of rationalization. This often entails the 
closure of many of the smaller stores in the acquired chain. 
The distribution director of one large multiple, which had 
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been formed by a long series of takeovers, estimated that on 
average 40% of the shops in an acquired chain would be 
closed down. These need not all be small, inefficient 
stores. Where the areas served by the acquiring and 
acquired chains overlap, it would necessary to eliminate 
competitive stores. The geography of the chains could, 
therefore, be radically altered by such a takeover, making 
it essential to reorganize the system of centralized 
distribution. This reorganization would, in many cases, be 
further complicated by the associated acquisition of central 
warehouse or warehouses. There have been several instances 
in the past decade of these warehouses either being sold off 
separately or being disposed off following the acquisition 
of the chain. However, roughly a third of the central 
warehouses currently operated by the sample of 23 grocery 
multiples were obtained through the acquisition 'of chains. 
The integration of these warehouses into the acquiring 
firm's existing distribution network has sometimes been 
further complicated by the fact that the chains they 
previously supplied provided a significantly different level 
of centralized delivery. All this has made it difficult 
for those chains growing principally by acquisition to plan 
carefully the long term development of a centralized system 
of delivery. It is not surprising, therefore, that those 
large national chains that have expanded mainly by 
acquisition over the past 20 years channel a relatively 
small proportion of supplies through their central 
warehouses. In contrast, those chains that are most 
dependent on central warehouses are characterised by a long 
period of organic growth. 
4. Commodity Mix: The overall proportion of supplies 
passing through the central warehouse is the net result of 
the retailer's policy on the reception of many different 
classes of product. As some product classes are more 
suited to centralized handling by the retailer than others, 
the relative importance of central warehouse deliveries will 
depend upon the range of goods stocked and their relative 
contribution to total turnover. 
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Some products are typically distributed via central 
warehouse: 
Imported goods (esp. canned fruits) - transported in bulk 
loads from the ports at particular times of year reflecting 
overseas growing seasons. 
Own label products - almost all own label supplies are 
channelled through central warehouses. In a survey of 23 
food manufacturers, Thorpe et al. (1973) found that roughly 
half delivered all their own label production to central 
warehouses, while almost 75% distributed more than 80% of 
own label output in this way. A multiple's policy on the 
development of own label products can, therefore, carry 
important. implications for distribution. As f igure 5.13 
shows, for a sample of 8 firms, there is a reasonably close 
correlation between the importance of own label products and 
the level of centralized delivery. 
The decision on which of the remaining products to take 
through central warehouse is usually based on a 
consideration of the following criteria: 
(i) Value density: Many multiples prefer to stock less 
bulky, higher value lines. 
(ii) Rate of turnover: There is some disagreement between 
chains over the desirability of centralizing the delivery of 
fast-moving lines. Some firms preferred to take these 
products through their central warehouses so that they could 
ensure a fast and regular delivery to shops. Other chains, 
however, had distribution systems that were not geared up 
for such a rapid through-flow of supplies and they generally 
had products with a faster rate of turnover delivered direct 
to the shops (Christopher et al., 1977). There was a 
greater consensus on the desirability of centralizing slower 
moving lines to reduce stock levels in these products 
(Madigan, 1980). 
(iii) Perishability: The majority of firms had highly 
perishable products delivered direct. Some of the more 
centralized chains, however, had distribution systems 
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capable of handling fresh and frozen foods and provisions. 
Broadly speaking, as sales of these products constituted an 
average of around a third of a chain's total turnover, 
chains that had not incorporated in their systems of 
centralized distribution could channel a maximum of only 
60-70% of their total turnover through the central 
warehouse. 
(iv) Ease of handling: Most multiples avoid taking 
products such as eggs and biscuits through their central 
warehouses partly because their greater fragility makes 
handling difficult. 
(v) Product Compatibility: Some products were excluded 
from multiples' central warehouses on the grounds that they 
could contaminate other 'products. Soap powder and 
toiletries, for example, cannot be kept with various types 
of food. 
Summary 
The larger retail grocery chains buy almost all" their 
processed food products direct from manufacturers. These 
products can either be delivered direct to branch stores by 
the manufacturer or distributed via the retailers' central 
warehouse. Retail chains in the grocery trade vary widely 
in their relative dependence on these two modes of store 
delivery. Numerous factors affect the proportion of goods 
channelled through the central warehouse, making 
generalization difficult. Some of these factors such as 
the spatial distribution of branch stores and the commodity 
mix can be subjected to quantitative and fairly objective 
measurements; others, such as growth history and "business 
philosophy", are more abstract and their influence is more 
difficult to assess. 
There is considerable uniformity within chains in the 
proportions of supplies received from the retailer's central 
warehouse. Significant variations in this proportion tend 
to occur only where there are pronounced differences within 
a chain in shop size -and manner of selling. The 
rationalization of -retail chains has narrowed shop size 
differentials, making it easier to standardise distribution 
arrangements within these chains. 
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Among the larger retail chains, the (weighted) average 
proportion of supplies channelled through the central 
warehouse appears to have declined during the 1970s. This 
is likely to have resulted mainly from the 
disproportionately large growth of turnover in chains of low 
central warehouse dependence, such as those that have; grown 
primarily by acquisition and those largely comprising 
superstores. Only one firm claimed to have reduced 
signifantly the proportion of supplies flowing through its 
central warehouse and this was in response to an 
exceptional surge in its volume of business following a 
successful sales campaign. Indeed, the majority of the 
multiples surveyed (54%) said that they had been increasing 
the proportion of supplies channelled through their 
warehouses. In all but two cases, however, future increases 
in this proportion were expected to be marginal (less than 
5%). Roughly a third (32%) of the retailers aimed to hold 
their level of centralized delivery stable. Only three of 
the firms (14%) claimed-that their policy was to reduce this 
proportion, and in two of these cases this reflected a 
growing emphasis on larger stores that could receive more 
direct, bulk deliveries. 
It would seem, therefore, that most grocery multiples 
anticipate little change-in their relative dependence on the 
two main modes of store delivery. The wide disparities 
between chains in their relative use of central warehouses 
are likely to remain and changes in the overall proportion 
of groceries channelled through these warehouses determined 
more by the allocation of . trade between multiples than by 
individual multiple's efforts to increase or reduce their 
dependence on centralized deliveries. 
WHOLESALERS 
The vast majority of grocery supplies handled by 
wholesalers pass through a single warehouse, either a 
"delivered trade" or a cash and carry facility. In most 
cases, therefore, wholesalers have no choice of logistical 
channels. It is worth considering, however, some of the 
exceptional circumstances under which such choice exists. 
There are two types of voluntary group. The most 
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important in terms of turnover and numbers of affiliated 
retailers are the "wholesaler sponsored" groups, such as 
Spar, Mace and VG. As the wholesalers belonging to these 
groups only earn revenue on the supplies they handle in 
their warehouses, they channel their entire trade through at 
least one of their premises. "Retailer sponsored" 
voluntary groups, in contrast, have been set up by consortia 
of retailers, either by acquiring a wholesale business (e. g 
PGMA-Bob) or by establishing their own depots from scratch 
(e. g. Londis) As their main aim is to maximise retail 
sales rather than the profitability of the wholesale 
operation, these groups are willing to arrange for producers 
to deliver some supplies direct to the larger shops (i. e. 
provide a "drop shipment"). The retailer 'sponsored group, 
unlike its wholesale counterpart can offer, its affiliated 
shopholders the benefits of centralized buying without 
requiring them to receive their supplies via its depot(s). 
Only a small proportion of these retailers' supplies are 
delivered direct from producers, though, as their demands 
are usually too small to qualify for drop shipment. 
A few instances were encountered of flows channelled 
via wholesalers passing through more than one depot. One 
large wholesaler belonging to a voluntary group had until a 
few months before the interview operated a central warehouse 
where stocks of longer shelf-life products had been 
concentrated. This facility did not serve shops directly 
but supplied mixed, bulk loads to a second tier of local 
wholesale depots. This centralization of the stocks of 
slower-moving lines had reduced stockholding and storage 
costs and enabled the wholesaler to receive goods from 
producers in large enough loads to qualify for discounts. 
These benefits, however, had been insufficient to justify 
the-continued existence of the central depot. The firm had 
decided instead to use the surplus storage space in the 
local depots and to raise additional capital by selling the 
central depot site. Somewhat ironically, this wholesaler's 
parent company, which was engaged in several different forms 
of food distribution, was seriously considering, at this 
time, setting up a very large central warehouse to supply 
groceries not only to the local wholesale depots but also to 
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cash and carry warehouses and retail 'depots operated by 
other subsidiaries. This would rationalize stockholding 
and distribution within the organization and strengthen its 
bargaining power vis-a-vis suppliers. It was thought that 
the resulting savings might outweigh the capital cost of 
establishing this new facility and the additional transport 
and handling costs that would be incurred by inserting 
another node in the chain of distribution. Such a 
development would be unique within the grocery trade in 
integrating the distribution systems of wholesale and 
multiple retail firms. 
Links already exist between wholesale voluntary group 
and cash and carry operations. Many wholesalers are 
engaged in both these activities, sometimes on the same 
site. Some of the smaller cash and carries are too small 
to qualify for a direct delivery of a bulk load from 
suppliers, in which case these bulk supplies are often 
centralized at the main voluntary group warehouse and 
transported out in smaller, sometimes mixed, loads to the 
cash and carries. As cash and carries have grown in size, 
however, the need for this break-bulk operation has 
diminished. By far the greater part of cash and carry 
supplies come direct from producers. 
Notes: 
1. has been decided not to create a separate stage in the 
evolutionary model for the radical restructuring of the food 
distribution system that occurred during the 2nd World War, 
on the grounds that this is best seen as a reponse to very 
exceptional circumstances. The wartime situation is 
discussed in McKinnon (1981a). 
2. It is possible to calculate the turnover rate (or rate of 
"stockturn") for various classes of food product on the 
basis of the data provided by the Census of Production. 
The product classification employed by this Census, however, 
is not compatible with that used in Table 5.2, preventing an 
assessment of the strength of correlation between the 
proportion of output distributed directly and the turnover 
rate. One can use the Census of Production data, 
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nevertheless, to compare the rate at which stocks of 
biscuits and fruit and vegetable products "turnover". 
Finished stocks of biscuits are estimated to "turnover" 
about 20 times per annum, whereas those of fruit and 
vegetable products about 8 times per annum (Census of 
Production, 1979, Summary Table). 
3. Against these disadvantages of direct delivery should be 
set the "merchandising" often done by manufacturers' staff 
in some sections of the trade e. g. petfoods, cakes. 
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Chapter 6 
The Links between Manufacturers' and Multiple Retailers' 
Distribution Systems. 
Types of Linkage 
The previous -chapter, . examined 
those sections of the 
logistical channel controlled by food manufacturers and 
multiple retailers separately. It is necessary now to look 
at the way in which these two channel sections connect. 
The four possible delivery arrangements are shown in figure 
6.1. Very little flow passes along channel 1. Retailers' 
central warehouses are generally of a size (in storage 
capacity and turnover) to receive bulk loads direct from the 
factory. Indeed, a major reason for multiple retailers 
operating central warehouses is to obtain the favourable 
buying terms associated with direct ex-factory delivery. 
It was not possible to measure this amount of flow , but it 
is reckoned to be under 5% of total grocery sales. 
Channel 4. is estimated to carry around 5% of total 
grocery turnover, almost all of it passing through 
superstores. 
Over 90% of grocery flow passes along channels 2. and 
3. Attention focuses, therefore, on the division of flow 
between these two channels. The pattern of warehouse and 
branch store deliveries is presented in matrix form (fig. 
6.2). This shows how a sample of 18 food manufacturers 
distribute their products to a sample of 22 multiple 
retailers. Each of the multiples purchased goods from each 
of the multiples, generating a total of 396 trading links. 
Data was received for 374 of these links. (Where data was 
unobtainable, the cell remains vacant. ) 
The delivery arrangements were classified into five 
categories. Table 6.1 shows the proportions of 
"arrangements! ' in each category. There was a slight 
preponderance of warehouse only deliveries. When the "all" 
and "most" categories are combined for warehouse and store 
deliveries, the aggregate proportions (50.9% and 48.8% 
respectively) closely resemble the corresponding proportions 
of grocery turnover channelled through each channel. These 
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Figure 6.1: Manufacturer-Multiple Retailer Logistical Channels. 
Manufacturer's Retailer's 
Distribution Central Branch 
Factory Depot Warehouse Store 
ML 1. -1w 
2s 
3. 
a. "s 
Table 6.1: Relative Importance of Various Delivery 
Arrangements. 
% of all 
arrangements 
1. All supplies to central warehouse(s) 44.7 
2. All supplies direct to branch stores 41.4 
3. Most supplies to central warehouse(s) 6.2 
4. Most supplies to direct to branch stores 6.4 
5. Even split between warehouse and store 1.3 
deliveries. 
Source: personal survey. 
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transactional data, therefore, tally with the data on 
channel throughput, confirming the earlier estimate that 
roughly half the grocery turnover of the food multiples 
passes through their central warehouse. (see p. 113) 
Roughly 14% of the trading links fall into categories 
3,4 or 5 and hence yield "mixed delivery arrangements". 
These warrant more detailed comment. 
Thorpe et al. (1973) defines mixed delivery with respect 
to product type, where multiple retailers receive some of 
their supplies of a product into their central warehouse and 
the remainder into their branches. For a sample of 11 
grocery products (excluding provisions, fresh foods and 
non-foods), mixed delivery was much more common than 
exclusive warehouse or store delivery (% figures show the 
proportion of multiples receiving supplies in this way): 
Mixed delivery 56% 
All to warehouse 29% 
All to branches 16% 
Mixed delivery can occur for two reasons: 
1. Goods supplied by two or more producers who have made 
different delivery arrangements with the same retailer. 
Competitive brands then arrive at the shops via different 
channels. The delivery arrangements of manufacturers 
producing a sample of ten products were compared. Table 
6.2 shows for each of these ten products, cases where 
suppliers differed in their mode of delivery to the same 
retailer. It can be seen that in the case of some products 
such as tea, jam and breakfast cereal, it was very common 
for competing suppliers to provide different types of 
distribution. In others, such as those of coffee and 
canned fruit, there was much greater similarity. Overall, 
an average of about a quarter of the transactions between 
competing suppliers and multiples differed in the type of 
delivery they produced. 
2. Where a single supplier delivers some goods to the 
central warehouse and some direct to the stores. All the 
14lß. 
Table 6.2: Extent to Which Food Manufacturers Differ in the 
Method of Delivery to Multiple Retailers. 
Sample Sizes % of Retailers Receiving 
No. of Food No. of Different Types of Delivery 
Product Manufacturers Retailers from Manufacturers 
Jam 2 19 53 
Tea 3 14 43 
Breakfast 
Cereal 3 14 43 
Canned 
De sests 2 14 29 
Biscuits* 2 18 22 
Crisps 2 18 17 
Flour 2 19 16 
Salad 
Cream 2 15 13 
Coffee 2 10 10 
Canned 
Fruit 2 20 0 
Source: personal survey. 
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mixed delivery arrangements shown in figure 6.2, (i. e. types 
3. , 4. and 5. in the five-fold classification) are of this 
kind. As was pointed out earlier, most multiples tend to 
standardise the proportion of goods their stores received 
from the central warehouse. However, exceptions are often 
made for shops at the extreme ends of the size range which 
are either too small to receive the minimum size of drop or 
large enough to accept a direct, bulk delivery from the 
factory. - Of the 14% of trading links that produced mixed 
delivery arrangements, the vast majority (> 90%) were 
biasses either toward warehouse or store delivery, the 
biasses being evenly divided between the two. 
In view of the relative proportions of mixed delivery 
arrangements stemming from these two sources, it would seem 
that mixed delivery for a particular product results more 
from different suppliers of that product using different 
methods of delivery than from individual suppliers providing 
retail chains with both central warehouse and store 
delivery. 
Analysis of the Pattern of Linkage. 
The organization of figure 6.2 is based upon two 
statistically significant relationships : 
a) between the extent to which a manufacturer distributes 
goods to the central warehouses of his retail customers and 
the proportion of his output delivered direct from the 
factory (r = . 722, sig. level = 0.999) 
b) between the proportion of a retail chains's supplies 
passing through its central warehouse and the proportion of 
suppliers delivering into its central warehouse1 (r= 0.479, 
sig. level = 0.95) 
The data in figure 6.2 is arranged in such a way as to 
test the hypothesis that the nature of the delivery will 
largely reflect the strength of these two relationships. 
Manufacturers are aligned along the vertical axis in order 
of the proportion of output they deliver direct from the 
factory. Multiple retailers are set out along the 
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horizontal axis in descending order of the proportion of 
supplies channelled through their central warehouses. Both 
samples present a wide variation in these proportions, the 
values in both cases grading reasonably gently over a wide 
range. 
One might expect to find a preponderance of store 
deliveries above the leading diagonal and a preponderance of 
warehouse deliveries below it. While there are 
concentrations of store and warehouse deliveries in the top 
right and bottom left corners respectively, the central 
section of the matrix does not display any clear pattern. 
Making allowances for the subjectivity of the analysis and 
the limitations of the samples, one may tentatively conclude 
that the pattern of logistical linkages in the grocery trade 
shows some regularity, but that there are, nevertheless, 
numerous anomalies. It would not be possible, therefore, 
to predict accurately the delivery arrangement between a 
particular manufacturer and a particular -retailer simply on 
the basis, respectively, of the proportion of total output 
distributed direct from the factory and the proportion of 
total turnover channelled through central warehouse. 
To explain why no clear pattern has emerged, one must 
examine the factors that influence the 'choice between 
warehouse and store delivery. There are advantages and 
disadvantages in the two types of delivery for both the 
supplier and the retailer. These have been discussed in 
chapter 5. Although the choice of delivery mode rests with 
the retailer, the supplier can influence this decision by 
adjusting the following variables: 
i) prices - i. e. the level of discounts offered 
ii) minimum drop size 
iii) service level - lead times for respective 
deliveries 
The way in which these factors affect the delivery 
arrangements is very difficult to discover as the question 
of delivery is usually resolved in the confidential, and 
often complicated, trade negotiations between supplier and 
retailer. Using information collected in the course of the 
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survey and culled from published sources it is, however, 
possible to shed some light on this subject. 
Factors Affecting the Mode of Delivery 
i) Pricing 
Losch (1954) considered the pricing system to be "the 
most important regulator of a rational spatial arrangement". 
Similarly, one might expect that if price differences 
reflected distribution costs, this would generate a 
"rational" pattern of freight flow. For this to be 
achieved the price mechanism would have to operate 
effectively at various levels of decision-making. At the 
highest level it would have to promote an efficient 
allocation of flow between logistical channels. In the 
foregoing analysis of the logistical relationships between 
food manufacturers and retailers it was not possible to 
assess the efficiency of the channel allocation; however, a 
reasonable proportion of the delivery arrangements did 
appear irrational in the sense' that, for example, some 
multiples with highly centralized distribution systems 
received branch store deliveries from manufacturers that 
overall distributed a large proportion of their output 
directly in bulk loads. It must be asked, therefore, to 
what extent the pattern of linkage has been influenced by 
suppliers' pricing policies and if their prices reflect 
distribution costs. 
Distribution costs: 
Before a firm can relate prices to distribution costs, it 
must first ascertain how these costs vary between different 
types of delivery. There is evidence to suggest, however, 
that many companies have only a scant knowledge of their 
distribution costs. A survey undertaken by the Department 
of Employment found that approximately 70% of firms 
questioned could not provide. a detailed break-down of 
distribution costs. According to Murphy (1978), a 
significant number of firms have not even calculated the 
total cost of their distribution. This he attributes to 
the fact that responsib il ity for distribution has 
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traditionally been divided between different branches of 
management and so, for the purposes of cost accountancy, 
distribution costs have not been calculated "in consolidated 
form". Even where firms do estimate their total 
distribution costs, they often differ in the range of 
activities they include in the cost calculation, thereby 
complicating inter-firm comparisons. These differences in 
accounting schemes result partly from disagreement among 
firms over what actually constitutes distribution. A 
survey of industrial attitudes to physical distribution 
revealed widely differing views of the scope of distribution 
(Whitehead Consulting Group Ltd., 1974). From the present 
survey and recently published case -studies of food 
manufacturers distribution systems (Hemingway, 1979), it 
appears that the main areas of disagreement are over the 
inclusion of stockholding, order processing and packaging in 
the distribution cost calculation. The addition of these 
items can effectively double the distribution cost estimate 
(McKibbin, 1982b) . 
It proved difficult to obtain comparable figures for 
total distribution cost from the food manufacturers 
consulted and almost impossible to get this data in 
disaggregated form. Almost half the firms in the sample 
were unable or unwilling to provide the distribution cost 
data requested. -- Of the remainder, six firms offered 
estimates that were not strictly comparable. This left 
nine estimates that had been calculated on a broadly similar 
basis. These excluded stockholding, order-processing and 
packaging costs. 
The estimates of total distribution costs ranged from 
3% to 5% of net sales revenue, and averaged 4.4%. These 
values appear low by comparison with the cost data compiled 
by a Mintel survey of food manufacturers in 1977, though it 
is not clear which items Mintel's respondents included in 
their cost calculations. They are also significantly lower 
than cost estimates made on the basis of a more recent 
survey by the Centre for Physical Distribution Management 
(McKibbin, 1982a). It has been shown that the ratio of 
distribution costs to sales revenue varies widely for firms 
in the grocery trade (Williams, 1975; McKibbin, 1982a) . 
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This variation can reflect differences in such things as 
product type, size of range (McLaren, 1980), speed of 
delivery and the allocation of output between different 
distributive channels (Sawdey, 1972). Given this wide 
variation in the level of distribution costs, average 
figures will be very sensitive to the particular combination 
of firms sampled, especially where, as in the case of the 
surveys referred to, the sample size is small. These three 
sets of figures strongly suggest, however, that the majority 
of food manufacturers expend between 3 and 6% of net sales 
revenue on the transport and storage of finished products. 
These proportions will be compared later with variations in 
the prices at which manufacturers sell their goods to 
retailers. 
Whilst inventory, administration and order-processing 
costs will vary to some extent with the choice logistical 
channel, the main sources of variation in total distribution 
costs will lie in the transport and storage of the goods. 
Partly for this reason and partly because of the inadequacy 
of the disaggregated cost data received from firms in the 
survey, attention will focus on the transport and storage 
elements in the distribution process. 
Only three firms provided separate expenditure figures 
for transport and storage. One of them, however, excluded 
factory warehousing from the cost estimate for storage 
rendering its figures incomparable. The way in which the 
other two firms divided their expenditure between transport 
and storage quite closely resembled the cost allocations 
averaged by Kearney (1980) from a survey of food and drink 
manufacturers. This identifies transport as the major cost 
component by a significant margin, a finding corroborated by 
a Mintel study (1977) of physical distribution in the 
grocery trade. 
Variations in transport costs: Transport costs are subject 
mainly to two dimensions of variation: 
a) variation with distance travelled 
b) variation with consignment size -(determining the 
transport rate per unit distance) 
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The British processed food industry employs almost 
universally an "equalised delivery" (or "single zone") 
pricing scheme (Price commission, 1975b) . This means that 
prides do not vary with the distance between factory and 
customer. To some extent, therefore, customers located 
near the factory cross-subsidise the more costly deliveries 
to customers further afield. Coates et al. (1977), 
nevertheless, contend that under such a spatial pricing 
system the amount of cross-subsidy will be small, partly 
because transport. costs generally represent a small 
proportion of final selling prices and partly because unit 
transport cost "taper" as journey lengths increase. The 
first of these points is borne out by the distribution cost 
estimates presented above. These figures suggest that the 
transport (of the finished products) represents around 2% of 
the final selling price of processed p4 The second point 
relates to the structure of transport rates. These rates 
may be divided into terminal and movement costs. As only 
the latter increase with distance, total transport costs 
"taper" as terminal costs are spread over longer distances. 
Figure 6.3 employs data presented by Chisholm (1971) to 
illustrate the tapering transport cost profile for a general 
category of food products (assuming fixed movement, or 
"linehaul", costs/mile) . 
Although transport costs vary less than proportionally 
with distance, the costs of delivery can still vary 
significantly between customers. Table 6.3, for example, 
shows how the costs of delivering canned fruit in bulk from 
a manufacturers' warehouse to three retailers' central 
warehouses can vary substantially over a comparatively short 
distance range, despite a pronounced tapering of the 
transport rate per ton-mile. It is likely too that branch 
store delivery costs and the cost differential between 
branch and warehouse deliveries will be subject to a marked 
geographical variation as delivery costs are largely a 
function of drop density, and hence population density 
(Williams, 1975) (fig. 6.4). If these cost, variations 
were translated into price differences, it is possible that 
they could affect a retailer's decision on whether or not to 
Table 6.3: Bulk Delivery Rates: Canned Fruit Company. 
I2 
From warehouse at Feltham to multiple's 
central warehouse s at: 
distance cost/ton cost/ton/mile 
(miles) (£) 
Farnborough 17 2.70 15.9p 
Waltham Cross 27 3.40 12.6p 
Aylesford 44 4.00- 9. lp 
Winsford 150 10.20 6.8p 
Source: personal survey. 
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channel supplies through his central warehouse. For 
example, a multiple operating a widely dispersed chain of 
stores in a region distant from a supplier's factory might 
be quoted a high rate for direct branch store delivery and 
thereby encouraged instead to take bulk deliveries into his 
central warehouse. The spatial uniformity of delivery 
costs ensures, however, that retailers are not subject to 
such geographically discriminating pressures. 
When asked how much weight was attached to distribution 
costs in the determination of prices, several of the 
distribution executives interviewed used the geographical 
standardization of prices to substantiate their claims that 
there was little or no relation between distribution costs 
and prices. Such responses, however, concealed the fact 
that food manufacturers' price structures often allow for 
transport cost differences that result from variations in 
the size of order to be delivered (Pettit, 1976). These 
cost variations can be very wide; one large manufacturer has 
estimated that the cost of distributing a palletised load of 
7000 units to a central warehouse represented 2.3% of the 
average selling price of his products while the cost of 
delivering 5 units to a shop represented 15.2% (Monopolies 
and Merger Commission, 1981). It is widely acknowledged 
that delivery costs vary inversely and exponentially with 
drop size (Bowen and Mundy, 1972; Jones, 1976; Thorpe et 
al., 1973) (fig. 5.3). There was general agreement among 
firms in the survey, however, that it was impractical to 
vary prices in accordance with the size of individual branch 
store deliveries. Indeed it is virtually impossible for 
suppliers to establish accurately and objectively the costs 
attributable to particular consignments (Buxton, 1975). 
Two manufacturers admitted, though, that they took the 
average size of drops to a 
account in deciding what lev 
was much more common for man 
distinguish between local d 
quantities from depots (to 
large bulk deliveries direct 
shows an idealised sequence 
order of distribution costs. 
iultiple's branch stores into 
is of discount to grant? it 
fa'cturers' pricing schemes to 
Liveries of relatively small 
'hich fig. 5.3 relates) from 
from the factory. - Table 6.4 
of deliveries in decl in ing 
Figure 6.5 extends the cost 
1.1+ 
Table 6.4: Size of Order, Nature of Delivery and Distribution 
Cost. 
Distribution 
Cost 
Ex-factory Maximum Vehicle Capacity - Trunk Vehicle LOWEST 
single drop 
2-drops 
decreasing 1 11 
3-drops 
utilization 
4-drops 
Ex-depot Maximum Vehicle Capacity - Delivery Vehicle 
single drop 
decreasing 
increasing 
I 
utilization/ no. of drops 
diminishing 
vehicle size 
C 
D 
a 
U) 
0 
U 
0) 
a, 
HIGHEST 
E--- Increasing No. of Drops/Journey 
Figure 6.5: Relationship between Drop Size and Unit Delivery 
Cost over a Wide Size Range. 
Increasing Drop Size 
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curve depicted on figure 5.3 to show how drop size 
eventually becomes large enough to qualify for direct 
delivery from the factory. The switch from ex-depot to 
ex-factory delivery is represented as a discontinuity on the 
cost curve because these larger direct deliveries avoid the 
costs of storage and handling at distribution depots. 
Direct delivery from the factory is, therefore, much cheaper 
per unit than distribution in smaller consignments via 
depots. Two firms supplied enough information about the 
logistics and costs of their distribution operations to make 
possible a cost comparison between the two types of 
delivery. The costs of direct delivery were calculated to 
be 32% and 35% of the cost of "indirect" distribution via 
depots. -Such large cost savings could give manufacturers a 
strong incentive to promote direct bulk deliveries by means 
of their pricing (i. e. discounting) policy. 
Thorpe et al (1973) have devised a generalized cost 
model to establish the critical volume required for direct 
ex-factory delivery: 
Critical 
Volume 
Extra costs for branch delivery incurred by 
Supplier per £' 000 of Supplies 
Retailer's distribution costs 
per P-1000 of supplies 
This model is of theoretical interest, but has little 
practical relevance for several reasons. In the first 
place, suppliers and retailers do not have access to each 
others cost information nor, as will be seen later, does the 
price mechanism permit an effective trade-off between these 
cost elements. Although NEDO (1976) argued that "the 
probing of total distribution costs from the factory itself 
needs to be an essential part of the customer/supplier 
relationship; " and that "the probing should be a joint 
effort in the interests of both" (p6), there is no evidence 
of firms in the grocery trade responding to this advice. 
Second, it can be extremely difficult for a supplier to 
isolate the costs 'of delivering his products to the branch 
stores of a single retailer. Third, this cost model makes 
no allowance for the various marketing considerations that 
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often dominate the choice of delivery type. 
Enquiries were made to find out the extent to which 
discounts actually reflect differences in distribution costs 
between warehouse and store delivery. For several reasons, 
however, many firms were unable to give simple, direct 
answers to these enquiries. A common response was that 
prices are agreed in complicated negotiations between the 
sales department and customers. The distribution 
department would submit the relevant cost information to the 
sales team which they would then take into account in their 
negotiations (cf. Crawford, 1972b). The actual amount of 
weight attached to these distribution costings could not be 
easily ascertained. Several firms delivered only to retail 
and wholesale warehouses and so had no need to draw up a 
separate scheme of prices for store deliveries. Many 
companies delivered products both to retailers' central 
warehouses and to some of their larger stores. In these 
cases it was impossible to say how the ratio of goods 
supplied to these two types of premises affected the levels 
of discount awarded. 
Only four companies gave figures for the percentage 
discount granted to multiples requesting central warehouse 
delivery. These ranged from 1% to 3%. One distribution 
director stated that the larger multiples generally expected 
a 3% discount for warehouse delivery, though seldom received 
so much. The general view of distribution managers was 
that it was almost impossible to say what proportion of a 
retailer's total discount was attributable to his acceptance 
of warehouse delivery. Three firms said that they offered 
a fixed discount of 1% to firms that took a full lorry load 
regardless of whether it was delivered to a store or a 
warehouse. Discounts for bulk, central warehouse delivery. 
are generally regarded as being insufficient to offset fully 
the retailer's distribution costs, which are estimated to 
average around 3-4% of turnover (Monopolies and Merger 
Commission, 1981; Thorpe and Shepherd, 1977). 
Of all the companies responding to the question on 
discount levels, including those that did not specify a% 
discount for warehouse delivery, three-quarters (15) claimed 
that the prices charged made little or no allowance for 
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differences in distribution costs. The five companies which 
said that they did tailor prices to distribution costs 
delivered less than 10% of their output to retail outlets; 
two of them made no deliveries direct to stores. By far 
the greater part of their output was delivered to warehouses 
and the prices charged were closely related to the bulk of 
the loads delivered. A survey conducted by the monopolies 
and Merger Commission (1981) found that fewer than half the 
manufacturers consulted had even attempted to assess 
differences in their distribution costs. 
As the majority of food manufacturers do not appear to 
relate prices closely to distribution costs, one must ask 
what factors do dominate decisions on pricing. Most firms 
have a price list which quotes prices on the basis of 
product type and quantity purchased. The "quantity" rates 
set out in the published price list are "non-cumulative" in 
the sense that they relate to each order separately. It is 
these bulk rates which generally correspond most closely to 
distribution costs. Those firms that claim to gear prices 
to distribution costs are those that adhere rigidly to the 
published price list. The majority of manufacturers in the 
sample, however, supplement this price list with a series of 
trade discounts. Some of these discounts are "cumulative" 
or "patronage" discounts (often referred to as 
"over-riders") , being related to the total purchases a 
customer makes over a period of time. These are designed 
to encourage the customer to maximise his total purchases 
and are not affected by the frequency or size of individual 
orders. Sometimes the supplier will set a target for 
annual sales to particular customers and if this is reached 
the customers receive an additional discount. Other trade 
discounts are associated with promotions and compensate 
wholesale and retail customers for promotional efforts they 
have undertaken, sometimes involving a temporary reduction 
in their margins (Monopolies and Mergers Commissions, 1981). 
These supplementary discounts may considerably exceed the 
bulk related discounts inherent in the published price list. 
With many large retail chains the lowest published bulk rate 
is the starting point in the price negotiations. Table 6.5 
gives a rough indication of the orders of magnitude of 
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Table 6.5: Approximate Level of Discount Granted by 
Suppliers to Retail and Wholesale Customers. 
10 - 15% largest 5-6 supermarket chains 
7- 10% large voluntary group wholesale organizations 
and middle range supermarket chains 
3- 7% smaller supermarket chains 
0- 5% voluntary group shops taking direct store 
delivery 
Source: personal survey. 
Table 6.6: Minimum Drop Sizes by Product Type. 
No. of Firms Minimum Drop Size Average 
(cases) (cases) 
Biscuits 2 6,6 6 
Crisps 2 lß, 10 10 
Tea 3 10,20,25 18 
Canned Fruit 2 40,70 55 
Breakfast Cereal 3 25,40,50 38 
Source: personal survey. 
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discounts won by various sizes of retail and wholesale 
customers (over and above listed prices) (cf. National Board 
for Prices and Incomes, 1971). 
Although the delivery arrangements made with customers 
are often taken into consideration in deciding the size-of 
over-riding discount offered, this decision is, in most 
cases, dominated by the total quantity purchased. This is 
confirmed by the evidence that the cheapest form of 
delivery, that of bulk, direct delivery to central warehouse 
attracts a discount of at the most 3%, and usually only 
between 1% and 2%, out of total discounts of between 10% and 
15% for the larger supermarket chains. It appears too that 
manufacturers vary considerably in the levels of discount 
they offer for the more economical forms of delivery to 
central warehouse and larger branch stores. The proportion 
that these discounts represent of the total "quantity" 
discount can also vary widely. There is, therefore, no 
clear -and direct relationship between the prices a food 
manufacturer quotes and the type of delivery he provides. 
This observation has recently been confirmed by a Monopoly 
and Merger Commission (1981) study which concludes that 
"over-riders tended to be regarded by manufacturers as a 
tool of marketing and not to be cost-related in any tangible 
way. " (p 25) 
Of the firms that offered little or no discount for 
central warehouse delivery, several gave reasons for this 
pol icy: 
i) Marketing reservations: Three manufacturers sought to 
discourage delivery to central warehouses and retain an 
extensive system of direct delivery to branch stores so that 
their sales representatives could continue to market their 
products intensively at store level. These firms were 
afraid that the switch to centralized buying which generally 
accompanies the change to central warehouse delivery would 
result in a loss of sales, particularly where a competitor 
continued to deal with and deliver direct to branch stores. 
Through this contact with store managers, salesmen could, it 
was claimed, ensure that the shops held adequate stocks and 
secure more shelf space and more prominent displays for 
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their products. Evidence to the contrary, however, was 
provided by one retail chain which showed that in many cases 
sales volumes rose significantly following the 
centralization of buying and delivery. 
To preserve their systems of branch store delivery, 
some food manufacturers have had to concede to their larger 
retail customers levels of quantity discount for store 
delivery more appropriate to bulk warehouse delivery. 
Their bargaining position has been weakened by the 
retailers' knowledge that they wish to continue delivering 
to branch stores and the retailers' willingness to 
changeover to central warehouse delivery. By granting 
similar levels of discount for deliveries to warehouses (of 
wholesalers, for example) and branch stores, these 
manufacturers prevent prices from reflecting differences in 
distribution costs and give the multiples in question an 
unfair advantage over their retail competitors. 
ii) Perishability/Fragility: Manufacturers of biscuits, 
crisps and snacks, foodstuffs of comparatively short 
"shelf-life" and high fragility, preferred to deliver orders 
direct to the customers' shops to ensure freshness and 
reduce damage to their products. 
iii) Variability of distribution costs: Four firms pointed 
out that their depot delivery systems were encumbered with a 
large element of fixed cost which could not, in the short 
run, be adjusted to changes in the volume of throughput. 
One firm, for example, asserted that distribution facilities 
accounted for 35% of its total overhead costs. Another 
food manufacturer, giving evidence to the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1981), claimed that 80% of its 
distribution costs were fixed. It is frequently stated that 
around 80% of distribution costs are fixed (Crawford, 1972a; 
Barber, 1976) The redirection of a multiple's supplies 
from branch store to central warehouse delivery might, 
therefore, in the short term, yield only a small net saving 
in distribution costs. Small discounts for central 
warehouse delivery would reflect this very limited cost 
reduction (Millar, 1983) . In the longer term, a firm might 
wish to reduce the capacity of its depot system, thereby 
increasing the ratio of fixed to variable costs and 
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releasing capital previously tied up in distribution. Such 
a firm might want to encourage bulk deliveries direct from 
the factory by offering more generous discounts for this 
type of delivery. The level of discount awarded for bulk 
delivery can, therefore; be` related to the manufacturers' 
longer term distribution objectives. 
Two of the firms which contracted out most of their 
local delivery work cited short term variability of 
distribution costs as one of the major benefits of doing so. 
In most cases, a contractors' delivery charges correspond to 
the volume of a customer's throughput. Some contractors, 
however, require fixed payments over a certain period, 
especially where whole depots or large parts of depots are 
used exclusively by particular manufacturers. 
Official Concern over Current Trading Practices. 
The scale of special discounts has increased in recent 
years as problems of over-capacity in the food industry have 
grown more acute and as retail sales have become 
concentrated in the hands of fewer, larger retailer 
organizations. The extent of this concentration was 
described earlier (p109)' in relation to the entire range of 
grocery products. An examination of the sales profiles of 
particular manufacturers reveals an even greater 
concentration on a small number of retailers (Table 5.6). 
Where twenty or fewer multiples absorb around 80% of a 
company's output, they can exert considerable bargaining 
pressure, particularly the largest multiples that may each 
take 10% or more of a firm's production. 
The concentration of buying power in the retail grocery 
trade in the 1960s and 70s and the consequent enlargement 
and proliferation of special discounts raised fears in 
government circles that this might be squeezing 
manufacturers' profit margins unduly (Madigan, 1980), 
creating unfair competition for smaller retailers and 
wholesalers and thereby reducing the efficiency of the 
distribution system. 
As explained earlier, large retail organizations can 
secure discounts that relate principally to the total volume 
purchased and not the purchases of individual stores. Most 
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of these organizations comprise hundreds of shops which vary 
considerably in size. Despite numerous closures of smaller 
branch stores in recent years, many of their stores are 
still of comparable size to those of the larger independent 
retailers. Two stores of the same size and turnover, one a 
branch of a large supermarket chain, the other an 
independent supermarket, might be treated very differently 
by a supplier .A supplier might relax minimum drop size 
restrictions for the large retail chain, deliver a 
comparatively small load direct to his store, yet still 
offer the chain as a whole a very large discount on total 
purchases, say, in the order of 10-15%. The independent 
store would be in a much less favourable position. Being 
unable to generate an order of -minimum drop size, it would 
have to obtain its supplies via a wholesaler. Even if this 
wholesaler belonged to a voluntary group, it would be 
unlikely to receive any more than an 8-10% discount from the 
supplier, and once it had deducted its operating margin, the 
independent retailer might be sold the goods for 2-3% off 
the list price. - This *situation therefore discriminates 
against the independent in two respects. In the first 
place, although it costs less-to distribute supplies to the 
wholesaler than the multiple's branch store, the latter 
secures a larger discount (Dore, 1980). Second, once the 
wholesaler deducts his gross margin for storage and shop 
delivery, the differential between what the multiple's 
branch store and the independent retailer pay for the goods 
widens further. 
In July 1977, the Secretary of State for Prices and 
Consumer Protection asked the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission. to examine "the general effect on the public 
interest of discounts, rebates and allowances agreed between 
suppliers and retailers where the reduction or value of 
benefit could. not be attributed to savings in suppliers' 
costs". A concern for current discounting practices was 
also expressed by the Price Commission in its reports on 
Tate and Lyle (1978a) , Cadbury-Schweppes Foods Ltd. (1978b) 
and CPC (UK) Ltd (1978e) . This official disapproval of 
trading practices in the food trade led some to suggest 
(e. g. Hill, 1978) that legislation similar to the 
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Robinson-Patman Act in the US might be enacted in the UK "to 
prevent large buyers from securing excessive advantages over 
their smaller competitors by virtue of their size and 
purchasing power". The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 
required that any discounts offered to customers must be 
cost-related, thus outlawing discrimination between 
customers simply on the basis of total quantity purchased. 
Suppliers had to demonstrate that price differentials were 
justified with respect to differences in manufacturing, 
marketing and distribution costs. As Matz et al. (1967) 
explain, however, the opportunities for discriminating 
between customers "fall chiefly in the field of distribution 
cost". It is on the pricing of distribution services, 
therefore, that the Robinson-Patman Act 'has had the greatest 
impact. The Act has inspired a great deal of interest in 
distribution cost analysis and is generally believed to have 
succeeded in bringing prices more into -1 ine with 
distribution costs. 
In anticipation of legislative moves in this direction 
in Britain, some of the main beneficiaries of the existing 
discount schemes, the large multiples, argued that the 
large, regular orders they place bring the manufacturer 
savings in terms of production efficiency and that their 
large centralized transactions also enable it to economise 
on marketing and sales. Some food manufacturers, 
nevertheless, responded to official criticisms by revising 
their trading policies and adhering more closely to 
cost-based price lists (Grocer 24/6/78, Walters, 1978). 
Such reforms are inhibited, however, by the intense 
competition in many sectors of the grocery trade. Under 
the oligopolistic conditions prevalent in many sections of 
the industry, individual companies are reluctant to 
jeopardise sales by acting unilaterally (Price Commission, 
1978c). There are, nevertheless, some sections of the 
trade in which pricing is not an important factor in 
competition. The Monopolies Commission (1973) identified 
the "ready-to-eat breakfast cereal" market as one in which 
many of the products were not in direct competition. 
Cross-elasticities of demand for the products were, 
therefore, low. This may largely explain why one company, 
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Weetabix, could successfully compete in the market despite 
the fact that unlike its three main competitors, it offered 
no "overriding" discounts (Price Commission, 1978c). Across 
the greater part of the grocery market, however, competitive 
conditions are such as to deter suppliers from unilaterally 
making prices more sensitive to d istr ibut ion costs. 
Furthermore, the opposition of the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission and Office of Fair Trading to collusion between 
competing manufacturers would seem to outrule any possib^ity 
of collective action on this matter. A fundamental reform 
of trading practices would probably, therefore, require 
legislation. 
In its report on "Retail Discounts" published in 1981, 
however, the Monopolies and Mergers Commission denies that 
there is a need for such legislation. It broadly approves 
of current trading practices in the grocery trade, arguing 
that they have "not in general had an adverse effect on 
competition among suppliers to the retail trade" and that 
highly competitive conditions in the retail trade have "so 
far ensured that the benefits of this competition have in 
the main been passed on to the consumer in one form or 
another. " The Commission recognises how 'difficult it is 
for manufacturers to quantify differences in the cost of 
distributing their products to different customers and 
concedes that other types of discount may be just as 
appropriate as those related to delivery costs. 
Minimum Drop Sizes 
A retailer's choice between branch store and central 
delivery can be partly constrained by a supplier's 
stipulation of minimum order sizes for the two types of 
delivery. The first of these minima applies to bulk 
delivery direct from the factory. This is defined by 
suppliers in various ways. It can be specified as a number 
of cases, a number of pallet loads or a weight. To 
standardise this minimum bulk order size for the purposes of 
comparison firms were asked to express this value in 
relation to vehicle capacity. Just over 70% of the firms 
require a customer to take a full lorry load to qualify for 
direct ex-factory delivery. The remainder are prepared to 
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. deliver a fraction of a full load, but never allowed a trunk 
vehicle to make more than two or three drops. Two of the 
firms that stipulated that a minimum bulk order size of half 
a vehicle said that they were contemplating reducing this 
minimum to encourage more direct distribution from the 
factory. Those firms which make bulk deliveries of less 
than a full lorry load sometimes mix customers' orders with 
supplies for their own distribution depots. 
Minimum drop sizes for shop delivery from a 
distribution depot showed a much greater degree of variation 
(fig. 6.6). It is difficult to assess the extent to which 
these variations are product-related because many of the 
firms manufacture diverse product ranges yet stipulate the 
same minimum size for orders regardless of their 
composition. It is, nevertheless, possible for those 
manufacturers whose output is exclusively or principally 
composed of a particular type of product to compare minimum 
order sizes by product class (Table 6.6). To some extent 
this variation will reflect differences in the weight and 
handling characteristics of the products sold. It is 
mainly determined, however, by the manufacturer's marketing 
objectives. A firm which wishes to market its products 
intensively at the retail level (such as biscuit 
manufacturers) must be prepared to deliver comparatively 
small amounts to a very large number of shops. This is 
particularly so where the product has a short-shelf-life and 
deliveries must be made frequently. In contrast, a 
manufacturer who does not value direct trading links with 
shops so highly (such as canned food producers) would tend 
to discourage small, relatively uneconomical branch 
deliveries by imposing a higher minimum order size. A 
retail chain containing branch stores too" small' to accept 
orders of this minimum size, might then be forced to channel 
this manufacturer's supplies through its central * warehouse. 
There have been instances, however, of manufacturers 
relaxing their order size restrictions for those larger 
supermarket chains that wield great bargaining power. 
Minimum order size is also related to the size of the 
manufacturer's product range and the rate at which its 
products sell. This may partly explain the differences in 
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minimum order sizes between firms manufacturing the same 
general class of products. In the case of breakfast 
cereals, for example, the firm with the- largest product 
range and fastest turnover rate has fixed its minimum order 
size at -a significantly higher level than its competitors. 
Service Level 
Many retailers gave as a reason for centralizing 
supplies their desire to minimise the risk of -branch stores 
running out of stock. This was based on their belief that 
they could provide their stores with a better level of 
delivery service ( in terms of order lead times) than 
suppliers. Thorpe et al. (1973) suggests that where the 
frequency of a manufacturer's delivery is less than once a 
week, most multiples can offer a superior service from their 
central warehouse. The "lead time" and reliability of 
manufacturers' deliveries will, therefore, influence the 
retailer's choice between warehouse and store delivery. 
Conversely, however, those manufacturers that are keen to 
continue distributing goods direct to branch stores partly 
justify this preference on the grounds that through direct 
store delivery they can ensure a higher level of stock 
availability. 
No data was collected in the survey to test the 
validity of these conflicting arguments. Thorpe et al. 
(1973) , however, compared direct and centralized deliveries 
in relation to the frequency with which branch stores ran 
out of stock in particular products. No clear relationship 
emerged, across a range of 81 products, between the amount 
of direct branch store delivery and the frequency of 
"stock-outs". This led Thorpe et al. to conclude that 
"although sales, through the influence of lack of stock, can 
be affected by distribution arrangements, the relation is by 
no means clear cut. Indeed it varies substantially from 
one retailer to another and is likely to vary from one 
product to another. "(p 137) It is, therefore, impossible 
to generalise about the affect of service level on the 
choice of delivery type. Its bearing on delivery 
arrangements will depend on the particular pairing of 
supplier and retailer, and on the product concerned. 
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Use of Distribution Contractors by Food Manufacturers and 
Multiples. 
Although in the case of linkages examined in this 
chapter ownership passes directly from manufacturer to 
retailer, it is quite common in the grocery trade for 
intermediate storage and final delivery to be contracted out 
to a third party. As a result of their preoccupation with 
the transfer of titles, conventional marketing studies often 
under-estimate the importance of agencies, such as 
distribution contractors, which provide storage and 
transport services but do not assume ownership of the goods 
they handle (Bowersox et al., 1968). The use of these 
agencies can influence both the nature of the supply linkage 
and the logistics of the shop delivery. It is important, 
therefore, to examine manufacturers' and retailers' motives 
for using contractors, to assess the extent to which they do 
so and to consider in what ways this affects the pattern of 
grocery movement. 
There has been a substantial growth since the late 
1960s in the number and size of specialist distribution 
contractors (Firth, 1976). Various factors have contributed 
to this growth. By abolishing the A, B, C system of vehicle 
licensing, the 1968 Transport Act enabled "own account" 
operators to carry goods for others. Since then several 
food manufacturers have begun to distribute other firms' 
(non-competing) food products on a contract basis. In most 
cases this third party work generates only a small fraction 
of the total throughput of these firms distribution systems 
(Cooper, 1978) and is regarded merely as a way of filling 
excess capacity in depots and delivery vehicles, and thereby 
helping to cover overhead costs. Other manufacturers, 
however, such as Imperial Foods and Tate and Lyle, have 
created separate subsidiaries to provide a general 
distribution service for outside customers while meeting 
their own "in-house" demands. In the case of two such 
firms, third party traffic accounts for roughly a third of 
total system throughput. This has represented a major 
diversification of some manufacturers into the field of "for 
hire" distribution and appears to have been prompted by a 
recognition of the fact that, as the demand for food is 
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fairly stagnant, food manufacturing alone offers little 
potential for future company growth. Other distribution 
contracting businesses have grown out of haulage firms 
(Firth, 1976) which, faced with a static demand for general 
haulage, have extended their range of services and begun to 
offer specialist distribution packages at premium rates. 
The growth in the volume of grocery traffic handled by 
specialist contractors has reflected an increased 
willingness on the part of manufacturers, and to a lesser 
extent multiple retailers, to contract out all or part of 
their distribution (Fielding, 1972; Firth, 1976). Numerous 
reasons have been suggested for this change of policy 
(Barber, 1976; Firth, 1976; Latta, 1977; Kelly, 1979). The 
main reasons may be summarised as follows: 
i) The use of contractors offers greater flexibility in 
the sense that firms can usually change contractors more 
quickly and easily than they can restructure an own account 
distribution system. This flexibility was particularly 
attractive in the 1970s when distribution planning was 
surrounded by many uncertainties about such things as oil 
price increases, the imposition of environmental controls, 
the reduction in drivers' hours and the future trend in 
interest rates. 
ii) By combining the storage and delivery of several 
firms' products the contractor can take advantage of 
economies of scale and often provide a more cost-effective 
service, especially in areas of, low demand. The 
substantial increase in distribution costs in the 1970s 
(Pettit, 1976) and growing realization of the high cost of 
delivering small orders encouraged a greater use of 
contractors. 
iii) By contracting out its distribution a firm could 
release capital that would otherwise be tied up in depots 
and vehicles for investment in the its main activity 
(manufacturing or retailing) or to help keep it solvent 
during periods of low liquidity. 
iv) The use of contractors could also reduce the risk of 
the distribution operation being disrupted by industrial 
action, especially where more than one contractor was used 
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or where, as in the case of Sainsbury's, a contractor 
complemented an own account operation (Barber and Payne, 
1976). 
v) Contractors provide more variable capacity than an own 
account operation. This made them well suited to food 
manufacturers whose throughput volumes fluctuated widely as 
a result of seasonal variations in demand or sporadic bursts 
of promotional activity. 
In the grocery trade it is mainly the manufacturers who 
employ distribution contractors. Fifteen (68%) out of a 
sample of twenty-two food manufacturers made use of outside 
contractors for shop delivery, though to widely differing 
degrees. In contrast, only three out of twenty-three 
multiples used contractors. As illustrated in figure 6.7, 
when a distribution contractor is used, its depot replaces 
that of either the manufacturer or the retailer. It very 
seldom constitutes an additional node in the logistical 
channel (Plowden, 1977). These contract depots generally 
offer storage, break-of-bulk, consolidation and store 
delivery services. All their manufacturing and retail 
clients take advantage of the store delivery function, but, 
as outlined in Table 6.7, vary in their use of the ancillary 
services. 
It was not possible to obtain information on the 
proportions of firm's grocery traffic channelled through 
contractors' depots. The extent to which manufacturers 
depend on contractors can only be measured in relation to 
the number of contract depots they use. It should be 
noted, however, that the proportion of contract depots in a 
manufacturer's distribution system is likely to exceed the 
proportion of traffic handled by contractors as these depots 
are likely to serve areas of lower demand. In examining 
these depot statistics, one must distinguish stockholding 
depots, where goods are stored for periods of several days 
or weeks, from transhipment depots where goods are only held 
long enough for consignments to be disaggregated or 
consolidated and for forward delivery to be arranged. 
Roughly 43% of the stockholding points used by the sample of 
food manufacturers are operated by contractors? A much 
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Table 6.7: Uses of Distribution Contractors. 
Services Used 
No. of Firms 
Manufacturers 
1. Storage and break-of-bulk at all 
the contract depots used. 6 
2. Only break-of-bulk at all the 
contract depots used. 4 
3. Storage and break-of-bulk at some 
contract depots, break-of-bulk alone 5 
at others. 
Multiple Retailers 
1. Storage of centralized stocks, consolidation 
and delivery of branch store orders 1 
(i. e. contracting out entire system of 
centralized storage and delivery. ) 
2. Use of contractors to provide a parallel 
system of centralized stockholding and 1 
consolidated delivery to complement the 
retailer's own account operation. 
3. Suppliers instructed by the retailer to 
deliver branch store orders to the depot(s) 
of a specified contractor. This contractor 
then assembles the orders for each branch 
store and delivers them in consolidated loads. 
Source: personal survey. 
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higher proportion (86%) of the transhipment depots these 
firms use are operated by contractors. In the case of the 
multiple retailers, it would not be meaningful to measure 
dependence on contractors in terms of depot numbers, as two 
of the three firms employing contractors operate an own 
account system in parallel. It is important to note, 
however, that, although only three of the multiples in the 
sample used contractors, these three firms account for 
around 30% of total grocery sales. 
It appears, therefore, that, overall, distribution 
contractors play an important role in establishing many of 
the physical links between food manufacturers and retailers. 
It is necessary now to consider the ways in which the use of 
contractors influences the allocation of grocery flows 
between different logistical channels. These have both an 
economic and a logistical dimension: 
1. Economics of Contract Services: When a manufacturer or 
retailer contracts out its distribution, the cost of the 
operation is clearly manifest in the distributors' charges. 
Most firms, therefore, have more accurate and readily 
available data on the cost of contracted services than on 
their own distribution operation, and this can increase the 
amount of weight attached to 'distribution costs in trade 
negotiations between manufacturer and customer. The 
particular pricing scheme the contractor adopts can also 
affect the mode of delivery. These pricing schemes vary in 
their sophistication, with some calculating the appropriate 
level of charges on the basis of a series of parameters such 
as average drop size, cases per pallet and total throughput; 
whereas others resort to a more simple averaging of charges 
per unit (Firth, 1976). Contractors commonly offer clients 
bulk discounts, however, and, by holding down average 
delivery costs, these can make manufacturers less willing to 
reduce the number of shops to which they (via the 
contractor) distribute their goods. On the other hand, in 
comparison with manufacturers operating their own 
distribution systems, those using third party carriers on a 
short term contract basis can more easily and economically 
alter the balance between branch store and central warehouse 
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delivery in response to multiples' wishes. As mentioned 
earlier, the flexibility with which manufacturers can vary 
the mode of delivery sometimes affects their bargaining 
position in negotiations with multiples. The use of 
contractors does not always offer manufacturers short term 
flexibility, however. Usually larger clients must enter 
into longer term contracts to secure the exclusive use of a 
contractor's premises. Of the 72 contract stockholding 
points employed by' the sample of food manufacturers 
(excluding those with a separate "in-house" distibution 
business) just over half (52%) were depots used on an 
exclusive basis. One firm acknowledged being "tied-in" to 
using a particular contractor and claimed that it would take 
several years to disengage itself from that contractor and 
carry heavy cost penalties. The use of contractors, 
therefore, does not always greatly enhance the 
manufacturer's ability to switch traffic between delivery 
modes. 
Two distribution directors of supermarket chains 
criticised some contractors' practice of averaging charges 
across different sizes of consignment. As delivery costs 
per case vary inversely with the size of drop, they alleged 
that their larger than average drops were being over-charged 
and thus effectively cross-subsidising the delivery of small 
consignments to smaller outlets operated by other multiples 
or independent retailers. If this is so, then-these 
contractors, through their policy of average pricing, may be 
helping to preserve manufacturers' deliveries to smaller 
shops. Too little is known, however, about contractors' 
pricing policies or their impact on trade negotiations 
between manufacturers and retailers to measure the extent to 
which this occurs. 
2. Logistics of Contract Delivery: Many of the smaller 
manufacturers do not distribute large enough volumes to 
justify the establishment of an own account system of shop 
delivery throughout the country (The Director, 1978) The 
use of contractors enables these firms to provide shop 
delivery more extensively than would otherwise be possible. 
This maintains the proportion of branch store deliveries 
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vis-a-vis central warehouse deliveries. It also helps 
smaller manufacturers to compete more effectively, first, by 
enabling them to promote their goods at shop level, and, 
second, by increasing the chances of their products being 
stocked by those supermarket chains that require suppliers 
to deliver to all their branches. For all sizes of 
manufacturer, the use of a distribution contractor can 
reduce the minimum economic drop size (Walters, 1974), and 
thereby help to preserve direct deliveries to smaller 
outlets. 
On the other hand, the use of contractors has enabled 
Sainsbury to maintain a high level of centralized delivery 
over a period when its total volume of business has grown 
substantially and its chain expanded geographically. 
Tesco's use of contractors in the wake of the dramatic 
growth in its business in the late 1970s was quite 
different. In this case the contractors did not provide a 
supplementary central warehouse service . similar to 
Sainsbury's, because they were not required to hold large 
amounts of bulk stocks on which branch stores°-could draw as 
the need arose. Instead, they- had merely to assemble 
consignments received from manufacturers destined for 
particular branch stores and deliver them to these shops in 
consolidated loads (Harvey, 1982). This then reduced the 
number of individual delivery vehicles visiting Tesco' s 
shops and relieved severe problems of "backdoor congestion". 
By using contractors in this way Tesco was able to increase 
the proportion of branch store supplies arriving in 
consolidated form without channelling them -through its own 
central warehouses, which were already, overstretched. 
Manufacturers also gain from this arrangement as they can 
now deliver all the orders bound for Tesco stores in an area 
in consolidated loads to the appropriate contractor's depot. 
This aggregate delivery is more economical partly because of 
its bulk and directness, and partly because unloading can be 
carried out more quickly and efficiently at the contractor's 
depot than at Tesco's shops. 
While it was innovative for a retailer to pressure 
manufacturers into directing their suppliers through 
contractors, consolidation operations such as this are the 
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mainstay of the contractor's business. It is through 
grouping small consignments bound for the same destination 
that contractors can provide cost-effective delivery. 
Indeed the growth of contract distribution over the past 
10-15 years has contributed greatly to the increased 
consolidation of shop deliveries. As these firms serve all 
types of retail outlets (multiple branch stores, 
independents and Co-operative stores), they have extended 
the network of consolidated services and supplemented the 
consolidation traditionally done by wholesalers and those 
multiple retailers with centralized delivery systems. The 
effects-of this increased consolidation on the routeing of 
vehicles between depots and shops- is discussed in Chapter 
10, the wider implications of this growth in consolidation 
in the concluding chapter. 
summary 
As both manufacturers and multiple retailers have a 
choice between direct and indirect logistical channels, 
goods can follow one of four possible "routes" from factory 
to shop. Around 90% of the groceries sold by multiple 
retailers pass through at least one intermediate node i. e. 
along one indirect section of logistical channel, employed 
by either manufacturer or retailer. In the previous 
chapter it was shown that multiple retailers and 
manufacturers differ widely in their dependence on indirect 
channels. One might expect to find an inverse relationship 
in each manufacturer-multiple retailer link between the 
firms' respective dependence on indirect channels. For 
example, a multiple channelling a large proportion of its 
supplies indirectly via its central warehouse would be 
expected to take bulk direct deliveries from a manufacturer, 
especially from one that distributes a large share of its 
total output straight from the factory. Whilst the 
logistical connections between the distribution systems of 
manufacturers and multiples do broadly conform to this 
general rule, there are too many exceptions to permit the 
accurate prediction of the type of link between a particular 
manufacturer and a particular retailer simply on the basis, 
respectively, of total output distributed direct from the 
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factory and the proportion of total turnover travelling via 
central warehouse. 
The choice of delivery mode rests with the multiple 
retailer, though this can be influenced by the manufacturer, 
principally by means of pricing, the imposition of minimum 
drop sizes and the provision of a particular standard of 
delivery service. It is very difficult to ascertain how 
much importance is attached to these factors in the trade 
negotiations between manufacturer and retailer, as these 
discussions are normally shrouded in secrecy. It would 
seem, however, that, in most cases, price differentials do 
not reflect differences in the costs of physical 
distribution. The effects of this-upon the efficiency of 
the grocery distribution system as a whole are very hard to 
assess, partly because of the serious dearth of price and 
cost data, and partly because the concept of "efficiency" 
itself is difficult to define in this context. The unit 
costs of distribution are, after all, a function of the 
total volume of goods distributed and this volume is 
sensitive to the instruments-of marketing policy such as 
pricing, sales promotion and service level, all of which 
have a bearing on the method of delivery. The objectives 
of maximising sales by effective marketing and of minimising 
distribution costs are, therefore, inextricably linked 
(Bartels, 1976). This frustrates any attempt to measure 
the efficiency of physical distribution independently of the 
framework of marketing policy. 
The pattern of linkage between manufacturers' and 
multiple retailers' distribution systems appears reasonably 
stable. Manufacturers and multiples reported very few 
switches from one mode of delivery to another in the 
previous 'year. The majority opinion of both groups was 
that there would be a further net diversion of grocery flow 
from manufacturers' distribution depots to multiples' 
central warehouses, but that this long term process was 
nearing its conclusion4 One manufacturer suggested that the 
allocation of flow between manufacturers' and retailers' 
warehouses had entered a phase of "dynamic equilibrium". A 
similar view was expressed by Beale (1974). In recognition 
of the projected growth in the number of superstores and 
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hypermarkets, most firms also anticipated an increase in the 
importance of direct bulk deliveries from factories to 
retail outlets. As many of these large stores will be 
additions to existing chains of small and medium sized 
supermarkets, mixed delivery arrangements are likely to 
become more common (Beckman, 1977). 
In many cases, the logistical link between manufacturer 
and retailer is formed by a distribution contractor with the 
result that the contractor's level of charges and quality of 
service will affect the choice of delivery mode. It is 
difficult, however, -to assess the net effect of these 
agencies on the ratio of branch stores to central warehouse 
as they have exerted conflicting pressures upon it. On the 
one hand, they have enabled manufacturers, particularly the 
smaller ones, to provide more extensive and often more 
economical branch store deliveries, while, on the other 
hand, the greater flexibility they offer can afford 
suppliers greater freedom to switch from shop to retail 
central warehouse delivery. There is no doubt, however, 
that distribution contractors have considerably augmented 
the volume of groceries delivered to branch stores in 
consolidated loads. 
Chapters five and six have been concerned with the 
allocation of flows between logistical channels. The 
following two chapters will examine the physical structure 
of these channels. 
Notes: 
1. For a sample of 18 manufacturers, excluding unknown 
linkages and including "part warehouse" with "all warehouse" 
deliveries. 
2. This figure includes depots operated by "in-house" 
subsidiaries handling a large volume of third party 
business. 
3. One firm also distinguished retail chains on the basis of 
their goods reception performance i. e. the amount of delay 
delivery vehicles experienced at their premises and the 
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frequency with which delivery was refused. 
4., Of the food manufacturers surveyed by Mintel (1977) , 
equal numbers (44% in each case) anticipated increases and 
reductions in the proportions of their output delivered in 
bulk to retail warehouses. The remaining 12% did not 
express an opinion on the subject. 
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Chapter 7 
The Number of Intervening Nodes in the Logistical Channels 
Manufacturers' Distribution Depots 
This section looks more closely at the structure of food 
manufacturers'-echelon channels through which roughly 30-35% 
of grocery production flows. In particular, it examines 
variations in the numbers of depots through which 
manufacturers distribute their output to retail and 
wholesale customers. To some extent the number of depots 
required will depend on the size of the firm's market area. 
All the food manufacturers in the survey, however, marketed 
their goods nationally. Variations in the numbers of 
depots operated by firms in the sample cannot, therefore, be 
explained with respect to differences in the extent of their 
market areas. 
For a sample of 29 manufacturers, variations in the 
number of stockholding depots were found to be large (fig. 
7.1)1 In their survey of 48 food manufacturers, Thorpe et 
al. (1973) discovered a higher degree of variation, though 
not all the firms in their sample distributed their goods 
nationally. Even when those firms with national coverage 
are excluded, the remaining sample (of 44) contains firms 
varying widely in the number of depots they employ. Thorpe 
does not offer an explanation of why depot numbers should 
vary so much. He, nevertheless, acknowledges that these 
variations cannot simply be the result of differences in the 
handling characteristics of the products distributed. In 
fact, the number of stockholding points in a manufacturer's 
distribution system is determined by a series of 
inter-related factors. These will be discussed under five 
head ings: 
1. Stockholding Policy: Echelon channels are characterised 
by the presence of one or more intervening storage point(s) 
between the factory and the retail or wholesale customer. 
The number of storage points in a channel of this type will 
depend partly on how the manufacturer chooses to arrange his 
pattern of stockholding. As outlined in Chapter 5, stocks 
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Figure 7.1:. Numbers of Stockholding Points in the- 
Distribution Systems of a Sample of 29 
'Food Manufacturers. 
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of products with a fast turnover rate are generally 
dispersed throughout the market area, while those with a 
slow rate of turnover tend to be concentrated, often in the 
vicinity of the factory (Ballou, 1973). Even within a 
single commodity class, such as groceries, turnover rates 
can vary significantly. Products such as biscuits and 
crisps, for example, with a relatively fast rate of 
stockturn are distributed through much larger numbers of 
depots than slower moving products such as canned fruit and 
vegetables. There are numerous instances, however, of the 
same types of product being distributed through widely 
differing numbers of depots, suggesting that other factors 
are also involved. Foremost among these are the costs and 
logistics of the transport operation. 
2. Trade-off between transport and stockholding/storage 
costs: In the theoretical literature of operations research 
it is often argued that the optimum number of stockholding 
points is determined mainly by the trade-off between 
stockholding/storage costs and transport costs (e. g. 
Christopher, 1971). Similar reasoning has been employed to 
explain the dispersal of production in more than one plant 
(Magee, 1968). Like production costs, the costs of 
stockholding and storage vary inversely with transport costs 
as the number of locations increases. The optimum number 
of depots is that which minimises the sum of 
stockholding/storage costs and transport costs (fig. 7.2). 
The configuration of the stockholding/storage and the 
transport cost curves are likely to vary between products 
thereby altering the shape of the resultant total 
distribution cost curve and the optimum number of depots. 
Furthermore, as many firms distribute a variety of products 
through the same depot system, the shape of these curves and 
optimum number of depots will also be influenced by the 
total number and particular mix of products handled (Buxton, 
1975). It has been found that the larger a firm's product 
range, the greater are the benefits of concentrating stocks 
in fewer locations (British Road Federation, 1978). 
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a) Stockholding/storage costs: Although combined for the 
purposes of this trade-off analysis, stockholding and 
storage represent two separate cost elements. Most 
distribution cost break-downs list them as separate items. 
(i) Financial costs of holding stock. It has long been 
recognised that the total amount of inventory in the echelon 
system is proportional to the square root of the number of 
stockholding points (Starr and Miller, 1962): 
sa 
=n 
S 
where S is the total volume of stock in the system 
c denotes complete centralization of stocks 
in a single location 
d denotes a decentralized stockholding system 
n is the number of stockholding points in the 
decentralized system. 
The formal proof of this exponential relationship has 
been provided by Maister (1976). In theory, a warehouse 
handling 1000 units per annum should, ceteris paribus, 
require only half as much stock as a system of four small 
warehouses with a throughput of 250 units each per annum. 
In practice, however, stock reductions are seldom so great, 
though they can still be large. Newson (1978), for 
example, reports on an office equipment supplier which, by 
closing 12 depots and centralizing stock in a single 
location, was able to reduce its inventory investment by 
40%. Figure 7.3 shows how, ceteris paribus, the total 
volume of stock decreases as stockholding becomes more 
concentrated. The actual amounts of stock held will depend 
on such things as the turnover rate, average order size, 
variability of demand and seasonality of production, all of 
which vary with product type (Fielding, 1972). 
The holding of stock carries a financial cost either in 
the interest that must be paid on capital borrowed to 
finance the inventories or in the interest foregone on that 
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part of the firm's own working capital tied up in stocks. 
The actual costs involved-depend partly on the level of 
interest rates, -. which should affect all firms similarly, and 
partly on the value of the product being stored. 
(ii) Physical costs of storage. These costs are also a 
function of the total amount of stock held; however, the 
storage cost per unit varies with the size of the premises 
and the characteristics of the product being stored. There 
are economies of scale in warehouse construction and 
operation. This is illustrated by the results of a survey 
of food wholesaling undertaken by the National Centre for 
Materials Handling (Williams, 1975) (fig. 7.4). The unit 
costs of storage fall sharply as warehouse throughput 
#increases. The centralization of stock in large facilities 
therefore carries the double benefit of reducing total stock 
levels and the physical storage cost for each unit of stock. 
Storage costs also depend on the physical 
characteristics and environmental needs of the product. 
Food products, for example, vary considerably in their 
fragility, their packaging, in the height they can be 
stacked and in the ambient temperature and humidity they 
require. 
(b) Transport Costs: The transport cost curve, like that of 
stockhold ing/storage is also a "composite" curve in the 
sense that it combines two separate relationships between 
depot numbers and i) local delivery costs and ii) trunking 
costs. 
i) Local delivery costs are affected by a host of factors 
including distance, drop density, the physical 
characteristics of the products and the nature of the 
reception facilities at delivery points (Sawdey, 1972). In 
examining the general relationship between local delivery 
costs and distance, the other factors may be assumed to be 
constant. Delivery distances comprise a "stem" component 
(distance from the depot to the zone in which drops are 
made) and a "zonal" component (distance travelled between 
delivery points within this drop zone) (fig. 7.5). The 
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zonal distance is a function of the drop density and hence 
is proportional to the square root of the catchment area 
required to produce a day's load for a delivery vehicle 
(Wentworth and Ramm,, -1976). Thus defined, a drop zone will 
be small relative to the total area served by a delivery 
depot. For this reason, the zonal distance is usually 
considered to be unaffected by variations in depot numbers. 
In contrast, the "stem" distance is very sensitive to 
differences in depot numbers. The smaller the number of 
depots, the larger will be the hinterlands and longer the 
stem distances, and vice versa. The addition of depots to 
an echelon system has the effect, therefore, of reducing 
stem distances and thus local delivery costs. The size of 
this marginal reduction declines, however, as the number of 
depots increases producing the cost curve illustrated in 
figure 7.6. The actual configuration of a local delivery 
cost curve would be influenced by the other factors listed 
earlier, principally the drop density and the nature of the 
product. 
Drop density: The higher the drop density, the greater is 
the potential for combining loads on each delivery run, the 
smaller is the average distance per drop and so the lower 
are the costs of the zonal section of the delivery journey 
(Dore, 1980). The drop density is a function of the number 
and size of outlets served by a firm's distribution system 
which, as was explained in Chapter 5 are related both to the 
firm's marketing strategy and various characteristics of the 
product. 
Physical characteristics of the product: These will affect 
transport costs in several ways. They will determine the 
nature of the vehicle (e. g. it may require temperature and 
humidity control) , the manner in which it is loaded and the 
energy it consumes. The costs of unloading will also 
depend partly on product handling characteristics. 
ii) Trunking costs: Variations in depot numbers have a much 
greater effect on local delivery costs than on the cost of 
~" 
trunking goods out to the depots from the factory. This 
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can be demonstrated by a simple example. Figure 7.7 shows 
ä region" containing 24 randomly located and randomly 
weighted delivery points (shops) being served by a single, 
optimally located depot? This depot receives all its 
supplies from a factory 100 kilometres away. This 
generates 15521 tonne-kilometres of local delivery movement 
and 33220 tonne-kilometres of trunk movement. By splitting 
the region in two and establishing a depot at the optimum 
locations in each part, it is possible to reduce the volume 
of local delivery movement by 40%, while increasing trunk 
movement by only 6%, producing an overall reduction in 
tonne-kilometres of 8%. Generally speaking, all the 
transport cost savings that accrue from an increase in depot 
numbers are the result of increases in the efficiency of 
local deliveries. As the number of depots increases, 
trunking costs usually rise, though, as Table 7.1 shows, the 
increase is relatively small and declines as the distance 
increases between the factory and the region where an 
additional depot is set up. Although the addition of 
depots can have the effect of increasing the average length 
of trunk movements, bulk freight costs do not increase in 
proportion'as a result of the "tapering" of transport costs 
with distance (fig. 6.3). These trunking costs rise only 
marginally, therefore, as depot numbers increase (fig. 7.8) 
and these small cost increments are far exceeded by savings 
in delivery costs. In fact, so limited is the sensitivity 
of trunking costs to the number of depots, that they are 
often excluded from the cost trade-off calculations 
(Wentworth and Ramm, 1976). 
Flexibility in the choice of depot numbers. 
It is found in practice that the total distribution 
cost curve produced by the summation of transport, storage 
and stockholding costs is fairly flat along its central 
section, indicating that there is no single, optimum number 
of depots, but rather a range of optima. One large food 
manufacturer (of breakfast cereals) , which had undertaken a 
detailed cost trade-off analysis, found little variation in 
total distribution costs across the range 9 to 16 depots, 
though other firms believed that the optimal range was 
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Table 7.1: Effect of Depot Numbers on Volume of Freight 
Movement. 
Increase in amount Overall reduction 
Distance between of trunk movement in freight movement 
factory and single resulting from use resulting from use 
depot (kms) (X) of two depots of two depots 
100 6.1% 8.4% 
200 1.4% 6.8% 
300 0.6% 5.2% 
400 0.4% 4.1% 
500 0.2% 3.5% 6 
Figure 7.7: Distribution to 24, Randomly'Located Customers via 
One or Two Depots.. 
(figures beside each point indicate amount to be supplied) 
191 
narrower than this. Cadbury-Schweppes, for example, found 
that the difference in cost between operating 7 depots and 
10 depots (in both cases, all optimally located) was only 
about 0.2% of total distribution costs (Beattie, 1973). 
The presence of such a range of optima offers firms some 
flexibility in the design of their distribution systems and 
allow other factors, excluded from the cost analysis, to 
influence the actual number of depots finally chosen. 
3. Service Level Considerations 
In addition to reducing distribution costs, the use of 
outlying depots can also have the effect of increasing sales 
revenue. The dispersal of stocks throughout the market 
area can enable firms to supply customers' orders more 
rapidly and, possibly, as a result secure additional sales. 
A fast delivery service can be of particular importance in 
the grocery trade where turnover rates are relatively high, 
the shelf life of products short and competition fairly 
intense (Buxton, 1975). Where a firm employs few depots, 
the areas they serve may be of a radius greater than the 
daily range of a delivery vehicle. This could effectively 
add a day to the order lead time of deliveries to customers 
located beyond this range, perhaps jeopardising sales to 
them 4 
An attempt was made to assess the extent to which the 
level of service a firm offered was dependent upon its 
number of stockholding depots. (fig. 7.9) For the purposes 
of this analysis, service level was defined as the average 
number of days taken for goods to be delivered from the 
receipt of the customer's order at the appropriate depot. 
Six of the firms achieving service levels of under 5 days 
operated "specified day" schemes, whereby customers obtain a 
faster delivery by adhering to a timetable for the 
submission of orders (see P-329). Even allowing for the 
slight bias that this introduces, it can be seen that there 
is little relationship between se rvice level and depot 
numbers. It is noticeable that the seven firms with the 
lowest service level (over five days) operate comparatively 
few depots. Across the range 1 to 5 days, however, within 
which the average delivery times of 70% of the firms fall, 
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there appears to be no significant relationship? This sheds 
some doubt on the frequent claim that a wide disperal of 
stocks is necessary to provide customers with fast delivery. 
Improvements in transport and communications seem to have 
made it possible for some firms to distribute their goods 
relatively quickly from a few locations. 
The importance of service level objectives in decisions 
on depot number has also been questioned by Powell (1976). 
He argues that depots should be justified only on 
cost-minimization grounds, as it is very difficult for a 
firm to establish in advance that by adding a depot it would 
generate more sales and that the additional revenue would 
exceed the costs of setting up the new facility. It is, 
nevertheless, acknowledged that many depots have been set up 
primarily to achieve a particular service level (Murphy, 
1978; Powell, 1976). As shown on figure 7.10, the numbers 
of depots required to offer very high levels of customer 
service are normally inefficient in terms of distribution 
cost. Ballou (1973) has suggested that distribution cost 
and service level considerations might be reconciled by 
incorporating into the distribution cost calculation a 
figure for the likely variation in sales revenue resulting 
from a change in depot numbers. It is extremely difficult, 
however, to predict accurately the impact of such a change 
on the level of sales and even to monitor this impact after 
the event. So many factors affect the level of sales that 
it is very hard to isolate and measure the effect that 
changes in service level have upon sales volumes (Beattie, 
1973). 
4. Use of Transhipment Depots: 
As explained in Chapter S. , it has long been a common 
practice for firms to use "satellite" transhipment depots 
(often known as "sub-depots") to extend the delivery range 
of stockholding points. Despite the fact that improvements 
in road transport since the war have eased the logistical 
constraints on the concentration of food stockholding, many 
manufacturers have centralized their stocks to such an 
extent that a high proportion of their deliveries must now 
be made via transhipment depots (Webb, 1972). These depots 
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usually perform only a break-bulk operation, transferring 
goods from large trunk vehicles to smaller delivery vans. 
They hold no "cycle" or "safety" stock; goods are kept there 
only until forward transport can be arranged, usually about 
48 hours at the most. They should not, therefore, be 
regarded as "stockholding" points. By splitting the 
storage and break-bulk functions of conventional 
"stockholding" depots and performing them in different 
locations, firms have been able to reconcile the conflicting 
transport and stockholding cost objectives outlined earlier. 
This spatial separation of storage from the breaking of bulk 
has effectively added another node to the (vertical) 
logistical channel. Transhipment depots can, however, in 
logistical terms, serve as substitutes for stockholding 
depots. It is possible, therefore, that the numbers of 
transhipment depots firms employ might vary inversely with 
the numbers of stockholding depots, thereby cancelling out 
observed variations in the latter. 
Some difficulty was experienced in compiling 
information on the numbers of transhipment depots used by 
firms which contracted out some or all of their distribution 
to professional carriers. Some of those which employed 
hauliers conceded that the haulage firm might, without their 
knowledge, tranship goods through its own depots. 
Similarly, some of those employing national distribution 
contractors might have their goods stored at only a few of 
the contractor's depots but transhipped through others. 
Manufacturers whose distribution operations were subject to 
either of these special circumstances and could not describe 
the pattern of transhipment in detail were excluded from the 
analysis. This reduced the sample size to 20. A 
comparison of the numbers of stockholding and transhipment 
points shows only a weak relationship between these two 
variables (fig. 7.11). These 20 firms can, however, be 
divided into four categories on the basis of the use they 
make of transhipment depots: 
(1) Centralized stockholding and extensive transhipment: 
(Firms 1 and 2) These firms have completely centralized 
their stockholding on single locations, but still supply 
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goods to comparatively large numbers of outlets (18-20,, 000). 
To serve such a large number of outlets economically and 
with a competitive service level from a single stockholding 
point, these firms must make heavy use of transhipment 
points around the country. Both firms contracted out all 
of this transhipment to professional carriers. This system 
of distribution (also operated by at least two other major 
food manufacturers outside the sample) is known by various 
names, such as "throughput carrier system", "order 
throughput system" and "embulk with order system". The 
numbers of transhipment points used by firms 1 and 2 
considerably exceeds the average numbers of conventional 
stockholding depots employed by other firms in the sample. 
This is partly the result of the desire of those firms 
centralizing their distribution to spread the risks of 
service disruption at the local level around as many 
different hauliers as possible, and to strengthen their 
bargaining position vis-a-vis individual carriers. The 
pattern of transhipment is not, after all, subject to the 
same pressure for spatial concentration that affects 
stockholding. The constraints on the fragmentation of the 
transhipment function are the need to ensure adequate levels 
of flow on each link of the trunk network and exceed the 
minimum economic throughput levels set by local carriers. 
(2) Dispersed stockholding with limited and isolated use of 
transhipment depots. (firms 6 to 20) This constitutes the 
traditional decentralized system containing upwards of 10 
stockholding depots and requiring only a small number of 
transhipment depots to facilitate deliveries in peripheral 
areas where the road network is poor and sales densities 
low. This category contains firms differing widely in 
their degree of stock dispersal. There is no clear 
relationship, however, between their numbers of stockholding 
and transhipment depots. This may be due to the fact that 
the number of supplementary transhipment depots a firm 
requires will be determined not only by the number of 
stockholding depots it operates but also by the locations of 
its stockholding depots, the spatial distribution of its 
sales outlets and the level of service it offers in remoter 
areas. 
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(3) Concentrated stockholding with numerous "satellite" 
transhipment depots: (Firm 5) This represents an 
intermediate stage between categories 1 and 2 and applies to 
firms which disperse their stocks in a small number of 
depots (3 - 8) yet serve comparable numbers of outlets to 
firms in category 2 (10 -20,000). This necessitates the 
use of numerous transhipment depots which act as 
"satellites" to stockholding depots. These "sub-depots" 
need not be distributed equitably between the stockholding 
depots. The assignment of sub-depots to depots depends on 
the spatial distribution of the latter and the division of 
the country into depot hinterlands. The seven satellite 
transhipment depots operated by firm 5, for example, are 
shared between only-two of its seven stockholding depots. 
(4) Highly concentrated stockholding with little use of 
transhipment: (Firms 3 and 4) This arrangement is typical 
of firms that channel the greater part of their sales 
through direct channels and use a depot. system only for the 
limited distribution of smaller amounts to wholesale and 
retail warehouses. They concentrate their stocks on three 
or four locations, using a similar number of transhipment 
depots for less than trunk load deliveries outside the 
delivery range of the stockholding points. These firms 
(canned fruit producers) rely on bulk distribution to a 
comparatively small number of outlets (< 2000). 
Although the very small sample makes any conclusions on 
this subject very tentative, it would seem that an inverse 
relationship between the numbers of stockholding and 
transhipment depots does exist among firms with highly 
concentrated stockholding patterns. This is particularly 
so if one excludes the firms in category 4 whose heavy 
dependence on direct delivery and small number of outlets 
distinguish them from the rest. The absence of a 
relationship in the case of the majority of firms which 
disperse their stocks in ten or more depots (category 2), 
however, establishes that the variation in the numbers of 
stockholding depots has not been produced simply by the 
substitution, in varying degrees, of transhipment depots. 
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5. System Throughput: 
The number of stockholding depots a firm employs is 
also likely to be related to the volume of goods it channels 
through its echelon system. The greater this volume, the 
more economical it will be to distribute goods through a 
large number of depots. A highly dispersed pattern of 
stockholding will require a large throughput to ensure that 
the loading of trunk vehicles and the turnover of individual 
depots is above a minimum viable level. The size of this 
minimum turnover will depend on whether the firm operates 
its own depots, in which case it will want to spread 
overhead costs across a large volume of traffic, or whether 
is contracts out its local storage and distribution, in 
which case smaller traffic volumes are likely to be 
acceptable. The minimum volumes a firm channels through a 
contractor's depots is usually determined by the latter's 
rate structure. 
It was not possible to test directly the relationship 
between depot numbers and system throughput because very few 
firms provided information on throughput in a suitable form. 
Two surrogate measures for throughput were used, however, to 
investigate this relationship: 
i) The proportion of output distributed through the echelon 
system. 
As almost all the firms in the sample could be classed 
as large volume producers, it was hypothesized that the 
number of depots they operated might correlate with the 
proportion of output distributed via these depots. This 
was based on the reasoning that the greater a firm's 
reliance on this mode of distribution, the more likely it 
would be to operate an extensive depot system. A Spearman 
Rank test was performed on the sample of 23 firms that 
supplied the necessary information (fig 7.12). This 
revealed that there was no significant relationship (at the 
95% level) between the relative extent to which firms use a 
depot system and the number of depots that system contains. 
(r = -0.21) 
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Several reasons may be offered for this absence of a 
significant relationship. Some of the firms in the sample 
were subsidiaries of large conglomerates and had access to 
the extensive depot system of the parent company. The 
overhead costs of such systems were, therefore, borne by 
several subsidiaries and, in two cases, by "third party" 
clients outside the company. The number of depots 
available to a subsidiary need not, therefore, be relatedto 
its individual use of the echelon channel, but rather to the 
overall dependence of the parent organization on this method 
of distribution. Firms employing a "throughput carrier 
system" are also unlikely to conform to the hypothesized 
relationship as their centralization on a single location is 
not a consequence either of small total output or limited 
use of the echelon channel, but rather of a conscious 
decision to organise their distribution in a manner very 
different from the majority of other food manufacturers. A 
special case must also be made for a large sugar refining 
firm in the sample which supplies a substantial propotion of 
its output in bulk loads to other manufacturers for use in 
their production processes. The proportion of his firm's 
output channelled through its echelon system is not, 
therefore, strictly comparable with that of the other firms 
which supply their products almost entirely in a finished 
state to wholesalers and retailers: If one removes from the 
sample those firms affected by these three sets of 
exceptional circumstances, the correlation coefficient falls 
to -0.62, indicating a strengthening of the inverse 
relationship between depot numbers and relative use of the 
depot system. This coefficient value is significant at the 
95% confidence level. 
ii') Number of outlets supplied: 
A relationship was established in Chapter 5 between the 
number of outlets to which firms deliver and their 
dependance on echelon systems of distribution. One might 
expect, therefore, that firms supplying large numbers of 
customers would do so from numerous depots. Where a firm 
had a high density of sales outlets, large enough delivery 
volumes would be generated in comparatively small areas to 
justify, or even encourage, the proliferation of local 
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depots. A sparse distribution of outlets, on the other 
hand, would impose a tight constraint on the number of 
depots a firm could economically operate. For the entire 
sample of firms providing the necessary data, however, a 
Spearman Rank test revealed that there was no significant 
relationship between depot numbers and the total numbers of 
sales outlets. (fig. 7.13) To some extent, the use of 
total sales outlets is unsatisfactory as this number 
includes not only customers served via echelon systems but 
also those supplied direct from factories. It is doubtful, 
however, if this imperfection in the data alone could 
account for the absence of a significant relationship. 
If one excludes from the sample the firms identified in 
the previous section as exceptional cases, the correlation 
coefficient rises to 0.725, a value significant at the 99% 
confidence level. It would seem therefore that the 
inclusion in the full sample of subsidiaries supplying 
different numbers of outlets through the same distribution 
system and firms employing a "throughput carrier system" 
largely obscures what now appears to be a significant 
relationship between depot numbers and numbers of sales 
outlets. 
A firm's dependence on the echelon system of 
distribution does, therefore, with some important 
exceptions, have a bearing on the number of stockholding 
depots it employs. 
6. Recent History of Depot Closure: 
The arguments advanced under the previous headings 
cannot explain all the variation in depot numbers. Much of 
this variation is the result of the particular circumstances 
of individual firms and does not conform to the general 
relationships discussed earlier. It is necessary, 
therefore, to supplement the theoretical considerations with 
an examination of the way in which depot systems have 
recently evolved. As explained in the section on the 
historical development of manufacturers' distribution 
systems (chap. 5), the number of stockholding depots 
operated by these firms has fallen over the past 20 years as 
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the proportion of output distributed direct from the factory 
has increased and as stockholding has become more 
concentrated. The vast majority of firms have, therefore, 
arrived at their present number of depots as a result of the 
contraction of larger depot system. The number of depots 
they currently operate partly reflects the way in which this 
contraction has been achieved. 
Table 7.2 has been compiled from desultory historical 
data on the numbers of depots employed by twenty large food 
manufacturers at various times since 1945. Bands of line 
shading represent the main periods over which depot 
contraction has occurred; those of stippled shading 
represent the recent period during which depot numbers have 
remained -stable. Apart from the large scale closure of 
temporary facilities in the immediate post-war period, the 
recent history of depot closures can be divided into two 
periods. Six of the firms pruned their depot systems 
substantially in the 1960s and followed this with only 
marginal reductions in the 1970s. This confirms the 
observation by NEDO (1967) that the spatial concentration of 
stockholding was well underway. For the majority of firms, 
though, the main phase of depot closure was in the 1970s and 
these firms usually compressed the programme of closures 
into a shorter time period. Several of the firms that 
rationalized their depot systems in the 1960s or early 1970s 
have since then made further, more marginal reductions in 
depot numbers. To obtain an overall indication of the 
reduction in the number of depots during the 1970s one can 
compare the average numbers of depots operated by food 
manufacturers in the survey undertaken by Thorpe et al. 
(1973) (16.1) with the average calculated on the basis of 
the present survey (10.6). A Mann-Whitney U test confirms 
that-the numbers of depots employed by firms in the present 
sample are significantly smaller than those of Thorpe's 
sample (at the 99% level) . 
Of a sample of 23 firms, for which adequate historical 
data is available, 13 (57%) have built up completely new 
systems of depots since 1960,5 (22%) of them since 1970. 
The other 10 firms still operate some depots constructed 
before 1960, though several of them have, nevertheless, 
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substantially re-organized their distribution systems over 
the past 20 years. . The rationalisation of depot systems 
has, therefore, entailed a considerable amount of new 
warehouse construction. As table 7.3 shows, over 80% of 
the stockholding depots operated by food manufacturers and 
distribution contractors have been built since 1960. 
Those firms adopting a "clean slate" approach and 
setting up a new system of depots from scratch free 
themselves of the legacy of past depot numbers and 
locations. Of the 13 firms that have closed and/or 
replaced all their pre-1960 depots, 6 have adopted this 
approach and redesigned their distibution systems in their 
entirety. In five of these cases, the organizations 
followed company mergers and were motivated principally by a 
desire to integrate the distribution of the combined firm's 
products (Mercer et al., 1978). In the remaining case 
(that of Brooke Bond Ox o), the complete redesign of the 
distribution system was made necessary by a changeover from 
a system of van sales via 140 small depots "to one of 
pre-ordered deliveries from a much smaller number of larger 
stockholding points (Barnett, 1978). The optimum number of 
depots in the newly planned systems appears to have fallen 
over this period, though, as the firms in this small sample 
vary in the products they manufacture and in their marketing 
policies, these depot numbers are not strictly comparable. 
A more legitimate comparison is of the numbers of depots 
calculated to be optimal for national distribution 
contractors specialising in food on three occasions since 
the war. These numbers have fallen sharply from 46 in 1947 
(SPD) to 12 in 1967 (Lowf ield) and 7 in 1971 (Cory) 
8 Given 
that new depot systems once established have a resistance to 
change, the number of depots a firm currently operates may 
be partly related to the date at which the distribution 
system was last restructured. 
The majority of food manufacturers have re-organized 
their distribution systems gradually, often rationalizing 
the pattern of stockholding in one region at a time, 
sometimes in response to changes in local circumstances, 
such as a road improvement or the switch of a major local 
customer's supplies from store to warehouse delivery. The 
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timing of these closures is often determined by the expiry 
of a lease. 
Some depot rationalizations entail no new capital 
investment. These commonly involve the closure of a 
marginal depot and the transfer of its stocks and delivery 
work to one or more neighbouring depots. In some cases, 
the depot may not be closed but simply downgraded to a 
transhipment point. Such changes have occurred quite 
frequently and with considerable ease. Where the capacity 
of the depots is too limited to permit the concentration of 
stocks within the existing system, firms must invest either 
in new, larger premises or in the expansion of some of the 
existing ones. Larger scale rationalizations of this type 
take longer to plan and implement and have occurred less 
frequently. Whilst distribution systems are generally 
regarded as being more mutable in the short term than 
systems of production (Cleary and Thomas, 1973), it may, 
nevertheless, take some time for the number of stockholding 
depots a firm employs to adjust to changing circumstances. 
If one takes this dynamic view of manufacturers' 
distribution systems, one can see that some of the observed 
variation in depot numbers may be due to the fact that firms 
in the sample are at different stages in the process of 
depot reorganization. 
There can be considerable inertia in a depot system 
(Ballou, 1968). Some firms acknowledged that they operated 
more depots than they needed or depots in sub-optimal 
locations, but believed that it was more economical to 
continue to do so than to incur all the costs associated 
with depot reorganization. Some of their older depots are, 
after all, fully depreciated and have low rateable values. 
In many areas the sale of these older premises could prove 
difficult. One distribution director declared that it was 
company policy to use existing distribution assets, many of 
which had been acquired as a result of company takeovers, to 
the full and not to divert investment into distribution from 
the firm's main activity i. e. production. Other firms 
attached considerable importance to the good labour 
relations that had been fostered over many years in some of 
their depots. If these depots were closed, it might prove 
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costly to make these staff redundant and to recruit other 
staff to operate larger, more centralised facilities 
elsewhere (GLC, 1977). 
It is often argued that the use of distribution 
contractors affords greater flexibility than own account 
operations. This would make it easier to reduce the number 
of stockholding 'points in the short term. Whilst this is 
to some extent true, it should, however, be-recognised that 
there are numerous instances of food manufacturers having 
the exclusive use of a contractor's depot and consequently 
''being tied into longer term contractual agreements. 
Several of the firms contracting out their distribution 
also preferred to disperse their, traffic through more depots 
than was necessary logistically, to reduce the possible 
ill-effects of any one carrier's operation being disrupted 
and to limit its bargaining power in rate negotiations. 
These perceived benefits of increased security of supply and 
an improved bargaining position must, therefore, be set 
against the benefits of concentrating stocks in fewer 
depots. 
It was predicted in the late 1970s that increasing fuel 
prices and reductions in drivers' hours would alter the 
trade-off between transport and stockholding costs and 
promote a return to more dispersed depot systems (Financial 
Times 22/11/1977; Smith, 1979a). It has also been 
acknowledged that in many firms, underlying these cost 
factors, is a pressure from sales staff to hold stock as 
close as possible to customers (Bevington, 1979), and 'a 
desire to reduce the vulnerability of the distribution 
system to industrial action by dispersing depot storage and 
delivery work (Smith, 1979). There has been no evidence, 
however, of the trend towards more concentrated patterns of 
stockholding being reversed. It appears that those 
predicting such a change under-estimated the possible 
savings in stockholding and storage costs accruing 'from 
concentration and over-estimated the increases in transport 
costs. It has been shown that it is quite common for a 
delivery driver to be idle for between a fifth and a third 
of his daily shift (Bevington, 1979). Reductions in 
drivers' hours need not, therefore, impose a serious 
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constraint on the delivery range and hence on depot numbers. 
It has also been found that, despite increases in fuel 
prices in 1973-4, total vehicle operating costs declined by 
5% in real terms between 1974 and 1977 (Cund il l and Shane, 
1980). Furthermore, as explained earlier, it has been 
possible for firms to maintain the economic efficiency of 
concentrated patterns of stockholding by increasing their 
use of transhipment depots (McKibbin, 1972; Newson, 1978). 
Multiple Retailers' Central Warehouses. 
Although the main factors affecting the number of 
stockholding depots manufacturers employ also influences the 
number of warehouses multiple retailers operate, important 
differences between the two types of organization make it 
necessary to adopt a different approach to the analysis of 
central warehouse numbers. In the first place, unlike large 
food manufacturers, the grocery multiples, individually, do not 
serve the national market and do not aim to bring their goods 
within easy reach of the entire population. At the time of the 
survey, the largest grocery multiple in Britain comprised roughly 
1100 stores, the average multiple operated only around 90 stores 
(Retail Directory, 1979). By comparison, the sample of large 
food manufacturers delivered their products to an average of 
15,330 outlets. The multiples surveyed vary greatly in size, as 
measured by turnover and number of branch stores. (Table 7.4) 
The number of central warehouses a firm operates, however, is not 
simply a function of size, however measured. Second, the range 
of variation in central warehouse numbers is much less than that 
of manufacturers' depots. Almost half the retailers operated 
only one depot, though these single warehouses varied enormously 
in size. Third, the retailer has much greater control than the 
manufacturer over the number and locations of outlets to be 
supplied. Indeed, it is possible for the multiple to coordinate 
closely the development of his warehouses with the expansion of 
his retail chain. Fourth, unlike manufacturers, which could in 
many cases be distinguished on the basis of product type, the 
grocery multiples channel a very wide variety of products through 
their central warehouses. Most multiples' warehouses handle 
between 1000 and 2000 lines. As noted earlier, the retailers 
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Table 7.4: Grocery Multiples: Depot Numbers, Shop Numbers and 
Turnover (1978-9). 
No. of Central Approx. No. of Turnover 
Code no. Warehouses Branch Stores (£M) 
1. 9 1100 490 
2. 9 600 506 
3. 8 650 543 
4. 5 700 953 
5. 4 220 811 
6. 4 143 214 
7. 4 156 193 
8. 3 83 213 
9. 2 67 90 
10. 2 78 112 
11. 2 77 70 
12. 1 66 170 
13. 1 174 73 
14. 1 105 - 
15. 1 94 65 
16. 1 70 85 
17. 1 46 62 
18. 1 45 61 
19. 1 45 - 
20. 1 36 80 
21. 1 32 - 
22. 0 60 450 
23. 0 39 64 
. Sources: Company Annual Reports, Retail Directory 
(1978/9), personal survey. 
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vary both in the proportion of supplies they store centrally and 
in the composition of these supplies. The number of central 
warehouses operated by multiple retailers cannot, therefore, for 
these various reasons, be compared in the same way as the number 
of manufacturers' depots. 
'Nevertheless, some of the general principles of stock 
distribution that were established earlier in connection with 
manufacturers' depots also apply to retail central warehouses. 
These will be examined under the same headings as in the previous 
section. 
1. Policy on Stock Dispersal: As the turnover rates of products 
handled by grocery multiples differ markedly between, for 
example, fresh foods which "turnover" daily and some non-foods 
which do so only four or five times a year, one might expect to 
find some spatial segregation 'of stocks within retailers' 
distribution systems. According to the principle advanced by 
Ballon (1973), slowly moving stocks of non-food products would be 
centralized, while stocks of faster moving lines would be more 
widely dispersed. Only two' instances were found, however, of 
multiples operating warehouses specialising in particular types 
of product, in one case non-foods, in the other fresh foods. 
Most of the firms in the survey did not handle centrally enough 
products in these categories to justify establishing separate 
warehouses for them. Furthermore, the systems of central 
warehouses that have developed, principally to handle groceries, 
can also, in most cases, meet the logistical needs of those 
products with turnover rates significantly faster or slower than 
groceries. As almost all branch stores are within the daily 
delivery range of their central warehouse, fresh foods can be 
delivered quickly and regularly from these bases. In the case 
of slow moving lines, there is evidence of those retailers with 
more than one warehouse concentrating their bulk stocks of 
non-foods at a single location. 
2. Trade-off between Transport and Stockholding/Storage Costs: 
Given the "uniform delivered pricing" scheme of food 
manufacturers, the multiples do not need to take the costs of 
trunking goods from the factory into account in planning the 
locations of their warehouses (GLC, 1977). In deciding upon the 
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number of warehouses to use, however, they must ensure that each 
is big enough to receive supplies in sufficient bulk to qualify 
for quantity discounts. NEDO (1967) reports on the case of one 
supermarket chain that ' found it could gain a "purchasing 
advantage" of 0.5% of net sales revenue by concentrating its 
operations in one rather than two central warehouses. Usually, 
however, the desire to receive discounted bulk loads imposes such 
a low size threshold, that it rarely acts as a constraint on the 
larger multiples' warehouse policies. As in the case of 
manufacturers' distribution systems, therefore, ex-factory 
trunking costs can be said to have little bearing on the number 
of central warehouses a retailer operates. The transport side 
of the cost trade-off is, therefore, dominated by the cost of 
deliveries out from the warehouse to branch stores, for which the 
retailer has full responsibility. The unit costs of these 
deliveries are generally much lower than those of manufacturers. 
This is mainly because these are consolidated deliveries of 
large, mixed loads, often made by much bigger vehicles than those 
employed by manufacturers for local delivery. Twenty-eight of 
the firms surveyed, seventeen multiple retailers and eleven 
manufacturers (including two distribution contractors used by 
food manufacturers) provided sufficient information on their 
delivery fleets to permit a comparison of vehicle sizes. As 
shown on table 7.5, the manufacturers delivery vehicles were 
considerably smaller than those of the multiples, having an 
average gross weight of only 10 tonnes by comparison with a 
corresponding figure of approximately 25 tonnes for the 
retailers' vehicles. Indeed, roughly half the vehicles operated 
by the multiples were of maximum gross vehicle weight at the time 
of the survey (32 tonnes), though several of these firms conceded 
that, when loaded with a standard mix of grocery products, these 
vehicles, even with the maximum size of trailer, would seldom 
have a gross weight in excess of 20-24 tonnes. 
The multiples' vehicles make on average only 2.5 drops per 
journey by comparison with around 12 for food manufacturers. 
Many of the firms operating large stores and channelling a high 
proportion of their supplies via central warehouse, have their 
vehicles deliver full trunk loads to individual shops. Branch 
store deliveries from multiples' central warehouses can, 
therefore, more closely resemble trunk hauls than manufacturers' 
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local deliveries. As these consolidated bulk deliveries have a 
relatively low unit cost per kilometre, and one which "tapers" 
with distance, they can be run efficiently over long distances. 
The careful scheduling of these deliveries and the use of 
specialised handling systems (most commonly "roll pallets") make 
it possible to off-load these large consignments rapidly. This 
fast "turn-around time" allows the vehicles to travel long 
distances within the "driving day". The nature of the multiples' 
transport operation thus makes it possible to serve widely 
dispersed branch stores reasonably efficiently from a single 
warehouse. 
Whilst the multiple's unit delivery costs are generally 
lower than those of manufacturers, its unit warehousing costs are 
usually higher, principally for two reasons. In the first 
place, the retailer holds much more diversified stock. The 
greater the number of product lines stocked, the higher is the 
ratio of total stocks to total warehouse throughput. These 
relatively large stocks are more costly both to finance and to 
store. The physical costs of storing, sorting and order-picking 
also vary in relation in the number of lines stocked, making 
retail central warehouses comparatively expensive to operate. 
All these cost elements, however, can be reduced by concentrating 
stock in fewer, larger premises. With respect to 
stockholding/storage costs, therefore, multiples` are under 
stronger pressure than manufacturers to centralize their stocks. 
The structure of the multiple retailers' distribution costs 
favours larger, more centralized facilities, serving wide areas. 
This partly explains why their warehouses tend to be larger than 
manufacturers' distribution depots. (fig. 7.14) 
3. Service Level: The level of delivery service provided by 
multiples to their branch stores cannot be compared in the same 
way as that of manufacturers. The multiples schedule the 
submission and delivery of orders much more tightly and 
routinely. Each branch store generally receives the same number 
of central warehouse deliveries each week at roughly the same 
time(s). The frequency of these deliveries, nevertheless, 
varies greatly between and within -chains. The variations 
between chains largely reflects differences in the proportion of 
supplies delivered from central warehouse. Variations between 
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Figure 7.14: Sizes of Grocery Warehouse Operated by Wholesalers, 
Multiple Retailers and Manufacturers in the Food 
Industry. (source: personal survey) 
1 includes 2 variety chains selling groceries. 
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branch stores within a chain is mainly the result of differences 
in shop size, measured by turnover. In the case of multiples, 
therefore, it is difficult to devise a meaningful measure of 
service level and impossible to establish a uniform basis for the 
comparison of service levels. 
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made about 
the relationship between service levels and the number of central 
-warehouses multiples operate. Warehouse numbers might be 
expected to influence service level in two ways. First, they 
could determine the proportion of branch stores within the daily 
range of delivery vehicles; the greater the number of warehouses, 
the more extensive would be their combined hinterland and the 
smaller the number of branch stores lying outside this area and 
therefore in need of a two day delivery. In practice, however, 
very few stores lie beyond the daily delivery ranges of the 
central warehouses that supply them. This can be attributed 
partly to the fact that the logistics of bulk consolidated 
delivery enable central warehouses to serve wide areas and partly 
to the constraining influence of daily delivery range on the 
spread of retail chains. Second, the frequency of delivery 
offered to stores within the daily service area might also be 
expected to vary with the number of central warehouses. The 
greater the number of warehouses, the shorter would be the "stem" 
distances of store deliveries and the smaller would be the 
marginal costs of providing branch stores with a more frequent 
delivery of smaller consignments? No evidence was found, 
however, of retailers dispersing their stocks to permit an 
increase in the frequency of delivery. Those chains channelling 
a high proportion of their supplies through central warehouse 
tend to operate large stores capable of receiving a large 
consignment daily. These loads are generally of sufficient bulk 
to make daily deliveries economical over long distances. Many 
of the less centralized chains, whose shops are less dependent on 
central warehouse deliveries and often smaller, are content to 
provide a once or twice weekly delivery. Indeed two such firms 
claimed that less frequent deliveries disciplined store managers 
into more carefully managing their stocks. Overall, it is 
doubtful if the benefits of increasing the frequency of branch 
delivery would outweigh the costs of dispersing stock in a 
greater number of smaller warehouses and of reducing the 
efficiency of the delivery operation. 
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4. System Throughput: Since the multiples vary greatly in size, 
it is likely that much of the variation in the numbers of central 
warehouses they operate can be attributed to size differences. 
As pointed out earlier, however, the number of warehouses is not 
simply a function of total turnover. It also depends on the 
proportion of supplies the firm channels through central 
warehouse, the rate at which stocks of these products "turnover" 
and the sizes of its warehouses. The first two factors 
determine the total amount warehouse space the multiple requires, 
the third reflects the distribution of this storage space between 
individual premises. 
Variations in Central Warehouse Capacity 
The amount of warehouse space a multiple retailer requires can 
be expressed as follows: 
T. C 
W= 
S 
where W is the 
T is the 
C is the 
throug 
S is the 
total amount of warehouse, ýrCL required 
total turnover of the chain 
proportion of turnover channelled 
h central warehouse 
warehouse turnover per unit area. 
Both T and C have been shown to vary widely. Together they 
determine the volume of turnover passing through central 
warehouse. By dividing this volume (measured in monetary terms) 
by the total amount of warehouse space the multiples currently 
use, one can measuere the "productivity" of this storage space 
i. e. the turnover rate per unit area (S). Like T and C this S 
value also varies considerably. This variation can be 
attributed to several factors: 
(a) The degree of stock concentration: As already discussed 
in connection with manufacturers' depots, the extent to which 
stocks are concentrated partly determines the total volume of 
stock that need be held at any given time to ensure a specified 
level of product availability. The greater the degree of 
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concentration, the smaller will be the volume of stock relative 
to sales, the greater, by definition, will be the turnover rate. 
Multiples centralizing their stocks in a few large premises 
should, therefore, be able to secure a higher ratio of turnover 
to storage area than those dispersing stocks through several 
smaller warehouses. 
(b) The particular mix of products channelled through the 
central warehouse: As products can differ markedly in the rate 
at which they sell and in the amount of space they occupy, a 
multiple's choice of products for centralized storage and 
delivery will partly determine the turnover rate per unit area. 
This rate will be particularly sensitive to the relative amounts 
of fast and slow moving lines, such as fresh foods and non-foods, 
the retailer directs though his warehouse(s). 
(c) Warehouse dimensions: Floorspace can be an unreliable 
measure of warehouse capacity as the height of the premises can 
differ markedly, particularly between the conventional single 
storey warehouses (between 20 and 30 feet "to the eaves") and the 
"high bay" warehouses that have sprung up in recent years, of a 
height equivalent to a five or six storey building, but with a 
floorspace measured only in relation to ground plan (Thorne, 
1977). At the time of the survey, however, only one "high bay" 
warehouse was operated by a grocery multiple and the firm 
operating it was not included in the present sample. Even the 
more modest variations in the height of the conventional 
warehouses operated by firms in the sample can, however, affect 
the turnover to floorspace ratio. 
(d) Internal warehouse organization: The actual amount of 
space required to store a given volume of goods also depends on 
the internal layout of the warehouse which in turn is affected by 
the choice of racking systems, methods of order picking and 
provision of space for ancillary activities. 
(e) Stage in warehouse development process: Reference was 
made in chap. 5 to Bowen and Mundy' s model of central warehouse 
development which suggests that following the opening of a new 
warehouse, multiples will seek to fill excess capacity by 
increasing, temporarily, the proportion of supplies channelled 
via central warehouse, reducing this proportion again as total 
turnover increases. As little evidence was found of this 
cyclical process actually operating it must be concluded that 
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central warehouses will carry varying , 
amounts of surplus 
capacity, depending upon the stage they are at in the long term 
programme of warehouse development. This situation is further 
complicated by the addition of warehouse space that accompanies 
the growth of a chain through acquisition. This mode of 
expansion makes it even more difficult to tailor the amounts of 
storage space available to the volume of warehouse throughput. 
Despite the variations in turnover per unit area, when total 
warehouse throughput is plotted against total warehouse 
floorspace for the sample of 16 grocery multiples (fig. 7.15) 
there appears to be quite a close relationship between these 
variables. A simple regression analysis of -total warehouse 
space (W) (in '000 sq. ft. ) on throughput volume (TV) (in it million 
produced the following equation: 
1ý = 1.96 TV + 58,600 
As throughput volume explained almost 96% of the variance in 
warehouse space, and the relationship was significant at the 95% 
level, this equation could form the basis of a predictive model 
of the demand for warehouse space among grocery multiples. it 
suggests that for every increase of 10 million pounds (at 1978 
prices) in the value of turnover channelled through central 
warehouse(s) an additional 5100 sq. ft. of storage space is 
required. A downward extrapolation of the trend line also 
indicates that the minimum amount of warehouse storage space a 
grocery multiple would be likely to operate is around 60,000 
sq. ft.. One of the firms in the sample, however, operated 
slightly less than this amount. A more accurate calculation of 
the minimum viable size of a central warehouse operation would 
require a study of the smaller multiples (with fewer than 20 
branch stores) that were excluded from this survey. 
Three of the major residuals from the best-fit regression 
line require comment. Firms 1 and 2, which lie some distance to 
the left of the trend line have a lower turnover rate per sq. ft. 
than predicted. This might be partly related to the fact that 
these firms operate dispersed systems of nine and six central 
warehouses respectively, serving chains of widely scattered 
branch stores. Much of these firms growth has also been through 
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acquisition. Firm 3 is at the opposite extreme, with a turnover 
per sq. ft considerably in excess of that predicted. This -firm 
was exceptional in having experienced, shortly prior to the 
survey, an increase in total turnover of around 40% over a short 
period. By the time of the survey it had not been possible for 
this firm to expand its warehouse capacity accordingly and, as a 
result, it was channelling exceptionally high volumes of supplies 
10 through its existing premises. 
Apart from these exceptions, there appears to be a 
reasonably close relationship between total amount of warehouse 
space and the volume of supplies a retailer channels via central 
warehouse. It is now necessary to examine the distribution of 
this storage space among individual premises. 
Central Warehouse Sizes. 
The central warehouses operated by grocery multiples in the 
sample ranged from 19,000 to 450,000 sq. ft. though almost two 
thirds of -them were between 50,000 and 150,000 sq. ft.. In- the 
case of those firms operating only one warehouse, sizes correlate 
quite closely with the volume of throughput, as demonstrated by 
the earlier regression analysis. An analysis of variance test of 
those firms with more than two warehouses, revealed that the 
variation in central warehouse size is greater between retailers' 
distribution systems than within them. The largest warehouses, 
in excess of 200,000 sq. ft. were all operated by large chains 
with highly centralized distribution systems, handling over 75% 
of their supplies. On the other hand, the smaller warehouses 
(under 100,000 sq. ft. ) were operated by less centralised chains, 
either small ones or national chains that had grown by acquiring 
smaller chains and associated warehouses. There were also 
several instances of warehouses sizes varying widely within 
chains. This variation was greatest in the case of two national 
multiples that had obtained most of their central warehouses 
through a process of 'acquisitive' growth. In contrast, 
however, the other large national multiple that has expanded 
mainly by a series of takeovers completely restructured its 
distribution system in the early 1970s, closing the assortment of 
central warehouses it had acquired over the years and replacing 
them with six large warehouses of almost identical size in 
strategic locations. Of the multiples that have grown 
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organically, only one has standardised the size of its grocery 
warehouses. The others operate warehouses widely differing in 
size, their dimensions largely reflecting the potential for store 
development in the areas they serve. 
Summary 
Relative to the respective volumes of groceries they deliver 
to shops, the multiples operate fewer and larger distributive 
warehouses than food' manufacturers. The displacement of grocery 
flows from manufacturers' distribution depots to multiple 
retailers' central warehouses has, therefore, produced a further 
spatial concentration of grocery stocks. The multiples, 
nevertheless, vary in the extent to which they concentrate their 
warehouse stocks. It is difficult to compare multiples in terms 
of the number of central warehouses they operate, however, 
because their chains vary greatly in size and areal extent. For 
a group of sixteen multiples, a fairly close relationship was 
found between the value of supplies channelled through central 
warehouse and the total amount of warehouse space. Half of the 
chains surveyed operated only one warehouse and, in the case of 
those providing adequate turnover data, warehouse size correlated 
quite closely with the value of central warehouse supplies. Many 
of the regional multiples have continued to concentrate their 
stocks in one warehouse while expanding their chains. The wide 
geographical extension of some of these chains (such as Wm. Low 
in Scotland)' outward from a single central warehouse has been 
facilitated by road improvements and the development of larger 
shops capable of receiving large consolidated loads that can be 
transported economically over long distances. In the case of 
chains operating more than one central warehouse, it was found 
that warehouse sizes varied more between firms than within them. 
The range of warehouse sizes was much narrower in the case of 
multiples that had mainly followed an "organic" pattern of 
growth. These chains tend to operate fewer, larger premises. 
Those growing principally "by acquisition" tend to disperse their 
stocks more widely in a larger number of smaller and more 
variably sized warehouses. The rationalization of these firms' 
distribution systems over the past 10-15 years has concentrated 
stocks in fewer, larger premises and reduced the variations in 
warehouse size. 
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Grocery Wholesale Depots 
Voluntary Groups: 
The number of wholesale depots in each of the voluntary 
groups is the product of the number of wholesalers belonging to 
the groups and the numbers of depots they operate. At the time 
when the first voluntary groups were formed, most wholesalers had 
comparatively small trade areas. To obtain national coverage, 
therefore, it was necessary to affiliate large numbers of 
wholesalers to the organizations (Fulop, 1962). The two largest 
voluntary groups launched national systems of distribution from 
the start, others achieved national coverage over several years 
by gradually incorporating more wholesalers into their 
organizations. In 1964, the major national voluntary groups 
consisted of between 25 and 35 wholesalers several of which 
operated more than one depot. In that year, these groups served 
the whole country from an average of 37 depots. Since then, the 
numbers of wholesalers and depots have fallen sharply. (Table 
7.6) While a few wholesalers have withdrawn from voluntary 
groups, most of the reduction in their numbers has been due to 
numerous amalgamations and takeovers in the wholesale sector. 
Mergers have occurred at two levels. They have occurred at the 
level of voluntary groups as a whole, as exemplified by the union 
between Spar and Vivo. There have also been numerous mergers of 
wholesalers within voluntary groups. In the case of the two 
largest national groups, this process has concentrated ownership 
in a few large firms. Both types of merger have resulted in a 
reduction in depot numbers. Following the integration of Spar 
and Vivo, the combined depot system was rationalized and many 
depots lost their voluntary group function. The merger of 
individual wholesalers has also frequently resulted in the 
closure of depots. Depot closure has not only been a 
consequence of merger activity. There have also been some 
instances of individual wholesalers concentrating their 
operations in fewer depots. 
These reductions in depot numbers have been made possible by 
several factors: 
1. Transport improvements, particularly to the road network, 
have permitted an extension of depot hinterlands. 
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Table 7.6: Major voluntary Groups: Numbers of Wholesalers, 
Depots and Affiliated Retailers 1964 - 79. 
Wholesale Voluntary Groups: 
No. of No. of Affiliated 
Wholesalers Depots Retailers 
1964 136 274 24,578 
-36% -30% -19% 
1979 94 
1 
193 
J 
19,800 
Retailer-Sponsored Voluntary Groups 
No. of No. of Retail 
Buying Combines Depots Membership 
1964 53 -] 53 -I 2872 
-28% -43% +50% 
1979 28 
J 
30 
1 
4300 
J 
Sources: Fulop (1964), Mintel (1979) 
Table 7.7: Average Floorspace and Turnover of Wholesalers' 
and Retailers' Warehouses in the Grocery Trade. 
Average Size Average Turnover 
(sq. ft. ) (£M annum) 
Multiple Retailers' 
Central Warehouse 106,125 42.5 
CWS Regional 
Distrib. Centre 76,600 32.9 
Voluntary Group 
Wholesale Depot 39,600 8.5 
Cash and Carry 
Warehouse 25,310 2.9 
Sources: same as for Table 5.4 
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2. Reduction in the number of smaller retailers in the groups: 
This has resulted from the closure of unprofitable shops, the 
deliberate policy of some groups to exclude shops unable to place 
orders of a certain minimum size and the growth of some of the 
smaller retailers. Between 1964 and 1979, there was a fall of 
20% in the number of retailers belonging to voluntary groups 
(Fulop, 1964; Mintel, 1979). Over the same period there was a 
significant increase in the average size of the remaining stores. 
One large voluntary group in the survey estimated that the 
average turnover of its shops had increased (in real terms) by 
50% between 1960 and 1979. Despite the reduction in the average 
proportion of supplies retailers purchase from voluntary group 
wholesalers (often referred to , as the "loyalty factor"), the 
increase in outlet size has resulted in an increase in average 
size of order delivered by these wholesalers. The 'reduction in 
the number of small shops coupled with the increase in average 
drop size has made deliveries over longer distances more 
- economical. ' 
3. Investment in new single-storey warehouses, often in 
locations more central to the wholesaler's trade area. One of 
the largest voluntary groups reported that almost all the 28 
depots it currently employed had been constructed since the group 
was formed. Many of these had `replaced several smaller, 
multi-storey depots in inner urban locations. 
Even after these reductions in depot numbers, voluntary 
groups with national or near-national coverage in 1979 still 
employed an average of 28 depots, each serving on average an area 
of about 30 'miles radius (Retail -Directory, 1978/9). This 
constitutes a much higher degree of stock dispersal than that of 
the larger multiples. The wholesale warehouses are also 
significantly smaller than those of multiples both in floorspace 
(fig. 7.14) and turnover. This greater dispersal of stock will 
be partly responsible for wholesalers' higher ratio of stocks to 
turnover (Mintel, 1979) and also their lower turnover rate per 
square foot than multiples' central warehouses. Only one 
voluntary group provided sufficient data on turnover and depot 
floorspace to permit the calculation of an average 
turnover/sq. ft. figure. This average value (for 28 depots) was 
38% lower than the average for the central warehouses of 
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multiples in the sample. Voluntary group wholesalers, 
therefore, have more storage space relative to turnover than the 
multiples and this is more widely dispersed. Such a dispersed 
pattern of stockholding is more suited to the delivery of smaller 
orders to larger numbers of smaller outlets. 
Cash and Carry Warehouses: 
No separate survey was undertaken of cash and carry 
wholesaling. , Detailed information on the sizes, spatial 
distribution and ownership of grocery cash and carries has, 
however, been compiled by Thorpe and Thorpe (1976) , Crofts (1972) 
and the Economist Intelligence Unit (1980). 
The number of cash and carry warehouses grew rapidly in the 
late 1950s and 1960s to reach a maximum in the early 1970s. Webb 
(1972) argued that the development of cash and carries in the 
1960s and early 1970s went against the prevailing trend towards 
more concentrated patterns of stockholding, as these premises 
were generally, much smaller than depots operated by 
manufacturers, retailers and other types of wholesaler (table 
7.7). Since then their number has remained fairly stable at 
around 600. The total amount of floorspace devoted to this type 
of wholesaling has, nevertheless, continued to increase 
substantially. Many smaller depots have been expanded or closed 
down and replaced by new much larger premises. Some 45% of cash 
and carry floorspace in use in 1975 was less than four years old 
(Thorpe and Thorpe, 1976). By the mid-1970s, grocery cash and 
carry. operations had clearly outgrown many of the older wholesale 
premises in which they had originated. Unlike the other types 
of depot considered in this chapter, the creation of a new 
generation of larger cash and carry warehouses has not been 
accompanied by a significant reduction in their total numbers. 
This is because the development of these new, larger premises is 
not the result of a policy of stock concentration but rather the 
provision of additional floorspace to accommodate the increasing 
volume of trade handled by cash and carries. (fig. 7.16) New 
cash and carry warehouses have tended, therefore, to, replace 
older premises on a one-to-one basis rather than centralize the 
operations of several. 
The cash and carry sector needs more warehouse floorspace 
relative to turnover than both the multiples and the voluntary 
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Figure 7.16: Size Distribution of Cash and Carry Warehouses: 
1971 and 1975. (after Thorpe and Thorpe, 1976) 
Warehouse Size Class ('000 sq. ft. ) 
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groups. It had an average turnover per square foot of around 
£130 in 1979 by comparison with £400 for the central warehouses 
of a sample of 18 multiples and £214 for a large national 
voluntary group. The higher ratio of floorspace to turnover can 
be explained partly by the fact that cash and carry warehouses 
need wider aisles for order picking by retailers and additional 
space for check-outs and displays. It is also likely to be the 
result of the more dispersed pattern of stockholding-in cash and 
carries. By comparing figures 7.14 and 7.16, one can see that, 
even allowing for the enlargement of cash and carries during the 
1970s, they are still generally smaller than the other main types 
of grocery warehouses. They also' serve smaller areas, the 
extent of their catchment areas being limited by the distances 
retailers are prepared to travel to collect supplies. 
These generalizations, however, conceal wide differences 
between cash and carry warehouses in size, turnover, turnover per 
square foot, and catchment area. In 1979, for example, 
warehouse sizes ranged from 24,000 sq. ft. to 137,000 sq. ft.; 
turnover per- sq. ft from £97 to £234. Turnover per sq. ft. 
tended to increase with depot size, though, it was also affected 
by the product mix and the firms' trading characteristics 
(Economist Intelligence Unit, 1980). 
Chapter Summary 
Stockholding depots act as "hinge=points" in a distribution 
system. For a market area of given size, the number of depots 
partly determines the pattern of trunk movement and the nature 
of the local delivery operation. The smaller the number of 
depots, the greater will be the concentration of flow on 
particular routes, the wider will be the depot hinterlands and 
the larger the average distance between depot and customer. " To 
distribute goods economically over these longer distances, firms 
must minimize the number of drops per delivery. This generally 
entails restricting deliveries to larger outlets, employing 
heavier vehicles -- and placing greater emphasis on the 
consolidation of orders. 
Over the past 20 years, there has been a major concentration 
of grocery stocks in fewer, larger premises. The motives for 
this concentration of stockholding are discussed in chapter 11. 
This has been achieved partly by manufacturers, wholesalers and 
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some multiple retailers rationalizing their depot systems, but 
also partly by stocks being displaced from the dispersed 
stockholding systems of manufacturers and wholesalers to the more 
centralized systems of multiple retailers. The effects of these 
changes in the pattern of stockholding on the logistics of shop 
delivery are discussed more fully in chapter 10. 
Despite the rationalization and concentration of 
stockholding at all levels of the distributive channel, the 
disparities in the numbers of depots operated by firms at each of 
these levels remain wide. This makes it difficult to generalize 
about the pattern of grocery movement as the route a product 
takes depends largely on the stockholding policies of the 
particular combination of manufacturer, wholesaler and/or 
retailer handling it. Moreover, these stockholding policies are 
not simply related to the physical and marketing characteristics 
of the product; they also depend on several other factors, such 
as the scale and geography of production, the way in which the 
firms! distribution systems evolved and the particular, mix of 
products with which the firm deals. 
Knowledge of the number of intermediate stockholding points 
in a distribution system allows one to make general deductions 
about the length of "local" deliveries from depots or central 
warehouses to shops. Before one can study the actual logistics 
of these deliveries and the pattern of trunk movement "upstream" 
of the stockholding depots, one must examine the spatial 
distribution of these depots. 
Notes: 
1. Smith (1979) has also found wide variations in the numbers of 
stockholding points in the distribution systems of confectionery 
manufacturers. 
2. A distinction may be drawn between a centralised echelon 
system and a direct system. In the former case, centralised 
storage would be located away from the factory or factories; in 
the latter case, it would be based at the main production site. 
3. The optimum location was taken to be the "ton-mile centre". 
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found by employing the algorithm devised by Kuhn and Kuenne 
(1962). 
4. The various methods of overcoming this logistical constraint, 
such as the use of transhipment, the out-basing of drivers or the 
provision of overnight accommodation for drivers, also add 
significantly to unit delivery costs. 
5. One cannot test this relationship rigorously as the data do 
not satisfy the conditions of any of the correlation tests. It 
should also be noted that the averages conceal differences in the 
range of a firm's delivery lead times. 
6. Idealised examples of categories l , to 3 were illustrated in 
figure 5.1 as stage 4 in the historical model of distribution 
system development. 
7. Some firms distribute significant quantities of their products 
to caterers. The methods of distributing supplies to these 
customers are generally similar to those used for wholesale and 
retail customers. 
8. a) In planning a new depot system in the early post-war period 
SPD under-estimated the future trend toward direct delivery and 
so by the late 1950s found it had more depot space than it 
required (Reader, 1969). b) Three of the Lowfield depots are 
used mainly for transhipment purposes. c) By operating a 
comparatively small number of depots Cory has tried to exploit 
the trend towards more concentrated patterns of stockholding. A 
managing director of Cory has claimed that, by transferring their 
distribution to Cory's seven-depot network, many of the firm's 
potential clients, operating at that time between 12 and 20 
depots of their own, would be able to achieve a much higher 
degree of stock concentration (Barber, 1976). 
9. The additional costs would result from a decrease in average 
drop size and increase in the number of drops per journey. 
10. It was also renting some warehouse space temporarily, though 
this has been included in the figure for total warehouse space. 
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Chapter 8 
The Location of Stockholding Points 
For the majority of grocery consignments which travel 
indirectly along echelon channels to the retail outlet, the 
locations of intermediate depots will largely determine the 
route followed. The spatial distribution of these 
intermediate nodes strongly influences the aggregate pattern 
of food movement. A clustering of these premises in 
particular locations would concentrate flows along 
particular corridors, whereas a more even distribution would 
produce a more dispersed pattern of movement. The spatial 
distribution of intermediate stockholding points is, 
therefore, of crucial importance to the forecasting of 
freight traffic, and to plans for rationalizing the pattern 
of freight movement. 
The location of distribution depots is also a topic in 
which several local planning departments have become 
increasingly interested as they have come to see warehousing 
as an alternative source of employment to manufacturing. 
The decline in manufacturing investment and slow take-up of 
structure plan allocations of industrial land in recent 
years have encouraged some local authorities, such as those 
of Warrington (Ince, 1977), Thamesdown and Peterlee, to take 
a more positive attitude towards distributive premises 
(McKinnon, 1983). To assess the potential for warehouse 
development in their areas, however, local authorities 
require more information on the factors influencing firms' 
choice, of depot locations. 
This chapter examines the spatial distribution of 
depots operated by food manufacturers, multiple retailers 
and. wholesalers, reviews the analytical techniques available 
to optimise depot location and considers the factors that 
actually influence depot location decisions. ' It is 
concerned primarily with the type of depots classified by 
Bowersox et al. (1968) as being "market oriented". The 
location of these depots is determined principally by the 
spatial distribution of the outlets they supply, in contrast 
to, "production-" and "intermediate-oriented" depots, whose 
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location is tied more closely to points of production and 
which are used much more for the storage and mixing of bulk 
stocks. Reference is made to these types of depot in 
Chapter 9. 
Food Manufacturers' Distribution Depots 
Analysis of the Aggregate Pattern 
Figure 8.1 shows the spatial distribution of the 306 
stockholding -depots employed by the full sample of 29 food 
manufacturers There is a high degree of concentration 
around the major settlements. Some 62% of the depots are 
within 20 miles of the centres of nine cities. This 
concentration confirms the view frequently expressed in the 
literature (Braithwaite and Dobbs, 1933; Sussams, 1969; 
Beattie, 1973; Coley, 1977) that there are several well 
recognised locations around the _ 
country to which 
distribution depots gravitate. Sussams (1971, p92) 
contends that this concentration of depots in particular 
locations "illustrates the fact that most traders have, over 
the years, arrived at good, if not optimal, solutions by a 
process of trial and error and that a process akin to 
natural selection has removed most of the errors". The 
clustering around major towns and cities is, however, more 
pronounced in some regions than others. In Scotland, the 
North East and Yorkshire there are reasonably tight 
concentrations around the main population centres, of 
Glasgow, Newcastle and Leeds, respectively. In the South 
East, North West and Midlands there is a more dispersed 
pattern. Such inter-regional comparisons, however, ignore 
the size and shape of the areas served by the depots. The 
wide scatter of depots in-. the South East, for example, 
results partly from firms serving the large London market 
from more than one location. One cannot, therefore, 
analyse the spatial distribution of individual firms' 
stockholding depots without also considering the numbers of 
depots they operate and the associated subdivision of the 
country into depot service areas. The number and 
locations of distribution depots are essentially interacting 
variables (Stasch, 1968) As depot 'numbers have been shown 
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London 31 
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Stockholding Points: Sample of 29 Firms. 
(source: personal survey) 
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to vary considerably, it is not possible to make a direct 
comparison of manufacturers' choices of depot locations. 
One must instead explore the relationship between depot 
numbers and locations, to see if there is any regularity in 
the sequence in which depots are added to a distribution 
system and in the ways in which the country is progressively 
subdivided as depot numbers increase. 
A careful, though subjective, study of the distribution 
maps of the 29 firms revealed considerable regularity in the 
order in which new locations were added- as depot numbers 
increased. This confirms claims by Stoker (1976) and 
Sussams (1971) that there is a well ordered sequence of 
depot locations. Stoker established that the optimality of 
an existing set of depot locations was unlikely to be 
affected by the siting of additional depots. It is not 
necessary, therefore, for firms to restructure their entire 
depot systems when adding new depot locations. This makes 
it possible to "decompose" the multiple location problem 
and, thereby, optimise each additional location separately 
without fear of reducing significantly the optimality of the 
system as a whole (Sussams, 1969). Sussams (1971) has 
argued, that not only is there general agreement among firms 
on what are the main strategic locations for distribution 
depots, but there is a similar consensus on the order in 
which these locations are added to a depot system. The 
preliminary study of the 29 food manufacturers' depot maps 
tended to support this view, but, nevertheless, revealed a 
significant amount of irregularity. An attempt was 
therefore made to devise a more rigorous method of measuring 
the degree of regularity and of generalising the sequence of 
depot locations. The method used bears some resemblance to 
that devised by Rosenhead et al. (1972) to test the 
"robustness" of a range of possible locations for new branch 
plants. It involved identifying the areas where depots 
were concentrated and examining the relationship between the 
number of depots a firm operated and the likelihood of it 
having a depot in each of these locations. The following 
method of analysis was used: 
1. A list was drawn up of all the urban areas with three or 
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more depots. 
2 Three was chosen as an arbitrary cut-off 
value. The list contained 25 towns and cities. (Table 8.1) 
2. The total number of depots within 30 miles of the centre 
of each town was enumerated and assigned to that town. This 
choice of a 30 mile radius can be justified partly by the 
fact that the search for a suitable depot site typically 
extends over this range (NEDO, 1967; Loasby, 1973). It 
also makes allowance for the fact that many depots are today 
found in peripheral locations beyond the boundary of the 
urban authority and, particularly in the case of 
conurbations, at a considerable distance from the centre. 
3. Several settlements were then removed from the list for 
two reasons: ` 
i) As a result of their close proximity to other larger 
depot concentrations. There are very few instances (only 2 
in this sample of 29 firms) of food manufacturers having two 
stockholding depots within 30 miles of each other. 
Settlements so close together would be regarded as possible 
alternative locations. Where', two 'settlements were less 
than 30 miles apart, therefore, the one with the smaller 
number of depots (within a radius of 30 miles) was 
eliminated from the list. 
ii) Even where settlements were-more than . 
30 miles apart, 
they could still be used as alternatives. This was found 
to be the case in the North East of Scotland (with Aberdeen 
and Montrose), South Wales (with Cardiff, Newport and 
Swansea) and the South West of England (with Exeter and 
Plymouth). Only the firm with the largest number of depots 
operated depots in the vicinity of each of these pairs of 
locations, thereby dividing the three regions into separate 
service areas. As none of the remaining 28 firms split 
these regions between two depots, it was felt that by 
treating each of these settements as separate depot 
concentrations one would not obtain a representative model 
of the sequence of depots locations. For this reason, the 
smaller depot concentration in each region was removed from 
the list. 
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Table 8.1: List of 25 Settlements with Three or More Food 
Manufacturers' Stockholding Points. 
Aberdeen Inverness Newport 
Birmingham Leeds Norwich 
Bolton Liverpool Nottingham 
Bristol London Plymouth 
Cardiff Maidstone Southampton 
Colchester Manchester Spennymoor 
Edinburgh Montrose Swansea 
Exeter Newcastle-upon-Tyne Welshpool 
Glasgow 
Source: personal survey. 
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Table 8.3: Idealised Successions of Depot-Locations. 
Present Study Sussams (1969) 
1. - Birmingham 
2. London London 
3. Merseyside Manchester 
4. -- Glasgow Glasgow 
5. Bristol Bristol 
6. Newcastle-upon-Tyne Newcastle-upon-Tyne 
7. East Anglia Southampton 
8. West Midlands Leeds 
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iii) The remaining 19 settlements were plotted on a map and 
lines interpolated midway between them (fig. 8.2). These 
lines then served as idealised zonal boundaries. It was 
recognised that the results of the analysis would depend to 
some extent on the configuration of these boundaries. To 
give some indication of the likely sensitivity of the 
analysis to the boundary alignment a count was made of 
depots lying-within 10 miles of the boundaries. These 
"marginal" depots represented only 6% of the total number of 
depots, reflecting the high degree of concentration around 
the "nuclei" of the 19 zones. Given the comparatively 
small proportion of depots in the vicinity of boundaries, it 
was concluded that marginal changes in the alignment of 
these boundaries would probably have little effect on the 
final outcome. 
iv) Each zone' was given a score of one for every food 
manufacturer that held stock there. This scoring system 
did not take account of the actual numbers of depots 
individual manufacturers used in each zone. The total 
numbers of depots in each zone were added up separately. 
v) All the depot location data was collated in Table 8.2. 
The zones were ranked in relation to their scores and 
arranged in descending order of magnitude along the vertical 
axis. Where two or more zones had the same scores, they 
were ranked in relation to depot number. In the one 
instance where two zones had identical scores and depot 
numbers, the tie was broken arbitrarily. The 29 firms were 
arranged horizontally in ascending order by the total number 
of stockholding depots they operated. Where firms had the 
same numbers of depots, ordering was arbitrary. On the 
basis of this ranking, the country was successively 
subdivided into idealised depot hinterlands. Figure 8.3 
shows the first sixteen stages of this zonal breakdown and 
indicates the "core area" within-.,,. each- zone where the 
stockholding points tend to cluster. The zonal boundaries 
have been generalised with respect to the actual pattern of 
depot area boundaries. 
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Figure 8.2: Zones Used in the Analysis of Depot Locations. 
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Table, 8. -2: Generalised Sequence of Depot Locations. 
(source: personal survey) 
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Figure 8.3: Idealised 'Sub-division of Country into Depot 
Hinterlands: 16 Stages. 
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Under ideal conditions, where there was a clear ranking 
of areas in terms of their popularity as depot locations and 
where the number of depots operated by firms increased by a 
uniform interval along the horizontal axis, a perfect 
sequence of locations would produce the matrix pattern shown 
in figure 8.4. Every cell above and to the right of the 
leading diagonal would be occupied by a single depot symbol, 
and the leading diagonal would form a straight edge. In 
practice, there are numerous deviations from this ideal 
pattern. The boundary between the areas of occupied and 
unoccupied cells is ragged and several cells have more than 
one depot. These deviations are partly attributable to 
defects in the data set and methods of analysis, 
particularly: 
a) imperfections in the zoning scheme 
b) uneven intervals between the numbers of depots 
firms operate 
c) the arbitrary ranking of zones with similar scores 
and firms with similar numbers of depots. 
When one allows for these various shortcomings, it appears 
that there is still considerable regularity in the sequence 
of depot locations. Over the first six rankings, this 
sequence closely resembles that postulated by Sussams (1969) 
for the multiple location of production plants, though 
applicable also to distribution depots (Table 8.3). 
It is difficult to generalise about those firms with 
completely centralized distribution systems as they often 
concentrate all their stockholding in the immediate vicinity 
of the main factory. In these cases, the depot locations 
are indirectly affected by the factors influencing the 
location of production. Furthermore, as no firms in the 
sample operated 2 or 5 depots, it was not possible to 
compare the second and fifth stages of the idealised 
sequence with real-world examples of such systems. At the 
opposite end of the sequence, those firms operating more 
than 15 depots-had more than one depot in some zones. This 
was an inevitable consequence of limiting the analysis to 19 
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zones. Altogether roughly 10% of the occupied cells in the 
matrix contained more than one depot symbol, indicating a 
tendency for the corresponding zones to fragment into 
separate depot territories. As almost two thirds of these 
cells belonged to the five firms operating more than 19 
depots, it was concluded that this did not seriously 
undermine the integrity of the 19 zones. If one were to 
extend the idealised sequence beyond 19 depots it would 
clearly be the most populous zones, of the South East, West 
Midlands and the North West, that would have to be 
subdivided first, as these account for most (61%) of the 
instances of depot duplication and triplication. 
Wider departures from this general pattern are likely to 
reflect anomalies in the spatial distribution of some firms' 
depots. These anomalies or "residuals" can be classified 
into two categories: 
Type 1 Residuals: Absence of a depot where one might be 
expected. 
23 residuals of this type were identified. Firms 
avoided holding stock in these zones by various means: 
(numbers in brackets indicate the relevant number of 
residuals) 
i) zone served by a large factory-based depot in an 
adjoining zone (6) 
ii) distribution in the zone split between two or more 
depots in adjoining zones (5) 
iii) zone served by a depot just beyond the zonal boundary 
(i. e. within 20 miles of the boundary) (5) 
iv) presence of a transhipment depot in the zone (5) 
v) incorporation of the zone within the extensive 
service area of a very large depot (2) 
Type 2 Residuals: Presence of a depot where one would not be 
expected. 
Only 5 such residuals were identified and all related 
to firms operating very few depots. In two cases the firms 
operated factories in the zones; in another the firm claimed 
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to have been attracted to the particular zone by the-good 
service offered by a contractor based there. No special 
reasons were found for the remaining two anomalies of this 
type. 
To attempt to explain these residuals, one would have to 
consider three types of variation. In the first place, the 
spatial distribution of firms' sales is likely to vary, 
reflecting regional differences in tastes, degree of market 
penetration etc. (Sussams, 1968). The optimum locations of 
depots might be expected to vary accordingly. As firms 
would not divulge information on their pattern of sales, it 
is not possible to compare them on this basis. Even if the 
demand for every firm's products were similarly distributed, 
however, depot locations could differ as a result of 
organizational factors such as the juxtaposition of factory 
and depot on the same site, the substitution of a 
transhipment depot for a stockholding depot or the use of 
contractors. Even if confronted with the same distribution 
of demand and if organized similarly, firms (using the same 
number of depots) could still choose different depot 
locations for a variety of reasons. These reasons are 
examined in a later section in the context of the 
"micro-level" study of depot location. Before then, 
however, it is necessary, while still at the aggregate 
level, to give more consideration to the relationship 
between patterns of production and stockholding in the food 
industry. 
The Distribution of Production Facilities as a Factor in 
Depot Location 
The trunking of supplies from the factory (or 
factories) is usually accorded considerably less importance 
in the choice of depot location than the pattern of delivery 
outward from the depot. As Hoare (1975) noted, the cost of 
local deliveries of small consignments is much more 
sensitive to distance than the cost of bulk, trunk 
movements. Nevertheless, as indicated in the study of 
"residuals" above, the factory location can have some 
influence on depot location. 
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Although it is beyond - the scope of this research to 
investigate in- detail the spatial distribution of food 
processing plants, it will be useful to outline in general 
terms the geography of food manufacturing. 
As shown on figure 8.5, there are major concentrations 
of food factories around London and Merseyside, and lesser 
concentrations around Glasgow and Bristol. An important 
factor in- their location has clearly been proximity to the 
ports through which raw foodstuffs are imported. The 
relatively limited development of food processing in the 
Midlands and West Yorkshire indicates that it has not simply 
emerged in the vicinity of large population centres. The 
spatial, -, distribution of some types of food manufacturing 
largely reflects their dependence on particular forms of 
agricultural specialization. Areas of intensive fruit and 
vegetable cultivation, for example, such as East Anglia and 
Strathmore, support numerous canning factories; sugar beet 
refineries are confined to the limited area in Britain where 
sugar beet is grown; milk products are manufactured in areas 
such as Somerset and Devon, noted for their dairy produce. 
All but three firms of the 29 firms in the sample 
operated more than one factory, the mean number of factories 
being five. In the majority of cases, the firms 
manufactured different products at different locations. 
Very few firms manufactured a similar range of products at 
more than one factory. Some dispersed the production of the 
largest selling line in more than one location and combined 
this in particular locations with the specialist production 
of different, lower-volume lines (Magee, 1968). Overall, 
however, there was little scope for firms dividing up the 
national market area between factories and assigning each an 
exclusive hinterland. Most factories feed their output 
into a national system of distribution and do not simply 
serve limited segments of the national market area. In 
addition to their stockholding and break-bulk roles, many 
distribution depots also act as mixing points where 
different products manufactured-- in separate locations are 
combined into consolidated orders. 
The spatial distribution of a firm's factories can 
affect the locations of its depots in two ways: , 
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Figure 8.5: Spatial Distribution of Factories 'Operated by 
a Sample of 26 Food Manufacturers. 
(source: personal survey) 
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1. Through the desire to reduce "back-tracking": It was 
stated earlier that the trunking of goods out from the 
factory has little bearing on the number of depots a firm 
operates. Its influence on the choice of depot location is 
similarly small, though there are some instances of depots 
being "pulled" towards factories to reduce the amount of 
"back-tracking" in the distribution system. This is 
illustrated in figure 8.6. Where depot 0 is located 
centrally within its hinterland, many of the local delivery 
journeys will "double-back" on the main trunk movement from 
the factory, making the routeing of products to the shops 
circuitous. Where the hinterland is comparatively small 
and demand fairly evenly spread across it, the amount of 
"back-tracking" will be small and the additional costs of 
trunking goods to the centre of the zone (rather than to 
point P) outweighed by the cost savings in delivering out 
from a central location. Where the hinterland is large, 
there can be a stronger case for locating the depot closer 
to the factory in an off-centre location, particularly where 
it is necessary anyway to use transhipment depots to serve 
peripheral areas. The actual position of the depot within 
the zone would depend on the distribution of demand. 
2. Through the establishment of depot at the factory site: 
There are clear benefits in locating a depot adjacent to the 
factory. This effectively eliminates a trunk movement; it 
facilitates and accelerates replenishment of the depot's 
stocks and permits a sharing between factory and depot of 
various overhead costs. It can also enable a firm setting 
up in an assisted area to obtain government financial 
support for the development of a depot. Under the terms of 
the 1971 Industry Act, this support is only available for 
storage premises on the factory site. Against these 
advantages must be set a series of possible disadvantages. 
The establishment of the depot on a factory site reduces the 
amount of space available for the future expansion of 
production facilities. The factory location may also be a 
poor location for the depot relative to the distribution of 
demand and the locations of the other depots in the system. 
The optimum locations for factories and depots need not, 
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after all, coincide. Patterns of stockholding are 
generally much more dispersed than those of production. 
The depot location is largely dictated by the geography of 
the sales area, whereas the factory location is also 
influenced by other factors such as access to raw materials 
and labour costs. The costs of locating depots 
sub-optimally at factory sites are compounded where a 
manufacturer operates several factories. Whilst it is not 
possible here to assess the degree of sub-optimality in 
depot location, there is some evidence to suggest that the 
location of depots beside factories causes little distortion 
of the general pattern of depot location observed earlier. 
Although almost a third (32.4%) of the factories operated by 
the firms sampled had adjacent depots, these represented 
only 13.4% of the total number of depots. Furthermore, of 
these 41 factory-based depots, only 8 were in locations that 
departed markedly from the idealised sequence of locations. 
Pattern of Recent Depot Closure. 
Reference has already been made to the large reduction 
in the numbers of food stockholding depots over the past 20 
years. It is necessary to examine the geography of this 
recent contraction of depot systems. Unfortunately, only 
two firms were able to provide lists of the locations of 
depots they operated at dates prior to 1970. As 
considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining 
information on past depot locations, it was decided to 
concentrate on the period since 1975. Twenty three firms 
provided sufficiently detailed information on the changes 
that had occurred in their depot systems since then. As 
shown in tables 7.2 and 8.4, the period since 1975 has been 
essentially one of marginal changes, the main phases of 
contraction having occurred in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
A total of 40 stockholding depots were closed over this 
period, 16% of the number employed by the sample of firms in 
1975. (95% of the depots were closed completely; only 2 
retained a transhipment function. ) In 26 (65%) of these 
cases the stockholding and delivery work was redistributed 
among existing depots. In the remaining 14 cases, these 
functions were transferred to new depots elsewhere. There 
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Table 8.4: Reduction in Numbers of Stockholding Points 
Employed by a Sample of 23 Food Manufacturers, 
1975-8. 
No. of Stockholding No. of 
Depots Closed Firms 
16 
21 
33 
4_2 
51 
10 1 
no change 9 
Total 23 
Source: personal survey. 
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were only two instances, however, of 
replacing one that had closed down. 
common for a new depot to centralize 
more than one closed depot., 
a new depot directly 
It was much more 
the stockholding of 
Figure 8.7 shows the distribution of stockholding 
depots closed between 1975 and 1978 and the direction of 
the consequent shift in stockholding. Three elements may 
be discerned in this pattern of closure: 
1. Withdrawal of stockholding from "peripheral" regions 
(North East Scotland, South West England, East Anglia, North 
Wales, Cumbria and Humberside). This may be related to the 
penetration of these-, areas by extensions to the motorway 
network in the 1970s: M5 to Exeter, Mll to Cambridge, M3 to 
Swansea, M62 to Hull, 
_ 
M94 to Perth. This process has 
increased-the spatial concentration of food warehousing and 
reinforced the sequence of depot locations identified 
earlier. 
2. Depot reorganization in more central areas, especially: 
i) within an area bounded by Birmingham, Nottingham, Leeds 
and Liverpool, 
ii) in Severnside and-South Wales. 
i) depot changes in this area can be divided into two 
categories: 
a) closure of depots in the vicinity of the Ml and Al, 
at Sheffield, Dronfield and Lincoln. In the case of the 
first two of these locations, the depots were "pinched out" 
by the expansion of the service areas of neighbouring depots 
along the line of the Ml. As the relevant sections of the 
motorway had been in existence for over 12 years, this 
adjustment. to the road improvement has been long delayed. 
b) closure of depots east and west of the Pennines at 
Gainsborough and Doncaster, and Warrington and Haydock by 
two firms centralizing their distribution to Yorkshire and 
Lancashire at Pontefract and Reddish respectively. This 
may be partly attributed to the improvement in trans-Pennine 
road connections with the opening of sections of the M62. 
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Figure-8.7: 
THE CLOSURE OF FOOD 
DISTRIBUTION DEPOTS 
1975 -1978 
f1 Sample of 14 Firms. 
(source: personal survey) 
o Depot Closure 
Planned' Depot 
Closure (1978) 
Shift of Stockholding 
s, to other Depots 
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ii) depot reorganization in this area may be associated with 
the extensions of the M3 and M5, and, belatedly, with the 
construction of the Severn Bridge. There has been a 
tendency for stocks to become- more concentrated in the 
Bristol area. Much of the movement of stockholing has been 
across the Severn Estuary, principally in the direction of 
Bristol. The main phase of depot reorganization in the 
area, in the five years following the opening of the. Severn 
Bridge has been thoroughly documented by Cleary and Thomas 
(1973). 
3. Contraction of a major carrier's distribution system: 
Four of the depots closed over this period were operated by 
a large distribution contractor. Following the loss of a 
large client's business, which accounted for 40% of tonnage 
and 25% of turnover, this firm closed its depots in the 
Greater London and West Midland conurbations. These depots 
were selected for closure partly because they suffered the 
greatest loss of traffic, but also because of the high rates 
and labour difficulties in these areas. In dispersing the 
firm's operations away from the main conurbations, this 
rationalization runs counter to the prevailing trend, but 
should be seen as the response of a particular firm to 
exceptional circumstances. 
Overall, therefore, the recent closure of 
manufacturers' distribution depots has resulted in a 
withdrawal of the stockholding function from more peripheral 
areas and an increased concentration of stockholding in a 
well-established set of strategic locations. Much -of the 
redistribution of depot capacity can be attributed to 
improvements in the road network. 
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Multiple Retailers' Central Warehouses 
Analysis of the Aggregate Pattern. 
Figure 8.8 shows the locations of 66 central warehouses 
operated by a group of 25 major grocery multiples? It would 
not be appropriate to analyse this spatial distribution in 
terms of the sequencing of locations because, unlike the 
large food manufacturers considered earlier, the multiples 
surveyed vary widely in the size of area they serve. One 
must, therefore,. confine oneself to a fairly general 
examination of the pattern of central warehouse location. 
The most notable feature' of this distribution is the 
pronounced clustering in the South East of England, with 
smaller concentrations in the North East and North West. 
The preponderance of central warehouses in the South East 
reflects the extensive development of multiple retailing in 
this region (Nielsen Researcher, 1974). The multiples 
share of grocery sales is significantly higher in the South 
East than in other parts of the country (fig. 8.9). In 
contrast, there are comparatively few central warehouses in 
the Midlands. This may be partly attributed to the fact 
that the multiples hold a smaller share of the grocery 
market in this area and partly to the ý- fact that the region 
has comparatively. few large indigenous chains. Many of the 
larger multiples operating branch stores in the Midlands, 
such as Tesco, Sainsbury and Gateway have expanded into the 
area from outside and continue to supply these shops from 
central warehouses in neighbouring regions. 
Some of the apparent clustering is the result of some 
of the bigger chains with national or near-national coverage 
(Allied Suppliers, International, Fine Fare and Tesco) 
operating central warehouses in the same areas. Several of 
these firms' warehouses have gravitated to locations around 
Glasgow, Newcastle, Warrington and along corridors between 
Cheshunt and Harlow, and Maidstone and Swanley. 
Roughly 90% of the central warehouses operated by 
retailers in the survey have been newly opened or taken over 
by them since 1960, over half of them since 1970. The 
pattern of central warehouse location existing at the time 
of the survey was therefore a fairly recent creation. It 
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Figure 8.8: Spatial Distribution of Grocery Multiples' 
Central Warehouses: Sample of 23 Firms. 
(source: personal survey) 
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is thus best examined in relation to the recent growth 
and/or rationalization of the grocery multiples. Unlike 
the large food manufacturers, few of the multiples have been 
reducing their numbers of stockholding points and 
concentrating stocks in fewer, larger depots. The majority 
of grocery multiples operate only one central warehouse 
anyway. Most of those operating more than one warehouse 
have been expanding their turnover while channelling an 
increasing proportion of this turnover through their central 
warehouses. This has, therefore, increased their demand 
for storage space. Two of the "organic" chains with highly 
centralized delivery systems have over the past' 20 years 
established warehouses reckoned to be close to the maximum 
efficient size, leaving little scope for further stock 
concentration. In contrast, some of the large chains that 
have grown principally "by acquisition" have inherited 
smaller, often poorly located warehouses, some-of which have 
been closed down and replaced, individually or collectively, 
by larger more centralized facilities. 
It is possible to classify the grocery multiples in 
relation to the development of their central warehousing 
systems during the 1970s. 
1. Construction of new central warehouses to support the 
geographical expansion of the chain by "organic growth". 
This policy is typified by Kwiksave, a major operator 
of discount stores, which has opened new warehouses at 
roughly 3 year intervals in phase with the rapid extension 
of the chain outward from its original base in North Wales. 
As the firm runs a limited-line discount operation, its 
stores receive a relatively large proportion of their 
supplies from a central warehouse, making it necessary to 
coordinate the development of warehouses closely with the 
spread of the chain. 
2. Construction of new central warehouse principally to 
accommodate the growth of sales through existing outlets 
and relieve congestion at existing warehouses. 
In the case of Tesco, a 40% growth in its volume of 
business over a period of a few months exhausted spare 
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capacity in its existing warehouses. An. additional 
warehouse was rapidly planned and constructed near the point 
where the service area boundaries of the existing central 
-warehouses intersected. In this location (Crick) the 
warehouse was able to absorb traffic from each of the 
existing grocery warehouses. 
3. Rationalization of central warehouse system following 
take-overs. 
The larger chains formed mainly by acquisition have 
been rationalizing their distribution systems to differing 
degrees. One chain set up a completely new system of six 
depots in the early 1970s. Two others have gradually been 
replacing-older, smaller depots with larger premises. Many 
of the older warehouses acquired by take-overs were in the 
towns where the absorbed chain originated. Following the 
integration of the chains and subsequent rationalization of 
outlets, these acquired warehouses were seldom of a size and 
situation to serve the combined chain efficiently. Over 
the past 10 years they have been replaced by a new 
generation of warehouses located more centrally relative to 
the shops they serve. 
4. Short distance move to more modern premises. 
Four of the smaller regional chains decentralized their 
warehouse operation from older, inner city building to 
larger, newly built premises on peripheral- industrial 
estates. None, of these firms employed locational models to 
test the efficiency of the new location and in each . case the 
search for a suitable site was confined to the town of 
origin and its immediate surrounding area. 
5. Use of contractors to supplement and extend the 
multiple's own distribution system. 
In the late, Sa insburys began using distribution 
n 
contractors to store some of its central supplies and 
deliver consolidated orders to its branch stores. As 
pointed out in chapter 6, the use of carriers enables the 
retailer to increase the capacity of its store delivery 
system without incurring the high cost of setting up new 
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warehouses and facilitates the geographical expansion of the 
chain into areas beyond the daily delivery range of its own 
warehouses. 
Voluntary Group Wholesale Depots. 
The spatial distribution of voluntary group depots owes 
much to the historical development of the affiliated 
wholesalers. The majority of these wholesalers still 
operate their main depots in their original trade areas. 
Many have expanded their operations geographically either by 
setting up new depots ("organic growth") or by acquiring 
wholesalers in adjoining areas. Where firms have replaced 
older, smaller depots, this has usually involved a 
decentralization from inner city locations. Depot shifts, 
however, have tended to be over short distances. In many 
cases, these have been constrained by the desire to retain 
the same management and labour force. In other cases, it 
has been due more to the conservatism of the owners of the 
firm. The senior executives of the voluntary groups that 
were consulted doubted if any of the smaller, independent 
wholesalers had made use of analytical models in the 
planning of new warehouse locations. The fragmentation of 
locational decision-making in a large number of independent 
wholesaling firms has prevented the rationalization of the 
system of voluntary group depots as a whole. The numerous 
mergers within voluntary groups in recent years, however, 
have brought large areas of the country within the franchise 
of individual firms and created conditions much more 
conducive for depot rationalization. The depot closures 
and relocations that have occurred in the wake of these 
mergers have had the effect of breaking -local ties and 
re-organizing wholesale distribution on a larger spatial 
scale. 
As figure 8.10 shows, the distributions of wholesale 
depots in three large national voluntary groups differ quite 
markedly. Most of the clustering of depots within 
particular groups results mainly from affiliated wholesalers 
serving the franchise areas from several depots. The 
uneven spread of depots can also be attributed partly to the 
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haphazard formation of the voluntary groups, which was 
dependent on the willingness of local wholesalers to 
" participate in the scheme, and partly to variations in the 
extent to which the depot systems have been rationalized in 
different areas. It is generally agreed that voluntary 
groups are relatively poorly developed in the main 
conurbations, reflecting the fact that independents hold a 
smaller share of the grocery market in these areas (Nielsen 
Researcher, 1974). 
In summary, therefore, the spatial distribution of 
multiple retailers' central warehouses and voluntary group 
wholesale depots do not exhibit the same degree of 
clustering as food manufacturers' depots, nor do they 
conform to a similar generalized sequencing of locations. 
As retail and wholesale firms distribute products over much 
smaller areas, their locational decision-making tends to be 
more localised and conditioned much more by factors peculiar 
to each organization, such as geographical origins, 
subsequent pattern of expansion and the present spatial 
distribution of branch stores in the case of multiples, 
retail customers in the case of wholesalers. It is more 
difficult, therefore, to generalise about the location of 
retail and wholesale grocery depots. 
Implications for the Rationalization of Grocery Movement 
It has been suggested that the concentration of 
distribution depots in strategic locations offers scope for 
the rationalization of the systems of long distance trunk 
movement and local delivery (Reed and Rees, 1972; Lorries 
and the Environment Committee, 1977b). The Lorries and the 
Environment Committee has proposed that "freight complexes" 
be established at these strategic locations to provide 
common storage and transhipment facilities, modal 
interchange between road and rail and a range of ancillary 
services. The use of such complexes by large numbers of 
manufacturers and distributors could, it is argued, yield 
substantial economic and environmental benefits by: 
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1) encouraging the consolidation of loads both for long 
distance and local delivery freight movements, 
2) increasing the opportunities of finding return loads 
for backhauls (Cundill and Hull, 1979), 
3) facilitating the transfer of consignments between 
road and rail. 
In these ways, they could reduce transport costs per 
unit and total vehicle kilometres on the road network. 
The study the Lorries and the Environment Committee 
commissioned on the potential for developing freight 
complexes focused attention on the movement of food 
products, considering the food industry to be the main 
source of traffic for such complexes. A survey of 67 food 
manufacturers and distributors undertaken during the course 
of this study revealed that food distribution depots 
(operated by manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers) were 
highly concentrated in particular areas. Roughly half the 
652 depots operated by these firms were located within 10 
miles of 13 cities or 30 miles of London. This pronounced 
clustering enabled the consultants to - identify a set of 
strategic locations where they believed the demand for 
freight complexes would be high. 
The inclusion of wholesalers' and retailers' warehouses 
in the survey raises the question of how much business 
freight complexes would be likely to attract from these 
agencies. Almost all wholesalers and multiple retailers, 
after all, already operate warehouses and already achieve 
high levels of consolidation in the delivery of goods to 
shops. Furthermore, as they have responsibility only for 
localised shop delivery, they would be unlikely to benefit 
directly from the increased availability of return loads and 
easier access to the rail network. 
It would be manufacturers who would have most to gain 
from using freight complexes. In this respect, the nine 
strategic locations selected by the Lorries and the 
Environment Committee study as possible sites for the 
development of such complexes seem to accord well with the 
locational preferences of the group of 29 food manufacturers 
consulted during the present study. There is a close 
correspondence between these prospective freight complex 
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locations and areas with high rankings in the generalized 
sequence of depot locations. Of the first nine areas in 
this sequence, only East Anglia was not assigned a freight 
complex, while+the London area was assigned two. This 
appears to confirm that, as far as grocery products are 
concerned, these would be areas. in which freight complexes 
would be most likely to succeed. However, as most 
manufacturers holding stock in, these areas either own depots 
there or hire depot space there on a long term basis, these 
freight complexes would be unlikely to capture much of their 
traffic in the short term. It is estimated that roughly 
20% of firms "seek new depot space" within a five year 
period, 50% within fifteen years (Lorries and the 
Environment Committee, 1977b). Therefore, even if the 
freight complexes were to provide a large proportion of the 
new depot space, it would take many years for them to 
rationalize significantly the pattern of grocery movement. 
Methods of Depot Location 
Numerous analytical techniques are available to firms 
wishing to optimise the locations of stockholding points. 
These are reviewed in Buxton (1975), Murphy (1978) and Mole 
(1975). Some search for optimal locations across 
continuous. space ("infinite set"),, while others select 
optimal locations from a previously prepared list of 
possible locations ("feasible set"). Techniques in the 
former category are usually based on the algorithm devised 
by Kuhn and Kuenne (1962) to establish the "ton-mile centre" 
(or weighted mean distance centre), though vary in the 
nature of their transport and warehousing cost functions 
(Eilon et al., 1971). Of the feasible set techniques, the 
heuristic methods devised by Kuehn and Hamburger (1963) and 
Feldman et al. (1966) to evaluate pre-selected locations 
have gained widest currency. 
There are several instances of these techniques being 
used in the food industry either by firms' own, in-house 
operations research departments, or by hired consultants. 
There is also evidence that the number of firms in the 
ii 
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grocery trade using computerised location models has been 
increasing (National Computing Centre, 1968; Robson, 1982). 
It has been estimated that the application of these models 
can yield potential savings of 5-15% over "good manual 
solutions" to the depot location problem (Atkins and 
Shriver, 1968). Nevertheless, many of the distribution 
staff consulted in the course of this research expressed 
considerable scepticism about the value of these techniques. 
Like Murphy (1978), many believed that "while the techniques 
developed were and are of undoubted value in the theoretical 
solution, they very often fall short in their practical 
application" (p229). It is necessary, therefore, to examine 
the shortcomings of these locational methods and consider 
the factors that cause actual depot locations to deviate 
from the theoretical optima. 
Limitations of Depot Location Models 
The most serious limitations of existing depot models 
may be summarised as follows: 
1. ` Most infinite set methods fail to differentiate possible 
from impossible locations. During the survey, two firms, a 
large multiple and a food manufacturer, reported using an 
infinite set approach in the initial stages of a depot 
location exercise. The former found that is should serve 
the South East of England from a depot on Waterloo Bridge, 
the latter that it should serve the South West from Lundy 
Island. Distribution managers frequently cite such 
ridiculous results as "proof" of the futility of 
"scientific" depot location models. These results, 
however, are not as worthless as they may at first seem. 
Firms cannot expect to locate their depots at the locations 
pinpointed by the model. In practice, even when firms 
decide on a location subjectively, they must search within a 
reasonably wide area, often withi, n a radius of 30-40 miles 
(Loasby, 1973), As the distribution cost function is 
generally very shallow in the vicinity of the minimum 
location, "some latitude in the choice of location is 
possible at little extra cost" (Willis, 1977, p150). The 
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initial stage in a depot location exercise, therefore, 
involves establishing a weighted centre point around which 
one can conduct a reasonably wide search for possible sites. 
2. As the models are based on the unrealistic assumption 
that all deliveries are direct and of a single consignment, 
they fail to take account of actual delivery logistics 
(Webb, 1968). 
3. The models determine only "local" optimal locations and 
do not guarantee an overall optimum set of depot locations 
for the system as a whole (Baxter, 1981). 
4. Cost functions are often over-simplified and inadequate 
attention- given to discontinuities, non-linearities and 
combinatorial factors in the cost calculations. 
Furthermore, the cost functions are usually related to 
single product types, whereas many firms distribute diverse 
ranges of products through their depots. It would be very 
difficult to- extend these models to accommodate 
multi-product distribution (Mole, 1975), particularly where 
the products differed widely in distribution costs and 
service level requirements. 
5. Almost all these models take no account of local 
circumstances such as the quality of the transport network 
or the availability of labour. These are discussed in the 
next section. 
Were depot location models expected to pinpoint optimal 
locations exactly, these would be serious limitations. 
Where they are employed in practice, however, expectations 
are generally much lower. As Sussams (1971) explains, " In 
practice, the optimum solution is usually of academic 
interest only because there is so much variability in the 
system that the conditions which make a particular solution 
optimal seldom ever apply" (p32). Indeed, many 
distribution executives in the food industry doubt the 
value of depot location models. Several firms indicated 
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that they had used these models to gain post hoc 
confirmation of the suitability of locations they had 
decided upon subjectively. 
Problems of simulating the distribution of stockholding 
depots: 
The attempts earlier to construct, inductively, a 
generalised sequence of depot locations provided only a very 
approximate basis for predicting where a firm operating a 
certain number of depots would be likely to locate them. 
The use of multiple location models could provide an 
alternative, deductive means of simulating the actual 
patterns of depot location. It is unlikely, however, that 
the actual distributions of depots would conform to the 
optimal or near-optimal distributions, established by the 
models, partly because these models do not take full account 
of all the circumstances that affect depot location 
decisions and partly because this decision-making itself may 
be sub-optimal. It is also seldom possible for an 
independent researcher to obtain the sales information that 
would be a necessary input into these-models. Few firms 
are willing to divulge information on their pattern of 
sales. Population could be used as a surrogate for sales 
data; however, population and sales need not correlate 
closely for several reasons: 
i) Sales per head of a firm's products can vary 
significantly between different parts of the country 
(Sussams, 1968). These variations can reflect differences 
in affluence, tastes, strength of local competition and 
historical factors such as-the long term effects of being 
prohibited by war-time zoning schemes from supplying some 
areas. (It should be noted, however, that in running a 
depot location model, one large firm used a uniform sales 
per head figure across the country on the grounds that it 
was a marketing objective, in the medium to long term, to 
bring sales in all areas up to the same level. ) 
I. 
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ii) Sales data is collected where people shop, whereas 
population census data relates to their place of residence. 
The relationship between the population of an area and its 
level of retail sales will, therefore, depend on the 
distribution of retail outlets and the spatial pattern of 
consumer behaviour - what Sussams (1969) has called the 
"shopping centre factor". At a' higher level, the 
relationship between population and the volume of sales 
through wholesalers. is likely to be even more variable 
(Revzan, 1966). 
iii) The. proportion of a manufacturer's output distributed 
via depots is 'likely, to vary geographically across its 
market area. This can reflect spatial variations in the 
firm's relative dependence on different distribution 
channels (Briggs and Smyth, 1967; Metcalf, 1968). For 
example, multiples account for a much larger share of 
grocery sales in the South East of England than in other 
regions (Nielsen Researcher, 1974), and most of the large 
chains supplying this area channel a relatively large 
proportion of their supplies via central warehouses. It 
is likely, therefore, that a larger proportion of 
manufacturers' sales in this area will be of goods supplied 
in direct, bulk consignments to retailers' central 
warehouses. They would then make comparatively less use of 
depots in this area. No data is available, however, to 
assess the extent to which the proportion of sales passing 
through distribution depots varies spatially. 
Even if such data were available, however, it would be 
of limited validity because goods supplied direct from the 
factory to retail central warehouses or wholesale warehouses 
within the depot's service area might subsequently be 
distributed to shops in the hinterlands of adjacent depots. 
Indeed, as figure 8.11 illustrates, a manufacturer's market 
area can be broken down into a hierarchy of depot service 
areas and retail trade areas 
4 This three dimensional 
representation of a distribution channel shows how the areas 
served by distributive nodes at different levels of the 
channel overlap. It can also be seen that different 
distributive channels produce different areal hierarchies. 
271 
Figure B. IL: Hierarchy of Service and Trade Areas in the Distribution System 
Jf 
.......... -º Flow of goods 
Factory Factory market area 
Manufacturers' Manufacturers' depot 
distribution depot service area 
" Wholesale/retail Wholesale; retail 
warehouse trade area 
f Shop """"""""" Retail trade area 
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In the light of the complex pattern of service and trade 
areas that emerges, it is doubtful that the capacity of a 
manufacturer's distribution depot would be closely 
correlated with the population of its hinterland. 
Furthermore, as the movement of goods between the various 
nodes is organized within this complicated framework of 
service and trade areas, it is hardly surprising that 
freight traffic distribution models based on fairly 
arbitrary zonations are unable to simulate accurately this 
pattern of movement. 
Only two firms provided enough information to permit a 
measurement of the variation in the amount of depot 
throughput per head between different depot delivery areas. 
These variations will be the combined result of factors ii) 
and iii) above. It is not possible to separate the effects 
of these two factors. As shown in table 8.5, the 
variations were large, particularly in the case of company 
2. This supports the view that information on the 
distribution of population is unlikely to give an accurate 
indication of the demand for depot capacity in different 
areas. 
Factors affecting the siting of depots 
While the location models reviewed in the previous 
sections can indicate a "search area", the actual siting of 
depots within this area is affected by numerous factors, not 
included in the model and usually evaluated subjectively: 
1. Availability of sites: Several firms reported that they 
had found it impossible to obtain a suitable site in the 
preferred location. Some had had to make do with sites 
within 15 - 25 miles of this location. In most of these 
cases there were simply no suitably zoned sites or 
ready-built premises in the area at an acceptable price. 
In three cases, however, (out of twenty-five) firms were 
prevented from developing a warehouse on industrially zoned 
land because planning permission was witheld. In two of 
these cases, the local planning departments refused the 
developments on the grounds that they generated insufficient 
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employment relative to the space they occupied. Low 
employment density has often been used by' planning 
authorities to justify negative" policies towards warehousing 
(Watts, 1977). It would seem from the recent experience of 
the food industry that, contrary to fears that have been 
expressed about restrictive planning policies impairing the 
efficiency of - the distribution system (NEDO, 1976; 
Department of the Environment, 1978), planning controls have 
rarely acted as a serious constraint on depot locations 
decisions. 
2. Road connections: These can influence the location of 
depots at different spatial scales. At the regional and 
national level, road network measures of distance, time and 
cost can be used in depot location models to make them 
sensitive to the structure of the road network. At a 
smaller spatial scale, within the area of localised search, 
firms prefer sites with good road access, often at 
intersections on the trunk road network. 
It has been common practice for firms to take road 
development plans into account in deciding upon depot 
locations. One might, therefore, suspect that the 
contraction of the trunk road programme since the mid 1970s 
and the delay in the completion of many new road schemes may 
have rendered the locations of some depots sub-optimal. In 
fact, only one firm reported that the delay in the 
construction of a motorway link (M42) was significantly 
impairing the accessibility of one of its depots (at 
Tamworth). 
3. Labour requirements: The majority of firms did not 
regard the availability of labour as a significant factor in 
the choice of depot locations. This may be attributed 
partly to the fact that a large proportion of depots are 
located in the vicinity of large population centres, and 
partly to the relatively small labour demands of most 
depots, in terms of numbers and skills. Nine food 
manufacturers provided employment data for a total of 85 
distribution depots. At 74.6 square metres per employee, 
the average employment density of these storage premises is 
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well below the corresponding values for manufacturing 
premises in thirteen local authority areas around the 
country (Peterlee Development Corporation, 1980). Surveys 
in these areas found manufacturing employment densities to 
range from 16 - 48 square metres per employee. Only three 
firms (10%) claimed that they attached considerable 
importance to the availability and quality of labour. 
Seven firms expressed anxieties about labour relations 
problems in some areas, particularly the West Midlands, 
where the local Transport and General Workers' Union branch 
was felt to be exceptionally militant. As Westwood (1975) 
has acknowledged, industrial relations considerations can be 
a significant factor in depot location decisions. Three 
firms, for example, attributed the fact that they did not 
operate depots in the West Midlands and instead served the 
area from other-regions, principally to West Midlands' poor 
industrial relations record in road transport. Two other 
firms closed depots, one in Cumbernauld, the other in 
London, because they suffered serious labour troubles. In 
both cases the replacement depots were located far enough 
away to discourage staff from moving to the new locations. 
4. Choice of contractor: In the case of those firms that 
contract out some or all of their distribution, the 
stockholding- location is determined by the choice of 
contractor. Firms employing a contractor to handle their 
distribution over a wide area commit themselves to using his 
system of depots. Those firms which divide their 
distribution geographically among a series of carriers can 
exercise more choice over the locations of depots they use 
in different areas. Usually, however, these firms select 
local carriers much more on the basis of their rates and 
quality of service than on the particular location of their 
depots. Indeed, two of the firms that make heavy use of 
contractors reported that they received quotations from 
carriers over a wide area before deciding where to base 
their distribution. On occasion, the chosen contractor's 
depot might be reasonably distant from the ton-mile centre 
of the area served. Jobson (1976) reports on the 
difficulty Cadbury-Schweppes experienced in finding a 
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suitable contractor for the distribution of its. products in 
the North of England. 
Firms which disperse their distribution among many 
contractors seem to change contractors, and thereby depot 
locations, more frequently and with greater ease than those 
which are dependent on a single contractor for distribution 
over an extensive area. As explained in Chapter 6, 
however, several food manufacturers have become "tied" into 
contract systems by long-standing agreements and even shared 
investment. Under these circumstances, it can prove costly 
and take several years to organize a change of carrier and 
corresponding change of depot locations. 
Optimizing the Locations of Retailers' Central Warehouses 
Multiple retailers can make use of the same techniques 
as manufacturers to establish optimal locations for their 
warehouses. Less than a third of the retailers surveyed, 
however, claimed to have used operational research methods 
for this purpose. - The problem of warehouse location 
confronting the multiples differs from that of the 
manufacturers in several important respects. 
In most cases, the problem is much less complicated, 
partly because the grocery multiples operate fewer 
warehouses and partly because these warehouses serve 
comparatively few outlets. The majority of the multiples 
operate only one central warehouse and, therefore, avoid the 
complexities of the multiple location-allocation problem 
inherent in the planning of most manufacturers' depot 
systems. As the multiples service many fewer outlets from 
their warehouses, they can use specific locational and 
turnover data for each store rather than the zonally 
aggregated sales data generally employed by manufacturers. 
This can enhance the accuracy of the calculation. The 
retailer also has much more control over the future 
distribution of the outlets to be served. In choosing a 
central warehouse location it can anticipate the future 
development of the chain. In the longer term, however, the 
extension of the chain can render a warehouse location 
suboptimal. One firm trading in the South East and, the 
Midlands admitted that relative to the locations of its 
277 
central warehouses it had over-extended 'its chain and was 
having difficulty supplying some peripheral stores 
efficiently. Two other retailers claimed that new branches 
added to their chains since their central warehouses were 
opened, while well within the delivery range of these 
warehouses, had left these warehouses respectively 30 and 40 
miles off-centre. In both cases, though, the additional 
costs this incurred were not considered great enough to 
justify relocating the central warehouses. There was a 
general consensus among the retail staff interviewed that in 
deciding to open a new branch store a firm would attach much 
more importance to the sales potential of the site than to 
the delivery of supplies. The observation made earlier, 
however, that very few multiples operate branch stores 
beyond the daily delivery range of their central warehouses, 
suggests that this range may constrain the search for 
promising retail sites in the first place. 
The location of a multiple's central warehouse is not 
influenced by the cost of incoming deliveries, as suppliers 
generally employ a system of equalised delivery pricing 
(Chisholm, 1971). This location tends, therefore, to be 
optimised with respect to the shops the warehouse serves 
rather than the points from which its supplies originate 
(GLC, 1977). This situation is little different, however, 
from that of the manufacturer's distribution depot, whose 
location is determined primarily by the economics of the 
local delivery operation and very little by the costs of 
trunk inward movements (Wentworth and Ramm, 1976). 
As multiple retailers' central warehouses are generally 
larger than manufacturers" distribution depots (fig. 7.14) 
and likely to generate greater volumes of goods traffic, it 
was hypothesized that retailers might experience more 
difficulty in finding suitable sites for these facilities 
and in obtaining planning approval. This might cause 
central warehouse locations to diverge from their 
theoretical optima. In fact, none of the retailers 
consulted reported any problems in this respect. 
As in the case of manufacturers' depots, one cannot 
independently assess the proximity of actual central 
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warehouse locations to those established by the various 
locational models to be optimal. Such an assessment would 
require information on the locations and turnover of all the 
branch stores in a chain. While information on store 
locations can be obtained from trade and telephone 
directories and, in some cases, from the retail firms 
themselves, it is virtually impossible for an outside 
researcher to obtain turnover data for individual shops. 
For some chains it is possible to get floorspace data, but 
shop floorspace tends to be a poor surrogate for turnover. 
Even if one could acquire turnover figures for individual 
stores, these need not correlate closely with the physical 
volume of goods passing through them, as the composition of 
branch stores' sales can vary considerably. 
Summary 
This chapter has examined the locations of grocery 
stockholding points at both the macro- and micro-level. At 
the macro-level, it was found that there is considerable 
regularity in the spatial distribution of manufacturers' 
depots. This is manifest both in the clustering of depots 
around a well recognised series of regional locations and in 
the order in which depot locations are added to a 
distribution system. The concentration of manufacturers' 
stockholding in particular areas has been reinforced by the 
recent pattern of depot closure. This concentration is 
likely to have the effect of channelling grocery flows along 
the network of arterial routes connecting these strategic 
locations with the main centres of food manufacturing. It 
also offers scope for the rationalization of grocery 
movements through the development of freight complexes. 
Multiple retailers' central warehouses and voluntary group 
wholesale depots are more evenly distributed and produce an 
aggregate pattern about which it is much more difficult to 
generalise. The trunk movement of supplies to these depots 
is likely to be more dispersed. For this, and other 
reasons (p 265) , the development of freight complexes would 
be likely to have less impact on the distribution systems of 
retailers and wholesalers. 
At the micro-level, a brief review was made of the range 
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of methods available to firms seeking to establish the 
optimum location for a distribution depot. It would seem 
that the enormous research effort that has gone into 
developing such methods has been inspired more by the 
intellectual challenge than by the practical needs of 
commercial enterprises. In addition to various analytical 
shortcomings, these models ignore many of the special 
circumstances that affect firms' final choice of location 
and are widely regarded as being impractical. It has been 
argued that by a collective process of trial and error 
industry has established a short'list of strategic locations 
which approximate closely to those identified by more 
rigorous methods as being optimal (Sussams, 1971). Several 
factors, however, constrain the use of these methods to 
simulate the spatial distribution of individual firm's 
depots. These include the difficulty of obtaining sales 
data, and the problem of generalizing about the relationship 
between the population of an area and the throughput of its 
distributive facilities. 
Notes: 
1. Transhipment and bulk storage warehouses are excluded. 
A contract depot may be represented by several dots where 
more than one manufacturer holds stock there. 
2. In this section the word "depot" will be used to refer to 
a "stockholding point". As several manufacturers may hold 
stock in the same contractor's warehouse, the term "depot" 
need not always refer to separate premises. One large 
contract warehouse in the North East of England, for 
example, holds stock for at least four of the food 
manufacturers surveyed. 
3. This excludes contractors' depots partly used by these 
chains. 
4. In the case of a "service area" (or "hinterland"), goods 
are distributed outwards from a central depot to dispersed 
outlets or customers. A retail "trade area" may be defined 
as an area from which a shop draws its customers. 
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Chapter 9 
Bulk Distribution from Factories 
The previous two chapters have examined various aspects 
of the physical structure of logistical channels: the number 
and locations of stockholding depots and the size of the 
areas they serve. They have outlined the static framework 
through which goods are transported. It is possible now to 
consider the routeing of flows within this framework. This 
chapter examines the bulk movement of flows outward from 
factories to distribution depots and larger customers, what 
might be described as the "strategic" routeing of primary 
flows. The following chapter is concerned with the 
logistics of local deliveries from intermediate stockholding 
points to shops. 
Logistical Options. 
The logistics of the bulk distribution of food from 
factories to depots (or direct to customers) were found to 
vary greatly, reflecting differences between manufacturers 
in the numbers and locations of their factories, the spatial 
organization of their production and their policies on 
direct bulk delivery. As the vast majority of the firms in 
the sample manufactured a variety of products at more than 
one factory, the routeing of product flows was strongly 
influenced by the strategies firms adopted for mixing the 
different product ranges into consolidated orders. The 
firms in the sample can be classified into three categories 
with respect to the complexity of systems of bulk 
distribution: (figures in brackets indicate the number and 
percentage of firms in each category. ) 
a) Single factory producing the entire product range: (3 ; 
10%) 
Under these circumstances, there is no need to mix 
product ranges and each depot is served direct from the 
factory. 
.ý 
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b) More than one factory, each producing the major product 
lines, but also specialising in the production of lower 
volume lines: (5 ; 17%) 
In this situation, the allocation of flows between 
factories and distribution depots depends on (1) the bulk 
transport costs on the various routes (2) the capacity and 
unit production costs of the factories and (3) the capacity 
and unit storage/delivery costs of the depots. In 
attempting to optimise this allocation firms' encounter the 
classical "transportation problem". This problem can be 
defined as follows: 
minimize: C= Tij. cij 
where C= total transport cost 
T= volume of flow 
c= transport cost per unit of flow 
and i and j denote origins and destinations. 
Various linear programming algorithms are available to 
solve this problem (Hitchcock, 1941; Hay, 1977). 
1 The 
practical application of linear programming in this context 
can be complicated by several factors: 
(I) The heterogeneity of the product flow: While linear 
programming can easily optimise the flow of the "major 
products" from all the factories to all the depots, it 
cannot accommodate the flow of specialist lines originating 
from different factories. - In practice, firms organize the 
mixing of these specialist lines in various ways. Some 
firms distribute bulk loads of these products from their 
separate points of production to each of the depots, 
effecting the mixing operation at the depots. Others use 
one or more- of the factories as a mixing point and trunk 
consolidated loads out to the depot from there. The 
logistics of these operations are complicated by the 
combination of "major" and "specialist" products on many 
trunk routes, to produce viably sized loads. 
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(II) The desire to maximise backhauls: To take advantage of 
backhauls, firms operating own-account vehicle fleets may 
route products indirectly via factories or depots. 
Merchant and Calcis (1974) have devised a form of linear 
programming that can make allowance for indirect routeing, 
though, their work may be criticised, firstly for its 
neglect of terminal costs and secondly for its treatment of 
vehicle capacity as a continuous variable. 
(III) Non-linearities in the transport cost function: As 
explained earlier the unit costs of transport seldom 
increase as a linear function of the size of consignment and 
distance travelled. This infringes the main assumption 
underlying the application of linear programming, i. e. that 
the functions are "linear". 
(IV) The combination in the same vehicle of bulk loads for 
depots and bulk orders for direct delivery to customers: 
Roughly two-thirds of the firms in the survey adopt this 
practice, though to widely varying degrees. Where this 
occurs a combinatorial element needs to be incorporated into 
the calculation of the trunk cost, as these costs are then 
shared between the two types of consignment. To make 
allowance for these multiple-drop, bulk deliveries in the 
allocation exercise would be extremely difficult, especially 
as the pattern of delivery is likely to vary from day to 
day. Nevertheless, as most firms stipulate a large minimum 
order size for bulk delivery (of at least a third of a trunk 
vehicle load) , it is likely that a maximum of two will be 
made at customers' premises in addition to the delivery to 
the depot. It is also likely that deviations from the 
direct route to the depot will be marginal as bulk 
deliveries of this type are generally only made to customers 
with premises in the vicinity of the depot. Were the 
deliveries to these customers regular in their scheduling 
and of constant sized consignments, it might be possible, 
with little loss of accuracy, to aggregate the customers' 
demands with that of the depot and simply assume that all 
the flow went to the depot. In practice, however, 
customers' bulk orders can vary widely in their frequency 
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and magnitude. 
c) Several factories manufacturing different product 
ranges: (21 ; 72%) 
Firms in this category adopted one of three strategies: 
(i) No mixing of bulk stocks. (6,24%) The only mixing of 
stocks was at the depots prior to local delivery. 
Customers wanting bulk deliveries had to obtain them from 
each factory separately by ordering large enough quantities 
of each factory's products. 
(ii) Mixing of stocks through inter-factory transfers 
("cross- shipment"). (10,34%) This allows some or all of 
the factories to hold mixed stocks and permits the 
distribution of mixed bulk -loads direct to customers, 
usually from the nearest factory. The mixed stocks are 
seldom dispersed evenly among the factories. Instead they 
are often concentrated at those factories that have the 
greatest output, largest storage capacity and/or most 
central location. 
(iii) Mixing of stock at one or more central storage points 
separate from the factories. (5,17%) The central mixing 
points are bulk storage depots. Some are used exclusively 
for the direct distribution of bulk loads to customers, 
others also serve as a base for local deliveries. These 
facilities usually receive supplies from all the factories, 
and thereby enable firms to dispense largely or entirely 
with inter-plant transfers. Central mixing points seldom 
supply local distribution depots as the latter generally 
receive their supplies direct from the factories. 
It is important to distinguish the mixing of stocks for 
bulk, direct delivery from the prior mixing of supplies for 
depots. Most of the firms in categories c(ii) and c (iii) 
do the former, but not the latter. They, therefore, use 
their local depots as mixing points for smaller orders. 
There are, nevertheless, some interesting exceptions to this 
general pattern. One firm (in category c(iii) ) which did 
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not make a practice of mixing depot 'supplies in advance, 
routed deliveries from its main factory to some of its 
depots via a second factory. This second factory acted 
merely as a "staging post" to enable the firm to operate its 
long distance transport more efficiently within the 
restrictions on drivers' hours. Another firm used an 
"intermediate" factory (which had excess storage capacity) 
as a storage and mixing point for supplies destined for some 
of the depots. Depending on their locations relative to 
the factories, some depots received mixed supplies while 
others did not. 
The spatial distribution of a firm's storage space can 
have a significant effect on the way in which it organises 
its bulk distribution. Three firms (all in category 
c(iii)), for example, had little bulk storage space at their 
factories. One of them only had enough space at the 
factories to store one day's production and so was forced to 
disperse their output almost immediately to stockholding 
depots. Most of this went to two of the firm's eight 
depots which had considerable bulk storage space and which 
acted as mixing points. The other two firms had greater 
amounts of storage space at their factories but still 
insufficient to permit the mixing of ranges or to 
accommodate the volumes of stock that would be necessary to 
support an extensive system of direct distribution. One of 
-these firms wished to increase the proportion of output 
distributed direct to customers but was being prevented from 
doing so by the limited storage space available at the 
factory sites. 
A simple distinction was drawn earlier (chap. 5) 
between direct and echelon channels. It can now be seen, 
however, that where a firm operates several factories 
manufacturing different products, the logistics of the 
distribution operation can be complicated by the need to mix 
bulk stocks. Goods leaving a factory need not be destined 
either for a depot or for a customer. Some may travel to 
another factory or to a central storage point for mixing 
purposes. Magee (1968) has suggested the following terms 
for these different types of movement: 
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"shipment" - direct delivery to customer 
"transhipment" - indirect delivery via distribution depots` 
"cross-shipment" - inter-factory transfer prior to bulk 
distribution 
The division of traffic between the direct and indirect 
(echelon) channels has been discussed. Attention now 
focusses on "cross-shipment" and the special form of 
"transhipment" involving the use of a central mixing point. 
Cross-shipment. 
Firms transfer finished products between factories 
mainly because this enables them to consolidate mixed orders 
for bulk delivery to customers. This has several 
advantages. In the first place, it raises the efficiency 
of direct distribution by reducing the number of bulk 
deliveries the customer receives. This permits a 
corresponding reduction in the amount of ordering and 
invoicing paperwork. It also makes it easier for customers 
to put together large enough orders for a bulk delivery, 
allowing these deliveries to be made with greater frequency. 
This improvement in service level, particularly for the 
lower volume lines in the product range, can both enhance 
sales and promote an increase in the amount of direct 
delivery. 
Against these advantages must be set several 
disadvantages. As cross-shipment disperses the bulk stocks 
of each product line, it increases the total volume of stock 
in the system. In addition to increasing the financial 
costs of stockholding, this also creates a greater demand 
for storage space at each of the factories. Cross-shipment 
also adds another transport link to the logistical channel 
with additional handling at either end. To the extra 
handling costs must be added the difference in movement 
costs between the delivery of unmixed orders direct from 
each factory and the more circuitous, indirect delivery of a 
proportion of the mixed orders. Where a firm operates many 
factories, cross-shipment can give rise to a complex network 
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of trunk movements. A complete system of inter-hauls among 
X factories generates a network of (X2 - X) links (allowing 
for directionality). This can create a large demand for 
heavy goods transport and prove difficult to organise 
efficiently, especially where directional imbalances in 
inter-factory flows make it necessary' to run vehicles on 
some journeys well below capacity. Firms operating many 
factories tend, therefore, to concentrate the mixing of 
products either at a few factory sites or at one or more 
central storage points. 
The impression was gained from the survey that many 
firms do not plan the trunking of goods between factories 
very carefully. Only a few of the distribution staff 
interviewed had readily available data on their firm's 
cross-shipment operations. Three of the larger firms 
confessed that their trunking networks were in need of study 
and probably rationalization. It would seem that with many 
firms the practice of transporting goods between factories 
has developed in a rather ad hoc manner. 
Over the past 20 years the demand for cross-shipment 
has been subject to two opposing forces. On the one hand, 
the formation of food manufacturing conglomerates has linked 
factories making diverse products into the same distribution 
system. Cross-shipment networks will have been extended to 
incorporate these acquired factories. The demand for 
cross-shipment has been further strengthened by the desire 
of large retail and wholesale customers to receive more of 
their supplies more economically in direct, bulk deliveries. 
On the other hand, the amount of cross-shipment is likely to 
have been reduced by the spatial concentration of production 
in fewer, larger factories. There have been several 
instances of firms closing smaller, often more specialist, 
plants and absorbing their production into larger factories. 
By concentrating the manufacture of more of the product 
range in fewer locations, these firms have reduced the 
number of nodes in their cross-shipment networks. 
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Product Mixing at a Central Location. 
The five firms in the sample that made use of a central 
mixing point3 offered a variety of reasons for doing so. 
There was general agreement that the centralization of bulk 
stocks at such a location permitted a reduction in inventory 
levels. It also streamlined the network of trunk 
movements. Two of the firms, for example, justified their 
use of a central mixing point on the grounds that the 
dispersal of their production in numerous factories made it 
impractical to adopt a system of cross-shipment, especially 
as flows on many of the inter-factory links would have been 
too small to be transported efficiently. Two other firms 
had acquired, as the result of a takeover, a large depot 
whose storage capacity far exceeded that required for local 
distribution. These facilities had, therefore, taken on 
bulk storage and mixing roles, despite the fact that neither 
were centrally located relative to the factories that 
supplied them nor the large customers they served. One 
firm was compelled to make use of a separate bulk storage 
facility by the inadequacy of storage space at the factory 
sites. Another operated a large warehouse dedicated 
entirely to the bulk storage and mixing of own-label 
products. The firm manufactured own-label products at 
several factories but in too small amounts at each to 
justify separate direct deliveries. Most of the own-label 
production was, therefore, mixed at a central depot before 
being distributed direct to customers. 
There are, nevertheless, some disadvantages in using a 
central mixing point. As there is little or no reverse 
movement of goods from this point to the factories, this 
arrangement can offer less opportunity for backhaulage than 
a system of cross-shipment. It is often possible, however, 
for lorries on their return journeys to the factories to 
deliver orders from the mixing point to customers on or near 
the route. The use of a separate mixing point also results 
in a net increase in the amount of handling required, 
because the proportion of each factory's production that 
would otherwise have been consolidated into mixed loads at 
the factory site must now be loaded onto vehicles and 
transported to the mixing point. 
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The extent to which the use of a central mixing point 
can improve the efficiency of the system of trunk movement 
depends largely upon its location. Ideally, it should be 
located at the "ton-mile" centre of the distribution of 
factories and those customers receiving mixed bulk orders. 
In the absence of data on factory outputs and bulk orders, 
it is not possible to measure the extent to which the mixing 
locations deviate from the mean weighted centres. However, 
as figure 9.1 indicates, only one of the bulk mixing depots 
operated by the firms in question appears to be located 
centrally relative to the factories supplying it. 
Even if the bulk mixing were done at the mean weighted 
centre, it is likely that this would generate a greater 
volume of freight movement (measured in tonne-kilometres) 
than an alternative system of cross-shipment. As seen in 
the context of local deliveries, the more centralized the 
system of distribution, the greater is the average distance 
to customers. The routeing of bulk supplies through a 
central mixing point will be longer and more devious than 
distribution directly from or via one of several factories. 
This is clearly exemplified by the firm whose cross-shipment 
network is shown on figure 9.1(a). As a result of its bulk 
distribution strategy, fruit canned at its factory in 
Blairgowr ie can be transported to the central mixing point 
at Spalding then-shipped back to large customers in Scotland 
as part of consolidated bulk orders. Although the use of a 
central mixing point is likely to increase significantly the 
distances that products travel from factory to customer, it 
will enable firms to transport these goods in larger, more 
efficient loads. It will be possible, therefore, to move 
products over longer distances at a lower cost per mile. 
Any transport cost increases that result from this 
lengthening of hauls are thus likely to be small, and 
possibly outweighed by the benefits of centralizing the 
mixing operation. 
summary 
It is difficult to generalize about the pattern of bulk 
grocery movements from factories to depots and large 
customers. This pattern is largely determined by the 
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nature and variety of the products a firm manufactures, the 
spatial organization of its production and its policy on the 
supply of mixed bulk orders, all of which vary considerably 
within the food industry. Almost three quarters of the 
manufacturers surveyed operated several factories producing 
different types of products and roughly 70% of these firms 
mixed stocks either by means of inter-plant transfers or 
the grouping of product types at a central storage point. 
In most cases, the mixing of bulk stocks was undertaken 
solely to permit the dispatch of large, consolidated orders 
direct to customers. The sorting of smaller, mixed orders 
for local delivery is- almost always carried out at 
distribution depots. As the proportion of 
manufacturers' output distributed in bulk loads direct to 
customers has risen, it has become increasingly necessary to 
assemble large mixed stocks. In most cases this has 
generated additional trunk movements among factories or 
between factories and central mixing points. In some 
cases, however, such an increase in bulk movement has been 
reduced or obviated by the concentration of production in 
fewer locations and/or the rationalization of product 
ranges. 
Given the diversity of most food manufacturers' product 
ranges, the availability of mixed bulk orders has clearly 
been a major factor in the growth of direct deliveries. 
The need for prior inter-factory "cross-shipment" or 
"transhipment" via central mixing points has, however, 
reduced the benefit of the "direct" delivery to the 
manufacturer, by making the routeing of products more 
circuitous, thereby raising transport costs, and by 
increasing material handling costs. These additional 
costs, however, must be set against the high costs the 
manufacturer would have to incur if, in the absence of mixed 
bulk deliveries, the retailer. required branch store delivery 
of small consignments. Likewise in evaluating the relative 
costs and benefits of an increase in these trunk movements 
from the standpoint of the community as a whole, one would 
have to take into account related changes in other parts of 
the distribution system. This wider evaluation is 
postponed to chapter 12. / 
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Notes: 
1. The application of linear programming in this context 
should be distinguished from that outlined in chapter 2. 
This earlier reference to the technique considered its use 
in the modelling of aggregate freight flows between traffic 
zones. It is more commonly used, however, by firms seeking 
to optimise the internal distribution of bulk flows among 
factories and warehouses. 
2. The term "transhipment" may cause some confusion. As 
used by Magee, "transhipment" refers to distribution via any 
type of intervening depot, such as a non-stockholding 
transit depot, a local stockholding depot or central mixing 
point. In this thesis, however, the more common usage of 
the word has been adopted meaning a transfer of goods 
between vehicles usually involving a disaggregation or 
consolidation of loads. A distinction has, therefore, been 
made between depots where goods are merely transferred and 
those that combine this operation with a storage and, often, 
mixing function. 
3. Central mixing points should be distinguished from 
"buffer stores" which cater temporarily for stock overspill 
from firms' factory-based warehouses. "Buffer" storage 
space is generally rented in public warehouses close to the 
factory to accommodate short-term peaks in the volume of 
stock. It is most used by firms whose production or 
product demand are subject to large seasonal fluctuations. 
In most cases bulk loads of single product lines (or a small 
range of products) can be dispatched to customers direct 
from these "buffer" stores; however, they are seldom used as 
mixing points for bulk orders. 
4. This factory has been closed since the time of the 
survey. 
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Chapter 10 
Local Delivery to Shops 
Areas Served by Stockholding Depots 
1. Manufacturers' Distribution Depots 
Before 'one can consider the routeing of local 
deliveries from depots to retail (and small wholesale) 
customers, one must examine the way in which customers are 
assigned to depot's. This assignment is simplified by the 
fact that these outlets almost always receive their supplies 
of a manufacturer's goods from only one of his depots, 
usually the nearest. Customers can, therefore, be assigned 
to depots by dividing the market area into separate depot 
service areas. This section will examine the factors 
affecting this subdivision of the market area and the actual 
zonal patterns that have been produced. 
Generally speaking, three factors affect the 
delimitation of depot hinterlands. The first is the 
logistical constraint imposed by restrictions on drivers' 
hours. As most food manufacturers' delivery operations are 
characterised by high drop densities and comparatively short 
"stem" and "inter-call" distances, the daily range of their 
delivery vehicles is constrained much more by the length of 
the driver's shift than by legal limits on driving hours. 
Whatever the nature of the restriction, however, one should 
be able to draw a "time-constraint boundary" around each 
depot. As discussed earlier (p. 120), the extension of 
deliveries beyond this boundary requires arrangements, such 
as the outbasing of drivers and the use of transhipment 
facilities, which can add substantially to transport costs 
and delivery times (Attwood, 1971). The time-constraint 
boundaries of neighbouring depots usually intersect, in 
which case the area of overlap is usually divided in 
relation partly to the capacities of the two depots and 
partly to their outward delivery costs. Given a uniform 
density of demand, a depot with a larger amount of storage 
and delivery capacity could serve a wider area. Where two 
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neighbouring depots have adequate capacity to serve the 
entire areas within their time-constraint boundaries, 
however, the intervening area is more likely to be divided 
on the basis of relative delivery costs. For this purpose, 
a "cost-equalization boundary" can be drawn using a method 
devised by Weber (1909) and later refined by Losch (1954). 
Iso-cost lines are drawn around each depot, connecting up 
points of equal delivery cost. The cost-equalization 
boundary is then interpolated between the points at which 
the iso-cost lines of neighbouring depots intersect. 
Several firms professed to using this method of partitioning 
the market area into depot service areas. Others were less 
specific about the methods they used. It is often found in 
practice that the two sets of iso-cost lines are widely 
spaced, allowing firms to vary the configuration of the 
cost-equalization boundary quite considerably without 
significantly affecting total delivery costs (Murphy, 1978). 
Firms often take advantage of this flexibility to make 
allowance for indivisibilities in vehicle numbers and 
drivers' shifts, thereby ensuring that each depot is 
assigned a whole number of vehicles and drivers and that 
these are fully utilized (Sussams, 1969; Attwood, 1971, ). 
Those firms which employ contractors to handle 
distribution in some areas should, theoretically, construct 
cost-equalization boundaries by comparing their own delivery 
costs with quoted haulage rates. Buxton and Quayle (1971a) 
have devised a procedure for delimiting the area served by 
an "own account" depot under these circumstances, and 
applied it to the case of Wander Foods Ltd (Buxton and 
Quayle, 1971b) . This practical application is rather 
exceptional, however, in that the firm in question 
distributed only from its single factory. Only three firms 
in the sample confronted a similar problem. The majority 
of the firms employing contractors operated several depots 
of their own and, therefore, had the more complicated 
problem of drawing a series of boundaries between these 
depots and the territories served by contractors. Several 
of these firms claimed that they maximised the extent of the 
areas served by their own depots, pushing their boundaries 
out to the limit of the daily delivery range. Some firms 
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argued, first, that the marginal costs of extending the 
delivery range were small implying a wide spacing of the 
iso-cost lines around their depots and, second, that their 
unit delivery costs were significantly lower than those of 
contractors. 
There were numerous instances of delivery area 
boundaries coinciding with the boundaries delimiting 
salesmen's territories (Magee, 1968). This is largely due 
to the fact that, as Smith (1979a, p46) observed in his 
study of the confectionery trade, distribution policy is 
usually "dictated by the need, or convenience, of the sales 
force". Many firms clearly prefer to have each salesman 
channel all his orders through a single depot and indeed 
often use depots as bases for local sales operations. There 
is evidence, however, of this practice impairing the 
efficiency of depot deliveries. NEDO (1967) reports on a 
manufacturer of "tinned products" which was able to reduce 
its delivery costs by severing the spatial relationship 
between distribution and sales, and allowing the size and 
configuration of depot areas to be determined mainly by the 
economies of the delivery operation. 
In most cases depot delivery boundaries were clearly 
defined. Twenty-two of the twenty-nine manufacturers 
sampled provided maps showing boundaries, though to varying 
degrees of accuracy. Most firms claimed that these 
boundaries were subject to very little change in the 
short-term and only likely to be substantially redrawn in 
the event of a major re-organization of the depot system, 
such as the closure of a depot (or depots) or change of 
contractor(s). The redrawing of depot boundaries can 
enable firms to make short term adjustments to their 
distribution systems in response to changes in the patterns 
of demand and accessibility (Beattie, 1973) Very few firms, 
however, make a regular practice of reviewing their boundary 
maps. Several firms admitted that they would like to 
redraw the boundaries more frequently but could not afford 
the cost in time and resources. 
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Variation in the Sizes of Deoot Hinterlands. 
One cannot examine the sizes of depot delivery areas 
without also considering the number of depots firms use. 
The more depots a firm operates, the more fragmented will be 
the pattern of service areas. In the earlier analysis of 
the sequence of depot locations (chap. 8) an attempt was 
made to idealise the pattern of zonal subdivision. This 
pattern was highly generalized, however, and, even in the 
case of firms operating similar number of depots in similar 
locations, concealed wide differences in the sizes and 
shapes of hinterlands in some parts of the country. 
In zoning their market areas for distribution purposes, 
firms do not attempt to equalise the population served by 
each depot. The logistics and economics of the delivery 
operation make it much more efficient to vary hinterland 
size and depot throughput in relation to population density 
and accessibility. Figure 10.1 shows that food distribution 
depots vary enormously in the amounts of population they 
serve. Whilst the average amounts of population in the 
hinterlands declines as the numbers of depots increases, 
there is a wide variation about the mean in the case of all 
the firms sampled. It can be seen, therefore, that 
hinterland size, measured in terms of population, is not 
merely a function of depot numbers. 
It is also related to depot- locations and to the 
particular way in which a firm delineates its hinterlands. 
The effects of these other factors are difficult to separate 
from the influence of depot numbers. Ideally, to measure 
these effects, one should compare the zonation of several 
firms operating the same numbers of depots. So few firms 
operated the same numbers of depots, however, that it was 
decided instead to compare the hinterlands of depots used by 
firms with similar numbers of depots. Six firms were 
chosen which employed between 10 and 14 depots (i. e. around 
the average number of depots for the sample as a whole) 
and had provided sufficiently detailed boundary maps to 
permit reasonably accurate comparison. It was found that 
these firms operated depots within 30 miles of each other in 
three areas: the North East, North West and South West. 
The hinterlands of the depots serving these areas are shown 
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on figures 10.2(a)-(c),, the populations of the areas listed 
on Table 10.1. It can be seen that in all four regions, 
there is a wide variation in the sizes and shapes of the 
areas served. Little of this variation appears to be 
attributable to differences in depot numbers, as there is 
little correlation between the numbers of depots and the 
measurements of hinterland size. It would seem, therefore, 
that even where firms- operate similar numbers of depots in 
similar locations, the size and configuration of their depot 
boundaries often differ markedly. The actual patterns of 
depot areas that emerges also bear little resemblance to the 
ideal hexagonal pattern postulated by Sussams (1969). 
Where a manufacturer distributes his goods to shops 
through depots, the spatial relationship between the shops 
and the depots will be affected by three factors: 
1. The number of depots the manufacturer employs 
2. The locations of these depots 
3. The delimitation of the areas served by these depots 
To illustrate the combined effects of these factors on 
patterns of delivery, one may compare the distribution 
systems of three large manufacturers of breakfast cereals. 
Although these firms employ similar numbers of depots and 
although many of the depots are in the same place, the three 
regionalizations of the country into depot service areas 
produce distinctly different patterns (fig. 10.3). Only in 
Scotland is there close similarity. In other regions, 
notably the North East and South West, depots in nearby 
locations serve hinterlands of markedly different 
configurations. As a result of these differences in the 
geography of the firms' distribution many shops receive 
supplies of their products from different areas. Fewer 
than half the 25 largest population centres receive their 
supplies of the three firms' products from depots within 30 
miles of each other. The firms differ particularly in the 
locations from which they serve the three major conurbations 
of Greater London, the West Midlands and South Yorkshire. 
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Figure 10.2: Hinterlands of Selected Food Manufacturers' Depots 
Located in Three Regions. 
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Differences in the spatial organization of food 
manufacturers' distribution systems proved beneficial (from 
the consumer's standpoint) in the 1979 lorry drivers' 
strike. As the strike was not uniformly enforced across 
the country, supplies of at least one brand of most products 
continued to be delivered to the shops (McKinnon, 1981b). 
The Delimitation of Depot Hinterlands. 
Some general patterns can be observed in the 
delineation of depot hinterlands in some areas: 
a) Presence of physical barriers: The alignment of depot 
boundaries can be strongly influenced by poor road 
connections across mountains and estuaries. Many firms, 
for example, have divided service areas in the North of 
England along the line of the Pennines (Murphy, 1978). 
With the bridging of the main estuaries since the mid 1960s, 
their barrier effect has been reduced, though it has usually 
taken several years for firms to adjust their delivery 
systems to the new patterns of accessibility in these areas 
(Cleary and Thomas, 1973). 
b) Effects of population distribution: The drawing of 
depot boundaries is facilitated by the uneven distribution 
of population (and sales). Firms commonly run depot 
boundaries across sparsely populated areas. The clearest 
examples of this are in the borderlands between Scotland and 
England, and in Mid-Wales. Eighteen of the firms in the 
sample had a depot boundary roughly collinear with the 
Scottish border. 
At the other extreme, many firms have split 
distribution to the conurbations, particularly those of 
Greater London and the West Midlands, between several 
off-centre locations, and drawn the depot boundaries through 
densely populated areas. Firms justified this division of 
the conurbation on several grounds: 
(i) A single depot serving these areas of high demand 
would be too large. 
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(ii) By employing several depots, they reduce the risk 
of the deliveries to these crucial areas of high demand 
being totally disrupted. 
(iii) Road congestion rendered travel across the 
conurbations slow, making it easier and more economical to 
serve them radially from several different directions. 
c) Inadequacy of London's road network: There was unanimous 
condemnation by firms in the sample of London's road system. 
The difficulties firms experienced in delivering goods in 
London encouraged the use of more than one depot in this 
area. Fewer than a third of the firms in the sample served 
London from a single depot. Of the "en that supplied the 
capital from two-depots, six located them to the north and 
south of the city within triangular areas between Radlett, 
Barnett and Hatfield, and Crawley, Croyden and Swanley, 
respectively. The importance of this north-south division 
was confirmed by the fact that eleven of the sixteen firms 
that serve London from more than one depot have a service 
area boundary running along the Thames. The limited number 
of bridges on the Thames coupled with the high levels of 
congestion on their approach roads makes this river a 
natural dividing line 
d) Effects of the trunk road network: One might expect the 
pattern of depot boundaries to be distorted by differences 
in the ease of movement across the road network. Following 
similar reasoning to that employed by Von Thunen in his 
theory of agricultural location, one might hypothesize that 
depot service areas will be elongated along the line of 
major trunk routes, as a result of a corresponding 
distortion of iso-cost lines and time-constraint boundaries. 
It is difficult to test this hypothesis, however, for, 
although there are numerous irregularities in the 
configuration of depot boundaries, one cannot be sure that 
they are the result of differences in the quality of the 
road network. It seems likely, nevertheless, that the 
northerly extension to Carlisle of the hinterlands of depots 
located around Manchester and Liverpool is associated with 
the fact that firms can supply Carlisle faster and more 
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cheaply along the M6 from Merseyside than over the 
significantly shorter, but inferior A74 route from depots 
around Glasgow. 
2. Multiple Retailers' Central Warehouses. 
The service areas of multiple retailers' central 
warehouses must be viewed differently from those of 
manufacturers' distribution depots because they generally 
contain a much lower density of outlets and only in a few 
cases do they knit together to give the retailer national 
coverage. If one delimits these hinterlands by drawing the 
boundary line through the branch stores most distant from 
the central warehouse, then the shape and size of the area 
may be distorted by a small number of these peripheral 
stores. One grocery multiple, for example, which operated 
both supermarkets and food halls in a chain of department 
stores, had most of its branches-concentrated in the South 
and Midlands of England, but had recently opened a new food 
hall in a department store in Stirling. It would not have 
been meaningful to extend the perimeter of this chain's 
warehouse service area from its previous most northerly 
point of Stockton to Stirling. The study of retail service 
areas must,, - therefore,, take account of the spatial 
distribution of branch stores. It was beyond the scope of 
this research to examine in detail the geography of all 
retail chains included in the survey. A comparison was 
made earlier of the cumulative proportions of branch stores 
at different distances from the central warehouses of a 
group of multiples (fig. 5.12). This indicated that the 
average distance from central warehouse and the spatial 
distribution of branch stores around the central warehouse 
can vary considerably. As one might expect, chains 
composed mainly of smaller supermarket and self-service 
outlets (such as Express Dairies and Foodrite) tend to have 
smaller and more compact service areas than chains of larger 
supermarkets (such as Safeways or Lows). It has been 
estimated that the areas served by food retailers' central 
warehouses have an average radius of about 60 miles (GLC 
Intelligence Journal, 1978). 
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This picture is complicated, however, by several 
significant anomalies. In the case of the larger chains 
that have grown principally by acquisition, the sizes of the 
areas served by the central warehouses can vary markedly, 
reflecting differences in the spatial structure of the 
chains that they have absorbed. One of these chains which 
had recently set up many large supermarkets and superstores 
used a two-tier system of distribution to supply shops of 
widely differing size. Only the larger central warehouses 
held stocks of the wide range of goods sold in the bigger 
shops. These warehouses, therefore, had effectively two 
separate hinterlands; one, of more limited extent, 
comprising smaller branch stores, the other much wider and 
related to the larger outlets. This arrangement appears to 
be exceptional, however, and can probably be explained by 
the fact that in the case of this firm the range of shop and 
central warehouse sizes was unusually large. Special 
consideration must also be 'given to a rapidly expanding 
chain such as Kwiksave, whose warehouse service areas have 
recently been in a state of flux, involving both an outward 
expansion into new sales territory and realignment of the 
boundaries between adjoining service areas. 
When asked how frequently they modified service area 
boundaries, most of the multiples (operating more than one 
warehouse) replied that this was done very infrequently 
("every few years" was a common reply) unless some major 
change occurred, such as a warehouse opening or closing, a 
new chain being acquired or an important transport link 
being improved. As in the case of the large food 
manufacturers, it has been uncommon for firms to make 
marginal short-term adjustments to service area boundaries. 
Central warehouses operated by the larger grocery 
multiples generally have more extensive hinterlands than 
food manufacturers' distribution depots. This is made 
possible by the fact that outward journeys from multiples' 
central warehouses usually take the form of large, 
consolidated deliveries to a comparatively small number of 
outlets. As few drops are made per trip, little time is 
expended travelling between shops or off-loading supplies, 
permitting long "stem" movements and pushing out 
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time-constraint boundaries. A more detailed comparison of 
the logistics of manufacturers' and multiple retailers' shop 
deliveries is made in a later section of this chapter. It 
must suffice at this stage to note that, while the 
hinterlands of manufacturers' depots and retailers' central 
warehouses vary considerably in size, the latter on the 
whole tend to be larger. 
3. Wholesalers' Depots 
Voluntary Groups: The major voluntary groups differ in the 
way they divide the country among affiliated wholesalers. 
Most have delimited- wholesaler "franchise" areas with a 
series of clearly defined boundaries. In many cases, these 
boundaries were fixed at the time when the voluntary group 
was formed and have subsequently undergone little change. 
Some trade areas have coalesced as a result of mergers, but 
generally these have left the perimeter of the joint area 
intact. A more complicated and extensive adjustment of 
boundaries followed the Spar-Vivo merger, to reduce the 
amount of overlap between franchise areas. 
One of the large voluntary groups does not give each 
wholesaler a designated "franchise" area. Instead it 
encourages affiliated wholesalers to compete for retail 
customers in the area of overlap between their depot 
territorities. In addition to intensifying the efforts of 
neighbouring wholesalers to recruit new retail members, this 
policy is also claimed to make it easier for wholesalers to 
alter the size and shape of their trade areas to accommodate 
changes in road conditions and the distribution of 
population. 
The radius of wholesalers trade areas varies between 20 
and 50 miles and averages around 30 miles. This makes 
their depot hinterlands significantly smaller than those of 
grocery multiples and large food manufacturers, except those 
with upwards of twenty distribution depots. 
Cash and Carries: The "catchment areas" of cash and carry 
warehouses differ fundamentally from the "hinterlands" of 
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delivery depots operated by manufacturers, multiples and 
voluntary wholesalers. Cash and carries are best regarded 
as "wholesale supermarkets" (Kirby, 1974) as the 
responsibility for transporting the goods purchased rests 
with the customer, who in this case is the small shopkeeper. 
It has also been found that around 70% of independent 
retailers obtain supplies from more than one cash and carry. 
one cannot, therefore, delimit the catchment area of a cash 
and carry warehouse in the same way as one delineates the 
hinterland of a delivery depot. Instead the allocation of 
retailers' purchases among neighbouring cash and carries 
would require the use of market potential models, such as 
those devised by Huff (1963) and Lakshmanan and Hansen 
(1965) to forecast the spatial distribution of retail sales. 
Although the relationship between independent retailers and 
cash and carries has not been modelled in this way, several 
studies have examined the factors that influence- the 
retailer's choice ' of cash and carry (Thorpe et al.,, 1973; 
Bates, 1976). It is beyond the scope of this project to 
extend this work. The main concern here is, after all, 
with the movement of groceries by manufacturers, multiple 
retailers and wholesalers in goods vehicles. 
The Routeing of Deliveries from Depots to Shops. 
The survey upon which this thesis is based was conducted 
at the upper levels of company management and concerned with 
the general strategy of firms' distribution operations. 
Very little information was collected on the "tactical" 
aspects of local delivery operation. Most of the 
distribution staff consulted did not have data readily 
available on the pattern of local deliveries, though many 
were able to provide estimates of the average level of 
vehicle utilization. These figures were of limited use, 
however, partly because firms measured vehicle utilization 
in different ways, but mainly because they gave little 
indication of the logistics of depot deliveries. It has 
not been possible, therefore, to analyse in detail the 
routeing of local deliveries from depots to shops. It is, 
however, possible using information collected in the survey 
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and drawn from published sources to make some general 
observations about the different types of store delivery and 
recent changes in their relative importance. 
Types of Local Delivery. 
Of the six possible routeing systems listed by 
McClelland (1966) (fig. 10.4), only three are found in 
common use in the grocery trade. These are (1) direct 
deliveries from production points to shops, (2) movement via 
an intermediate depot at which loads are consolidated for 
direct delivery to shops, and (3) round trips from 
individual supplier's premises (usually distribution depots 
rather than production points in the case of packaged 
groceries). Of these (2) and (3) are by far the most 
commonly used and tend to be organised at a smaller spatial 
scale than the direct distribution of bulk supplies to large 
retail outlets from factories. This chapter is primarily 
concerned with delivery types (2) and (3). These types of 
localised delivery may be compared on the basis of the 
following criteria: 
(i) journey length: This is constrained mainly by the 
limit on the number of hours per day a driver can work. 
The distance that can be travelled in a daily shift depends 
not only on the speed at which the vehicle travels but also 
the time required to off-load goods at each of the delivery 
points. Where the delivery is of a single consignment, the 
maximum distance that can be travelled out and back in the 
"driving day" will be the radius of the "time-constraint 
boundary". A distinction can be made between one-day 
journeys that lie entirely within a time-constraint boundary 
and those with longer stem distances that take two days to 
complete. The vast majority of grocery store deliveries 
are of the former type, but, as outlined earlier, some firms 
use transhipment via satellite depots (or sub-depots) or the 
outbasing of drivers to extend the service area of 
stockholding depots beyond the daily delivery range, 
especially in more peripheral areas with a low density of 
demand (Crawford, 1972b; Beattie, 1973). 
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Figure 10.4: Possible Route Systems (after McClelland, 1968). 
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(ii) drop density: (i. e. the number of drops per unit 
distance) This depends upon the spatial distribution of 
the outlets to be served. The greater the density of 
outlets, the shorter will be the average distance per drop 
and the smaller the deviation from the direct radial route 
to each outlet. The unit delivery costs tend to fall, 
therefore, as drop density increases. This has been 
confirmed empirically by Williams (1975). (fig. 6.4) 
(iii) number of drops per journey: This is constrained 
partly by the time limits mentioned in (i) and by vehicle 
capacity. Given these constraints, the number of drops 
that can be made on a journey will depend on the drop 
density, the consignment sizes and the times taken to 
off-load goods at each of the premises en route. 
A major distinction can be drawn between the direct 
delivery of a single consignment and the multiple drop 
journey. As outlined earlier (p. 112), it is common for 
multiple retailers operating centralized delivery systems to 
supply their branch stores with direct, consolidated 
deliveries, often of full lorry loads. In contrast, 
deliveries from manufacturers' depots are generally of small 
quantities taking up only a small fraction of the capacity 
of the vehicles. These consignments are almost invariably 
combined in mixed loads and delivered to customers in the 
course of a multiple drop journeys. Such journeys are 
inevitably circuitous; only the delivery to the first 
customer on the round is direct. The degree of circuity 
increases with the number of drops. 
Eilon et al. (1971) have examined the relationship 
between direct radial distance and minimum delivery round 
distance, using random distributions of customers within an 
area of given extent. Multiple drop journeys generate less 
vehicle kilometres than direct deliveries to each of the 
customers, and as the number of drops increases this 
differential widens. (This relationship forms the basis of 
Clarke and Wr ight' s "savings criterion" method of finding 
the shortest path between a set of points, which is 
discussed later. ) Although the multiple drop journey is 
more devious than the direct route to each customer, it 
dispenses with the individual backhauls that result from 
_, 
I 
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direct deliveries. 
The multiple drop delivery round and the direct radial 
delivery are not strictly comparable, however, as they 
d--Ffer in the sizes of consignment they can supply to each 
customer. A vehicle delivery to several customers en route 
will supply only a fraction of the full consignment, 
whereas a direct delivery could supply a whole lorry load, 
perhaps meeting the order in full. It will, therefore, 
require several delivery rounds to distribute the same 
quantity of goods as a series of direct deliveries. 
This point may be illustrated by means of a simple 
example (fig. 10.5). Depot A serves ten customers 
distributed 
, at equal 
d istances around ac ircle of radius r 
kilometres. Each customer demands ten tonnes of goods. 
The vehicles used for the deliveries have a maximum payload 
of ten tonnes and must always carry this full amount on 
outward journeys from the depot. Whole numbers will be 
used to simplify the calculation. The size of individual 
consignments must, therefore, divide evenly into 10, 
restricting them to one of four values: .l tonne, 2 tonnes, 5 
tonnes or 10 tonnes. Consequently, the number of drops 
per journey can only be 10,5,2 or 1. It is also assumed 
that each customer receives his 10 tonnes in loads of 
similar size. Within these constraints, it is possible to 
devise ten patterns of delivery, ranging from direct 
deliveries to a series of multiple drops of one tonne. For 
each of these patterns the total number of tonne-kilometres 
has been calculated and plotted on figure 10.6. It can be 
seen that tonne-kilometres are minimised by direct 
"radiation" and increase as the size of drop diminishes and 
the required number of delivery rounds increases. In 
addition to reducing the total volume of freight movement 
measured in tonne-kilometres, the consolidation of supplies 
in fewer, larger drops carries other important advantages 
which are discussed later. The system of direct deliveries 
is more efficient despite the fact that it usually entails 
more empty running by vehicles. Although this example is 
highly idealised, it demonstrates the general point that for 
a given depot location and distribution of customers it is 
more efficient to deliver directly in consolidated loads 
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than in a series of multiple drop rounds. 
In the light of these general, theoretical 
observations, one can now compare the types of grocery 
delivery currently operated by manufacturers and multiple 
retailers 
2 
Deliveries from manufacturers' depots are almost 
invariably multiple drop rounds. The number of drops per 
journey and their sizes can vary considerably, however. 
Only six manufacturers estimated the average number of drops 
on their local deliveries; these estimates ranged from 8 to 
20 and averaged 12.6. As might be expected, firms 
supplying larger numbers of outlets make on average more 
drops per journey. Although the average size of drop also 
varies widely, it does not appear to correlate closely with 
either the total number of outlets served or the average 
number drops per journey. Little can be deduced from these 
figures, however, partly because of the very small sample 
size, and partly because the firms differ in the way in 
which they calculate these indices. 
The logistics of the manufacturers' depot deliveries 
differ sharply from the consolidated deliveries the 
multiples operate from their central warehouses. For a 
sample of 18 multiples, the average number of drops per 
journey (we. ighted by turnover) was only 2.6. Eight of 
these chains reported that the majority of their ex-central 
warehouse deliveries were of a full lorry load to a single 
branch store. In the cases of the bigger chains operating 
large supermarkets, many of these lorry loads would comprise 
over 1000 cases. The size of consolidated drops is likely 
to vary widely, however, depending on the frequency of 
delivery, the proportion of supplies channelled through the 
central warehouse and the turnover, storage capacity and 
reception facilities of the branch. These variations in 
drop size are reflected in differences in the sizes of 
vehicle the multiples employ. As shown in Table 7.5, the 
size distribution of vehicles operated by the multiples is 
bi-modal. Roughly a third of them are "box-rigid" vehicles 
of around 16 tonnes gross weight, mainly for deliveries to 
smaller shops which, for reasons of low turnover, limited 
reception facilities or inaccessible location, are unsuited 
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to delivery by larger, articulated vehicles. About half 
the vehicles operated by the multiples are articulated 
vehicles capable of carrying the maximum permitted weight 
and used to deliver consolidated loads to the larger 
supermarkets. Most consolidated drops would be 
substantially greater than consignments delivered by 
manufacturers direct to the store. This is confirmed by a 
survey undertaken by the GLC of deliveries to a supermarket 
chain in the London area (GLC, 1975). This found that the 
size of consolidated drops from the firm's central warehouse 
averaged 740 cases as opposed to 26 cases for deliveries 
direct from suppliers. 
These differences in the number of drops per journey 
and average size of drop can be related to the differences 
between the multiples and the manufacturers in the number 
and sizes of outlets they supply, their degree of stock 
concentration and the size of the areas served by their 
depots. The multiples deliver to a much smaller number of 
larger stores. By consolidating supplies into large 
consignments, they can deliver to stores economically over 
long distances, thereby making it possible for them to 
concentrate their stocks in large central warehouses. With 
more dispersed stockholding patterns, manufacturers can 
often have depots closer to branch stores than the 
retailers' own central warehouses. The greater dispersal of 
manufacturers stocks and the smaller size of their depot 
hinterlands are likely to reduce the difference between 
their multiple drop rounds and the direct consolidated 
deliveries of the multiple retailers in terms of vehicle- 
and tonne-kilometres. The simple model presented earlier 
(fig. 10.5) to demonstrate the superiority of the latter 
type of delivery was based on the assumption that all 
deliveries would originate from the same depot location and, 
therefore, that the distances between this location and the 
customers remained fixed. In practice, however, 
differences in the nature of the delivery are associated 
with variations-in the average distances between depots and 
customers. This_ can be demonstrated by measuring the 
direct distances to a chain's branch stores from depots 
operated by a sample of manufacturers and comparing these 
316 
with direct distances from the multiple's own central depot. 
Table 10.2 summarises the results of such an exercise and 
shows clearly that, by operating larger numbers of depots, 
the manufacturers are able to reduce the aggregate direct 
distance from depots to branch stores. If distribution 
from all these depots were to take the form of direct radial 
deliveries, the retailer's system would generate much more 
vehicle and freight movement. To illustrate this point one 
might imagine a situation in which every branch store 
demanded one tonne of the products of each of the 
manufacturers in the sample. Were these orders to be 
supplied direct from the manufacturers depots, this would 
generate a total of 41,046 tonne-kms of freight movement. 
If these orders were consolidated at the retailer's central 
warehouse then delivered direct this would give rise to 
76,824 tonne-kms of freight movement, an increase of 87%. 
This comparison assumes, quite justifiably, that bulk 
distribution from the manufacturers' factories to their 
depots generates similar amounts of freight movement to bulk 
distribution to the retailer's central warehouses. It 
ignores the fact, however, that the manufacturers would 
combine deliveries to this retailer's branch stores with 
drops to other customers in a-multiple drop round, thereby 
reducing the number of vehicle- and tonne-kilometres per 
drop. It can be seen, therefore, that the greater 
centralization of multiple retailers' stockholding can more 
than offset the savings in vehicle- and tonne-kilometres 
made possible by consolidating loads and rendering 
deliveries more direct. This finding requires several 
qualifications, however. The evidence presented here 
relates to a single supermarket chain and small sample of 
food manufacturers. It is not known how representative 
these firms are of the grocery distribution system as a 
whole. The 86 branches of the supermarket chain in 
question (firm no. 6 in figure 5.12) are on average 
significantly further from the central warehouses that serve 
them (68 km) than the average distance (56 km) for the total 
of 482 branches operated by the sample of eight chains 
operating central warehouses whose spatial structure was 
examined earlier (fig. 5.12). Even this shorter average 
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Table 10.2: Depot Numbers and Distances to Branch Stores: 
Comparison of Multiple Retailer and Sample of 
Food Manufacturers'. 
Average Distance to 
No. of Depots Branch Stores (kms) 
Manufacturers: 1. 22 28.9 
2. 19 23.2 
3. 16 28.7 
4. 14 31.5 
5. 13 31.6 
6. 12 38.7 
7. 11 38.4 
8. 10 38.3 
9. 10 53.4 
10. 8 39.1 
11. 4 46.9 
Multiple Retailer: 3 68.0 
Source: personal survey. 
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distance for the complete sample of branch-stores, however, 
is likely to be considerably greater than the average 
distance from manufacturers' depots to these stores, still 
largely offsetting the saving in vehicle- and 
tonne-kilometres accruing from the use of consolidated 
direct deliveries. The consolidation of loads, however, 
permits the use of larger vehicles, which reduces vehicle 
kilometres per drop, enables firms to schedule the 
deliveries more carefully and economises on the handling of 
goods at depot and shop. Furthermore, given the present 
spatial distribution of manufacturers' and retailers' 
warehouses, the size of the differential in vehicle- and 
tonne- kilometres between the multiple-drop round and the 
direct consolidated delivery depends heavily on the 
efficiency with which the former type of delivery is 
operated. Much importance must, therefore, be attached to 
the particular route a vehicle follows on a multiple-drop 
round. The planning of multiple drop routes is considered 
in a later section. 
The Changing Pattern of Local Delivery 
Over the past 20 years the logistics of the local 
delivery of grocery products have changed markedly. The 
average number of drops per delivery has fallen while 
average drop size has increased and "stem" distances 
lengthened. Multiple drop rounds have declined in 
importance, to be replaced increasingly by direct, 
consolidated deliveries to individual outlets. As Smith 
(1979a) has observed, this trend towards greater 
consolidation of deliveries has been promoted both by shifts 
in the allocation of trade between marketing channels and by 
changes in the internal organization of firms' distribution 
operations. The multiples have traditionally placed much 
greater emphasis on direct, consolidated deliveries to 
branch stores than manufacturers and wholesalers, and this 
emphasis has increased as chains have concentrated their 
sales in smaller numbers of larger outlets with high 
turnovers and better reception facilities. The growth in 
multiples' share of the grocery market and their growing 
involvement in distribution "upstream" of the shop have 
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effected a major shift away from multiple drop delivery 
rounds towards more direct forms of consolidated delivery. 
As outlined in Chapter 6, the increased use of distribution 
contractors by food manufacturers and retailers has also 
contributed to the consolidation of deliveries; so too has 
the large number of takeovers and mergers in the food 
industry (Lorries and the Environment Committee, 1979). 
Meanwhile, shop closures and increases in minimum drop sizes 
have been reducing the number of outlets manufacturers and 
wholesalers must supply, allowing them to reduce the number 
of drops per delivery and increase their average drop sizes. 
By stopping the delivery of small orders and thereby 
lowering the density of delivery points, these firms have 
also been able to reduce significantly total vehicle- and 
7nne-kilometres (Mercer et al., 1978). By refusing to 
deliver small quantities, food manufacturers have forced 
many independent retailers to increase the proportions of 
supplies they receive in consolidated loads from 
wholesalers. Hall (1979) sees the use of wholesalers as a 
means of rationalizing the pattern of shop delivery through 
the consolidation of retailers' orders and supplies. In 
addition to promoting the consolidation of deliveries, 
increases in minimum drop size, by both manufacturers and 
wholesalers, have also made small independent retailers more 
dependent on cash and carries, thereby displacing a 
significant proportion of food movements from goods vehicles 
to vehicles used mainly for personal travel by shopkeepers 
and their families. 
Regardless of the means by which it has been achieved, 
the increased consolidation of deliveries has yielded large 
cost savings. These may be divided into a) savings 
accruing from the improved efficiency of the transport 
operation, and b) savings made possible in related 
activities: 
a) Efficiency of the transport operation: As outlined 
above, for a given set of outlets with given demands and 
fixed depot location, the consolidation of deliveries 
reduces both total vehicle kilometres and total 
tonne-kilometres. Furthermore, as this consolidation is 
generally coupled with the use of larger vehicles, economies 
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of scale in vehicle operation permit a reduction in running 
costs per kilometre and per tonne delivered. It has been 
found, however, that only around a third of the benefits of 
consolidation stem from reductions in vehicle kilometres 
(Foulkes, 1979). Most of the economic benefits arise from 
other related improvements to the delivery operation. 
Consolidation reduces "backdoor congestion" and thereby the 
amount of time vehicles spend queuing at shops. It also 
facilitates the scheduling of deliveries to shops and 
warehouses. In recent years, there has been a large 
increase in the number and severity of restrictions on the 
timing of deliveries to these premises (McKibb in, 1982b) . 
Retailers and wholesalers have been reducing the number of 
hours during the week when they are prepared to receive 
deliveries, and have in many cases implemented a booking-in 
system (Low, 1978). This has led to an increase in the 
number of "refusals" i. e. occasions when delivery vehicles 
are turned away (Bowen and Mundy, 1972). Access to these 
premises, especially those in town centres, has also become 
increasingly restricted at particular times of the day by 
local traffic regulations. In assessing the impact of 
these access restrictions, one must make allowance for the 
fact that the timing and duration of access restrictions can 
vary between neighbouring towns and even between different 
parts of the same town (Urquhart, 1976; Turner, 1978). In 
addition to all these formal restrictions, the movement of 
delivery vehicles in urban areas has also become 
increasingly inhibited by worsening road congestion. 
Approximately 80% of grocery deliveries are made between 8 
and 12am, when urban traffic levels are high (Robson, 1982). ' 
This road congestion makes journey times both longer and 
more variable. All these constraints have strengthened the 
comparative advantage of the consolidated delivery over the 
multiple drop round. By travelling more directly to a 
small number of outlets, a vehicle making a consolidated 
delivery is less affected by access restrictions and can 
adhere more closely to customers' delivery schedules. 
Overall, delivery costs per unit vary inversely and 
exponentially with drop size (McConkey, 1979; Williams, 
1975), making large consolidated drops much more economical 
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to deliver than numerous small, individual consignments. 
b) Benefits for related activities: The consolidation of 
deliveries can improve the efficiency with which the 
dispatching node (the depot) and the receiving node (the 
shop) are operated. As consolidated deliveries generally 
have a much greater distance range than multiple drop 
journeys, they enable firms to serve wide areas from 
comparatively few locations, thereby yielding economies of 
scale in stockholding, storage and materials handling at 
depots. The arrival of supplies in large, consolidated 
drops at the shops also makes for more efficient off-loading 
of goods, a reduction in the amount of paper work and 
greater security. Shop managers can also deploy staff more 
efficiently when vehicles arrive at regular, pre-arranged 
times, as is generally the case with direct, consolidated 
deliveries. 
Several reports by governmental and quasi-governmental 
agencies published over the past 13 years have strongly 
supported this trend towards an increased consolidation of 
deliveries (OECD, 1970; Pettit 1973; DTp, 1979; Lorries and 
the Environment Committee, 1979; Armitage, 1980). The 
report of the Institute of Food Distribution Working Party 
on Deliveries (1970) favoured a reduction in the delivery of 
small consignments direct to food shops and a large increase 
in the proportion of food supplies consolidated at 
retailers' and wholesalers' warehouses. In all these 
cases, support for increased consolidation has been 
justified mainly on economic grounds. In the mid-1970s it 
was recognised that there was a close link between 
consolidation and peripheral transhipment (PE Consultants, 
1975); for if transhipment depots were to be established on 
the outskirts of towns, these could serve equally well as 
consolidation points and break-of-bulk points. While there 
would be a clear economic preference for using these 
facilities for consolidation purposes, there would be 
environmental opposition to the resulting use of large 
vehicles for urban deliveries (Plowden, 1981). 
Considerable concern has been expressed over the past 10 
years about the increased use of heavy vehicles, 
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particularly in an urban delivery capacity (Civic Trust, 
1970 and 1979; Wardroper, 1981). Official transport 
statistics suggest that the heavier classes of vehicle, 
which were formerly confined to long distance trunk 
movements, have been increasingly used for shorter distance 
delivery work. They show that between 1974 and 1981 the 
average length of haul for vehicles over 20 tonnes (gross 
weight) fell from 91.4km to 70.7km, while these vehicles 
increased their share of the total weight lifted from 42.5% 
to 70.7% (DTp, 1982). These heavy vehicles have been 
widely deployed in the delivery of groceries to shops. It 
was noted earlier that over half the delivery vehicles 
operated by the grocery multiples in the sample were of 
maximum legal size at the time of the survey. Margason and 
Corcoran (1978) have shown how a supermarket chain can 
substantially reduce unit delivery costs, fuel consumption 
and total vehicle mileage by using larger vehicles (table 
10.3). Transport costs per ton were estimated to be 40% 
lower for 24 ton vehicles than for 8.5 ton lorries. It is 
likely, therefore, that there would be a strong pressure 
from firms in the food trade to use any new transhipment 
facilities for the consolidation rather than disaggregation 
of loads. 
The environmental consequences of increased 
consolidation are difficult to assess because some 
environmental costs, such as those incurred by air pollution 
and traffic accidents, are a function mainly of vehicle 
numbers, whereas others, such as those associated with noise 
and vibration, correlate more closely with vehicle size 
(Smith, 1977a). It has also been shown that the public has 
no clear preference for either several small vehicles (c 6 
tonnes gvw) or one large one (c 24 tonnes gvw) (Rosman, 
1976). Sir Arthur Armitage in his report on "Lorries, 
People and the Environment" (1980) acknowledges that "any 
environmental advantage gained from consolidation as a 
result of lower lorry mileage has to be offset against the 
disadvantage brought by the use of the larger types of 
lorries for consolidation". Foulkes (1979), nevertheless, 
argues that consolidation brings net environmental benefits. 
On balance the environmental objections to consolidation do 
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not seem to outweigh the large economic benefits, and are 
unlikely to precipitate government action to curb the trend 
towards more consolidated delivery. In the grocery trade, 
as in many others, there is still considerable scope for 
further consolidation of retail deliveries (Wilson, 1979; 
Lorries and the Environment Committee, 1979). It should,, 
nevertheless, be noted that, as established earlier 
, 
(P316 ), 
much of the consolidation of deliveries has been associated 
with a concentration of stockholding and enlargement of 
depot hinterlands. It is likely that the additional 
vehicle and freight movement generated by this spatial 
concentration will, in many cases, have exceeded reductions 
in vehicle- and tonne-kilometres accruing from the 
consolidation of deliveries. 
There are other ways in which the system of grocery 
delivery can be rationalised, however, which appear to offer 
less questionable economic and environmental benefits. 
These relate to the routeing of multiple drop deliveries. 
Despite the recent growth of consolidation, a substantial 
proportion of grocery products continue to be delivered to 
shops in the course of multiple drop rounds. This is still 
the dominant mode of delivery for many of the more 
perishable products and for products, such as biscuits, that 
have traditionally been marketed intensively at the retail 
level (Greater London Council, 1976). Although these 
multiple drop deliveries are generally made by vehicles of 
less than 16 tonnes (gvw) and, therefore, deemed more 
environmentally acceptable than the larger lorries used for 
direct consolidated deliveries, environmental, as well as 
economic, benefits can still accrue from a net reduction in 
the total distance they travel. Before examining ways of 
reducing the vehicle kilometres generated by multiple drop 
rounds, it is necessary to consider how these rounds are 
currently planned. 
The Planning of Multiple Drop Journeys 
In the case of multiple drop journeys, the search for 
an optimum route between a series of delivery points is an 
extension of the classical "travelling salesman problem", 
sometimes referred to as the "truck despatch -problem" 
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(Dantzig and Ramser, 1959). Since this problem involves 
establishing the order in which customers on a route are to 
receive a delivery, it is often called a route or vehicle 
"scheduling" problem. Sussams (1971) estimated that 99% of 
Britain's vehicle fleet was subject to manual route 
scheduling, using one of a series of simple and practical 
methods. -These generally 
divide the routeing exercise into 
3 stages (Webb, 1972; Sussams, 1971; Attwood, 1971; Menzies, 
1976): 
1. The formation of a "fixed" or "semi-permanent" system 
of delivery zones at intervals ranging from several months 
to several years. In most cases this involves dividing 
the market area (or depot service area) into zones or 
"bricks". The size of these zones depends on the density 
of demand. Although they are usually square or rectangular 
in shape, the aim is to have the zonal boundaries delineate 
discrete clusters of customers. In practice, this is 
seldom possible and, as a result, many of the boundaries are 
drawn arbitrarily. 
2. Daily route scheduling. The number of customers in a 
zone requiring delivery and the sizes of their orders will 
vary from day to day. The route planner will calculate the 
aggregate demands of a zone on a particular day and estimate 
the time required to deliver the various consignments within 
the zone. The aggregate weights are usually expressed as 
fractions of the maximum vehicle payload; the antra-zonal 
delivery times as fractions of the drivers' daily shift. 
Each vehicle is then allocated a series of zones in such a 
way that maximum use is made of the available vehicle 
capacity and drivers' time. By applying a few simple 
principles and his knowledge of road conditions in the area, 
the route planner decides in which order the zones should be 
visited. 
3. Intra-zonal routeing between customers (or 
"micro-routeing"). The driver is usually responsible for 
planning his movements within the zones, deciding in which 
order to call on customers and which roads to use. Where 
there are comparatively few customers in each zone, the 
route planner might recommend that they be visited in a 
particular sequence, though this still leaves the choice of 
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road to the driver. 
The success of this procedure rests heavily on the 
route planner's knowledge of all the circumstances likely to 
affect the movement of delivery vehicles in the area and the 
driver's familiarity with the local road network. It is 
acknowledged, however, that such a procedure is very 
unlikely to yield an optimum pattern of routes that 
minimises total vehicle-kilometres (Sussams, 1971; Attwood, 
1971). This is because, in the first place, there are 
inherent weaknesses in the planning of deliveries on a zonal 
basis. Even if zones are very small and zonal boundaries 
carefully interpolated between clusters of customers, this 
method is still inferior to one treating each customer 
location separately. The degree of approximation is 
increased further where zones are large and zonal boundaries 
drawn arbitrarily. Second, as the network of delivery 
zones is constructed on the basis of average sales data for 
each customer, and this network modified infrequently, firms 
cannot tailor vehicle routes to particular patterns of 
demand on a day to day basis. This tends to impair the 
efficiency with which vehicles and drivers are used (Drew 
and McConkey, 1981), and prevents firms from minimizing the 
distances vehicles travel on any given day. 
The obvious solution to these problems would be to devise 
an optimum set of routes each day in the light of the actual 
demands arising at particular locations. This would be a 
much more complicated exercise, however, and require the use 
of much more sophisticated techniques than most route 
planners have at their disposal (Sussams, 1971). 
Various algorithms have been developed to optimise the 
routeing of goods vehicles between a series of points 
(Christophides and Eilon, 1969; Eilon et al., 1971; Sussams, 
1971). These differ in their precision and computational 
demands. Having tested five of the main algorithms, 
Gaskell (1968) concluded that, in terms of their ability to 
approximate an optimal solution, "none of the methods 
considered (was) uniformly better than any other. " Over 
the past 20 years a number of computer packages have been 
developed, mostly on a commercial basis, to help firms put 
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these algorithms into practice (Mann, 1976; Robson, 1982). 
These packages differ in their method of optimization and in 
their geographical framework. The majority employ the 
"savings criterion" method devised by Clarke and Wright 
(1963). Some of the models use grid references and plot 
straight-line routes across continuous space; others plan 
optimal routes across a specified road network. More 
versatile packages offer a choice between these two 
referencing systems. 
Despite the large range of such packages available and 
the strenuous efforts of consultancy agencies to market 
them, they appear to be very little used by food 
manufacturers and distributors. A general -feeling was 
expressed that these models were unable to take into account 
the host of exceptional circumstances that can affect the 
route a vehicle takes. This confirms Sussams' observation 
that firms often regard the more sophisticated routeing 
algorithms as "abstruse and unrealistic" (Sussams, 1971, 
p26). The manufacturers in particular claimed that the 
computer packages could not cope with the variations in the 
pattern of delivery points from day to day. Several 
manufacturers contended that they were more suited to 
multiple retailers, whose pattern of delivery was much more 
stable. The managing director of one of the major 
supermarket chains has, nevertheless, declared that 
computerised vehicle scheduling is "wholly inappropriate to 
the food retailer" (Millar, 1983). One of the multiples in 
the sample had experimented with computerised route planning 
and obtained very disappo-inting results. The computer 
model in question had failed, after seven attempts, to 
improve upon manually planned routes. Many of the 
multiples' vehicles, however, make consolidated drops to 
only one or two shops per trip, making the routeing exercise 
elementary. A survey undertaken by the Institute of 
Grocery Distribution in 1979 found that of the firms in the 
grocery trade with a computer only 30% used it for vehicle 
scheduling (Robson, 1982). At the time of the survey, 
therefore, the vast majority of delivery routes were planned 
manually. 
In recent years, however, numerous refinements have 
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been made to the main computerised routeing packages and 
there has been a general re-evaluation of the role of these 
packages in planning delivery routes. It has been admitted 
by agencies promoting this use of the computer, that many of 
the early packages were over-simplified and impractical, and 
that consequently "the results were disastrous and resulted 
in immense resistance to computerised vehicle scheduling for 
many years" (Jones, 1976). The shortcomings of these early 
packages have been thoroughly documented (Jones, 1976; 
Menzies, 1976; Mercer et al., 1978); some related to the 
generalized distance and travel time matrices upon which the 
calculations were based; others to the structure of the 
routes proposed. By being peripheral rather than radial 
and frequently intersecting, these routes conflicted with 
traditional routeing practices and were criticised for being 
more sensitive to delays and apparently wasteful. They also 
resulted in work loads becoming less evenly divided between 
drivers. The most serious complaint, however, concerned 
their inability to make allowance for special circumstances. 
Many of these defects have been corrected in the new 
generation of computer routeing packages (Mercer et al., 
1978) , several of which can now be run on micro-computers. 
Being faster, easier and cheaper to use, these packages have 
become more suited to the planning of delivery routes on a 
day-to-day basis. It has also been recognised that these 
models should not replace, but complement, the route 
planner's judgment. As Robson (1982) points out, "it would 
be a somewhat dangerous, and rather naive, approach to 
simply program the mathematical equations into the computer 
and expect optimised answers to be produced". It has been 
suggested too that firms preferring not to use a computer 
package to redesign delivery routes daily can still profit 
from using computerised scheduling methods at longer 
intervals to draw up a general network of routes, around 
which actual routes can be planned manually to accommodate 
day to day variations in the pattern of demand (Mercer et 
al., 1978; Jones, 1976). As this scheme only optimises the 
general route structure at intervals of, say, several 
months, the extent to which actual routes diverge from the 
optimum will depend on the degree of variation in the 
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pattern of demand from day to day. The larger these 
variations, the greater will be the emphasis placed each day 
on manual route planning. If firms, therefore, are to take 
full advantage of the ability of the computer packages to 
optimise route schedules, it is desirable for them to 
minimize variations in the spatial pattern of demand. 
The most effective way of minimizing these variations 
is by delivering to individual customers only on "specified 
days". A customer might then be informed that he could 
receive delivery only on a particular day of the week and 
that orders would have to be submitted a certain period 
(say, 4-5 working days) in advance of this delivery day. 
At present, it is common practice throughout the grocery 
trade for retailers' orders to be submitted at irregular 
intervals. As manufacturers then promise to deliver the 
goods within a certain number of days of the order being 
received (in accordance with their "service level"), the 
timing of the order will largely determine on which day of 
the week the delivery is made. Much of the day-to-day 
variation in the spatial distribution of delivery points 
therefore stems from customers submitting orders in an 
irregular and uncontrolled manner. In many cases, the 
irregularity of the inward flow of orders results from 
retailers postponing the replenishment of their stocks until 
supplies are almost exhausted, thereby minimizing the amount 
of stock they need to hold (Harvey, 1982). This, 
therefore, has the effect of transmitting fluctuations in 
the level of consumer demand back along the distribution 
channel and impairing the efficiency with which deliveries 
to shops can be organized. Furthermore, by holding small 
buffer stocks, the retailer increases the risk of running 
out of stock before the next delivery arrives, and thus 
losing sales. 
By imposing more discipline on retailers' ordering 
habits and making service level guarantees conditional on 
orders being submitted a certain period in advance of the 
specified delivery day, manufacturers can exert much greater 
control over the distribution of points requiring delivery 
on any given day (Freight Transport Association, 1974). 
2 
This produces a more stable framework within which vehicle 
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routes can be planned (Bowersox, 1978), and makes it 
possible for actual routes on particular days to adhere more 
closely to the network of optimal routes planned on a longer 
term basis by computer algorithm. By implementing a system 
of specified day deliveries, Cadbury-Schweppes were able to 
reduce the number of vehicle-kilometres per case by 9.3% 
(Mercer et al., 1978). In the case of a brewing firm, the 
adoption of a specified day delivery system coupled with 
computerised route scheduling yielded a reduction in 
vehicle-kilometres of 10% (Mercer et al., 1978). It is 
claimed that the vehicle scheduling packages currently 
available can reduce transport costs by between 10 and 50% 
(Robson, 1982), though the actual level of savings depends 
on the accuracy of the existing manual methods and the 
variability of the pattern of demand. 
Despite these benefits, there is considerable 
resistance in the grocery trade to the use of computerised 
route scheduling and the implementation of a specified day 
delivery system. Much of the aversion to computerised 
route scheduling can be traced back to the failure of the 
early packages to live up to expectation. Some of it, 
however, reflects an unwillingness to rationalise the 
delivery operation in a way that would allow these packages 
to be applied more effectively, in particular by moving to a 
system of specified day delivery. Opposition to such a 
system comes mainly farm marketing and sales staff who often 
argue that, -)y"forcing customers to accept rigid timetabling 
of ordering and delivery,. it- weakens their company's 
competitive position and jeopardises sales. In many firms 
where marketing considerations dominate distribution 
planning, the fear of losing sales usually outweighs the 
desire to improve the efficiency of the delivery system. 
Research has shown, however, that retailers attach twice as 
much importance to the reliability of deliveries. as to their 
speed (Christopher and Wills, 1974). By enhancing this 
reliability, the specified day system can improve the 
service the retail customer receives. Also, by lowering 
unit delivery costs, it can help firms to support a more 
extensive network of shop delivery than would otherwise be 
economically feasible. The fears of the sales staff can 
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also be partly allayed by the fact that firms, such as 
Cadbury-Schweppes, which have adopted such a system have 
been able to maintain or improve their position in highly 
competitive markets. 
It seems likely, therefore, that the number of vehicle 
kilometres generated by the distribution of groceries to 
shops in multiple drop rounds could be significantly reduced 
by the wider adoption of the specified day system of 
delivery and more widespread application of computerised 
route scheduling. Futher reductions in vehicle kilometres 
might be made possible at stage three of the routeing 
process by giving lorry drivers more guidance on their 
choice of roads. Studies have shown that a large 
proportion of the routes delivery drivers follow across the 
road network are unnecessarily circuitous (Hasell and 
Christie, 1978; Urquhart,. 1976). As the number of drops 
per delivery declines and delivery patterns become more 
stable, it will become easier for firms to plan precise 
routes across the road network. This practice is also 
likely to be encouraged by the increasing availability of 
detailed computer models of the road network, such as 
Roadnet (Jones, 1976)j, and by the spread of lorry routeing 
restrictions. As much of the decision-making on the choice 
of route is currently devolved to the lorry driver, the 
actual pattern of vehicle movement on the road network would 
require more detailed investigation at the local scale than 
was possible during the course of this research. 
Implications for the Compilation and Analysis of Freight 
Statistics. 
Changes in the logistics of shop delivery also have 
important implications for the way in which freight 
statistics are compiled and the spatial pattern of freight 
flow is modelled. The compilation of these statistics and 
their subsequent analysis has always been complicated by 
multiple-drop rounds. Freight journeys of this type, known 
by the DTp as "intermediate journeys", constituted roughly 
26% of all lorry movements in 1967/8. In the case of these 
journeys, it is difficult to decide which point on the 
delivery route to regard as the "destination", and 
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consequently how to calculate the average length of haul. 
In the 1962 Road Goods Survey the destination of 
"intermediate journeys" was taken to be the delivery (or 
collection) point most distant from the point of origin. 
It was then assumed that the entire load was unloaded (or 
picked up) at that point. This would have had the effect 
of increasing the average length of haul and distorted the 
observed pattern of freight flow. In analysing this 
pattern of flow, Heyman (1971) "hoped" that most of the 
intermediate journeys would be accommodated within 
individual traffic zones, thereby minimizing the effects of 
this distortion. Despite this arbitrary and unrealistic 
treatment of multiple drop rounds, Chisholm and O'Sullivan 
(1973) were able to obtain levels of explanation of 62% and 
82% when they simulated the 1962 pattern of food movement 
using, respectively, gravity and linear programming models. 
These values were among the highest for all the commodity 
types examined and this Chisholm and O'Sullivan attributed 
to the fact that the movement of food is "characterised by 
short hauls and widespread sources and destinations" 
3 By 
comparison with other products, food has fairly dispersed 
patterns of production and stockholding and is sold through 
a large number of outlets. Since 1962, however, the 
spatial concentration of food production, stockholding and 
retail sales has considerably lengthened hauls and, as will 
be described in greater detail in chapter 11, reduced the 
number of "sources and destinations". This is likely to 
have significantly reduced the explanatory power of these 
models and if so, would raise more general questions about 
the practical value of freight traffic models whose accuracy 
is partly dependent on the spatial structure of the systems 
of production and distribution. 
Since the 1962 survey, the DTp has refined its method 
of calculating the average length of haul for intermediate 
journeys. The DTp now uses one of nine formulae to 
calculate the ton-mileage of these journeys depending on the 
permutation of collections and deliveries en route. This 
calculation of ton-mileage, from which the average length of 
haul statistic is derived, takes account of the length of 
each section of the delivery round. Where the vehicle 
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makes fewer than five stops, a record is made of the 
distance between these stops. Where larger numbers of 
intermediate collections and deliveries are made, the 
lengths of the journey segments are simply averaged. While 
these methods of calculating average length of haul are 
superior to the former method, one of the most commonly used 
formulae, that relating to a conventional delivery round 
where loads are dropped off at several points en route, can 
be criticised on the grounds that the value it calculates 
for the average length of haul varies with the number of 
drops. This is illustrated by the simple example of a 
lorry making a round trip of 60 miles and delivering a total 
of 10 tons of supplies at varying numbers of points en 
route. As table 10.4 shows, when one applies the formula 
in question, the average length of haul increases as the 
number of drops diminishes. This formula will, therefore, 
have to some extent translated the reduction in the average 
number of drops per grocery delivery into an increase in 
average length of haul as calculated for the purposes of 
statistical accounting and traffic flow analysis. 
It may be concluded, therefore, that neither the 
compilation of freight statistics nor the standard methods 
of freight flow analysis are sufficiently sensitive to 
changes in the logistics of shop delivery. This is 
particularly disturbing as this is an area of freight 
operations that has been undergoing major organizational 
changes and which is particularly intrusive in the life of 
the community. 
Chapter 11 will try to relate the changes in the 
grocery distribution system outlined in this and previous 
chapters to some of the general trends apparent in official 
statistics on the movement of food. 
Notes: 
1. No data was collected on the logistics of wholesale 
deliveries. 
2. This gives manufacturers similar control over the 
scheduling of retailers' orders to that which the central 
offices of supermarket chains exercise over their branch 
stores. 
3. The statistics Chisholm and O'Sullivan employed included 
all types of food, not simply groceries. 
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Table 10.4: Average Length of Haul and Number of Drops per 
Delivery. 
Formula applied where the vehicle leaves the base fully 
loaded, makes a series of deliveries and then returns empty 
to the starting point: 
TD x LM 
TM = " 1 + 
2 ND + 1 
where TM = ton mileage of the complete journey 
TD = total weight delivered 
LM = Loaded mileage 
ND = No. of drops 
Let TD = 10 and LM = 60, while varying ND: 
No. of Drops (ND) Ton-Mileage (TM) Average Length of Haul 
(miles) 
20 314 31.4 
15 319 31.9 
10 327 32.7 
5 350 35.0 
Source: Dept. of Transport manual (unpublished). 
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Chapter 11 
Recent Trends in the Movement of Food Products. 
An attempt will be made in this chapter to relate some 
of the processes observed in previous chapters to recent 
trends in the main freight transport indices of tonnes 
lifted and tonne-kilometres moved. Unfortunately the 
commodity classification employed by the DTp does not allow 
one to isolate the group of grocery products that have been 
the subject of this study. As these products account for 
only 40% of total household expenditure on food (Notley, 
1983), and as consideration has been given only to 'the 
movement of these products in finished state, it will not be 
possible to account for recent trends in the movement of all 
food products solely on the basis of the foregoing analysis. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that other 
sectors of the food trade have been experiencing changes 
similar to those occurring in týe grocery distribution 
system. This, therefore, permits some generalization on 
the basis of earlier findings. 
As only around 2% of the traffic of food, drink and 
tobacco products (measured in tonne-kms) is carried by modes 
other than road transport, the following discussion of 
trends in the movement of these products relates almost 
entirely to road transport. 
The Weight Lifted: 
Between 1962 and 1980, the weight of food transported 
fluctuated within a margin of 10%, but showed no obvious 
secular trend upwards or downwards (fig. 11.1) 
2 This 
variation may be explained with respect to three factors: 
1. The. total tonnage of food produced (or imported) and 
consumed (or exported) over this period. 
2. The number of intermediate "lifting points" in the food 
supply system. 
3. Statistical errors. 
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Least can be said about the last of these since the 
Department of Transport does not qualify its statistical 
estimates with information on standard errors. It is 
thought, though, that the sample size (of 20,000 
vehicles/annum making over 250,000 journeys/annum) is large 
enough to keep these errors within 2-3% in the case of the 
total volume of freight (DTp, private communication). 
Inevitably, the margin of error will be greater when this 
total is disaggregated by commodity type, but such 
inaccuracies are likely to be small relative to the 
variations in food tonnage carried. Attention therefore 
focuses on factors 1. and 2. 
1. Food production and consumption. 
Although the total expenditure on food (in real terms) 
has remained fairly stable since 1968 (IGD, 1982), there has 
been a gradual replacement of bulky staples by lighter 
processed and prepared foodstuffs (Halliday Assocs. Ltd. 
This has produced a net reduction in the total weight of 
food consumed (table 11.1). These food consumption figures 
cannot be compared directly with the transported weight of 
food because in its calculation of "weight lifted" the 
Department of Transport includes the following: drink and 
tobacco, exports, packaging and containers and compound 
animal feedstuffs. In compiling figure 11.2, allowance has 
been made for these additional products. This graph relates 
the weight lifted to the weight of these products consumed. 
There is little evidence of a stable relationship between 
these variables. Clearly, therefore, variations in the 
weight of food, drink and tobacco lifted do not simply 
reflect variations in the actual weight of commodities 
consumed. The relationship between these two variables is 
likely to be strongly influenced by the spatial structure of 
the food supply system. 
;!. The Structure of the Food Supply System: 
The above comparison revealed that the tonnes lifted 
figures far exceed the weights consumed. The ratio of the 
weight of goods lifted to the weight of goods consumed (or 
produced) was identified in chap. 2 as the "handling 
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Figure 11.2: Weight of Food, Drink and Tobacco Products Consumed 
and Weight Gifted onto Vehicles. (1962-100) 
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factor". A set of handling factors was calculated on the 
basis of the weight of food and drink products consumed in 
Britain or exported. Appendix 4 outlines how these handling 
factor values have been calculated. As shown on figure 
11.3, the handling factor declined by about 11% between 1968 
and 1974, but in 1975 it rose sharply. Since 1975, the 
handling factor has fluctuated around 5.2. This 
fluctuation casts some doubt on the existence of a secular 
trend, particularly over such a short time series. The 
Department of Transport's own calculations, however, suggest 
that handling factors have generally been declining, and it 
bases its freight traffic forecasts on an extrapolation of 
this downward trend (DTp, private communication). It is also 
possible that a decline in the handling factor is being 
masked by an increase in the weight of food and drink 
tcontainers and packaging. The handling factor calculations 
done for this study make no allowance for changes in the 
weight of containers, such as churns, bottles and kegs, nor 
for the packaging of individual products. As there has 
been an increase in the amount of packaging (Corcoran et 
al., 1980; PIRA, 1980), this would add to the "weight 
consumed". For a given number of tonnes-lifted, an increase 
in the weight of packaging would reduce the value of the 
handling factor. In the absence of accurate estimates of 
increases in the weight of packaging, it is not possible to 
, quantify this reduction. 
If one accepts that the handling factor is declining, 
then the most probable explanation of this trend is that the 
}number of nodes in the supply line has been decreasing. 
Broadly speaking, these nodes fall into two categories: 
(i) nodes at which the physical form of the product is 
changed as a result of processing, preparation or packaging. 
(ii) nodes at which the product is stored or transhipped 
between vehicles, but not physically altered. 
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Figure 11.3: Handling Factor for Food and Drink Products. 
1962-80. (see Appendix'4 for method of calculation) 
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(i) Production Points: Food manufacturing has undergone a 
process of spatial concentration in recent years. In the 
present context, it is important to distinguish between two 
types of spatial concentration. The first involves the 
concentration of- a single process (or set of related 
processes) in fewer factories. This might be called 
"horizontal concentration" as it centralizes one stage in 
the productive process (fig. 11.4). In contrast, the 
second type of concentration, which might be described as 
"vertical", assembles in a single location different stages 
in the productive process. Only "vertical concentration" 
would reduce the number of production points in the supply 
line and thereby affect the handling factor. A 
pre-requisite for concentration of this type would be the 
vertical integration of firms closely associated in the 
production of particular goods. Under common ownership, 
the various productive processes previously performed by 
different firms in different locations, might be brought 
--together in-large complexes. It appears, however, that only 
a small minority of mergers in the food industry have been 
of the "vertical" type (Parker, 1975). In this industry, 
high levels of vertical integration have been achieved by 
companies such as Ranks Hovis McDougall, Associated British 
Foods and Spillers French (Maunder, 1980). These companies 
are engaged both in primary processing and in the 
manufacture of consumer products. There is little evidence 
of "vertical concentration", however, in the recent 
experience of these firms. Although it was beyond the 
scope of' this research to measure the degree of "vertical 
concentration" in the food industry, one may tentatively 
conclude, on the basis of available evidence, that the 
spatial concentration of food manufacturing has made little 
contribution to the decline in the handling factor. 
(ii) Stockholding and Transhipment Points: Attention, 
therefore, focuses on the reduction in the number of 
intermediate stockholding and transhipment points. This 
reduction may be caused both by organizational changes in 
the "marketing channels" and by structural changes within 
the distribution systems of individual firms. 
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Figure 11.4: Horizontal and Vertical Concentration of Production. 
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Figure 11.5: Marketing Channels in the Fresh Fruit 
and Vegetable Trade (after Price Commission, 1974). 
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'1. Organizational changes: These are changes that affect 
the number and nature of agencies engaged in the 
distribution of a product and the relationship between them. 
New marketing channels may develop that bypass one or more 
of these agencies, or, alternatively, the volume of business 
may be redistributed among existing channels. Often these 
organizational changes are manifest in a reshaping of the 
physical pattern of flow. There is clear evidence of this 
having happened in some sectors of the food industry, most 
notably that dealing with fresh fruit and vegetables (Price 
Commission, 1974). 
The flow chart (fig. 11.5) illustrates the main 
marketing channels in the fresh fruit and vegetable trade. 
All these channels were in existence at the time when the 
Runciman Committee was investigating horticultural marketing 
in 1956. Since then, however, there has been a 
substantial shift of trade away from the secondary 
wholesaler and the independent retailer to the multiple 
green-grocer and, in particular, the supermarket chains 
(Duft, 1967; Barker, 1981). Flows along the more direct 
channels have grown at the expense of the less direct 
channels. In the 1970s, many large supermarket chains have 
become heavily involved in fruit and vegetable retailing. 
They generally buy produce in large amounts and deal direct 
with the grower. Supplies are delivered in bulk loads 
direct from the farm to the retailers' central warehouse, 
thus bypassing both the wholesaler's warehouse and the 
market (Wood Committee, 1983). Fresh fruit and vegetable 
markets have, therefore, suffered a serious loss of 
business. For instance, since opening in 1974, the New 
Covent Garden market at Nine Elms has been working well 
below capacity and is unlikely ever to recover more than a 
small part of its capital costs. As a result of 
organizational changes in the distribution of fresh fruit 
and vegetables, more of this produce in now channelled 
through fewer intervening nodes. This will have had the 
effect of reducing the handling factor. 
The meat distribution system has been experiencing 
similar changes in recent years, but to a lesser extent 
(Webb, 1972; Price Commission, 1975a). So too has the 
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distribution of compound animal feedstuffs, with an 
increasing proportion of feed being delivered in bulk loads 
direct from the manufacturer and less being distributed in 
bags through the merchant (Price Commission, 1978d). 
As explained in Chapter 4, the most significant 
organizational change in the grocery trade has been the 
growth of multiple retailing, principally at the expense of 
independent retailers and the wholesalers that supply them. 
This has not, however, resulted directly in a reduction in 
the number of nodes in the supply line, because the 
displacement of trade from independents to multiples has 
often merely diverted flows from wholesale warehouses to 
multiples' central warehouses. Nevertheless, in dealing 
direct with the manufacturer, the multiple creates 
conditions that are conducive to an increase in the amount 
of direct delivery. As this involves change within 
manufacturers' and retailers' logistical channels, it will 
be considered below under the heading of "structural 
changes". 
2. Structural changes: These occur within the logistical 
system of a single firm and affect its use of intermediate 
depots. It is possible here only to comment on the 
distribution systems of the manufacturers and distributors 
of packaged groceries. The dominant changes within this 
sector in recent years have been as follows: 
a) Manufacturers distributing an increasing proportion of 
their output in bulk loads direct from factories to retail 
and wholesale customers, thus bypassing their own system of 
depots. 
b) Multiple retailers receiving an increasing proportion 
of the supplies for small and medium sized branch stores 
through their own warehouses. 
c) Multiple retailers developing large superstores that 
can receive supplies in bulk deliveries direct from the 
manufacturer. These supplies bypass the retailer's central 
warehouse. 
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These trends have resulted in a diversion of flows from 
channels 1, and 2 in figure 11.6 to channels 3,4 and 5, and 
a general growth in the importance of channel 6. There are 
occasionally short-term shifts between channels 3 and 4, but 
these tend to balance out and, anyway, to not alter the 
total number of nodes in the supply line. On balance, this 
redistribution of flow between the various channels will 
have reduced the handling factor for groceries. 
It would seem, therefore, that the reduction in the 
handling factor has been caused mainly by the decline in the 
use of intermediate nodes in the distribution system. It 
should be recognised, however, that these generalizations 
about the 'reduction in handling factors and the processes 
causing it may conceal important differences between the 
various sectors of the food industry. Reference to an 
average factor for food and drink overlooks the wide 
variation in the handling factors of different types of 
product. For example, the handling factors for some fruit 
and vegetable products is little more than one, as they tend 
to be transported direct from farm to shop. On the other 
hand, some cereals are subject to so many different stages 
of processing and distribution that they may have handling 
factors of over eight. The scale of the reduction in 
handling factors is also likely to have varied between 
product classes. It is also possible that some of the 
reduction in the average handling factor is the result of a 
change in the pattern of consumption away from products with 
large handling factors (e. g. canned vegetables) to products 
with lower ones (e. g. fresh vegetables). One is prevented, 
however, from analysing differences in the handling factors Ei 
of particular product types by the system of freight 
classification employed by the Department of Transport. It 
offers no disaggregation, for example, of the large residual 
category, "other food, drink and tobacco", into which most 
grocery products fall. The calculation of disaggregated 
handling factors is further constrained by the 
incompatibility of the Department of Transport's scheme of 
food classification and that employed by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in its surveys of food ; 'I 
Fý ý 
ý' .. 
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1. Factory A. Shop 
2. Factory oa Shop 
3. Factory Shop 
4. Factory A Shop 
5. Factory U Shop 
6. Factory Shop 
Manufacturers Distribution Depot. 
Wholesale Warehouse. 
0 Retail Central Warehouse. 
Figure 11.6: Channels of Distribution. 
r 
348 
production and consumption. These official statistics 
offer little insight, therefore, into the structure of the 
distribution systems of particular product classes and the 
way in which these systems are evolving. 
The Amount of Freight Movement: 
Unlike the weight of food "lifted", the volume of food 
movement (measured in tonne-kilometres) has increased 
steadily since 1962 (fig. 11.1). As the latter measure is 
the product of the weight lifted and the distance moved, the 
divergence of the two trends must have resulted from a 
lengthening of hauls. Between 1968 and 1981, the average 
distance travelled by food, drink and tobacco products 
increased by 69% from 54.1 kms to 91.6 kms (DTp, 1982). 
Several . possible explanations may be offered for this 
lengthening of hauls (fig. 11.7): 
1. Expansion of the market area: (fig. 11.7a) If the 
location of the production remains fixed but the area 
supplied expands, the average distance goods travel to 
customers will increase. In penetrating new areas a firm 
may either generate new sales there or displace sales from 
existing local suppliers. Consumers may substitute goods 
transported over long distances from large producers for 
locally produced items. 
While there has been a great deal of geographical 
research on the trade areas of retail outlets, very little 
work has been done on producers' market areas (Watts, 1975). 
Most producers are understandably reluctant to reveal 
information about their pattern of sales. 
Most of the large food manufacturers in the UK were 
marketing their products nationally by 1939. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that much of the increase in the 
average length of haul can be attributed to the expansion of 
the market areas of the main producers of packaged 
groceries. There have, nevertheless, been some instances 
of food and drink manufacturers extending their market areas 
over the . period 
in question: 
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Figure 11.7: 
SPATIAL PROCESSES CONTRIBUTING TO AN AVERAGE LENGTHENING OF HAULS 
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(i) The larger brewers (Corcoran et al. , 1980) 
and a major manufacturer of crisps and snacks (Walkers) have 
considerably widened the areas to -which they distribute 
their products. 
(ii) The rapid growth of multiple retailing and 
the increased involvement of the multiples in the 
distribution of goods to their shops has made it easier for 
small producers to gain access to a wider market. It is no 
longer necessary for a producer to establish a costly system 
of shop delivery to ensure wide market coverage. Goods 
trunked to a multiple's central warehouse(s) can be 
distributed by the retailer to branch stores throughout the 
country. Indeed, some multiples partly justify operating 
central warehouses on the grounds that this enables them to 
expand their ranges by acquiring the products of suppliers, 
often on an own-label basis, that are too small to provide 
direct delivery to branch stores. This also helps them 
reduce their dependence on larger suppliers and thereby 
strengthen their bargaining position vis a vis these firms. 
The opportunity of delivering bulk loads direct to retail 
central warehouses has been a particularly important factor 
in the growth of many producers of frozen foods. 
2. Redistribution of sales within-the market area: (fig. 
11.7b) Within a market area of given extent, sales of a 
firm's products may be redistributed away from the point of 
supply, perhaps as a result of changes in tastes or income 
levels in different parts of the country or spatial 
variations in the demand for new product lines or in the 
strength of competition. This would tend to increase the 
average length of haul within a given market area. It is 
virtually impossible, given the confidentiality of sales 
data, to examine changes in the pattern of firms' sales. 
It seems unlikely, however, that there will have been any 
significant net redistribution of sales away from the main 
concentrations of population and production. 
f 
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3. Relocation of production away from the main 
concentrations of demand: (fig. 11.7c) The relocation of a 
factory to a point more distant form the weighted centre of 
its market area will also increase the average distance 
travelled by each unit of output. Such relocation has been 
encouraged by Government regional policy (DTp, 1979). Since 
1972, the food, drink and tobacco industries have received 
roughly 10% (by value) of regional development grants (Dept. 
of Industry, 1982), a proportion in line with their share of 
total manufacturing employment (Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, 1983). In its evidence to the Armitage Inquiry, 
the Freight Transport Association (1979) identified regional 
development as an important factor in the lengthening of 
lorry journeys and it suggested that the costs associated 
with this additional lorry movement should be set against 
the benefits of regional development. The Association cites 
the example of Carrington-Viyella, which closed a shirt 
factory in London and, in response to regional policy 
incentives, transferred production to a new 'factory in 
Londonderry. No similar examples were encountered of firms 
in the food industry relocating their production in this 
way. There were instances, however, of firms setting up 
branch plants in assisted areas which complemented rather 
than replaced existing factories (Watts, 1982). The Kellogg 
factory in Wrexham and Kraft factory at Haverford West are 
examples of branch plants attracted to assisted areas by 
regional policy measures. The effect of the establishment of 
a branch plant on average length of haul depends on the 
nature of its production. If it produces similar goods to 
those of the parent factory, then it can distribute these 
goods - to the surrounding area at closer range than the 
parent factory. The resulting division of the market area 
between the factories would have the effect of reducing the 
average length of haul. Where different products are 
manufactured at the branch plant and from there distributed 
nationally, the peripheral location of this plant relative 
to the main concentration of demand will cause delivery 
distances to be greater than they would have been had the 
firm merely expanded on its original, more centrally located 
site. The opening of the branch plant in a peripheral area 
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can also lengthen the firm's supply linkages. As little 
information was collected during the course of this research 
on the spatial organization of food processing, it is not 
possible here to assess the extent to which a redistribution 
of manufacturing capacity in the food industry has 
contributed to a lengthening of freight hauls. 
= 4. Spatial concentration of production, storage and retail 
sales: (fig. 11.7d) Where a firm reduces the number of 
points from which it serves its market area, the average 
distance between supply points and customers will increase. 
This is usually considered to be the main reason for the 
lengthening of hauls. The 1976 Consultative Document on 
Transport Policy identified the "growing concentration of 
industry" as "probably the chief contributor" to the 
increase in the average length of haul (DTp, 1976, p16). 
It observed that "there has been a trend away from local 
factories supplying the local markets towards fewer, larger 
factories supplying the whole country. " Corcoran et al 
(1980) and the Armitage Report acknowledge that the spatial 
concentration of stockholding has also played an important 
part in this process. Also, as outlined in chapter 10, the 
concentration of grocery sales in larger retail outlets has 
been accompanied by changes in the logistics of shop 
delivery that have resulted in an average lengthening of 
hauls. Overall, it has become conventional wisdom to 
attribute the lengthening of freight journeys to the spatial 
concentration of economic activity, often to the exclusion 
of other possible factors. 
Concentration of production. 
Census of Production figures show that between 1958 and 
1978, the number of food manufacturing establishments fell 
by 26% (from 9390 to 6937). Using the number of employees 
as a measure of establishment size, it appears that the 
overall reduction in the number of plants is the result of a 
redistribution of production from small units to large (fig. 
11.8). The degree to which production has been 
concentrated has varied widely amongst different sections of 
the food, drink and tobacco industry. A high degree of 
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concentration has occurred in the brewing industry. s'.. 
Although beer production increased by roughly 50% between 
1958 and '1973, the number of breweries decreased over this 
period by 67%. It has been estimated that this 
centralization in the brewing industry increased the 
distance travelled by the average unit of beer by a factor 
of between two and three (GLC, 1978). 
The correlation between the concentration of production 
and the average length of haul cannot be tested 
statistically for disaggregated product groups as the Census 
of Production and Department of Transport employ different 
systems of commodity classification. 
The concentration of production most likely to increase 
the length of haul would be that of the "horizontal" type, 
where similar processes are assembled in fewer locations and 
undertaken on a larger scale. This type of concentration 
has been promoted in the 1960s and 1970s by the numerous 
mergers of food manufacturers (Maunder, 1980). Between 
1969 and 1973, for example there were approximately 100 such 
mergers (Development Analysts Ltd., 1975) It was a common 
occurrence for mergers to be followed by a rationalization 
of production in fewer, larger plants. This merger 
activity and subsequent restructuring has helped to 
concentrate a high proportion of the total production of 
some types of food in a few firms and a relatively small 
number of factories. Using Census of Production figures, 
it is possible to measure the extent to which production has 
become concentrated in the plants of the five largest 
manufacturers in the various sectors of the food, drink and 
tobacco industry. This can be expressed as a concentration 
index: 
Proportion of establishments operated 
Concentration = by the five largest producers 
Index Proportion of net output produced by 
the five largest producers 
Table 11.2 presents concentration indices for the main 
classes of food product in 1970 and 1978. A reduction in 
this index indicates an increase in the proportion of net 
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Table 11.2: Concentration Indices for the Manufacture of 
Food,, Drink and Tobacco Products. 
1970 1978 
Grain Milling 0.187 0.192 
Bread and Flour 
Confectionery 0.339 0.165 
Biscuits 0.270 0.221 
Bacon-curing etc. 0.121 0.080 
Milk and Milk 
Products 0.372 0.194 
Sugar 0.704 0.643 
Cocoa, Chocolate 
and Sugar Confectionery 0.095 0.037 
Fruit and Vegetable 
Products 0.148 0.094 
Animal and Poultry 
Products 0.155 0.189 
Vegetable and 
Animal Oil 0.200 0.343 
Margarine 0.351 0.316 
Starch and Misc. 
Foodstuffs'' 0.165 0.130 
Brewing and 
Malting 0.225 0.307 
Soft Drinks 0.176 0.129 
Spirits and 
Distilling 0.350 0.409 
British -Wine 
and Perry 0.273 0.253 
Tobacco 0.517 0.587 
Sources: Censuses of Pr oduction 1970 and 1978. 
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output concentrated in the factories of the five largest 
producers. Although the share held by these companies may 
have become more concentrated in fewer factories, these 
firms' share of total net output could have declined, in 
which case production need not have become more concentrated 
for the industry as a whole. In only six of the seventeen 
sectors, however, did the top five firms' share diminish. 
-, Eleven out of the seventeen sectors recorded a decline in 
the concentration index. The decline was most marked in 
the case of the processing of foods for final consumption. 
It is generally agreed that the principal reason for 
this concentration of production has been the desire by food 
manufacturers to obtain greater economies of scale. Little 
empirical work has been done, however, on the nature and 
extent of these scale economies (Maunder, 1980). 
Concentration of Stockholdin 
Although official statistics exist on the distribution 
of warehouse space and stock levels within the economy, 
these do not allow one to monitor the spatial concentration 
of stockholding. Data compiled in the course of this 
research, however, has shown that within the grocery sector, 
stockholding has become much more concentrated (table 7.2), 
partly as a result of trade shifting towards distributive 
agencies that typically operate more centralized storage 
systems and partly because there has been a strong tendency 
for producers and distributors to concentrate stockholding 
within their individual storage systems. Several factors 
have promoted this process of spatial concentration. 
i) Desire to reduce the total amount of stock held, thereb 
releasing working capital: This has been greatly 
strengthened in the 1970s by the high level of interest 
rates coupled with frequent liquidity crises. In the 1970s 
interest rates have become increasingly volatile (fig. 11.9) 
and on several occasions have soared to levels more than 
double the prevailing levels of the 1960s. As the 
financial cost of stockholding is closely related to 
interest rates, this has exerted a strong pressure on firms 
to minimise their stockholding. Much short-term destocking 
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Figure 11.9: Variations in Interest Rates, 1966-81. 
(source: Central Statistical Office 
"Abstract of Statistics". ) 
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in times of economic crises, such as the sharp reduction in 
the stock of food, drink and tobacco products in 1975, 
involves the depletion of stocks within existing premises. 
High and fluctuating interest rates also encourage a 
long-term reduction in stock levels, such as can be achieved 
by concentrating stock in fewer locations. 
ii) Economies of scale in storage: As explained in Chap. 7, 
the unit costs of storage diminish as warehouse size 
increases (Powell, 1976; Williams, 1975). Advances in the 
methods of warehouse construction and the development of 
improved handling and stock control systems have been 
augmenting these scale economies (Thorne, 1977; Rudd, 1979). 
These changes have produced a realignment of the 
stockholding/ storage curve shown on figure 7.2, tilting it 
upwards and to the left. Had the transport cost curve 
remained unchanged, this realignment of the 
stockholding/storage curve alone would have increased the 
optimum degree of stock concentration. Improvements in the 
transport system (to roads, vehicles and handling methods) 
have, however, reinforced this tendency. By increasing the 
distance that can be travelled in the "driving day". they 
have relaxed the logistical constraint that limits the size 
of area a depot can efficiently serve and hence the degree 
of stock concentration. In economic terms, they have 
reduced the unit cost of transport and thereby lessened the 
transport cost penalty resulting from the concentration of 
stock. These transport improvements have had the effect of 
displacing the transport cost curve downward and reducing 
its slope. This has also affected the trade-off between the 
two cost elements, further reducing the optimum number of 
depots. 
It is likely that the optimum number of production 
facilities has also been reduced by a similar set of forces. 
The optimum patterns of production and stockholding have 
therefore become more spatially concentrated. Although 
these more concentrated patterns generate a greater volume 
of freight movement, the real cost of transport per unit has 
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fallen to a level at which the cost of this additional 
movement is more than offset by scale economies in the two 
activities. The savings accruing from transport 
improvements have not been directly deducted from the total 
transport bill. They have instead been largely 
internalised in more efficient patterns of production and 
stockholding? As the Freight Transport Association (1979) 
has stated, "more freight movement, and greater expenditure 
on freight has been the price of achieving greater overall 
economies in the total industrial process, with the 
objective of meeting consumer demand at minimum overall 
cost" (p9). Between 1963 and 1968, for example, food 
manufacturers' transport costs per tonne-kilometre fell (in 
real terms) by about 12% (Censuses of Production, 1963 and 
1968) ? This cost reduction more than offset the 9% increase 
in the average length of haul over this period. Transport 
costs, nevertheless, rose as a proportion of net output over 
this period in ten of the seventeen classes of food, drink 
and tobacco products (fig. 11.10). Only in the case of 
53 fruit and vegetable products did it fall by a significant 
margin. 
It is also important to examine the structure of these 
freight transport costs. The costs have a "terminal" 
component, which is fixed for each journey and a "movement" 
component which varies with distance. As only the latter 
increases with distance, total transport costs taper as 
journey length increases (Chisholm, 1971). Table 11.3 
expresses terminal costs as a% of total road transport 
costs for six classes of food product over the average 
distances they are moved. In every case terminal costs 
constitute more than half the total transport costs, and for 
the residual category of "other foods including fats and 
oils", which contains most processed foods, they represent 
over 70%. Table 11.4 shows how the costs of transporting 
the six classes of food over distances 25% greater than 
their average length of haul would increase by much less 
than 25%; in fact, by only 7.4% in the case of the "other 
foods" category. It is possible too that transport 
improvements may have reduced movement costs more than 
terminal costs and produced an even greater tapering of the 
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Figure 11.10: Transport Cost: Net Output Ratio'for Food, Drink 
" and Tobacco Products, 1963 and 1968. 
(source: Census of Production. ) 
Transport Cost as a% of Net Output in 1963 
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Table 11.3: Relative Size of Terminal Costs for Six Classes 
of Food Product (1966-8): 
Average Length Terminal Costs as a% of 
Product Class of Haul (ALH) Total Transport costs 
(kms) (at ALH) 
Cereals 64.8 53% 
Animal Feeding 
" Stuffs 60.3 61% 
Beverages 55.7 62% 
Flour 81.8 69% 
Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetables 48.5 69% 
Other Foods (*) 55.2 71% 
(*) incl. oils, fats and tabacco, excl. meat, fish, poultry, 
dairy produce and eggs. 
Sources; Chisholm (1971), unpublished DTp Statistics from 
1967-8 Road Goods Survey. 
Table 11.4: Effect on Transport Costs of a 25% Increase in 
Average Length of Haul. 
product Class % Change in Total Transport Cost 
Cereals +11.2 
Fresh Fruit and 
Vegetables +7.8 
Beverages +9.6 
Flour +7.9 
Animal Feeding 
Stuffs +9.7 
Other Foods (*) +7.4 
(*) see corresponding note for Table 11.3 
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total transport cost curve. Distance has, therefore, had a 
comparatively small and diminishing part to play in 
determining total transport costs. This may further help 
to explain the apparent willingness of manufacturers and 
distributors to rearrange their production and stockholding 
into spatial patterns that require freight movements over 
longer distances. 
Furthermore, as terminal costs represent a large 
proportion of the total cost of transporting food products, 
this gives their producers and distributors a strong 
incentive to minimise the number of nodes through which they 
pass and thereby exerts a downward pressure on their 
handling factor. Savings in terminal costs are also a 
valuable supplement to the other benefits accruing from the 
concentration of production and stockholding in fewer, 
larger premises. 
Concentration of Retail Sales 
The relationship between the spatial concentration of 
grocery retailing and the lengthening of freight journeys is 
less direct, but still worth noting. Between 1971 and 
1981, the total number of grocery stores declined by 41%, 
while the volume of grocery sales increased slightly 
(Institute of Grocery Distribution, 1982). The closure of 
large numbers of smaller shops has been accompanied by the 
opening of numerous large supermarkets and superstores. It 
has been estimated that, as a result of these changes, the 
average size of supermarket increased by 50% between 1977 
and 1981 (Harvey, 1982). The main effect of this spatial 
concentration has been to increase the average distance the 
consumer must transport the groceries he/she purchases, 
thereby generating additional "freight movement" by vehicles 
used principally for personal travel, which is not reflected 
in official transport statistics. As it is estimated that 
the average family of four takes home roughly 50 kg of food 
per week (Dawson, 1983), even marginal increases in the 
length of shopping trips can generate considerable amounts 
of this "latent" freight movement by personal modes of 
transport. 
The spatial concentration of retail grocery sales has 
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promoted an increase in the average length of haul in three 
ways. First, as the turnover of retail outlets has risen, 
it has been possible to deliver supplies in larger loads, 
especially where these loads are consolidated at the 
warehouses of multiple retailers, wholesalers or 
distribution contractors. These larger loads can be 
distributed more economically over longer distances, 
permitting a greater concentration of stockholding higher up 
the logistical channel. Second, since larger stores can 
receive supplies in greater bulk, it has been possible to 
supply them more directly, thereby reducing the need for 
products to be channelled through intermediate nodes. As 
will be discussed in more detail in 6. below, the 
elimination of an intermediate node in a logistical channel 
can lengthen the freight journey. Third, as was explained 
in Chapter 10, the DTp's main formula for calculating the 
average length of haul for multiple drop rounds translates 
the reduction in the number of drops per delivery, that has 
accompanied the spatial concentration of grocery retailing, 
into an increase in average journey length. This increase 
is the result of a statistical anomaly. It does, however, 
highlight the arbitrary nature of the method of calculating 
the average length of haul, and hence tonne-kilometres, of 
multiple-drop journeys and the failure of the current method 
to reflect accurately the shift to more direct journeys with 
fewer drops. 
5. Relocation of intermediate storage points: (fig. 11.7e) 
Where goods are transported via intermediate nodes more 
distant from the direct route, this will have the effect of 
increasing average journey lengths. This can be the result 
of shifts between marketing and logistical channels. The 
redirection of flow from manufacturers' depots to retail 
central warehouses is likely to have increased the average 
distance from stockholding point to shop (as demonstrated 
earlier (P-316)). The displacement of trade from local 
wholesale depots to more centralized retail warehouses can 
have a similar effect. This relocation of the intermediate 
stockholding point is often closely associated with the 
spatial concentration of stockholding, discussed more fully 
under 6. 
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6. Elimination of intermediate nodes in the supply line: 
(fig. 11.7f) 
This has resulted primarily from the redirection of flows 
away from channels containing two intermediate nodes (1 and 
2 on fig. 11.6) towards more direct channels, and the 
growing importance of channel 6 in the bulk distribution of 
supplies to superstores and hypermarkets. 
The extent to which average length of haul is increased 
by the elimination of an intervening node (B) depends on its 
location relative to the direct through-route from factory 
(A) to shop (C) (fig. 11.7f) . The closer this node (B) 
lies to the direct route the greater will be the increase in 
average journey length. This leads to the rather odd 
situation where, if the node actually lies on the direct 
route from factory to shop, its elimination results in a 
doubling of average journey length, despite the fact that 
the total distance travelled remains the same. This 
highlights the danger of considering average journey lengths 
independently of the number of separate journeys a 
consignment makes in the course of its movement from factory 
to shop. Both these variables influence the relationship 
between the total amount of freight movement measured in 
tonne-kilometres and the total volume of goods consumed (or 
produced). This relationship may be defined as follows: 
Total Freight volume of goods handling average 
Movement = produced or x factor x length 
consumed of haul 
It was established earlier that the total weight of 
food and drink consumed changed little during the 1970s. 
Between 1968 and 1980 this weight increased by roughly 7% 
whereas the total amount of freight movement by these 
commodity classes rose by 31% (table 11.5). The net decline 
in the handling factor of about 16% between 1968 and 1980 
would, on its own, have had the effect of reducing the total 
volume of freight movement. This reduction in the number 
of journeys per consignment has been far exceeded by the 
increase of 40% in their average length. The rapid 
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increase in the total volume of freight movement by food and 
drink products suggests, therefore, that the increase in the 
average length of haul is not simply a result of goods 
bypassing intermediate nodes and travelling more directly 
from points of production to points of sale. The other 
factors listed above are clearly responsible for much of 
this increase. 
Summary 
It was argued in the introduction to this thesis that 
variations in general freight statistics can only be 
explained by examining the spatial structure of the 
production and distribution systems. This chapter has used 
information about the system of grocery supply to try to 
account for recent trends in the movement of food products. 
It has focused attention on two parameters that have a 
critical role in determining the relationship between the 
volume of consumption and the volume of freight movement, 
and which are key variables in the DTp's new freight 
forecasting model. These are the handling factor and the 
average length of haul. 
Although fluctuating quite widely, the handling factor 
appears to have followed a downward trend, while the average 
length of haul has increased sharply. As the increase in 
the average length of haul has considerably exceeded the 
decline in the handling factor, the total number of 
tonne-kilometres has risen substantially, despite the fact 
that the volume of food consumed has remained fairly stable. 
Both the handling factor and the average length of haul are 
affected by changes in the spatial organization of L 
production and distribution. The dominant spatial change 
in recent years has been the concentration of production, 
storage and retail sales. This has been caused by 
individual firms concentrating their activities, by mergers 
between firms at all levels of the distributive system and 
by the displacement of grocery flows towards logistical 
channels characterised by a high degree of spatial 
concentration in production, stockholding and retailing. 
Contrary to popular belief, however, concentration is not 
the only spatial process to have produced an average 
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lengthening of hauls. The extension of market areas, 
relocation of premises and redirection of flows are also 
likely to have increased average journey length. 
To assess the overall impact of these spatial processes 
on the ratio of tonne-kilometres to the tonnes 
produced/consumed one must examine their effects on the 
complete route from point of production to point of sale. 
When one takes this broader view, it appears that as 
deliveries have become more direct, successive nodes in the 
distributive channel have become more widely separated, 
giving rise to a net increase in the volume of freight 
movement. 
Notes: 
1. Statistics refer to weight lifted onto vehicles. 
°2. This transport cost data was only made available in the 
1963 and 1968 Censuses of Production. 
3. Mohring and Williamson (1969) have called the savings in 
transport costs that result from a transport improvement 
"direct benefits" and those translated into more efficient 
patterns of production and distribution "re-organization 
benefits". They have undertaken a graphical analysis of 
the way in which a transport improvement yields these two 
types of benefit. They have also devised a model to 
estimate the size of these benefits and employed it to 
measure what the effect of a 25% reduction in unit transport 
costs would have been on American industry in 1947. It was 
estimated that 11.3% of the total cost saving would have 
taken the form of re-organization benefits, the remainder 
(88.7%) being expressed as direct benefits. No similar 
analysis has been undertaken of the effect of transport 
improvements on the British space economy. Such an 
analysis would require much more data on transport costs and 
the spatial organization of production and distribution than 
is currently available. 
368 
Chapter 12 
Conclusion 
Geographical studies of the pattern of freight movement 
have made little headway in recent years. An impasse has 
been reached in the development of models to simulate and 
forecast the spatial distribution of freight traffic (Hay, 
1979). Forecasts of the aggregate volume of freight 
movement have been criticised on the grounds that they 
merely extrapolate past trends and are not based upon an 
understanding of the economic processes that generate this 
movement. It has also been recognised that the official 
transport statistics used in freight modelling exercises are 
"an inadequate measure of changes in the structure of a 
commodity movement system" (Lee and Lalwani, 1978). In an 
effort to shed more light on the system of grocery movement, 
this research has adopted a new approach to the study of 
freight flows. This has involved a detailed examination of 
the framework of marketing and physical distribution within 
which freight transport is organized, and concentrated 
attention on the routeing of consignments through the 
distributive system. This chapter will discuss the 
advantages and limitations of this approach, summarise the 
main research findings and consider the implications of this 
work for the way in which freight traffic is forecast and 
regulated. 
Assessment of the Approach 
The main benefits of this approach are clearly that it 
enables one to explore in much greater depth the reasons for 
a -consignment following a particular route from factory to 
shop, and to see the transport operation in a much wi der 
perspective. The distinction must be made, howev er, 
between the pursuit of explanation and the construction of 
operational models that may be used for forecasting and L 
" optimising. To date, the bulk of the resear ch undertaken on 
the spatial distribution of freight flows ha s been dedica ted 
to the development of accurate "black box" models based on 
inter-zonal flow, data. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
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results of this work have been disappointing, largely, it 
would seem, because of its failure to take account of the 
complexity of the distributive system. An alternative 
approach might, therefore, be to model the pattern of flow 
quite explicitly with respect to the distributive system. 
This would entail "decomposing" this system into its various 
elements, such as the allocation of flows between marketing 
channels, the location of depots, the logistics of bulk 
movements and the routeing of delivery vehicles (Stasch, 
1968). Once each of these elements had been modelled 
satisfactorily, they might be integrated into a composite 
spatial model of product flow through a distribution system. 
Though in theory quite an attractive proposition, an 
exercise of this type would encounter serious practical 
problems: 
i) Most of the component models currently available are 
optimising models, that take no account of sub-optimal 
behaviour. It might be possible to incorporate a random 
element into these models to permit deviation from the 
optima, as has been done in the case of the linear 
programming version of conventional freight flow analysis 
(Pitfield, 1978b). This, however, would be a poor 
substitute for an understanding of the reasons for actual 
practices diverging from the optimum. It should also be 
noted that most of the optimising models currently used in 
distribution planning define optimality narrowly in terms of 
simple, commercial criteria. 
ii) Attempts to develop models that were both positive and 
generalised would prove very difficult, given the great 
variety of distribution methods revealed by this research. 
Even within a single trade, such as that of packaged 
groceries, there can be marked differences in the way firms 
organise their distribution, as indicated by wide variations 
in such criteria as a) the proportion of a manufacturer's 
output delivered direct from the factory, b) the number of 
distribution depots a manufacturer operates, c) the extent 
to which it mixes bulk stocks, d) the nature of the supply 
arrangement between manufacturer and multiple retailer, i 
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('ejthe proportion of a multiple's turnover channelled through 
central warehouse and f) the logistics of shop delivery. 
iii) Even if it were possible to develop models capable of 
simulating the various aspects of the distribution system, 
integrating these models would prove a formidable task. At 
present the links between marketing models and models of 
physical distribution are very poorly developed (Bartels, 
1976). Schary (1970) has devised a comprehensive model of 
a physical distribution system, but this has not been 
operationalized, nor does it give adequate consideration to 
the spatial dimension. 
iv) Such an integrated model of the distributive system 
would not relate directly to the pattern of freight flow. 
Rather, it would define a framework within which inferences 
could be made about the pattern of flow. It would be 
difficult, however, to estimate the volumes of flow passing 
along particular linkages in the system, especially in its 
lower reaches. Most firms are very unwilling to provide 
information on the internal flow of their products between 
their own premises and even more so in the case of external 
flows to customers. Attempts to estimate flow volumes on 
the basis of population data would be frustrated partly by 
spatial variations in consumption levels, but mainly by the 
complex pattern of overlapping service and trade areas which 
makes it possible for a consumer to receive supplies along 
several different routes. 
Given these problems, it would be extremely difficult 
to construct an operational model of a distribution system, 
such as that of grocery products, that could accurately 
simulate the spatial pattern of freight flow. It would be 
easier in monopolistic or of igopol istic industries, in which 
there would be less variation in distribution method and 
more control exerted over the distribution system by the 
manufacturer. The experience of the Commodity Flow Study 
teams in attempting to model the flows of industries of this 
type is not encouraging, however (Pike and Gandham, 1981). 
The failure of this approach to yield operational flow 
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models comparable to those of the traditional method of flow 
analysis does not invalidate its use. It can still offer a 
valuable insight into the workings of the freight transport 
system and thereby complement more superficial, statistical 
modelling. Although providing no direct quantitative input 
into freight forecasting models, research of this kind can 
allow forecasters to move away from blind extrapolation 
towards more reasoned speculation based on a detailed 
understanding of the dominant trends in the distribution 
system. This is particularly important in an industrial 
sector such as that of food, where total volume produced and 
consumed is fairly static and the growth in freight traffic 
attributable mainly to logistical changes. Only by 
examining the logistics of freight distribution can one 
establish the link between industrial output (or GDP) and 
tonne-kilometres. The freight forecasting model currently 
used by the DTp defines this link by means of two 
parameters, the handling factor and the average length of 
haul, both of which are largely determined by the spatial 
structure of the distributive system. If, as a result of a 
closer examination of the geography of the distribution 
process, these parameters could be predicted more 
accurately, the reliability and credibility of freight 
forecasting could be enhanced. 
It has also been suggested. that the link between 
industrial output and the volume of freight movement should 
be investigated with a view to finding ways of severing it 
(Civic Trust, 1979). This suggestion is based on the view 
that "it should be an object of policy to stabilise or 
reduce the movement of freight by road and that the forecast 
increases should be regarded as a warning of something to be 
avoided rather than something to be fulfilled" (Haigh and 
Hand, 1982) . One major way of containing the growth of 
road freight is to alter the relationship between the volume 
of material consumption (or production) and that of traffic 
flow. Environmentalists have recently seized upon the fact 
that the relationship between these two variables is 
"elastic" (Quinet et al., 1982). This enables them to 
counter the argument frequently advanced in defence of 
present levels of lorry traffic, that these levels could 
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only be significantly reduced by scaling down the level of 
industrial activity (Pettit, 1973; Sharp, 1973). It would 
be possible to reduce the amount of freight traffic, while 
maintaining present levels of production and consumption by 
reorganizing the marketing and distribution of goods 
(Freight Management, 1975). While some of the ways in 
which this could be achieved, such as dividing market areas 
between competing manufacturers, would infringe trading laws 
and prove impractical (Sharp and Jennings, 1976)p others, 
such as the rationalization of product ranges, improved 
coordination of the sales effort with distribution and 
increased consolidation of deliveries, are much more 
acceptable and have, in fact, been shown to yield 
significant economic benefits. The problem lies in 
deciding how best to promote rationalizations of this sort. 
In the -1970s, various methods of controlling the 
movements of heavy vehicles were proposed, at central and 
local government levels, and some of these, such as lorry 
routeing and access restrictions, were widely implemented. 
In most cases, these proposals met with fierce opposition 
from firms using these vehicles, and local planners were 
frequently criticised for formulating policies on heavy 
lorries on the basis of a very limited knowledge of 
distribution methods (Smith, 1976). In the case of 
planning at central government level, the Armitage Report 
(1980) concluded that "the instruments available to the 
state are too blunt adequately to control the total quantity 
of freight transport, and, in economic terms, it is unlikely 
to do better in determining the "right" amount and kind of 
freight transport than the market does" (p49). In the 
absence of such controls, the most promising methods of 
arresting or reversing the growth of freight traffic are 
those which yield economic as well as environmental 
benefits, and thereby can command wide support from lorry 
users. As outlined in chapter 10, there has been a large 
increase in the consolidation of shop deliveries, which, 
ceteris paribus can reduce the amount of vehicle and freight 
movement per unit delivered and carry a host of other 
operational benefits. Consolidation is only one of several 
methods that might be used to reduce the internal and 
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external costs of freight movement. Surveys have revealed 
that the efficiency of firms' distribution systems can vary 
widely; so too can their environment impact. Some systems 
are clearly more transport-intensive than others, generating 
more vehicle movement per unit produced (or sold) than 
others. Plowden (1981) has devised a simple measure of 
vehicle utilization which could be used as an index of the 
transport-intensity of a distribution system: 
vehicle kilometres performed 
Index = 
irreducible tonne-kms required 
While it might be possible to calculate this index 
for a single firm's distribution operation, using various 
optimising models to estimate the denominator, it would be 
very difficult to apply in practice to the complete 
through-movement of products from factory to shop. it 
could not, therefore, allow for the possibility that 
separately optimised systems, each minimising tonne- 
kilometres, might not, when linked together, yield a minimum 
number of tonne-kms in toto. The idea behind this proposed 
measurement is, nevertheless, a good one, for it recognises 
the need to standardise the comparison of distribution 
systems. Several comparisons have already been made of the 
costs of firms' distribution operations (Williams, 1975; 
McKibb in, 1982a) . The present research has attempted to 
compare the spatial structure of distribution systems. By 
comparing systems in this way it may be possible to identify 
those that are most cost-effective and/or least damaging to 
the environment. As it is unlikely that the internal and 
external costs of a distribution system can be minimised 
simultaneously, some optimum trade-off between these cost 
elements will have to be established. This will involve 
making difficult environmental and economic choices, such as 
that between few, large lorries and numerous, smaller ones. 
Improved methods of organizing marketing and 
distribution might then be more widely publicised, citing 
the experience of firms that already successfully employ 
them. It would be hoped then that other firms would follow 
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their example. A precedent for such convergence on an 
optimum practice has been set in the case of depot location, 
where a consensus has developed, certainly among food 
manufacturers, on the ideal locations from which to 
distribute one's products. Furthermore, the present 
diversity of distribution methods, even within highly 
competitive sectors of the grocery market, suggests that 
firms might be able to alter their distribution systems 
quite radically without jeopardising their market share. 
It would seem preferable to encourage the 
rationalization of whole distribution systems, either of 
individual firms or of "chains" of 'firms linked in a 
marketing channel. Suggestions that distribution systems 
be reorganized at the urban scale (Plowden, 1981) may be 
challenged on the grounds that changes introduced in one 
area may have detrimental knock-on effects in neighbouring 
areas (Hasell and Christie, 1978) and that these may hinder 
more fundamental restructuring. Recognising the 
disadvantages of localised and piece-meal attempts to modify 
the distributive system, mainly by means of negative 
controls, Drury (1981) has proposed that a national policy 
on distribution be devised. This could promote a widespread 
application of more desirable distribution practices, such 
as consolidation, the rescheduling of deliveries and the use 
of improved routeing methods. 
Before such apolicy can be formulated, a great deal of 
information has to be accumulated on current distribution 
practices. This thesis has presented a framework for the 
collection and analysis of this data and identified the 
routeing of flows through a distribution system as, the 
central issue. Product routeing is affected by 
decision-making at many different levels, ranging from the 
choice of marketing channel, through the planning of the 
physical structure of manufacturers', wholesalers' and 
retailers' distribution systems to the daily scheduling of 
delivery vehicles. At each of these levels, considerable 
diversity makes generalization difficult. Chapter 
summaries have discussed the extent to which one can make 
general statements about particular aspects of the grocery 
distribution system. By taking an overview of these 
375 
discussions, one can draw several major conclusions: 
1. Variations in many of the distribution variables, such 
as the proportion of factory output distributed direct, the 
number of outlets supplied, depot numbers and the proportion 
of multiple retailers' turnover channelled through central 
warehouse are so great as to render averages fairly 
meaningless. 
2. The route a consignment follows is not simply related 
to the nature of the product. The flow of almost all the 
grocery products considered was divided between different 
types of marketing and logistical channels. Manufacturers 
and distributors of the same product group often vary 
considerably in the way they organize their physical 
distribution. Many other factors, such as marketing 
pol icy, product mix, the geography of production and various 
historical circumstances, need to be taken into account. 
In attempting to explain the wide variation in many of the 
features of the distribution system that strongly influence 
the spatial pattern of flow, one cannot focus attention on 
any single independent variable. The analysis must, 
therefore, be sufficiently broad to incorporate a range of 
variables, most of which are inter-related and few of which 
can be easily quantified. 
3. Many of the relationships between different aspects of 
the grocery distribution system are fairly weak. Little 
relationship was found, for example, between the following 
pairs of variables: 
a) the proportion of output a manufacturer distributes 
in bulk loads and the total number of outlets supplied. 
b) a manufacturer's relative dependence on the echelon 
channel and the number of distribution depots it operates. 
c) the nature of the supply link' between a 
manufacturer and, multiple -retailer and the combination of 
the manufacturer's relative emphasis on direct delivery and 
the multiple's relative use of a central warehouse. 
d) a multiple's relative dependence on central 
warehouse deliveries and the spatial distribution of its 
branch stores. 
Stronger correlations were found between the numbers of 
s 
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depots manufacturers operate and the locations of these 
depots, and between the size of depot service areas and the 
nature of the outward delivery operation. 
Overall, however, there are tight limits on the extent 
to which one can make inferences about a whole distribution 
system on the basis of a narrow investigation of one or two 
of its component parts. It is important, therefore, that 
whole systems be monitored and that comparisons made between 
different firms distribution operations be wide-ranging. 
As Darker (1978) has noted, the diversity of 
distribution methods also makes "trend-spotting" difficult. 
Nevertheless, in the case of the grocery distribution 
system, several major developments have been occurring in 
recent years. 
i) Distribution has become more direct both in marketing 
and logistical terms. In the case of marketing channels, 
this has been achieved mainly by the diversion of trade from 
wholesalers and the independent retailers they supply to 
multiple retailers, which deal direct with the manufacturer. 
In the case of logistical channels, increases in the size of 
depots, shops and the consignments they receive has 
permitted a reduction in the number of intermediate 
stockholding points. 
ii) Production, stockholding and sales have become more 
spatially concentrated in a smaller number of larger 
premises. This has been made possible by transport 
improvements (includ ing an increase in personal mobility) 
and the adoption of new materials handling methods in each 
of these spheres of economic activity. 
iii) Responsibility for transport and storage has shifted 
down the distributive channel from manufacturer to 
distributor, from wholesaler to retailer and from retailer 
to consumer. 
iv) There has been a large increase in the consolidation 
of deliveries as a result mainly of a) an increase in the 
proportion of groceries handled by multiple retailers, b) an 
increase in the use of distribution contractors and c) 
mergers and take-overs in the food processing industry. 
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These developments have all promoted several important 
changes in the way in which groceries are transported. 
They have broken down the traditional pattern of grocery 
movement, comprising a long distance trunk haul to a local 
storage/break-bulk point and, from there, local multiple 
drop deliveries by small vehicles. This pattern has been 
increasingly replaced by one in which the intermediate node 
serves a much wider area, consolidates rather than 
disaggregates loads and dispatches goods direct to shops in 
large, mixed consignments. The development of this new 
pattern of distribution has involved an increase in the use 
of heavier vehicles in a shop delivery role. By comparison 
with multiple drop rounds by small vehicles, the use of 
heavier vehicles for the delivery of consolidated loads has 
reduced the ratio of vehicle- and tonne-kilometres to the 
volume sold. The associated changes in the spatial 
structure of the distribution system have, however, 
generated additional vehicle- and tonne-kilometres. 
Foremost among these changes has been the spatial 
concentration of production and stockholding. The 
concentration of production has increased the average 
distance between factory and consumer, while the 
concentration of intermediate stockholding has made the 
actual route between the two, on average, more circuitous. 
Ironically, as the journey from stockholding depot to shop 
has become more direct, the overall route from factory to 
consumer has deviated further from the direct, straight line 
between them. The benefits accruing from the 
rationalization of local deliveries through increased 
consolidation must, therefore, by set against the additional 
costs of transporting goods within more concentrated 
patterns of production and stockholding. 
In addition to making general ization and 
"trend-spotting" difficult, the diversity of distribution 
operations also complicates the forecasting of future 
developments. By adopting a "distributional" approach to 
the study of freight flows, however, one can apply 
forecasting techniques not available to those forecasting 
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these flows in isolation. Walters (1976) and Gattorna 
(1977), for example, have used the Delphi forecasting method 
to canvass the opinions of a panel of business executives on 
future developments in food distribution. Although it is 
not possible to translate the results of these exercises 
into quantitative estimates of future changes in the spatial 
distribution of grocery flows, forecasting work of this type 
could be addressed more specifically to the various aspects 
of distribution systems that most strongly influence this 
pattern of flow. 
This is only one of several ways in which the research 
reported in this thesis might be extended. Similar studies 
might also be done on the distribution of other products. 
Although Sussams (1968) has argued that the grocery 
distribution system can serve as a useful model for the 
distribution of other products, surveys of distribution in 
other trades, such as footwear (Smith, 1977b),, records 
(Smith, 1979b) and textiles (Lancaster, 1977) have revealed 
considerable differences in the way these products are 
marketed and physically distributed. In addition to 
extending this research horizontally into other industrial 
sectors, one might explore the spatial organization of 
distribution systems in greater depth. In the course of 
this research, it has been necessary on numerous occasions 
to make deductions about firms' motives for arranging their 
distribution in a particular way on the basis of available 
facts and figures. It would be preferable if 
decision-making in this field could be examined more 
directly by means of an explicitly behavioural study. Work 
of this kind would require a high degree of cooperation from 
the staff consulted and possibly access to information often 
regarded as confidential. The recent renaissance in 
distribution planning, however, has inspired new interest 
and enthusiasm among management staff for this long 
neglected function, creating favourable conditions for 
further, in-depth, investigations in this field. 
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Glossary 
Backhaul: return journey to point of origin from point at 
which load is delivered. 
Break-of-Bulk: disaggregation of large, bulk load into 
smaller consignments for dispersed delivery. 
Cross-Haulage: where similar products travel in opposite 
directions between the same two locations, e. g. goods 
produced in town A travelling to customers in town n, 
while similar goods produced in town B are distributed to 
customers in town A. 
Cross-shipment: movement of stocks between factories 
producing different products to permit mixing of bulk 
orders for direct distribution. 
Consolidation: grouping of consignments for delivery to the 
same destination. 
Direct Channel: direct routeing of products from factory to 
retail or wholesale customer. 
Drop Density: number of deliveries per unit distance. 
Drop Shipment: where goods are purchased centrally by 
multiple retailer or voluntary group, but delivered direct 
by manufacturer to the retail outlet. 
Dual System: system of distribution comprising both direct 
and echelon channels. 
Echelon Channel: indirect routeing of products from factory 
to retail or wholesale customer via one or more 
intervening stockholing points. 
Embulk with order System: see Throughput Carrier System. 
Handling Factor: ratio of the weight of goods lifted onto 
vehicles to the total weight of these goods produced or 
consumed. 
Hinterland: area to which goods are distributed from a 
factory, warehouse, port etc. (also referred to as 
"service area" in case of warehouse/depot). 
Intermediate-Journey: section of a multiple drop journey 
between two consecutive deliveries. 
Inter-haul: movement of goods between factories or 
warehouses at the same level of the distributive channel. 
Logistical Channel: channel along which products pass in 
their physical distribution from factory to shop, 
consisting of nodes, such as factories, depots and shops, 
and vehicle movements (also known as "Logistics Channel"). 
ýý 
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Marketing Channel: organizational channel, composed of 
various productive and distributive agencies, along which 
the ownership of goods is transferred. 
Minimum Drop (or order) Size: minimum size of order a 
manufacturer or wholesaler is prepared to deliver. 
Modal Split: division of traffic between different transport 
modes. 
Multiple Drop Round: lorry journey, beginning and ending at 
the same point, during which consignments are delivered to 
more than one customer. 
Order Throughput System: see Throughput Carrier System. 
Own Label Products: products sold under the distributor's 
trade name. 
Physical Distribution: collective term for the series of 
inter-related functions (principally transport, 
warehousing, stockholding and handling) involved in the 
physical movement of goods from producer to consumer. 
Service Area: see Hinterland. 
Service Level: time taken for ordered goods to be delivered 
(measured either in average number of days for all orders, 
or proportion of orders delivered within a given time 
period). 
Specified (or Nominated) Day Delivery: where a supplier 
delivers to a certain area or customer only on a 
particular day of the week, requiring the customer to 
submit his order a fixed number of days in advance of this 
delivery day. 
Stockout: exhaustion of the stock of a particular product. 
Stockturn: see Turnover Rate. 
Throughput Carrier System: system of distribution in which a 
manufacturer distributes bulk loads to hauliers and 
distribution contractors which provide a local break-of- 
bulk and delivery service (also known as "Embulk with 
Order" and "Order Throughput" system). 
Tonnes Lifted: unit of freight traffic comprising the weight 
of consignments lifted onto vehicles at the start of a 
journey. 
Tonne-kilometres Moved: unit of freight movement calculated 
by multiplying the weight of consignments lifted onto 
vehicles by average journey length. 
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Trade Area: area from which a distributive facility 
(eg. shop or cash and carry warehouse) draws its 
customers. 
Transhipment: transfer of goods between vehicles, usually of 
different sizes. 
Turnover Rate: ratio of total annual sales to the value of 
stock held at the end of the financial year (also known as 
Rate of Stockturn). 
Value Density: ratio of the monetary value of a product to 
its weight. 
Value of Service Pricing: transport pricing scheme in which 
the level of charges is related to what a consignment 
"can bear" rather than the cost of providing the service. 
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Appendix 1 
Firms co-operating in the survey. 
Food Manufacturers: 
Associated Biscuit Manufacturers 
Australian Canned Fruits 
* Batchelors 
Beecham 
Brooke-Bond Ox o 
Cadbury-Schweppes 
Cavenham 
Crosse and Blackwell (Nestle) 
Del Monte 
* Farley Health 
* General Foods 
Hienz 
. 'I 
Imperial Foods 
Kellogg 
Kraft 
Lovell and Christmas 
Lyons-Tetley 
Nabisco 
* Pasta Foods 
Quaker 
Ranks Hovis McDougall 
* Robertsons 
Smiths Foods 
Spillers Foods 
Tate and Lyle 
United Biscuits 
* Van den Berghs 
* Firms providing information only by post. 
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Multiple Retailers: 
Allied Suppliers 
Bishops 
Budgen 
Cater Bros. 
Express Dairies 
Fine Fare 
Foodrite 
Gateway 
* Hintons 
Internatioal 
Jacksons 
Laws 
Lennons 
Lows 
Keymarket 
MacMarket 
Oakeshotts 
Safeway 
Te sc o 
Willsons 
Voluntary Groups: 
Spar 
Mace 
Harvey Bradfield Toyer (VG) 
Wavy Line 
* Londis 
Distribution Contractors: 
SPD 
Cory 
Lowf. ield 
Associated Deliveries (ADL) 
National Carriers 
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Co-operative Organizations: 
* Co-operative Union 
Co-operative Wholesale Society 
Royal Arsenal Co-operative society 
* Firms/organizations providing information only 
by post. 
Data on the following firms from published sources (Annual 
Reports, Price Commission reports, Hemingway (1979) and 
trade press) : 
Mars, CPC (UK), Weetab ix, J. Sa insbury, Waitrose, ASDA, 
Kwiksave. 
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Appendix 2 
Copies of Questionnaires and introductory r. ottorn 
Used in the Survey. 
1. Introductory letter aunt to multiplo rotoi1arn 
2. Questionnaire for multiplo rotailoru 
3. Introductory lottor sent to food manufncturorn 
4. Questionnaire for food manufocturora 
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Department of Geography 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
GOWER STREET LONDON WCIE 6BT 
Telephone or-387 7050 
Dear 
As part of a programme of doctoral research, I am currently compiling 
information on the storage and distribution of food products. I am principally 
concerned with the patterns of warehouse and shop location, how these have evolved 
and how they relate to other aspects of the distribution system, particularly the 
way in which food products are transported. A great deal of research has gone into 
finding ways of optimising various components of the distribution system. Few attempts 
have been made, however, to compile information about actual distribution practices. 
It is hoped that it may be possible to build up a general picture of. the distribution 
systems of multiple retailers in the grocery trade which might assist companies in 
the formulation of future distribution policy and strengthen planners' understanding 
of retail supply methods. 
I would like to know, therefore, if it would be possible to arrange a 
meeting with you or a member of your staff during which I might enquire about the way 
in which your firm organizes the delivery of supplies to branch stores. This meeting, 
I expect, would last about an hour. Any information which you gave me would be 
recorded and analysed in the strictest confidence, and your company's name would not 
appear in any subsequent documentation. Should you desire a summary of the survey 
results, this I would gladly provide. 
I would be most grateful if you would complete and return the enclosed 
slip to let me know if and when I might meet you. 
Yours sincerely, 
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CON? ILMTIAL Department of Geography 
t2 IVM SITY COLLEGE LONDON 
Survey of Retail Sui, ly Methods 
Name of the Company: 
1. Opening date and location of the first store: 
2. How many stores did the Company operate in the following size categories in 1970, and 
how many does it operate today? 
Net Sales Area 
(sq. ft. ) 
Under 2,000 2,000-4,999 5,000-9,999 10,000-19,999 20,000-49,99 9 Over 50,000 
1970 
1978 
3. Rough], y what proportion of the stores currently operated by the Company were taken over 
from other grocery multiples? 
4. Please list the retail chains of more than 5 stores that have been acquired since 1900. 
Name of Company Area Served Date of Acquisition 
5. How many branch stores were a) opened and b) closed in 1976 and 1977? 
a) Stores ooened" 
1976 1222 
Number Average Size Number Average size 
(sq. ft. ) 
b) Stores Closed: 
1976 1977 
Number Average Size Number Average Size 
6. Under what names does the Company trade in groceries? 
7. Overall, what proportion of the goods sold in the branch stores ; ass through a company 
warehouse? 
8. Is the long term trend in the proportion of goods passing through a Company warehouse 
a) upward 
b) downward 
c) stable 
if c), at what date did the proportion stabilise? 
if a), to what target is the proportion being raised? 
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9. Please tick those commodities in the following list which are channelled through a 
Company warehouse. Mark with a 'V' those commodities which are delivered to the 
warehouse by some companies and direct to the stores by others. 
Canned Meats 
Canned Fruit 
Canned Vegetables 
Biscuits 
Cake 
Cereals 
Coffee 
Tea 
Sugar 
Meat 
Butter 
Cheese 
Sausages 
Frozen Food 
Wines/Spirits 
Soap Powder 
Household Ware 
10. Do some suppliers deliver direct only to the larger stores in the chain, leaving the 
smaller stores to be supplied from Company warehouse? 
If so, how many suppliers have entered such an arrangement and which products does 
this affect? 
Ii. Please insert information in the following table on warehouses currently operated by 
the Carpany: 
Oren Storage Extent of Area Number of Number of Number of Staff 
Loeatiat Date Area servea rroaucti a, anes vanICIV5 kanci. arivers 
12. Please insert information in the following table on any warehouses closed by«the 
Company since 1960: 
Location Opening Date , Closing Late 
Storage Area 1 Reasons for Closure 
13. Please insert information in the follcring table on any further warehouses planned by 
the Company: prooosed Extent of Area 
Location I OT+ening Late Storage Area to be Served 
14. ? hat factors determine which goods pass through a Ccmpany warehouse? 
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15. How long, overall, would stocks last at an average rate of consumptions 
a) in the warehouse(s)? 
b) in the branch stores? 
16. Is packaging or other pre-sale processing carried out in the warehouse(s)? 
If so, which products are packed/processed? 
If dame at one time but no longer, when did packing/processing in the warehousing cease? 
17. That factors dominated the decision on where to locate the warehouse(s)? 
18. How many vehicles are operated by the Company and what are their gross weights? 
i 
19. How, maxy of these vehicles are a) articulated? 
b) leased? 
20. Does the Company employ the services of a) a road haulier? 
b) a distribution contractor (offering storage 
as well as a transport service)? 
c) other transport operator (please specify)? 
If so, are they employed i) on a permanent basis? 
ii) temporarily? 
If they are only employed occasionally, under what circumstances are they used? 
Are they employed for particular routes or products? If so, for which? 
21. What handling methods are employed for deliveries from Company, warehouse(s) to branch 
stores? (e. g. use of Coabitainers/Unitainers or wooden pallets) 
22. How frequently are deliveries made to branch stores from the Company warehouse(s)? 
23. If this frequency of delivery varies with the size of the branch store or its location, 
please describe, in general terms, the nature of the relationship. 
24. On average how long does it take for a branch store order to be supplied from a 
Coin eny warehouse? 
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25. What proportion of delivery vehicle trips from the Company warehouse(s) would drop 
suvplies at: a) 1 store? 
b 2-3 stores? 
c) 4-5 stores? 
d) 6 or more stores? 
26. On the average day, what proportion of delivery vehicles would have a) 1 reload? 
b) more than 1 reload? 
27. What is the average load factor an delivery vehicles leaving the warehouse(s)? 
(i. e. actual load as a% of the full capacity load) 
By weight: 
By volume: 
28. Are any products collected from suppliers a) in Company vehicles? 
b) by a haulage/distribution contractor? 
If so, which products are involved? 
29. Is "backdoor congesticn" regarded as a problem at: a) any 
b) many 
c) most 
d), all stores in the chain? 
30. How many branch stores, if any, are considered to have a) difficult access? 
b) inadequate unloading 
facilities? 
31. How frequently are vehicle schedules revised? 
32. Are routes planned a) manually? 
b) by computer program? 
33. How many product lines would be stocked in an average sized branch store? 
3l+. How many of these would be "own label" lines? 
Is the number of "own label" lines increasing, decreasing or remaining stable? 
35. Do you foresee any significant changes in the way products are delivered to branch stores 
over the next five years? 
If so, what chan; es do you anticipate and what factors do you consider will exert the 
greatest pressure for change? 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
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Departmcnt of Geography 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
GOWER STREET LONDON WCIE 6BT 
Tclcphonc 01-387 7050 
Dear 
As part of a programme of doctoral research, I am currently 
compiling information on the storage and distribution of food products. No 
previous study has attempted to map the major nodes in the food supply system 
nor to compare different distribution strategies within an explicitly 
geographical framework. I have already collected information on the distribution 
systems of over, twenty large supermarket chains and am now extending my survey 
to cover the main food suppliers. The Institute of Grocery Distribution has 
expressed an interest in this part of the survey, and it is hoped that it may 
be possible to make some general statements about the grocery distribution system 
which will assist companies in the formulation of future distribution policy. 
The study is particularly concerned with recent changes in the location and size 
of food warehouses, with minimum drop sizes and the general relationship between 
the distribution operations of producers, wholesalers, and retailers. 
I would like to know, therefore, if it would be possible to 
meet you sometime soon to ask you'some questions about the form of your company's 
distribution system. This meeting, I expect, would last about an hour. Any 
information that you gave me would be recorded and analysed in the strictest 
confidence, and your company's name would not appear in any subsequent 
documentation. Should you desire a summary-of the survey results this I would 
gladly provide. 
I would be most grateful if you would complete and return the 
enclosed slip to let me know if and when I might meet you. 
Yours faithfully, 
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confidential Department of Geography 
U NIVSRSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
Study of the Grocery Distribution System 
Name of Company: 
1. Information on the company's factories in the Ud: 
Location Products Storaoe Srace (in sq. tt. ) 
2. If different products are made at different factories, is there a central mixing 
point- for distribution purFoses? 
If so, where is it, how much storage space does it have and when did it open? 
j. Information on warehouses/distribution depots: 
a) Operated by the company: 
Location Size Oreninv Number of Em loyee : 
(sq. ft. ) Date warehouse drivers others 
b) Contracted: Is the delive r service 
Location Srace Allocation Date Chen 'ovideß by a warehouse 
(sq. ft. ) First Used contractor or b sei rarste 
carrier? 
º Please mark with an 'E' those warehouses of which the comfy has exclusive use. 
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3, b) Contracted: (contt^. ued) 
Locatirn 3race a11o atior. 
c) Transhilment Points: 
Location Parent Derot 
2 
Date , limn Is the 9eliverv service 
First TTSPA rrovAeA by alwarA öuse 
contractor or b) s , errate 
carrier. 
O. n 
(own/haulier's distrib. contractor) 
1+12 
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L. Would it be possible to obtain a copy of a map sho, vinQ the division of the country 
into depot service areas? If not, could the boundaries possibly be sketched onto 
the blank map appended to this questionnaire? 
5. How large does a load have to be before it is delivered direct from a factory 
(or central mixing point) to a customer? 
'; ghat proportion of company output (by weight and/or value) is distributed bulk in 
this way, thus bycassin3 the depot system? 
Roughly what tonnage would this represent per annum? 
Is the proportion of output being delivered direct a) increasing 
b; -decreasing 
c) remaining stable? 
6. To how many outlets are the company's products delivered: 
a) overall 
b) through the depots 
c) direct from factory (or nixing point) 
What was the total number of outlets serviced in 1960 and 1970? 
(or any other year since 1960, if statistics are not available for the years 
in question. ) 
7. Which of the following list of supermarket chains. receive a)dir. ct store delivery 
only b) warehouse delivery only c1 mixture of store enß warehouse deliveries? 
(Please tick in the appropriate column). 
Cot nv All to Warehouse All to Stores 
T=O 
FTh'E FARE 
SAI SBtRI 
ALLI'D SLTPLI. r_ Z 
SA FZVAY 
INTERNATIONAL 
WALLIS 
WAITROSE 
C TS 
=- s 
BIIDGIN 
CATER BROS. 
: 0ºIL3AVB 
BISHOPS (London) 
Ck=, CTTS (Londcn) 
FXPI3BSS DJ 2I (London) 
FOODRITE (Shoreham) 
GAT 1AY (Bristol) 
L'"K NC&TS (St. ßelena) 
'TONS (Stockton) 
? 'ixel relive 
Mainly to Stores , 4athly to T9'houe.!! 
(continued on page 3. > 
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ConrA All to -w-, rehouse All to Stores 
JACKKSGTTS (Hull) 
LAWS (' ateshead) 
WILLSC(S (Gateshead) 
LOWS (Dundee) 
LOIDCN CO-OP 
Mix-, 9 Deliver 
Mainly to Stores -ainly to i'houses 
Are there any geographical patterns in the way the more extensive chains are served 
( e. g. in one region the company's products might go to the warehouse, iwhereas in 
, 
another they might go direct to the stores)? 
8. What are the present a)minimum and b) average drop sizes? 
That were they in 1960,1970 and 1975? 
9. To what extent do the terms charged to customers reflect differences in distribution 
costs (e. g. bulk load to a central warehouse as opposed to a small consippmeut to 
a shop) ? 
a closely 
b)fairly closely 
c)little 
d)not at. all 
10. What proportion of total output is trunked out of the factory(ies): 
a)by the company's own vehicles? 
b)by outside hauliers? 
c)by rail? 
Are there some routes typically served only by one particular mode ( a), b) or o) )? 
If so, which routes and by which mode? 
11. VThat proportion of outward trunk movements from the factory(ies) would comprise 
complete loads for a single destination? 
12. What proportion of trunk movements by the company's vehicles obtain a backhaul load? 
13. Do company vehicles carry any third party traffic (either on outward journey or backhaul)? 
If so, what types of product are carried and how much rouQhly"per annum: 
trunk vehicles delivery vehicles 
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14. Information on"vehicles operated by the company: 
a) Trunk Fleet: No. of Vehicles Gross Tei; hts 
b) Delivery Fleet: Ido. of Vehicles Gross 1eirhts. 
15. What is the average load factor (by weight) on comrany vehicles: 
a) Delivery Vehicles: 
b) Trunk Vehicles 
16. Ilease estimate peak throughput for the company's distribution system as a 
of the average throughput. 
When are the main periods of peak demand for the company's products? 
V. How long would company stocks last at an average rate of consumption? 
18. How long, on average, does it take for. a delivery to be made. after an order has been 
received from a customer? 
HISTORICAL BACKCý2OUfm: 
19. When was the company set up in the UK? 
Sphere was the first factory? 
20. If the company has taken over or amalgamated with any other food manufacturers, 
please state at what date this occurred? 
Have the respective distribution systems been integrated? 
If so, when diß this occur? 
21. Has the company reduced significantly its. nunber of depots? 
If. so, when was the main phase of reduction? 
Please list the locations and closure dates of depots closed since 19601 
Thank you for your coore rg tion. 
415 
Appendix 3 
The Co-operative System of Grocery Distribution 
Although' the Co-operative movement's share of total 
grocery sales has fallen from around 21% in 1960 to 14% in 
1981, this share is still substantial and roughly equivalent 
to that of the largest food multiple. The unique 
organization of the Co-op, vertically integrating 
production, wholesaling and retailing, enables it to control 
the movement of some products along the entire length of the 
distribution channel from factory to shop (Guirdham, 1972). 
Information for this examination of the Co-operative 
system of food distribution was provided by the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society (CWS), the Co-operative Union and a large 
Co-operative retail society in the South East of England. 
A similar framework of study will be used to that employed 
earlier for manufacturers and multiple retailers. First, 
however, it is necessary to provide background information 
on the organizational structure of the Co-op and the way in 
which it has evolved. 
Organizational Background. 
Retail Societies: There was a great proliferation of 
Co-operative retail societies in the latter half of the 19th 
century. By the end of the century, their food retailing 
operation had secured complete national coverage. Many 
societies had overlapping trade areas and actively competed 
for business. A series of boundary agreements made around 
the turn of the century, however, greatly reduced this 
competition (Co-operative Union, 1968). The total number 
of societies reached a peak of 1455 in 1903 (Jefferys, 
1954), then gradually declined as a result of take-overs and 
amalgamations. There were still around 1000 societies in 
1958. In that year the Report of an Independent Commission 
recommended that these societies be grouped into larger 
units to pool scarce capital and benefit from economies of 
scale. In 1958, roughly three quarters of the societies 
operated fewer than fifteen grocery stores, falling below 
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what was regarded as the minimum viable size of a multiple 
food retailing operation (Co-operative Union, 1958). The 
rapid growth of the grocery multiples at this time made 
these smaller societies particularly vulnerable. The 
Independent Commission advocated an extensive programme of 
amalgamation to reduce the number of societies to between 
200 and 300. In the following years the decline in the 
number of societies "came about through force of economic 
circumstances and not through any foresight or deliberate 
planning. " (Co-operative Union, 1968) By the time of the 
next major report on the state of the organization, the 
Regional Plan of 1968, the number of societies had dropped 
to 600. Estimates of the optimum number of societies had 
fallen by a much greater proportion, however, from 200 - 300 
to, 50. Improvements in road transport had increased the 
mobility of shoppers, making it necesary to coordinate 
retail efforts on a larger spatial scale; they also 
facilitated centralized distribution over wider areas. The 
increase in the recommended size of amalgamated societies 
was also a response to the dramatic growth in the size and 
buying power of the multiples during the 1960s. The 1968 
Plan was not implemented, however. 
In 1971, a new organization, called Co-operative Retail 
Services (CRS) i, 'was set up to act as a 
"rescue" agency Ito 
take-over and rehabilitate societies suffering financial 
crises. The absorption of insolvent societies by the CRS 
constituted a negative form of rational ization. - 
A revision of the 1968 Regional Plan (Co-operative Union, 
1974) recommended the integration of the 240 societies still 
in existence at the time into 26 regional groupings. Once 
again these proposals were not put into practice. The main 
obstacle to large scale re-organization lies in the 
unwillingness of many retail societies to surrender their 
autonomy. Since 1979 the number of retail societies has 
begun to fall more sharply (to c. 160 in 1982), though a 
thorough rationalization of the system of retail societies 
still appears some way off. 
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Co-operative Wholesale Society: The CWS was founded in 
1863 (and its Scottish equivalent in 1867) initially to act 
as a wholesaler to the retail societies, but later it 
developed its own production facilities. , 
Until the late 
1960s, its role as intermediary in the Co-operative system 
of grocery distribution was limited to the bulk storage and 
distribution of imported foodstuffs and products 
manufactured in the CWS's own factories. Responsibility 
for localised storage and delivery of the general range of 
grocery products was left to individual retail societies. 
Since the late 1960s, the CWS has begun to expand its role 
in grocery distribution by handling products from sources 
other than its own factories and overseas, and by providing, 
on a regional basis, centralized systems of storage and shop 
delivery to replace the numerous separate systems operated 
by individual retail societies (Bamf ield, 1978). This new 
initiative was launched in the North East of England with 
the opening in 1969 of a large regional distribution centre 
at Birtley (NEDO, 1972). Although the retail societies in 
the area retained their independence, they relinquished 
control over the distribution of groceries to their shops. 
Most Co-op food shops in the area thereafter received 
consolidated deliveries from the Birtley distribution centre 
rather than from their local society warehouse. This new 
system offered three major advantages: 
1. By centralizing the ordering of supplies, it increased 
the organization's buying. power and hence ability to secure 
larger discounts from manufacturers. 
2. By centralizing stock, it permitted a reduction in 
stock levels and the total amount of storage space required. 
Furthermore, in design and location the new warehouse was 
considered much superior to many of those it replaced. 
Many were older, multi-storey premises in congested inner 
urban locations. 
3. By centralizing buying and storage, it promoted a more 
efficient management of stock in the retail outlets. 
r 
}! 
Since 1969, similar developments have occurred in other 
parts of England and Wales (table A3.1). By 1979,62 
Table A3.1: The Development of Co-operative Wholesale 
Society Regional Grocery Distribution 
Centres (1967-79). 
Location Date of Opening 
Urmston 1967 
Birtley March 1969 
Newport Pagnell July 1971 
Longridge August 1971 
Swindon January 1972 
Port Talbot March 1973 
Alfreton January 1979 
Barnsley January 1979 
Halesowen July 1979 
Source: Co-operative Wholesale Society. 
i 
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retail societies were participating in the scheme accounting 
for 47% of the total number of Co-op food outlets and 40% of 
the organization's share of grocery turnover (in England and 
Wales). 
The upper management of the CWS has increasingly come 
to regard this programme of rationalization as a means of 
demonstrating to retail societies the benefits of 
centralized distribution and of encouraging them to 
integrate other aspects of their operations on a regional 
basis, as the reports of 1958,1968 and 1974 recommended. 
Logistical Channels. 
In examining logistical channels under the control of 
the Co-operative wholesale and retail societies, it is 
important to draw a distinction between products 
manufactured in CWS factories and those produced elsewhere. 
CWS Food Production: By far the greater proportion of 
food produced in CWS factories is sold in Co-op shops; the 
remainder consists of a series of "own label" products 
manufactured under contract for some large retail chains. 
Most of the output sold in Co-op shops passes along one of 
three echelon channels: 
i) via a retail society warehouse 
ii) via a CWS regional distribution centre 
iii) via a specialist CWS depot specialising in those 
products, such as soft drinks, biscuits and provisions, that 
the CWS has traditionally delivered direct to the shops. 
It would be very unusual for products to pass through more 
than one of these depots. There are some instances, 
however, of bulk consignments of CWS products bypassing all 
three types of depot and travelling direct from factory to 
shop. 
General Range of non-CWS Products: The Co-operative 
system of distribution links into the general system of 
grocery distribution at three levels: 
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a) CWS regional distribution centres - like multiple 
retailers' central warehouses, these receive direct bulk 
deliveries from manufacturers. Over 90% of these centres' 
turnover is of non-CWS products. 
b) Retail society warehouses - like the societies to 
which they belong, these warehouses vary greatly in size, 
though most have large enough turnover and storage capacity 
to accept direct bulk deliveries from the majority of 
manufacturers. 
c) Shops - like other chain stores, Co-op food stores 
receive some of their supplies direct form the manufacturer. 
When these two classes of product are combined, the 
allocation of grocery supplies between the major logistical 
channels are as follows: for stores served by CWS regional 
distribution centres, the proportion of supplies delivered 
in consolidated loads from these centres varies between, 47% 
and 58%; for stores served by retail society warehouses, 
this proportion varies more widely between 40% and 70%, and 
averages around 50%. Stores in the latter category 
generally also receive a larger proportion of supplies from 
the older CWS depots specialising in imported foods and the 
output of CWS factories. 
The Co-operative movement is, therefore, currently 
operating two systems of grocery distribution. In some 
regions distribution is centralized; in others, 
responsibility for distribution is divided among numerous 
retail societies. In terms of the proportions of 
consolidated delivery the shops receive, the two systems are 
broadly similar. The mean proportions of supplies 
channelled through the two main types of Co-operative 
warehouse closely resembles the average for the sample of 
multiple retailers considered earlier. Variation about the 
mean is much greater, however, in the case of the multiples. 
The Number of Stockholding Depots. 
Each of the Co-operative systems of distribution has a 
separate set of depots. The ten CWS regional distribution 
centres handle around 20% of Co-op grocery supplies, while 
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the 140 or so warehouses operated by retail societies handle 
around 30%. Although there are no up-to-date statistics 
available on retail society warehouses, it is believed that 
almost all the retail societies that do not belong to a CWS 
regional distribution scheme operate at least one grocery 
depot. Some of the larger societies operate more than one. 
Where two or more local societies have merged, it has been 
common practice to concentrate grocery operations on the 
larger of the existing depots. Some of the wealthier 
societies, such as the South Suburban, have centralized 
their operations in a new warehouse. The numbers of 
warehouses operated by the retail societies has also fallen 
sharply as a result of the expansion of the CWS system of 
regional distribution. The ten regional distribution 
centres in existence in 1979 had replaced around 70 retail 
society depots. 
Regional distribution centres have been set, up in areas 
where several retail societies have expressed a willingness 
to participate in the CWS scheme. Some have been built in 
the expectation of other societies in the area being 
subsequently attracted into the system. In planning the 
capacity of each of its regional centres, the CWS has had to 
forecast: 
(i) changes in the grocery turnover of societies 
committed from the outset to using the warehouse. 
(ii) the subsequent entry of other local societies into 
the scheme. 
(iii) changes in the grocery turnover of these other 
societies. 
(iv) changes in the proportion of shop supplies to be 
channelled through the warehouse. 
The regional distribution centres so far established have 
varied widely in size, reflecting differences in their 
initial base load and forecasts of the future growth of 
business within a radius of 50 - 60 miles. Despite the 
high degree of speculation in the planning of these centres, 
the CWS has managed to operate them at a turnover rate per 
square foot slightly above the average for multiple 
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retailers' central warehouses ( L430 / sq. ft as opposed to 
Z400 /sq. ft .). It has been estimated 
that if all the 
retail societies joined the scheme, a total of about 25 
distribution centres would be required. As discussed 
below, however, the actual number required would depend on 
the way in which the system evolved geographically. 
Depot Locations 
Many of the retail society depots are old, multi-storey 
premises located in the inner areas of the towns where the 
societies were originally founded. In many cases, these 
depot locations have been retained despite the fact that 
mergers with other societies have enlarged their service 
areas and reduced their centrality. The main Royal Arsenal 
Society depot at Woolwich, for example, is poorly situated 
relative to the combined area of the eleven societies with 
which it has merged (fig. A3.1). As mentioned earlier, 
however, there are some examples of wealthier retail 
societies closing older, inner-city depots and replacing 
them with new, more centralized facilities on greenfield 
sites (e. g. the South Suburban warehouse outside Croydon). 
The locations of the CWS regional distribution centres 
have been determined by the spatial distribution of retail 
societies willing to participate in the CWS scheme. When 
enough retail societies within an area of 50-60 mile radius 
have agreed to join the scheme, the CWS has set up a 
distribution depot fairly centrally with respect to these 
societies' branch stores. In most cases, the choice of 
location has also been influenced by the possibility of 
other societies in the area entering the scheme at a later 
date. There has been no obvious pattern in the way the 
system of regional distribution centres has developed. 
This has depended upon the process of negotiation between 
the CWS and retail societies in different parts of the 
country. 
There are clear disadvantages in this mode of 
development. It is doubtful if such piece-meal growth of 
the system will in the long term optimise the overall 
spatial distribution of the CWS regional depots. If 
planned in its entirety from scratch to serve all the 
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existing Co-op food shops, the system would probably 
comprise fewer depots and would possibly have depots in 
different locations from those currently occupied. At 
present, all but two of the depots have separate catchment 
areas of 50 mile radius. At later stages in the 
development of the system, however, it may prove difficult 
to serve the interstitial areas efficiently. They may not 
generate sufficient demand to justify the addition of new 
depots and, therefore, have to be served inefficiently over 
long distances from existing depots. Already one of the 
earlier distribution centres has had its location rendered 
suboptimal by the subsequent entry of other local societies 
into the scheme and by the development of another depot in 
an adjoining area. 
The CWS recognises the possible long term disadvantages 
of setting up distribution centres in this way, however, it 
claims that all these centres have been built in accessible 
locations - six of the seven centres open in 1978 were 
within 5 miles of a motorway - to a standard that would make 
them easily saleable should relocation become necessary. 
Relocation, however, would only be justified where the costs 
involved were less than the resultant savings in 
distribution costs (Ballou, 1968). Were this not the case, 
it would be preferable to continue operating the depot in a 
suboptimal location, to the long term detriment of the 
system as a whole. 
Areas Served by Co-operative Depots. 
The hinterlands of the retail society grocery depots is 
generally conterminous with the societies' territories. 
The CWS regional centres serve the combined territories of 
the local retail societies participating in its distribution 
scheme. 
These societies territories can be of a very irregular 
shape, largely as a result of the pattern of mergers. This 
is clearly illustrated by figure A3.1 which shows the 
division of the South of England into retail society areas. 
This pattern is very inefficient in terms of distribution. 
Two very small areas, around Crawley and Maidstone, are 
controlled separately by Co-operative Retail Services (CRS),, 
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despite the- fact that it would be more economical to 
integrate them into the larger, adjoining societies. 
Several of the territories, such as those of the Royal 
Arsenal Society and. the CRS along the Kent coast, are very 
elongated and hence inefficient to service. The Royal 
Arsenal's territory is also in two separate 'parts as a 
result of a past merger with a non-contiguous society. 
The present pattern of society boundaries bears 'little 
relation to the economics and logistics of distribution. 
Many of the boundaries date back to the agreements on 
society territories made around the turn of the century. 
Very few changes have been made to society boundaries in 
response to transport improvements or the redistribution of 
population. From a distribution standpoint, the spatial 
organization of the Co-operative retail societies is much 
less efficient than that of the grocery multiples. 
Routeing. 
Strategic Level: Only in the case of biscuits does the CWS 
manufacture the same products at different locations. Its 
biscuit factories produce a similar range of products and 
each serves a separate part of the country. There is very 
little cross-shipment of bulk supplies between CWS 
factories. Almost all the product mixing is done at 
separate CWS warehouses or at retail society depots. The 
CWS mixes stocks at two levels. It does so at large 
centralized warehouses, such as that at Shieldhall (in 
Glasgow), from which mixed, bulk consignments are 
distributed to retail society depots. It also mixes 
products at its new generation of regional distribution 
centres to assemble consolidated loads for delivery to 
shops. It was not possible to obtain estimates of the 
proportions of CWS-manufactured products passing along the 
four main logistical channels (fig. 6.1), though, from 
consultation with Co-op officials it appears that channels 1 
and 2 are by far the most important. 
Tactical Level: The limited amounts of information 
obtained on the logistics of deliveries to Co-op grocery 
stores suggest that deliveries made by the CWS from its 
regional distribution centres tend to achieve higher levels 
1f26 
of consolidation than those organized by retail societies. 
The average number of drops per delivery for one of the 
regional distribution centres was 2.2, whereas it was 
estimated that the corresponding figure for a delivery from 
a retail society warehouse was at least 'twice as large. 
This partly reflects the fact that Co-op stores belonging to 
the CWS system generally receive a larger proportion of 
their supplies from central warehouse than do those outside 
this system. It also results from the CWS's policy of 
reducing the frequency of store delivery and imposing 
tighter stock' control on the shops it serves. The gradual 
absorption of Co-op grocery stores into the CWS regional 
distribution system has, therefore, had the effect of 
consolidating supplies in fewer, more direct deliveries. 
Summary. 
Although the organizational structure of the 
Co-operative system of grocery distribution is unique and 
currently undergoing radical change, this system has been 
subject to the same processes of stock concentration and 
delivery consolidation that have been observed in other 
sectors of the grocery trade. The concentration of 
stockholding has been achieved by: 
i) retail societies centralizing their grocery stocks 
ii) adjoining retail societies merging and combining 
their stocks 
iii) (most important) the CWS establishing a series of 
large, regional distribution centres which can 
concentrate the grocery stocks of many retail 
societies in their hinterlands. 
The increased use of the CWS distribution centres, coupled 
with the concentration of grocery sales into fewer, larger 
branch stores, has promoted the consolidation of deliveries, 
reducing the average number of drops per delivery and 
increasing average drop size. 
The part of total grocery movement controlled by 
Co-operative agencies is subject to wide spatial variation. 
In the first place, the Co-operative's share of the grocery 
market varies significantly between different regions 
(Nielsen Researcher, 1974) (fig. 8.8). There are also 
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variations from area to area in the way branch stores are 
supplied. In some areas, the shops are served by Cws 
regional distribution centres; in others by local retail 
society depots. In the latter case, the retail societies 
can differ in the proportion of supplies they channel 
through their depots. In addition to being very 
complicated, the geography of the Co-op's system of grocery 
distribution is currently in a state of flux as a result of 
mergers between retail societies and the absorption of 
retail societies into the CWS regional d ist ibut ion scheme. 
It is likely, however, that these changes will ultimately 
simplify the structure of this system and make it resemble 
more closely that of a large multiple such as Fine Fare, 
though an a much larger scale. 
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Appendix 4: (cont. ) 
Notes: 
1. The calculation of handling factors excludes 
a) containers 
b) packaging 
c) live animals 
d) tobacco products 
(c 100,000 tonnes of tobacco were "consumed" in 1977 
i. e. only 0.17% of the total weight of food and drink 
consumed/exported in that year. ) 
2. Handling factors only calculated for years in which 
surveys of road goods traffic were undertaken. 
3. Figures for domestic food consumption were calculated by 
multiplying consumption/head by population. 
4. The weight of food exported was calculated in relation 
to the monetary value of exported food, assuming that the 
value: weight ratio for exported food is the same as that 
for food consumed in Britain. 
Sources: Central Statistical Office "Annual Abstracts of 
Statistics. " 
Dept. of Transport "Transport Statistics: Great 
Britain. " 
